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Abstract 
%%&79¶VPanoramaFRQIOLFWFRYHUDJHDQGWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ 
David Adrian McQueen 
7KH%%&¶VµIODJVKLS¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHVPanorama, occupies a central place in 
%ULWDLQ¶VWHOHYLVLRQKLVWRU\DQG\HWVXUSULVLQJO\LWLVUHODWLYHO\QHJOHFWHGLQDFDGHPLF
studies of the medium. Much that has been written focuses on Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI
armed conflicts (notably Suez, Northern Ireland and the Falklands) and deals, primarily, 
with programmes which met with Government disapproval and censure. However, little 
has been written on Panorama¶VOHVVFRQWURYHUVLDOPRUHURXWLQHZDUUeporting, or on 
WKHSURJUDPPH¶VPRUHUHFHQWKLVWRU\LWVHYROYLQJMRXUQDOLVWLFSUDFWLFHVDQGSODFHZLWKLQ
the current affairs form. This thesis explores these areas and examines the framing of 
war narratives within Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH*XOIFRQIOLFWV of 1991 and 2003.  
 
One accusation in studies looking beyond Panorama¶VPRUHFRQWHQWLRXVHSLVRGHVLVWKDW
WKHVHULHVKDVWUDGLWLRQDOO\RYHUUHSUHVHQWHGµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶RUHOLWHSHUVSHFWLYHVLQLWV
reporting. This charge has been made by media scholars (Williams 1968; Hall et al. 
1981; Born, 2004), champions of rival current affairs programmes (see Goddard et al. 
2007) and even by a number of senior figures within the BBC and Panorama itself (Day 
1990; Dyke 2004a). This thesis tests that view in relation to an archive of Panorama 
programmes made between 1987 and 2004, with particular reference to its coverage of 
the First and Second Gulf Wars. The study aims to establish if Panorama has, in fact, 
SDWUROOHGWKHµOLPLWVRIGHEDWH¶ODUJHO\FRQILQHGLWVHOIWRµHOLWHYLHZV¶DQG
SUHGRPLQDQWO\UHIOHFWHGWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶LQLWVFRYHUDJHRIFRQIOLFW. 
 
The thesis is supported by interviews with current and former Panorama staff and 
contains discussion of working practices at Panorama, particularly as they relate to 
UHSRUWLQJFRQIOLFWVLQYROYLQJ%ULWLVKDUPHGIRUFHV7KHUHLVDQDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH%%&¶V
journalistic culture and developments within the News and Current Affairs directorate 
in the period under discussion; the legal and institutional constraints under which the 
series operated; challenges and threats to the current affairs tradition; wider concerns 
UHODWLQJWRWHOHYLVLRQ¶VFRYHUDJHRIZDULQJHQHUDODQGWKHWZRZDUVDJDLQVW,UDT
specifically. Questions of indexing and framing are foregrounded in textual and content 
analysis of forty-two episodes dealing with the Gulf Wars to assess whether 
Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHZDVRYHUGHWHUPLQHGE\RIILFLDOVRXUFHVDQGHOLWHSHUVSHFWLYHVRU
if it gave adequate space to a diversity of opinions and explanations for the conflicts and 
thereby fulfilled its legal obligations and Public Service role.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Project Overview 
 
7KLVWKHVLVLVDVWXG\RIWKH%%&¶VµIODJVKLS¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHPanorama 
between the years 1987-2004. 3DQRUDPD¶V investigations and reports in these seventeen 
years are a reflection of national and international concerns at the time. They also shed 
OLJKWRQWKH%%&¶VMRXUQDOLVWLFFXOWXUHSURGXFWLRQSUDFWLFHVLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWV
and the particular policy-making context of the News and Current Affairs Department. 
 
Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIDUPHGFRQflict between 1987 and 2004 is the main research 
focus for this thesis, particularly the First and Second Gulf Wars. The history of 
Panorama shows that at times of war, particularly a war lacking wide public consensus, 
media representations of the conflict may become fiercely contested.  Furthermore, 
3DQRUDPD¶V LFRQLFVWDWXVDQGFORVHDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKWKH%%&¶VLGHQWLW\KDVPHDQWWKDW
any disputes over particular episodes with the government of the day have had a 
powerful impact upon the Corporation when they have occurred (see Born 2005; 
Lindley 2003a, Bolton 1990; Day 1989). However, it is likely that the sense of 
frequency, if not the intensity, of such disputes is somewhat magnified by the focus of 
existing media histories on the more contentious Panorama episodes. 
 
This thesis will address itself to identifying major differences in the coverage of armed 
FRQIOLFWLQYROYLQJ%ULWLVKWURRSVZKHUHWKHUHKDVEHHQIDLUO\ZLGHµFRQVHQVXDOVXSSRUW¶
in Westminster (as in the First Gulf War and Afghanistan) against conflicts where 
divisions and disagreements in Parliament and beyond have been quite evident (Suez, 
Northern Ireland and the 2003 invasion of Iraq). The most detailed attention will be paid 
specifically to seventeen episodes covering the Persian (or First) Gulf War (1991) and 
twenty-five episodes broadcast between 2001 and 2005 dealing with events surrounding 
the, so-called, Second Gulf War (2003) as they offer the opportunity for both content 
and qualitative analysis of two conflicts with highly replicable features. This analysis, in 
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combination with interviews with staff and research of existing literature will be used to 
judge how the widely differing levels of  parliamentary support for each war was 
reflected in the framing of 3DQRUDPD¶V war coverage. Analysis of 3DQRUDPD¶V war 
UHSRUWLQJLQWKHµ*XOI,¶DQGµ*XOI,,¶ZDUVZLOOEHXVHGWRVKRZLI'DQLHO+DOOLQ¶V
H[SODQDWRU\IUDPHZRUNIRU86PHGLD¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH9LHWQDPDQG)LUVW*XOI:DUFDQ
be applied to a particular British current affairs context. Charges that Panorama echoes, 
DQGLVERXQGE\3DUOLDPHQWDU\FRQVHQVXVDQGµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶GLVFRXUVHFDQWKXVEH
carefully assessed.  
 
The focus on a single current affairs series can explore in more detail why war coverage 
took a particular form. If PanoraPD¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVDUHIRXQGWRUHPDLQZLWKLQ+DOOLQ¶V
µ6SKHUHRI&RQVHQVXVDQG6SKHUHRI/HJLWLPDWH&RQWURYHUV\¶RUVWUD\LQWRWKHµ6SKHUH
RI'HYLDQFH¶DWZKDWOHYHODUHWKHVHGHFLVLRQVEHLQJPDGH"+RZGRSURJUDPPHPDNHUV
cope with representing perspectiYHVRIWKHZDUWKDWZHUHRXWVLGHWKHµ3DUOLDPHQWDU\
SDUW\YLHZ¶LIWKH\GRDWDOO"&DQWKHHIIHFWRIWKH%%&¶VVHQLRUPDQDJHPHQWDSSURDFK
EHVHHQDWSURJUDPPHPDNLQJOHYHO",VWKHUHDQRWLFHDEOHFKDQJHLQ3DQRUDPD¶VZDU
coverage post-2000 under the supposHGO\PRUHµOLEHUDO¶UHJLPHRI*UHJ'\NHFRPSDUHG
to his predecessor John Birt, for instance?  
 
It is hoped that this close analysis of a high-profile current affairs series can provide 
detailed evidence for some of the wider debates on war reporting and help provide an 
understanding of some of the many, interconnecting macro and micro processes and 
forces that shape broadcast journalism, particularly at time of war.  
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Hypothesis 
 
By surveying the academic literature, interviewing a number of former and current 
Panorama VWDIIDQGFRQGXFWLQJLQLWLDOZRUNRQWKHDUFKLYHDK\SRWKHVLVRUµWHQWDWLYH
JHQHUDOL]DWLRQFRQFHUQLQJWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWZRRUPRUHYDULDEOHV¶:LPPHU
and Dominick 1997, p.480) was developed. This is expressed simply as µ3DQRUDPD¶V 
confOLFWFRYHUDJHUHIOHFWVWKH:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶This hypothesis emerged from 
reading critical literature which claimed broadly similar things about British 
broadcasters¶ DQGVSHFLILFDOO\WKH%%&¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV¶FRYHUDJHRIZDU
(see Chapters 4.3, 5.1, 5.3, 6.1). It also reflected in conclusions reached within the 
smaller body of literature dealing with Panorama directly, specifically in Hall HWDO¶V 
(1981) essay. The Panorama archive research presented an opportunity to test a 
frequently made assertion, expressed with some variation in critical literature. An 
LPSRUWDQWYDULDWLRQLVWKHXVHRIWKHEURDGHUWHUPVµHOLWHGLVFRXUVH¶µHOLWHRSLQLRQ¶RU
µHOLWHFRQVHQVXV¶LQSODFHRI:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ZKLFKZDVDOVRIRXQGWREH
µHFKRHG¶LQEUoadcast war coverage, especially at the BBC.  
 
:KLOHQRWV\QRQ\PRXVWKHWHUPVµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶DQGµHOLWHFRQVHQVXV¶ZLOOEH
treated as broadly parallel in this study, referring to a long history of critical scholarship 
LQZKLFKWKH%%&¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRµWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶µ7KH6WDWH¶DQGRWKHUSROLWLFDODQG
HFRQRPLFµFentres RISRZHU¶LVVHHQDVSUREOHPDWLFVHH6FKOHVLQJHU,QWKLV
UHVSHFWWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµHOLWHV¶LQWKLVVWXG\LVGHULYHGIURPDFULWLFDOWUDGLWLRQRI
scholarship that gives due significance to the (structuring) influence of class, and in 
ZKLFKSROLWLFDOµHOLWHV¶DUHRIWHQUHJDUGHGDVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHEURDGO\FRQJUXHQWLQWHUHVWV
RIDUHODWLYHO\µVPDOOVRFLR-HFRQRPLFDOO\DQGSROLWLFDOO\KRPRJHQRXVJURXS¶
(McAllister 1991, p.237). Exactly how congruent such interests are or how 
µKRPRJHQRXV¶%ULWLVKUXOLQJHOLWHVDUHLVFOHDUO\DPDWWHUIRUGHEDWHEXW0LOOLEDQG
echoes Hall et al. 1981 in arguing that these shared or congruent (class) interests are 
SURWHFWHGDQGPDLQWDLQHGE\µ7KH6WDWH¶FRPSRVHGRIYDULRXVLQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDV
parliamentary assemblies, the military, the police, the judiciary and the government and 
whose interrelationship shapes the form of the state system: 
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,WLVWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQVLQZKLFKµVWDWHSRZHU¶OLHV and it is through them that 
this power is wielded in its different manifestations by the people who 
occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions ± presidents, prime 
ministers and their ministerial colleagues; high civil servants and other state 
administrators; top military men; judges of the higher courts; some at least 
RI WKH OHDGLQJ PHPEHUV RI SDUOLDPHQWDU\ DVVHPEOLHV >«@ 7KHVH DUH WKH
people who constitute what may be described as the state elite. 
0LOOLEDQGFLWHG2¶0DOOH\S 
 
 
IIWKLVGHILQLWLRQRIµHOLWHV¶SRVHVDGDQJHURIEHLQJWRRDOO-inclusive, the definition of 
WKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶RUODFNRILWFDQLWLVKRSHGEHPRUHDFFXUDWHO\DQG
narrowly gauged as that publicly expressed in Commons votes on a given issue, such as 
VXSSRUWIRUPLOLWDU\DFWLRQLQ,UDTLQDQG+HUHµWKHFRQVHQVXV¶RIFRXUVHLV
that public expression of agreement and compromise represented in an open vote in the 
House of Commons and does not account for the privately held views of M.P.s whose 
parliamentary careers may depend on compliance with the party whip or the views of a 
party leadership, rather than their own views, or those of fellow party members or 
constituents. 
 
As mentioned already, a survey of the literature (see below and Chapter 4) reveals that 
while there is a substantial body of research employing textual and/or content analysis-
based studies of news coverage of war, there is remarkably little on current affairs 
coverage of wars, especially the two Gulf Wars of 1991 and 2003 which are ideally 
VXLWHGWRDFRPSDUDWLYHVWXG\JLYHQWKHZLGHO\GLIIHUHQWGHJUHHRIµSDUOLDPHQWDU\
FRQVHQVXV¶IRUWKHVHPLOLWDU\LQWHUYHQWLRQVVHH+DQVDUG 
 
The hypothesis µPanorama¶V conflict coverage reflects the Westminster consensuV¶ 
leads to a series of research questions which also emerge from the literature and the 
archive material viewed. Three key and overlapping questions are: 
 
1. ,VµWKHDJHQGDRISUREOHPVDQGµSUHVFULSWLRQV¶ZKLFK>Panorama] handles limited to 
those which have registered with, or are offered up by, the established Parliamentary 
SDUWLHV¶"+DOOet al. 1981, p.115.)  
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2. Does Panorama report IURPWKHµVSKHUHRIFonsensus¶DQG WKHµVSKHUHRIOHJLWLPDWH
controversy¶, but not WKHµVSKHUHRIGHYLDQFH
"7KLVZDVWKH conclusion of Daniel 
Hallin¶VVWXGLHVRIWKH86PHGLD¶VUHSRUWLQJRIWKH9LHWQDPDQGWKH)LUVW
Gulf War. 
 
3. Is there any evidence of conformity amongst current affairs journalists to the interests 
DQGDJHQGDRIµSULPDU\GHILQHUV¶VHH+DOOet al. 1978)? For Herman and Chomsky, 
importantly, such conformity is not normally accomplished by crude interventions or 
µFRQVSLUDFLHV¶EXWµE\WKHVHOHFWLRQRIULJKW-WKLQNLQJSHUVRQQHODQGE\WKHHGLWRUV¶DQG
ZRUNLQJMRXUQDOLVWV¶LQWHUQDOL]DWLRQRISULRUities and definitions of newsworthiness that 
FRQIRUPWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQ¶VSROLF\¶S[L,GHQWLI\LQJLQVWLWXWLRQDOSROLFLHVDQG
FRQVWUDLQWVZLWKLQWKH%%&¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV'HSDUWPHQWDQGPDSSLQJZD\V
LQZKLFKWKH\PLJKWSULYLOHJHµGRPLQDQW HOLWHV¶DQGµFHQWUHVRISRZHU¶LVWKHUHIRUHD
key research area. 
 
4. Is there eYLGHQFHRIµLQVWLWXWLRQDOILOWHUV¶operating within the BBC and Panorama, 
specifically, to ensure criticisms remain within narrow bounds set by the political elite 
(Ibid)? FoUWKLVVWXG\WKHWZRPRVWUHOHYDQWµILOWHUV¶JLYHQWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VSULPDULO\
non-commercial nature, are over-reliance on government (and corporate) experts and 
µIODN¶HVSHFLDOO\JRYHUQPHQWFULWLFLVPDQGSUHVVXUH 
 
On the question of flak, described as µQHJDWLYHUHVSRQVHVWRDPHGLDVWDWHPHQWRU
SURJUDPPH¶,ELGSWKHUHLVDJUHDWGHDORIHYLGHQFHWKDW%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWVERWK
Labour and Conservative) routinely make their negative responses to items known to 
the BBC. This can be in a more or less aggressive form with the first two terms of 
0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VUXOHDQG7RQ\%ODLU¶VSHULRGRIRIILFHXQWLOWKHUHVLJQDWLRQRI
$ODVGDLU&DPSEHOODVWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V'LUHFWRURI&RPPXQLFDWLRQVEHLQJ
particularly noted for sustained and highly politiFL]HGµIODN¶VHH:DOWHUV%HOO
2003, Brown 2003). These and other issues raised by the research questions are 
explored throughout the thesis. 
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1.2 Rationale for the Study 
 
7KH%%&¶VµIODJVKLS¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHVPanorama LV%ULWDLQ¶VORQJHVWUXQning 
television programme and, according to the Panorama ZHEVLWHµWKHZRUOG¶VORQJHVW
UXQQLQJLQYHVWLJDWLYH79VKRZ¶%%&D2QDLUIRUPRUHWKDQKDOIDFHQWXU\DQG
with a regular audience of many millions Panorama¶V prominence and longevity is a 
remarkable achievement. 
 
As former Panorama presenter and reporter Richard Lindley (2002a) notes in his 
DFFRXQWRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VKLVWRU\Panorama was at the peak of its power and 
influence in the late fifties and early sixties. For Wyndham-Goldie this was time when 
the political significance of television began to be appreciated by the major parties in 
Westminster. Panorama, in particular, was regarded by politicians as a key venue for 
GLVFXVVLQJµLPSRUWDQW¶LVVXHVWKDWWKH\IHOWQHHGHGWKHDWWHQWLRQRIWKHpublic: 
 
What was said on 'Panorama' on Monday evening came increasingly to be 
KHDGOLQHG LQ 7XHVGD\¶V PRUQLQJ QHZVSDSHUV  $QG DQ LQWHUYLHZ RQ
'Panorama' was soon accepted by politicians, including Prime Ministers and 
Leaders of the Opposition, as a suitable method for communicating with the 
nation. 
(Wyndham Goldie 1977, p.190-192) 
 
'HVSLWHWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIDPRUHµDJJUHVVLYH¶LQWHUYLHZVW\OHLQPanorama pioneered, 
to some extent, by Robin Day, the programme remained a favoured platform for the 
political FODVVWRDGGUHVVµWKHQDWLRQ¶WKURXJKVXEVHTXHQWGHFDGHVVHH.DYDQDJK
Panorama¶V FULWLFDODQGSXEOLFUHSXWDWLRQJUHZLQSDUWEHFDXVHRIWKHPDQ\µODQGPDUN
LQWHUYLHZV¶DQGGHEDWHVZLWKDQGEHWZHHQVHQLRUSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVVHH'D\
Gaber 2008b). In fact this tradition only fell largely out of use following the January 
2007 relaunch of Panorama in a new half KRXUµLQYHVWLJDWLYH¶IRUPDWFI Gaber 2008a, 
2008b). 
 
Panorama PD\VWLOOFODLPµIODJVKLS¶VWDWXVDOWKRXJKLWVµLPSRUWDQFH¶DVDFXUUHQt affairs 
series had diminished by the 1980s, according to former Director General Sir Ian 
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Trethowan (1984) and former presenter Robin Day (1989); or in the 1990s and 2000s in 
the view of, amongst others, former Panorama reporters Richard Lindley (2002b) and 
Tom Mangold (2004). This is partly because, as Holland (2000) explains, WKHµEURDG
FDQYDV¶RIWRSLFVLVVXHVDQGHYHQWVSLRQHHULQJSURJUDPPHVVXFKDVPanorama µVHWRXW
WRFRYHULVQRZGLYLGHGDPRQJVWDZLGHUDQJHRIPRUHVSHFLDOLVHGSURJUDPPHV¶S 
Nevertheless, over the decades Panorama remained of deep significance to the BBC ± 
described by one former Editor as a µbellwether¶ for changes within the Corporation 
(Hewlett 2005) and by the writer Michael Leapman (2007) as a µOLWPXVWHVW¶RIWKH
CorporDWLRQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRVHULRXVMRXUQDOLVP:KLOHPanorama¶Vreputation for 
µKHDY\ZHLJKW¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVFRYHUDJHKDVDOPRVWFHUWDLQO\GHFOLQHGUHFHQWO\VHH
DUWLFOHVE\/HDSPDQ5RVHLWUHPDLQVLQ,YRU*DEHU¶VYLHZµD%ULWLVK
broadcasting instiWXWLRQ¶ZKRVHVXUYLYDOLQWKHWUDQVLHQWZRUOGRIWHOHYLVLRQLVD
µVSHFWDFXODUUHFRUGIRUZKLFKWKH%%&FDQEHMXVWLILDEO\SURXG¶*DEHUES 
 
1.3. Key Literature Review: Previous Studies of Panorama 
 
<HWUHPDUNDEO\*DEHU¶VWKLUWHHQSDJHHVVD\ examining the post--DQXDU\µQHZ¶
Panorama DQGLWVSURPRWLRQDVDQµLQYHVWLJDWLYHSURJUDPPH¶LVRQHRIRQO\DKDQGIXO
of academic studies of the programme, (see Hall 1981; Abell and Stoboe 1999, 2001; 
Rowland 2000). Despite Panorama¶Vwidely acknowledged central place in British 
WHOHYLVLRQKLVWRU\LWDZDLWVGHWDLOHGH[WHQGHGFULWLFDODQDO\VLV5LFKDUG/LQGOH\¶V
µLQVLGHVWRU\¶Panorama: Fifty Years of Pride and Paranoia is a useful, densely 
researched, and often critical account, but remains a general and sometimes 
entertainingly anecdotal history with a focus on the programme¶V highpoints, moments 
of crisiVDQGSHUVRQDOLWLHV:KLOHQHYHUSULPDULO\LQWHQGHGIRUDFDGHPLFXVH/LQGOH\¶V
work is frequently referenced in this study as it offers both a valuable first-hand account 
and a carefully referenced chronicle of the programme - GUDZLQJRQWKHDXWKRU¶V
H[WHQVLYHUHVHDUFKDWWKH%%&¶VZULWWHQDUFKLYHDW&DYHUVKDP3DUNDQGLQWHUYLHZVZLWK
former Panorama staff.  
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Former Panorama Editor and reporter 5REHUW5RZODQG¶VHVVD\µPanorama in the 
VL[WLHV¶IRFXVHVRQSURGXFWLRQSUDFWLFHVLQPanorama LQWKH¶VDOWKRXJK
there are brief sections on audiences, influences and the institutional context of the 
BBC. Rowland introduces the essay by suggestLQJLWLVµLQHYLWDEO\VHOHFWLYHDQG
VXEMHFWLYH¶DQGDµSHUVRQDOYLHZ¶SEXWWKHSDJHVWXG\OLNH/LQGOH\¶VZRUN
which draws from it, shows evidence of detailed archive research in addition to relating 
personal experience, and does not feel markedly out of place in the academic collection 
RIFDVHVWXGLHVZKHUHLWFDQEHIRXQG5RZODQG¶VHVVD\LVUHIHUHQFHGDPRQJVWRWKHU
JHQHUDOZRUNVVXFKDV-RQDWKRQ'LPEOHE\¶VELRJUDSK\RIKLVIDWKHU5LFKDUG
Dimbleby, in the chapter on current affairs (Chapter 4.3) and on Panorama¶V history 
(Chapter 4.4). 
 
%HVLGHV*DEHUDEDQG5RZODQG¶VZRUN+DOOHWDO¶V (1981) essay on 
WKHLGHRORJLFDOFKDUDFWHURIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVWHOHYLVLRQµ7KHµ8QLW\¶RI&XUUHQW$IIDLUV
7HOHYLVLRQ¶LVRQHRIWKHIHZacademic studies in the field of Media, Culture and 
Communications Studies to focus specifically on Panorama.  Hall HWDO¶V essay deals 
with a single episode from Monday 7th October 1974 - three days prior to the General 
Election - involving a studio debate between the deputy leaders of the three main 
parties: James Callaghan, William Whitelaw and David Steel. Textual analysis of the 
WUDQVFULEHGGHEDWHLVXVHGWRHODERUDWHSDUWLFXODUFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHµFXUUHQWDIIDLUV
ILHOG¶LGHQWLILHGDVSURYLGLQJµLQIRUPHGVSHFXODWLRQ¶DERXWHYHQWVDOUHDG\DFFUHGLWHG
VLJQLILFDQFHE\WKHLUDSSHDUDQFHLQQHZVEXOOHWLQVRUSUHVVUHSRUWVZLWKµWKHREMHFWLYHRI
SURPRWLQJDµUDWLRQDO¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHLVVXHVLQYROYHG¶S  
 
Hall HWDO¶V essay attempts to distinguish between news and current affairs programmes 
(see Chapter 4.3 for further definitions) suggesting that a news story or report becomes 
DµWRSLF¶IRUFRPPHQWLQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVE\µEHLQJIUDPHGDVDTXHVWLRQRUVHWEHWZHHQ
seemingly alternate or antagonisWLFSURSRVLWLRQV¶S7KHDXWKRUVVXJJHVWWKH
framing of the news story in this way is particularly characteristic of Panorama which 
UHJXODUO\µSUREHVWKHDWWLWXGHVDQGRSLQLRQVRIWKHDFWRUVLQYROYHG¶WHVWVDUJXPHQWVDQG
LQYLWHVµH[SHUWRSLQLRQ¶S4). Panorama is viewed as gravitating especially to 
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µLQVWDQFHVRIKLJKFRQWURYHUV\EHWZHHQWKRVHLQDXWKRULWDWLYHSRVLWLRQV¶DQGWRSLFV
µZKLFKVWDQGKLJKRQWKHDJHQGDRIµOHJLWLPDWHFOHDYDJH¶LQWKHSROLWLFDOGRPDLQ¶S 
 
Hall HWDO¶V essay briefly outlines the immediate political context for the studio debate 
WKDWLVDQDO\VHGLQFOXGLQJWKH/DERXU3DUW\¶VVOLP&RPPRQVPDMRULW\DWWKHWLPHWKH
µHFRQRPLFDQGLQIODWLRQDU\FULVLV¶DQGWKHYDULRXVFDOOVIRUµQDWLRQDOXQLW\¶EHIRUH
moving on to give a breaNGRZQRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VVWUXFWXUHµVLJQLI\LQJV\VWHPVDQG
SUDFWLFHV¶7KHµSUHIHUUHGHQFRGLQJRIWKHWRSLF¶DLPVLQWKHDXWKRU¶VYLHZIRUDFHUWDLQ
NLQGRIµLGHRORJLFDOFORVXUH¶LQWKLVFDVHDURXQGLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHWKHPHVRIQDWLRQDO
unity with tKHµWZRWKUHH"SDUW\V\VWHP¶S&ORVHWH[WXDODQDO\VLVLVWKHQXVHGWR
explore aspects of the current affairs form, the role of presenters or anchors, the 
FRQVWUXFWLRQRIµOHJLWLPDWH¶WRSLFVDQGWKHµVKDUHGRUFRQVHQVXDOIUDPHZRUN¶S
between the politicians and programme makers. The essay investigates how 
EURDGFDVWHUVµDVVXPHDFRQVHQVXV¶DQGLGHQWLI\µZKDWLVSUREOHPDWLF>DV@DGLYHUJHQFHDW
WKHOHYHORIVWUDWHJ\¶SWKURXJKGLVFRXUVHDQDO\VLVRIWKHVWXGLRGHEDWHtranscript. 
7KHDXWKRU¶s argue how: 
 
>«@WHOHYLVLRQ reproduces selectively QRW WKH µXQLW\¶ RI DQ\ RQH 3DUW\ EXW
the unity of the Parliamentary political system as a whole. Panorama, above 
other Current Affairs programmes, routinely takes the part of guardian of 
unity in this second sense. It reproduces, on the terrain of ideology, the 
political identification between the Parliamentary system and the Nation. As 
D FRQVHTXHQFH WKH DJHQGD RI SUREOHPV DQG µSUHVFULSWLRQV¶ ZKLFK VXFK D
programme handles is limited to those which have registered with, or are 
offered up by, the established Parliamentary parties. [original emphasis] 
(Ibid p.115)  
 
While the studio interview sequence analysed was broadcast more than a decade before 
the period this research relates to (1987-2004), Hall et al¶V analysis remains highly 
pertinent in helping to answer the research questions posed in this study and will be 
returned to in later chapters. It is worth briefly noting, however, that John Corner (1980) 
LVFULWLFDORIWKHORRVHXVHRIWKHWHUPµFRGH¶LQHall HWDO¶V essay (1976) arguing that the 
OLQJXLVWLFOHYHOVµGHJUHHVRIV\VWHPDWLFLW\DQGWKHNLQGVRIRUJDQLVLQJLQIOXHQFHRIWKH
µFRGHV¶YDULRXVO\LQGLFDWHGLQWKHSDSHUDUHGLIILFXOWWRVXEVXPHZLWKLQDVLQJOH
XQLI\LQJFRQFHSWRIFRGLILFDWLRQ¶&RUQHUS:HPD\TXLEEOHZLWK&RUQHU¶V
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somewhat rigid reading of Hall HWDO¶V work or the danger of reductionism inherent in 
WKHFDOOIRUDµXQLI\LQJFRQFHSWRIFRGLILFDWLRQ¶DQGQRWHILQDOO\WKDWµ7KHµ8QLW\¶RI
&XUUHQW$IIDLUV¶ was undoubtedly a groundbreaking and influential essay; as testified by 
*XUHYLWFKDQG6FDQQHOO¶VFKDSWHUµ&DQRQL]DWLRQDFKLHYHG¶GHYRWHGWRWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRI
the essay in Canonic texts in media research.  (Katz et al. eds. 2003). 
 
No other academic media research exclusively related to Panorama has yet been 
conducted. There are a small number of essays from a variety of disciplines such as 
linguistics, psychology, theology, medicine and law that use particular Panorama 
episodes as part of their research, but these are not explorations of the current affairs 
series, so much as studies using the contents of particular episodes. These include a 
discourse analysis of the famous Martin Bashir interview with Princess Diana Spencer 
for Panorama in 1995 (Abell and Stoboe 1999, 2001); medical research proposals 
emerging from Panorama¶Vcoverage of the anti-depressant Paroxetine (Medawar et al. 
2002) and the theological consequences of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH&DWKROLF
Church (Hutchings 2007). None of these studies or other studies that make use of 
Panorama material for objectives pertinent to disciplines beyond the broad field of 
media research is drawn on here. 
 
1.4 Main Research Focus 
 
The primary research into the series for this thesis is largely confined to the years 1987-
2004, the period for which the Bournemouth University-based BBC Panorama video 
archive is most complete. The period has not been determined only by the availability of 
UHFRUGHGSURJUDPPHVPDUNVWKHEHJLQQLQJRI-RKQ%LUW¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI%%&
News and CurUHQW$IIDLUVIROORZLQJ'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO$ODVGDLU0LOQH¶VVDFNLQJE\WKH
BBC Board of Governors over Real Lives and other issues (see Cotton 2001). 2004 
PDUNVWKHHQGRI*UHJ'\NH¶VSHULRGDV'LUHFWRU*HQHUDODIWHUKLVµUHVLJQDWLRQ¶
following the Board of GRYHUQRU¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKH+XWWRQ5HSRUW 
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The wider research identifies a number of factors shaping Panorama¶V evolving 
representation of stories and issues during the period 1987-2004. These include: 
changes in the public service broadcasting environment; regulatory mechanisms and 
institutional constraints; competition from other news and current affairs programmes; 
journalistic culture and practices; and the legacy of particular management regimes and 
personnel within BBC in general, and Panorama in particular. 
 
These and other factors can be seen at play through Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIDUPHG
conflict between 1987 and 2004 which is the main research focus for this thesis. The 
reporting on wars involving British troops, both at home and abroad, sometimes 
resulted in UK-based current affairs series such as World in Action, This Week and 
Panorama becoming the subject of heated controversy, legal action and, occasionally, 
government anger (see Ware 2000; Holland 2006; Lindley 2003a; Goddard et al. 2007). 
However, the focus of these authors on the more contentious episodes, particularly 
those involving some measure of internal or external pressure, political comment or 
interference serves to skew these histories somewhat away from their regular output, a 
fact thaW+HDGRI&KDQQHO¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV'RURWK\%\UQHEULHIO\
notes with disapproval of the only comprehensive work on the series by Richard 
Lindley (2002a).  
 
In fact, challenges to Panorama¶Vrepresentations of political disputes and armed 
conflicts have come from across the political and academic spectrum, including 
FULWLTXHVZKLFKVXJJHVWWKDWWKHSURJUDPPHKDVEHHQWRRµFORVH¶WRWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHU
FRQVHQVXV¶WRSURYLGHDQ\UHDOLQVLJKWLQWRWKHRULJLQVRIRUSRVVLEOHVROXWLRQVWRWKH
issues described (Williams 1971, Hall 1981, Edwards and Cromwell 2002, 2006). 
Certainly, Panorama KDVKDGDUHSXWDWLRQDPRQJVWVRPHFULWLFVDVDUDWKHUµGXOO¶
µSDVVLRQOHVV¶%\UQH 2002) µHOLWLVW¶DQGµHVWDEOLVKPHQW-IULHQGO\¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHV
and was often resented by its competitors for precisely this reason (Macdonald 1982, 
Goddard et al. 2007). 
 
This charge should be contextualised within the particular regulatory and institutional 
FRQVWUDLQWVRSHUDWLQJDWWKH%%&%RUQKDVQRWHGWKH%%&¶VKLVWoric tendency 
22 
WRZDUGVDFDXWLRXVGHIHQVLYHµUKHWRULFRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVP¶RUVR-FDOOHGµLPSDUWLDO¶
umpiring of differences of legitimated opinion. This tendency is exacerbated, it is said, 
E\µHOLWLVP¶LQWKH1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV'HSDUWPHQWDGHILQLng characteristic that 
remains entrenched despite recruitment policies that have attempted to widen the social 
DQGHWKQLFEDFNJURXQGRI%%&VWDIIJHQHUDOO\<HWDFFXVDWLRQVRIµGHIHUHQFH¶3RWWHU
1963 cited Lindley 2003a SRUµORVVRIQHUYH¶*RGGDUG et al. 2007) against 
Panorama were made less often against other BBC current affairs series. For example, 
Francis Wheen is one of several critics (see Macdonald 1982 , Watkins 1982) to 
contrast Panorama¶V approach to current affairs somewhat unfavourably with the 
%%&¶VTonight (1957-65), 
 
The British programme Panorama, for all its authority, still tended to avoid 
controversy and to interpret 'news' as meaning the actions of political 
OHDGHUV >«@ Tonight >«@ KDG SURYHG WKDW µSROLWLFLDQV QHHGQ¶W EH WUHDWHG 
ZLWK DZH UDLOZD\PHQ ZLWK FRQGHVFHQVLRQ¶ $QG DOWKRXJK PDQ\ RI WKH
items were perhaps more whimsical than newsworthy, Tonight was not 
afraid of controversy.  
(1985, p.77-78) 
 
 
Those defending Panorama VLQFHLWVHDUOLHVWGD\VKDYHVSRNHQRILWVµVHULRXV¶
µDXWKRULWDWLYH¶DQGµGLVWLQJXLVKHG¶TXDOLWLHV:\QGKDP*ROGLHZKLOHRWKHUVKDYH
QRWHGWKHSURJUDPPH¶VµSROLWHDORRIQHVV¶6WXDUW+RRGRUKDYHGLVPLVVHGLWDVµUDWKHU
self-LPSRUWDQWDQGIDLQWO\WLUHVRPH¶$ODVGDLU0LOQHDVVRFLDWHGDWWKHWLPHZLWKTonight) 
(both cited Lindley 2003a, p.126, 127). The programme treads a line in popular and 
FULWLFDOFRPPHQWDU\EHWZHHQEHLQJSRVLWLYHO\UHJDUGHGDVDµKHDY\ZHLJKW¶FXUUHQW
DIIDLUVVHULHVDGGUHVVLQJWKHµELJLVVXHVRIWKHGD\¶DQGPRUHQHJDWLYHO\DVµSRPSRXV¶RU
FRQFHUQHGWRRH[FOXVLYHO\ZLWKWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUZRUOGYLHZ¶7KLVODVWFKDUJHZKLFK
even Panorama journalists have sometimes acknowledged (Day 1989, Lindley 2003a) 
will be examined carefully in the proposed research, particularly in relation to 
Panorama¶Vwar coverage. 
  
As mentioned before, the available literature specifically on Panorama, often focuses 
RQPRPHQWVZKHQWKHVHULHVZDVXQGHUµJRYHUQPHQWSUHVVXUH¶RYHULWVFRYHUDJHRI
various issues, including foreign and domestic conflicts. Reference is frequently made 
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to three well known flashpoints in Panorama¶V ORQJKLVWRU\7KHµ&DUULFNPRUHLQFLGHQW¶
1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU"¶WKH)DONODQGV:DUDQG
µ0DJJLH¶V0LOLWDQW7HQGHQF\¶WKHDFFXVDWLRQRIOLQNVEHWZHHQWKHConservative 
Party and racist groups). However, these Panorama episodes were unusual to the extent 
that they involved open dispute between senior BBC management and the government 
of the day (see Clutterbuck 1981; Cotton 2001; Bolton 1990; Miller 1994; Simpson 
1999; Reira 2000; Hussey 2001; Lindley 2003a, 2003; Wilby 2006). 
 
Other controversies, which appear in the literature on PanoramaUHODWHWRµLQWHUQDO¶
efforts to control programme makers in some way. Cautious micro-management of 
µFRQWHQWLRXVSURJUDPPHV¶DQGH[DPSOHVRILQWHUIHUHQFHRUEORFNLQJRISDUWLFXODU
LQYHVWLJDWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\XQGHU-RKQ%LUW¶VSHULRGDV'HSXW\'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO-
1992 and to a lesser extent as Director General 1992-2000 are documented in quite 
damning detail by Lindley (2003a), Barnett and Gaber (2001); Curtis and Jempson 
(1993) and Horrie and Clarke (1994) (see Chapter 4.2). 
 
:KDWLVOHVVFRPPRQLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHLVDQDO\VLVRIPRUHµURXWLQH¶Panorama output. 
An assessment of Panorama¶Vcoverage of the First Gulf War (1991); the NATO 
bombing of Yugoslavia (1999); the invasion of Afghanistan (2001) or the invasion of 
,UDTUHYHDOVOLWWOHUHDOµFRQWURYHUV\¶RUJRYHUQPHQWSURWHVWVRQDVFDOH
comparable to the uproar over Carrickmore in 1979 or of the Falklands War in 1982, for 
instance. The absence of close attention to the µXQH[FHSWLRQDO¶SURJUDPPHVLQWKH
literature dealing with current affairs, particularly in the work of Lindley (2002a) and 
Godard et al¶Vstudy of World in Action (2007) is a gap which this research intends to 
address. These studies tend to focus more on programmes which were the subject of 
internal or external scrutiny, either by BBC management, the courts, the ITA/IBA (in 
the case of World in Action) or, in the most controversial cases, the government. But 
what of the majority of programmes that did not µUXIIOHIHDWKHUV¶":KDWPLJKWDFULWLFDO
analysis of these episodes reveal? What, if anything, does Panorama¶VZDUFRYHUDJH
UHYHDODERXWWKHSURJUDPPH¶VDQGWKH%%&¶VUHODWLRQWRSRZHU"  
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At a wider level, an examination of the broadcasting ecology and historical context 
within which Panorama operated between 1987-2004 will help contextualise the 
debates about µREMHFWLYLW\¶µimpartiality¶, µbalance¶ and the µrange of opinions¶ covered 
by, and expressed in, its coverage of conflict. Rather than seeking single explanations 
for Panorama¶V coverage of recent wars, this thesis will consider the institutional 
context, regulatory issues, WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH%%&, wider questions of 
war reporting and agenda setting, the specific journalistic culture at Panorama and the 
BBCQRWLRQVRIµHOLWLVP¶DQGµSRSXOLVP¶DQGWKHFRUURVLYHHIIHFWVRIDFRPSHWLWLYH
broadcastiQJµPDUNHW¶RQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVfrequently made within the critical tradition of 
media and communication scholarship. Finally, Panorama¶V place within the tradition 
of British current affairs will be assessed through this study of the archive, by 
interviews conducted with former and current Panorama staff and through the body of 
literature indicated in the bibliography. 
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2. Theoretical approach  
 
2.1 The Critical Paradigm 
 
For Boyd-Barrett and Newbold (1997) the very broad field of media and communications 
research invites attention to the industries and industrial practices which lie behind 
communications media such as television. Within this field two paradigms have been 
LGHQWLILHG7KHILUVWLVGHVFULEHGYDULRXVO\DVµDGPLQLVWUDWLYHUHVHDUFK¶RUµFRQYHQWLRQDO
UHVHDUFK¶ZKLFK/D]DUVIHOGGHILQHGDVµFDUULHGWKURXJKLQWKHVHUYLFHRIVRPHNLQGRI
administrative agency of puEOLFRUSULYDWHFKDUDFWHU¶SJ-µ&ULWLFDOUHVHDUFK¶E\
contrast, is posed against the practice of administrative research, challenging its 
assumptions and the narrow boundaries of study as defined by media practitioners and 
politicians. Halloran (1981) summarises the characteristics of the critical approach as 
follows: 
 
First and foremost, it deals with communication as a social process; second it 
studies media institutions not in isolation but with and in terms of other 
institutions, and within the wider social context (nationally and internationally); 
and third, it conceptualises research in terms of structure, organisation, 
professionalisation, socialisation, participation, and so on.  
(pg.37) 
 
 
However, the critical umbrella, as Halloran further notes, is understood more by its 
opposition to conventional work and independence from professional interests than any 
single theoretical stance. Critical research covers a variety of positions including the 
cultural studies tradition, ethnographic audience research and the political economy 
tradition. In recent years these various traditions have informed each other in interesting 
ways, which has led to richer insights and understandings of complex social and economic 
phenomenon.  
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For the purposes of this research which focuses on an archive of current affairs series, 
textual and content analysis will be employed drawing on established techniques of media 
and cultural studies. Furthermore an analysis of the institutional context of the series 
drawing on the political economy tradition will be tested and given more nuanced 
understanding via interviews, research of the available literature and by reference to the 
archive material. Assumptions frequently made within the political economy approach that, 
as Mosco (1995) explains, foreground social relations, particularly the power relations that 
influence the production of communication resources, can be tested against this triangulated 
body of evidence. 
 
The central charge made by those critical scholars who LGHQWLI\µLQVWLWXWLRQDOELDV¶RQ
behalf of an elite consensus will be addressed in this research, in relation to Panorama¶V 
war coverage. Does Panorama¶V coverage of the wars against Iraq (in 1991 and 2003) offer 
evidence of the explanatory power or the wHDNQHVVRISHUVLVWHQWFULWLFLVPVRIWKH%%&¶V
MRXUQDOLVPIRXQGZLWKLQWKHFULWLFDORUµUDGLFDO¶WUDGLWLRQVHHHall et al 1981; Philo and 
McLaughlin 1993. Edwards 2003; Edwards and Cromwell 2002, 2006, 2009; Miller 2003 
Berry and Theobald 2006)? What does close analysis reveal of the relationships between 
µWKH6WDWH¶VHH2¶0DOOH\SHOLWHSRZHUDQGWKHPHGLDDQGµWKHWDFWLFVDQG
strategies of control and resistance in that VSKHUH¶(OGULGJHES" 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 &RQWHQW$QDO\VLV7H[WXDO$QDO\VLVDQGWKHµPXOWL-
PHWKRGRORJLFDO¶DSSURDFK 
 
-RKQ&RUQHUGLYLGHVµWKHRULHVDERXWWHOHYLVLRQ¶LQWRIRXUW\SHVWKHRULHVRI
representation, theories of medium, theories of institution and theories of process. The 
research approaches adopted here can mainly be traced back to theories of 
representation and theories of institution and the various methodologies that emerged 
from these traditions. As Corner writes, the work of the University of Birmingham 
&HQWUHIRU&RQWHPSRUDU\&XOWXUDO6WXGLHVXQGHU6WXDUW+DOO¶VOHDGHUVKLSZDVRIWKH
most formative significance in theories of representation, supported by theoretical 
GHYHORSPHQWVRI$OWKXVVHULDQµLGHRORJLFDOFULWLTXH¶LQOLWHUDU\VWXGLHVDQGILOPVWXGLHV 
(p.150-+DOO¶VIRXQGDWLRQDOZRUNRQFRGLQJDQGHQFRGLQJZDVWKHQWDNHQLQ
various directions, sometimes against the Marxist traditions they were built on, in 
various post-modern readings (see Fiske 1987). 
 
Theories of institutions are, for Corner, primarily concerned with the organisational 
structure of television and the embedding of this within specific political and economic 
systems. Corner also notes that at the level of theory it is the political economy strand 
which has been most active. However, not all attention to institutions has drawn on the 
primarily Marxist inflection of the political economy tradition. A more recent strand of 
WHOHYLVLRQKLVWRULRJUDSK\IRUH[DPSOHKDVIRFXVHGRQµPHWD-QDUUDWLYHVRIWHOHYLVLRQ¶V
production, organisation aQGUHJXODWLRQ¶DVZHOODVµPLFUR-histories of television 
SURGXFWLRQ¶:KHDWOH\S)RU:KHDWOH\LQVWLWXWLRQDOKLVWRU\UHPDLQVDWWKH
FHQWUHRI%ULWLVKWHOHYLVLRQVWXGLHVEHFDXVHµTXHVWLRQVRISXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJLQ
WKH8.DQGWKH%%&¶VSODce as a publicly funded institution, remain such pressing 
LVVXHV¶S 
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It is clear that a variety of questions are raised when studying the institutional context 
for the production of programmes. In reviewing the literature and conducting interviews 
theµ,QWHQWLRQVDLPVSXUSRVHVSROLFLHVRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIUDPHZRUNVPRGHVRI
operation, professional values, funding, general circumscriptions, external pressures and 
LGHRORJLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVDOOQHHGWREHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW¶+DQVHQet al. 1998, p.19). 
Representational issues can then be dealt with more directly in relation to the archive of 
material, sharpened by an understanding of how the institutional context may have 
constrained or affected the choices available to the programme makers. This focus on 
both institutional and representational issues presents a significant challenge to the 
researcher, but a focus on either element in isolation can only give an incomplete 
answer to the research questions posed. 
 
The evidence for this study is gathered in three ways. Firstly, a review of the literature 
dealing with the following areas relevant to the research: the broader political context 
DQGEURDGFDVWLQJHQYLURQPHQWRIWKHSHULRGGHEDWHVDQGFRQFHUQVDERXWµSXEOLFVHUYLFH
EURDGFDVWLQJ¶36%WKH%%&Furrent affairs and war reporting, particularly relating to 
Panorama¶V FRQIOLFWFRYHUDJH7KHµOLWHUDWXUH¶ includes academic studies, books and 
journal articles, material written by or about associated media professionals, relevant 
press coverage and audio-visual material (see Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
 
Secondly, structured and semi-structured interviews with former and current Panorama 
staff, BBC personnel and other interested parties. Interviews have been conducted with 
reporters David Lomax, Michael Crick, Paul Kenyon, John Ware and Tom Mangold; 
producers Eamonn Matthews, Gary Horne, Mike Rudin, Tom Giles, former Editor 
Roger Bolton and former Director General Greg Dyke DVZHOODVQXPHURXVRWKHUµRII
WKHUHFRUG¶FKDWVDQGGLVFXVVLRQV7KHVHLQWHUYLHZVKDYHEHHn transcribed and 
referenced, where appropriate, in the study. 
 
Thirdly, content and textual analysis (explained in more detail below) of the Panorama 
archive between 1987 and 2004 focusing on coverage of the First and Second Gulf 
Wars (1991, 2003). Triangulating the evidence gathered in these ways will help draw 
conclusions as to the effects of a number of perceived influences and constraints 
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operating on and around the BBC current affairs series Panorama in its coverage of 
contemporary conflicts. This approach has been trialled in a pilot study of Panorama¶V 
coverage leading up and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq (McQueen 2008), drawing 
RQWKHVWUHQJWKRIDµPXOWLSHUVSHFWLYLVWDSSURDFK¶ZKLFKLQ'RXJODV.HOOQHU¶VZRUGV
µdeploys a multitude of theories and methods of interpretation to provide more many-
VLGHGUHDGLQJVDQGFULWLTXHV¶S 
 
The use of content analysis and textual analysis provided a body of complimentary 
evidence to draw upon and test the hypothesis. With regard to the content analysis 
conducted, the pilot study took the form of coding the transcripts for all pre-recorded 
Panorama transmissions dealing with the 2003 war. The programmes were divided into 
pre-war, war and post-war coverage. A coding scheme was developed that could 
LGHQWLI\SDWWHUQVDQGVKLIWVLQWKHUHSRUWLQJRIµSUR-ZDU¶DQGµDQti-ZDU¶YLHZVVFDOHG
(coded 1-7WRWUDFNLIWKHGHEDWHVWUD\HGEH\RQGWKHVSKHUHRIµOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶
LHWKH:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXVLQWRWKHµVSKHUHRIFRQWURYHUV\¶VHH+DOOLQ989, 
E&RQWHQWDQDO\VLVKDVEHHQFKDUDFWHULVHGDVWKHµV\VWHPDWLFFDWHJRULVDWLRQDQG
FRXQWLQJRIFRQWHQWHOHPHQWVLQDJLYHQPHGLDLWHP¶&RUQHUS7KLVGHVFULEHV
the work of the pilot study where the full transcripts for each programme were coded 
DQGWKHQXPEHURIZRUGVDOORFDWHGWRHDFKµSRVLWLRQ¶ZHUHFRXQWHGDQGH[SUHVVHGDVD
percentage of the total. As Hansen et al. note, content analysis can offer valuable 
insights because it provides evidence of structured absences as well as helping to 
measure what is UHSUHVHQWHGµ&RQWHQWDQDO\VLVFDQKHOSSURYLGHVRPHLQGLFDWLRQRI
UHODWLYHSURPLQHQFHVDQGDEVHQFHVRINH\FKDUDFWHULVWLFVLQPHGLDWH[WV¶+DQVHQet al. 
1998, p.95). 
 
The coding scheme adopted is included in the Appendix, with accompanying notes. In 
defining the analytical categories effort was made to ensure that the text characteristics 
singled out related to the overall research questions and hypothesis (see section 1.1). 
The coding criteria selected (codes 1-ZHUHµJHQHUDOFDWHJRULHV¶LQGLFDWLQJWKHWKHPHV
issues, lexical choice and value dimensions of particular utterances within the 
programme. Above all, WKHVHFRGHVDUHDQµDQDWWHPSWDWFODVVLI\LQJFRYHUDJHLQWHUPV
of value judgements, or assessment of the ideological stance¶+DQVHQet al. 1998, 
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SRIWKHLQGLYLGXDODFWRUVVRXUFHVDQGµSULPDU\GHILQHUV¶DVZHOODVWKH
programme/series as a whole. 
 
While useful in providing some evidence in support of the hypothesis the pilot study 
has, to some extent, further underlined the interpretive role of the researcher in both 
µTXDQWLWDWLYH¶DQGµTXDOLWDWLYH¶VWXGLHVVHH-HQVHQS-107). The content 
DQDO\VLVUDLVHVVLJQLILFDQWGRXEWVDVWRWKHDELOLW\WRµPHDVXUH¶LQDQ\FRQVLVWHQW
replicable way discreet messages in complex communicative texts which, to quote Hall 
et al. never GHOLYHURQHPHDQLQJEXWUDWKHUDµSOXUDOLW\RIPHDQLQJV¶LQZKLFKµRQHLV
SUHIHUUHGDQGRIIHUHGWRWKHYLHZHUVRYHUWKHRWKHUVDVWKHPRVWDSSURSULDWH¶
p.90).  µ0HDVXULQJ¶Panorama reportHUSUHVHQWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHSURJUDPPH in a 
reliable, replicable way is shown to be particularly problematic in this respect given 
their role as supposedly impartial mediators in the debate (see chapters 4.2, 4.3; 
McQueen 2008). For this reason the reporter/presenter contribution was initially 
excluded from the coding exercise (for the pilot study), but as this contribution was 
shown to be a dominant one (up to 65% of total contributions in some programmes) it 
was judged that it could not legitimately be wholly excluded from the final content 
analysis.  
 
Hence a framing analysis that links into and elaborates on the coding criteria used for 
pilot study was developed that also allowed an analysis of the reporter/presenter 
contribution. While this was problematic, as we shall see, it provides some insights into 
the various ways the debate was framed in the crucial pre-invasion phase of Gulf 2 
when consensus was most conspicuous by its absence and the public was, arguably, 
most open to influence.  Consequently, the Panorama UHSRUWHUSUHVHQWHU¶V contribution 
in the pre-war period is also mapped (and correlated to the study of interviewees and 
participants) through a frame analysis which draws on the work of Taylor (2008). 
7D\ORU¶VVFKHPDWDdoes not attempt to ascribe firm positions on the pro-war/anti-war 
continuum, but instead identifies four areas of contestation: security, international law, 
morality and opportunity and highlights how the issues are reported and discussed (cf. 
Weaver 2007) with reference to DUDQJHRIµFRPSHWLQJIUDPHV¶6FKHXIHOHDQG
Tewksbury 2007, p.14).  
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Consequently, framing analysis allows presenter/reporter contributions to be categorised 
in relation to a set of WKHPHVµSUREOHPGHILQLWLRQV¶ DQGµWUHDWPHQWUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV¶
which inform particular µVFKRROVRIWKRXJKW¶ around the justification for war (see Taylor 
2008). This approach has the benefit of analysing reporter/presenter contributions 
without arguing that they actively championed any particular µYLHZV¶along simple pro- 
or anti-war lines. Nevertheless, by exploring, developing or eliciting certain  µSUREOHP
GHILQLWLRQV¶or frames of understanding over others the reporters and/or presenters 
effectively gave airspace to perspectives or schools of thought that were ranged in 
favour or against a military intervention in Iraq. ,QWKHFDVHRIWKHµDQWL-ZDUUDGLFDO¶RU
µQHRFRQVHUYDWLYH¶VFKRRORIWKRXJKWVRPHRIWKHSUREOHPGHILQLWLRQVUDQJHGEH\RQG
ZKDWPLJKWEHUHJDUGHGDVWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶)RULQVWDQFHWKHQRWLRQs that 
there were direct links between Iraq and Al Qaeda, or that the war was a thinly 
disguised opportunity by the US WRFRQWURODFFHVVWRWKDWFRXQWU\¶VHQHUJ\ resources, 
while popular amongst particular groups and frequently rehearsed in elite debate abroad, 
were not major themes in British Parliamentary discussions (cf. Hansard 2002, 2003). 
 
It should be noted that the results of the coding/framing scheme are presented here 
primarily as supporting material to the interpretive textual analysis in order to illustrate 
broad trends and patterns within the texts. Any percentage figures drawn from the study 
should not be judged as final, empirical RUµREMHFWLYH¶ proof, or seen as an uncritical 
FRPPLWPHQWWRWKHµSRVLWLYLVW¶ tradition of media analysis. They can, however, show 
how broadcast debates and investigations relating to the conflicts were broadly 
structured and framed in relation to a so-called µ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶,1 or lack 
thereof.   
 
Furthermore, if the limitations, approximations and (often) de-contextualised results of 
quantitative analysis are foregrounded the approach can provide further insight into 
                                               
 
1  Undoubtedly a problematic term for a range of opinions as this study shows. 
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questions of ideological reproduction, particularly if used to complement more fine-
grained, interpretive content and textual analysis. Certainly, KrippeQGRUII¶V
GHILQLWLRQRIFRQWHQWDQDO\VLVDVµDUHVHDUFKWHFKQLTXHIRUPDNLQJUHSOLFDEOHDQGYDOLG
LQIHUHQFHVIURPGDWDWRWKHLUFRQWH[W¶FLWHG-HQVHQSGRHVQRWH[FOXGHODWHQW
PHDQLQJVIURPWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VµOHJLWLPDWHKRUL]RQRILQWHUHVW¶DQG acknowledges the 
necessity of interpretative work by the researcher (see Deacon et al. 1999, for further 
discussion). 
 
 
To re-iterate, whilst the (quantitative) content analysis is an important component of this 
study a greater part of the research work is (qualitative) textual analysis. Following Hall 
HWDO¶V 1981 study of Panorama, this research employs a number of approaches, 
including those developed in critical discourse analysis (Fairclough 2006) and 
particularly in the thematic analysis developed by the Glasgow University Media Group 
(GUMG 1985; Philo1995a, 2002a, 2007). At the level of transcribed spoken text 
discourse analysis DOORZVWKHUHVHDUFKHUWRGRFXPHQWµDFORVHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKH
linguistic details of media texts and the production of LGHRORJ\¶-HQVHQS
7KHPDWLFDQDO\VLVHQDEOHVDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIµH[SODQDWRU\IUDPHZRUNVRUSHUVSHFWLYHV¶
XQGHUSLQQLQJWKHGHVFULSWLRQVJLYHQZLWKFORVHDWWHQWLRQWRWKHµDVVXPSWLRQV¶WKDW
underlie the deployment of various textual strategies (Philo 2007 p.178-192). In many 
cases this focus on µthematic UHODWHGDWWULEXWHV¶ complements and informs the framing 
analysis described above (see Weaver 2007, p.143). However, as in the work of the 
Glasgow Media Group, this study recognises the need to look beyond the text and 
consider various institutional factors and production contexts, including the practices of 
journalists, which help shape media coverage. 
 
The discussion of methodology has so far omitted to deal with the moving image as an 
object of study. Hansen et al. (1998) argue that qualitative discourse analysis has been 
successfully employed in the analysis of visual information, although it has been given 
several different formulations, usually with recourse to one of two theoretical sources: 
Roland Barthes and Charles Sanders Peirce. Hansen et al. go on to discuss the use of the 
WHUPµDQFKRUDJH¶DQGQRWHWKDWIRU%DUWKHVWKHDQFKRULQJWH[WKDVµDrepressive YDOXH¶
ZKLFKLVDEOHWRµUHPRWHFRQWURO>WKHUHDGHU@WRZDUGVDPHDQLQJFKRVHQLQDGYDQFH¶
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(Hansen et al. 1998, p.111). The qualitative textual analysis conducted for this study 
incorporates a review of the audio-visual content of these programmes. 
 
 
$OODQUHPLQGVXVWKDWµcritical researchers have borrowed a range of conceptual 
tools IURPYDULRXVDSSURDFKHVWRWH[WXDODQDO\VLV¶(p.87.). A number of specific 
approaches in Media and Communication Studies have been developed for the study of 
QHZVDQGRWKHUµIDFWXDO¶IRUPVWKDWZLOOEHGUDZQRQIRUWKHLQVLJKWVWKH\RIIHU:KLOH
drawing from the diverse critical methods and terminology outlined above has 
undoubted dangers, good research, as Hansen et al. (1998) remind us, usually benefits 
from the use of a combination of methods. Selecting from methods, or combinations of 
methods, can help illuminate what are multidimensional and complex processes and 
phenomena: 
 
Social reality ± real life ± is multi-faceted. Although not universally 
accepted, its adequate study requires various theories and approaches 
applied together, and no single approach is capable of providing more than 
the partial picture of social reality permitted by its own narrow perspectives 
and conceptual limitations. In this sense we should welcome eclecticism, 
not apologise for it.  
(Hansen et al. 1998, p.29) 
 
The following chapters include a review of literature relating to the broadcasting 
environment in the period under discussion and a critical historiography of the BBC, 
current affairs and conflict coverage pertinent to the discussion. This review includes a 
decade-by-decade overview of 3DQRUDPD¶V history as well as reference to interviews 
with former and current Panorama staff in relation to the journalistic practices and 
specific issues, events or episodes under discussion. 
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4.  Contextual research and critical historiography 
4.1  Broadcasting  
 
Broadcasting in Britain comes from two sources: the public sector British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and the commercial or 'independent' industry. An important feature of 
broadcasting in Britain is that it has operated under relatively strict public service 
requirements since the 1925 Crawford Committee made its long term recommendations 
DERXWWKHVFRSHDQGFRQGXFWRI%ULWLVKEURDGFDVWLQJ6FDQQHOO2¶0DOOH\). 
These requirements, as Scannell indicates, have changed significantly in a number of ways 
since the first British television transmissions began from the BBC studios at Alexandra 
Palace in 1936$V6FDQQHOO¶VHVVD\RQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKHFRQFHSWPDNHVFOHDU
µSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJ¶36%LVDWHUPWKDWODFNVDQDJUHHGGHILQLWLRQDOWKRXJK
GHILQLWLRQVDERXQGVHH6FKOHVLQJHU6FDQQHOO2¶6XOOLYDQHWDO2IFRP
2004; Born 2004). Whilst these definitions often share core characteristics, they are subject 
to considerable change over time (see 2¶0DOOH\ 
 
 
Barnett and Docherty (1986) identify eight normative principles and conditions for the 
existence of public service broadcasting. These stress universal availability; protection from 
vested inWHUHVWµSDUWLFXODUO\WKHJRYHUQPHQWRIWKHGD\¶WKHUROHRIEURDGFDVWHUVLQ
developing community and national identity; special provision for minorities and the 
HQFRXUDJHPHQWRIµJRRGSURJUDPPLQJ¶ 
 
6FDQQHOO¶VZRUNVKRZVKRZVRPHRIWKHVHSULQFLSOes were partly developed at the 
BBC and how, in Britain, national public service broadcasting was tied to notions of 
GHPRFUDF\(QJOLVKQHVVDQGQDWLRQKRRG+LVDFFRXQWRXWOLQHVKRZWKH%%&¶VILUVW'LUHFWRU
General John Reith's original conception of public service broadcasting was based on the 
principles of universality and equality of access, as well as the desire to educate the 
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populace while binding them together in a nationally imagined community. However, the 
LGHDWKDWSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJ¶VRULJLQVHPHUJHGIURPVXFKµKLJKSULQFLSOHV¶LVJLYHQ
VKRUWVKULIWE\6RUOLQZKRDUJXHVWKDWWKH%%&¶VFUHDWLRQRZHGPRUHWRIHDU
DPRQJVWSROLWLFLDQVDQGRSLQLRQOHDGHUVRIµWKHUDSLGH[SDQVLRQRIUHYROXWLRQDU\LGHDV¶
S2¶0DOOH\DOVRRIIHUVDPRUe critical explanation for the emergence of public 
VHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJZKLFKZDVKHEHOLHYHVµin part a consequence of the perception 
among political elites that the new medium of broadcasting was, potentially politically 
dangerous and needed to be contUROOHG¶2¶0DOOH\S. 
 
In an earlier essay Scannell (1989) argues that the relationship between broadcasting and 
WKHZRUOGRISROLWLFVLVDµKLVWRU\RIPDQLSXODWLRQDQGSUHVVXUH¶H[HUWHGRQEURDGFDVWQHZV
DQGGLVFXVVLRQLQRYHUWDQGFRYHUWZD\VµE\SROLWLFLDQVSDUWLHVDQGJRYHUQPHQWV¶S
However, he defends broadcasting in general, and public service broadcasting in particular, 
against those (like Stuart Hall) who regard LWSULPDULO\DVDIRUPRIµVRFLDOFRQWURO¶RURI
µLGHRORJLFDOPLVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶DUJXLQJLQVWHDGKRZLWKDVµXQREWUXVLYHO\FRQWULEXWHGWR
WKHGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQRIHYHU\GD\OLIH¶S+HIXUWKHUDUJXHVWKDWWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI
,79µJDYHWKH%%&VRPHWKLQJRWKHUWKDQWKHLUSROLWLFDOPDVWHUVWRZRUU\DERXW¶UHGXFLQJ
deference to authority which came to be replaced by: µa more populist, democratic stance as 
WKHEURDGFDVWHUVDVVHUWHGWKHSXEOLF¶VULJKWWRNQRZE\PDNLQJSROLWLFLDQVDQVZHUDEOHDQG
accountable to the electorate for their FRQGXFWRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VDIIDLUV¶(Scannell 1989, 
p.145). 
 
Stevenson (1995) agrees that the initial impact of commercial broadcasting following the 
7HOHYLVLRQ$FWRIZDVWRXQGHUPLQHWKHµFRV\UHYHUHQWLDOGLVSRVLWLRQRIWKH%%&
WRZDUGVWKH%ULWLVKVWDWH¶EXWDGGVWKDWWKHHQGUHVXOWZDVDQHQhancement of commercial 
forms of culture over the promotion of political identities. Stevenson further suggests that 
µDUHODWLYHO\VWDEOHQDWLRQDOO\DUWLFXODWHGLGHQWLW\¶KDVEHHQDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\GLVSODFHGE\D
PRUHµIOXLGIUDJPented and shifting construction' (p.204). Stevenson also notes that since 
the end of the 1970's notions of public service broadcasting have been showing signs of 
crisis. The rise of the New Right and attendant public spending cuts, combined with the 
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arrival of new technologies capable of global penetration opened new broadcasting markets 
to private investment and weakened government commitments to public service ideals. The 
view that purely commercial forces provide the best broadcasting service and that public 
service broadcasting commitments represent a restriction of the freedom of the market is 
rarely, if ever, proposed in British Media and Communications Studies academic literature. 
Nevertheless, there is a substantial body of polemical material, political policy 
recommendations and debate along these lines (see Aitken 2007, North 2007, Murdoch 
2009) which has, to some extent, become an increasingly influential view since the late 
1980s in the British political establishment. This has been reflected in broadcasting 
legislation under both Conservative and New Labour governments WKDWKDVµOLEHUDOLVHG¶WKH
television market and gradually rolled back PSB requirements, particularly for the 
independent sector (see Williams 1996; Curran and Leys 2000; Fitzwater 2008) . 
 
Scannell (1990) believes that the PSB requirement to cater for a variety of cultures, tastes 
and minorities (following the pluralistic ideals championed by the Annan Committee 1974-
79) is also threatened by the commercial logic of the market place that values either mass 
audiences or wealthy niche audiences. Scannell argues that market forces threaten 
genuinely mixed programming, replacing it with generic programming which fragments 
and atomises audiences, destroying 'the principle of equality of access to all entertainment 
and informational resources in a common public domain' (p.26).  
 
Powerful technological and institutional forces increasingly shaped the broadcasting 
landscape in the period studied in this research (1987-2004). A more aggressive pursuit of 
audiences was reflected in scheduling policies and programme-making by the terrestrial 
stations in Britain which faced increased competition from satellite and cable (see Born 
2004, McNair 1999, McQueen 1998). The consequences of what Curran and Leys describe 
DVµFUHHSLQJPDUNHWL]DWLRQ¶KDVEHHQLQWKHLUYLHZWKHHURGLQJRIWKHDXWRQRP\RI
broadcasters both in the commercial and public sector. 
 
The effect of active regulation of commercial broadcasting before 1990 had 
been to create pockets of space in which some broadcast staff had considerable 
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freedom to make important programmes.  These pockets are becoming smaller, 
and less insulated.  At the same time, the BBC's survival strategy during the 
Thatcher era involved increased centralisation and managerialism in ways that 
reduced staff autonomy.  The mainspring of British broadcasting's quality, the 
relative freedom it allows to production teams, is being steadily depleted. 
(Curran and Leys 2000, p.230-231) 
 
Thussu (2003) and Kellner (2003) have shown how, internationally, forms of entertainment 
permeate news and information, and a tabloidized µinfotainment¶ culture has become an 
LQFUHDVLQJO\FRPPRQIHDWXUHGLVSODFLQJIDFWXDOSURJUDPPHVLQ
KDUGHU¶FDWHJRULHVVXFKDV

KLVWRU\
µSROLWLFV¶µGHYHORSPHQWHQYLURQPHQWDQG KXPDQULJKWV¶DQGµFRQIOLFWDQG
GLVDVWHU¶7KXVVXS Reevell (2005, 2006) explains the difficulty in Britain of 
producing current affairs as competition from satellite television gathers pace: 
 
In multichannel homes there are always drama/comedy and entertainment 
shows on, and this creates a challenge for more informative, thought-provoking 
programmes, which now have to work hard to attract more than just a core of 
well committed, curious viewers. 
(Reevell 2005, p.23) 
 
BBC1 and ITV, which Reevell describes as µWKHSRODULFHFDSVRIWKHROGEURDGFDVWLQJ
ZRUOG¶KDYH, in his view, suffered erosion from multichannel competition resulting in a 
marked drift towards more populist, mass-market and entertainment-driven programme 
making (Reevell 2006, p.13). For Greg Philo (2002, 2004) the inexorable 
commercialisation of British television is likely to make it increasingly difficult for 
audiences to have a grasp of national and international affairs. Research by Philo on 
television news and understanding of war indicates that poor understanding of the origin of 
conflicts 
 
>«@LVLQSDUWWKHUHVXOWRIWHOHYLVLRQFRYHUDJHWKDWWHQGVWRIRFXVRQGUDPDWLF
violent and tragic images while giving very little context or explanation to the 
events that are being portrayed.  The development of television organised 
around crude notions of audience ratings is likely to make this situation worse. 
(Philo 2002, p.185) 
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4.2 The BBC 
 
7KH%%&LVWKHZRUOG¶VODUJHVWPHGLDRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGKDVGRPLQDWHG%ULWLVKFXOWXUDODQG
political life since it became a nationalized corporation in 1926. Consequently, there is an 
enormous volume of both academic and non-academic literature relating to the BBC, much 
of which is pertinent to the research area of this thesis. This includes legal, constitutional, 
regulatory and corporate literature, historical surveys, studies of news and current affairs, 
FULWLTXHVRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKHZLGHUSROLWLFDO
establishment, memoirs of Director Generals, senior management and journalists, conflict 
coverage research and a relentless stream of newspaper, magazine and journal articles 
H[DPLQLQJHYHU\DVSHFWVRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VRXWSXW 
 
Given the time and space constraints this literature review can, therefore, only indicate a 
sample of the available work on a number of issues that are central to this study. Asa Briggs 
monumental five volume history of the BBC The history of broadcasting in the United 
Kingdom (1961, 1965, 1970, 1979a, 1995) is a key reference for many academic studies of 
WKH%%&DOWKRXJKLWSUHVHQWVDQµRIILFLDO¶DFFRXQWRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\ZKLFK
concludes before the relevant years for this research and therefore is of less value than more 
UHFHQWZRUN*HRUJLQD%RUQ¶VHWKQRJUDSKLFDFFRXQWUncertain Vision offers a more 
critical and up-to-date view and is particularly useful at exploring the different management 
cultures of Director Generals John Birt and Greg Dyke and their effect on the News and 
Current Affairs Department in the time frame IRUWKLVUHVHDUFK%RUQ¶VZRUNLVFRQVLGHUHG
in relation to particular themes later in this chapter. 
 
$QXPEHURIWH[WVGHDOZLWKWKH%%&¶VFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUDQGWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH
&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFKHTXHUHGUHODWLRQVWRWKH%ULWLVKVWDWH*HQHUDODFFounts of this highly 
complex phenomenon are laid out by Curran and Seaton (2003); Beetham et al. (2002); 
Kuhn (2007); Born (2004); Barnett and Gaber (2001), Curran and Leys (2000) and Ward 
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(1989) amongst others. Curran and Leys examine deteriorating relations between the BBC 
DQG0UV7KDWFKHU¶V&RQVHUYDWLYH*RYHUQPHQWRIWKHVDQGVLQDVXEWOHPDQQHU
They suggest that a frontal assault on the BBC failed because it did not secure the support 
of the Cabinet, Conservative parliamentary party or the public.  7KH%%&¶VµUHSXWDWLRQIRU
EHLQJLQGHSHQGHQWRIJRYHUQPHQW¶HDUQHGWKH&RUSRUDWLRQUHVSHFWDQG3XEOLF6HUYLFH
Broadcasting remains popular in Britain, in their view, µbecause it made, relatively early 
on, a strategic compromise between high culture and market values¶(2000, p.228). 
 
<HWWKH\TXDOLI\WKH%%&¶V µLQGHSHQGHQFH¶LQLPSRUWDQWZD\VDVVHUWLQJWKDWWHOHYLVLRQ
practitioners are not as far removed from authority as they like to claim. Broadcasters, they 
H[SODLQDUHREOLJHGE\ODZWRGLVSOD\µGXHLPSDUWLDOLW\¶DQGWKDWWKLVKDVEHHQXQGHUVWRRG
to mean that opposed interpretations should be foregrounded in reports of controversial 
issues: 
   
However, these opposed interpretations tend to reproduce the narrow range of 
disagreement between the two competing Parliamentary leaderships rather than 
the full range of disagreement in society.  Moreover, the definition of what is 
controversial is strongly influenced by what is contentious between the political 
parties.  If an issue does not come within an area of legitimated controversy, the 
conventions of balance tend to be downplayed or set aside.  
(Curran and Leys 2000, p.228) 
 
 
Born (2004) is also sensitive to these tendencies, particularly the contradiction in the 
supposedly independent relationship between the BBC and the state which she feels spills 
RYHULQWRWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VVWDQFHRQSROLWLFV6KHH[SORUHVWKHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURI
WKH%%&DQGWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VOHYHUDJHWKURXJKLWVDSSRLQWPHQWRIQHZPHPEHUVRIWKH
Board of Governors (BBC Trust since 2007) and its power to set the license fee and renew 
WKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFKDUWHUVHHDOVR&XUUDQDQG6HDWRQ6KHUHWUDFHVWKHIRUPDWLYH
history of the BBC, particularly under Reith at the time of the General Strike (explored also 
by Briggs 1961, 1979b, 1985; Curran and Seaton 2003 and others). Born describes the 
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establishment of a tradition of journalism in which µSROLWLFV¶ZDVDQDFWLYLW\ZKLFKRQO\
KDSSHQHGµEHWZHHQPDMRUSROLWLFDOSDUWLHV¶DQGQHYHUWKHµH[SUHVVLYHSROLWLFVRIWKHVWUHHW¶ 
 
The LPSOLFDWLRQLVWKDWWKH%%&¶VSURIHVVLRQDOMRXUQDOLVPRILPSDUWLDOLW\DQGRI
the mediation of party politics was born of defensiveness and expediency. It is a 
journalism that was formed by over-close relations with the state; and it is a 
journalism that, over decades, has aided a widespread depoliticisation.  
(Born 2004, p.32-33) 
 
Interviews with current and former Panorama programme-makers reveal mixed views on 
relations with the state. Reporter -RKQ:DUHIRULQVWDQFHDUJXHVWKDWWKH%%&LVµJHQXLQHO\
iQGHSHQGHQW¶ 
 
The one thing I would say about the BBC and I have been there twenty one 
years, with one or two exceptions the BBC is a genuinely independent 
broadcasting organisation and almost to the point of relishing combat with 
governments or any institutions when it has got the evidence to back it up. And 
WKDW¶VDQHQWLUHO\KHDOWK\SRVLWLRQIRUDSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWHUWREHLQDQG,
WKLQNLW¶VSUHWW\PXFKKRZWKH%%&KDVDOZD\VEHHQ 
(personal communication,  February 19, 2007) 
 
This view is made forcefully despite :DUH¶V strong suspicion that under John Birt 
programmes that ZHUHµSROLWLFDOO\FRPEXVWLEOH¶VXFKDVµ6S\FDWFKHU¶µ6OLGLQJLQWR6OXPS¶ 
RUµ6XSHUJXQ¶, or investigations which KHIHOWµPLJKWFRPSURPLVHOLFHQVHIHHQHJRWLDWLRQV¶
were subject to greater scrutiny, interference and delay, such as :DUH¶V second report on 
alleged gerrymandering (see Lindley 2003a) in 'DPH6KLUOH\3RUWHU¶V:HVWPLQVWHUCity 
Council. Transmission of this was delayed on technical legal grounds, a move Ware 
suspected was motivated by %LUW¶VGHVLUHWRSURWHFWWKH%%&LQLWVQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWKWKH
government: 
 
1RZ,KDSSHQWRWKLQNWKDW¶VZURQJ<RXWDNHDSULQFLSOHGDSSURDFKWRWKHVH
WKLQJVEXW,¶PQRWWKH'LUHFWRU*HQHUDODQGWKHIDFWLVWKDWKHVHFXUHGDQ
extremely generous license fee deal for the BBC. I think that John, I strongly 
VXVSHFW,FDQ¶WSURYHLWWKDWKHGHOD\HGWKHVHFRQGRIP\3RUWHUSURJUDPPHV
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because it came at a difficult time just before the local elections and I do 
suspect that he was concerned that might affect the negotiations he was having 
ZLWKWKH0DMRUJRYHUQPHQWDERXWWKHOLFHQVHIHH,GRQ¶WNQRZWKDWEXW,GR
VXVSHFWLWDQGLWZRXOGQ¶WVXUSULVHPHDQG,ZDVYHU\FURVVDERXWLW%XWLQWKH
end he got a very good license fee for the whole of thH%%&VR« 
(Ibid) 
 
 
:DUH¶VIDLWKLQWKHXOWLPDWHLQGHSHQGHQFHRIWKH%%&, despite the evidence of political 
caution and compromises apparently made by senior management, is an assessment shared 
by many of the current and former BBC staff interviewed. However, Roger Bolton, draws 
somewhat different conclusions from his experience as Editor (see Bolton 1990, 1997) and 
IURPDFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI%LUW¶VSHULRGRIFRQWURO 
 
R.B. >«@he needed to get rid of a generation, to impose considerable central 
control and negotiate through a licence fee, the continuation of the BBC and a 
OLFHQFHIHHDJUHHPHQWDJDLQVWDVFHSWLFDO*RYHUQPHQW+HGHFLGHGDQG,¶PQRW
VD\LQJLW¶VGLVKRQRXUDEOH,WKLQNLW¶VHVVHQWLDOO\GLVDVWURXVEXW,GRQ¶WWKLQNLW¶V
dishonourable, he decided once or twice to postpone programmes, to hold the 
journalism back.  And I think he did so because he was primarily concerned 
with the survival of the BBC as an independent organisation.  But of course if it 
GLGVXUYLYHLWZRXOGQ¶WEHLQGHSHQGHQWEHFDXVHKH¶GFRPSURPLVHGLWVQDPH
From my position I would have taken a different approach, but I think one 
should be properly sensitive of the problems.  So the licence fee probably is the 
best way of ensuring the maximum independence of the BBC.  But anybody 
whRVD\VLW¶VDQDEVROXWHLQGHSHQGHQFHLVDQLGLRW 
 
D.M. <HV2.6RLW¶VDFRPSURPLVHGLQGHSHQGHQFHLQWKDWVHQVH 
 
R.B. ,W¶VDFRPSURPLVHDQGDVORQJDV\RX¶UHRSHQDQGKRQHVWDERXWWKDWLWKDV
a better chance of being real.   
(personal communication,  October 23, 2008) 
 
 
Both internal and external pressures and related influences on the reporting of current 
affairs, including relations between the state and the BBC, are a major focus of this 
research and will be returned to in subsequent chapters through exploration of a number of 
issues. At a more general level, however, interviews, articles and memoirs of senior BBC 
 43 
managers and journalists, many of whom have worked for Panorama, usually reassert the 
%%&¶VSURXGKLVWRU\RILQGHSHQGHQFHIURPJRYHUQPHQW interference. Yet these same 
accounts often reference specific and telling examples of state influence and pressure which 
come in a variety of forms, including surveillance and infiltration by intelligence services 
(Bell 2003; Simpson 2002); political appointments at management level (Simpson 1999, 
$WWHQERURXJKµEXOO\LQJ¶RIYDULRXVNLQGVLQFOXGLQJLPSOLFLWDQGH[SOLFLW
threats to licence fee funding levels, charter renewal (Day 1990; Simpson 2002, 2003) or 
ZDUQLQJVµWKDWLWPLJKWEHGLVPDQWOHG¶6LPSVRQSQXPHURXVQHZV
management strategies - LQFOXGLQJSUHIHUHQWLDOWUHDWPHQWIRUµFRPSOLDQW¶UHSRUWHUVDQG
GHQLDORIDFFHVVRUHYHQSXEOLFGHQXQFLDWLRQIRUµDZNZDUG¶RQHVBowen 2006; Simpson 
1999, 2000, 2002); and systematic monitoriQJOREE\LQJDQGFRPSODLQWVDERXWµXQEDODQFHG¶
or negative coverage  (Lindley 2003a; Simpson 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004). 
 
'HVSLWHDJUHDWGHDORIIDFWXDODQGDQHFGRWDOHYLGHQFHRIJRYHUQPHQWDWWHPSWVWRµVWHHU¶
editorial policy, particularly around contentious issues, opinion appears divided both in the 
academic community and amongst BBC managers, journalists and producers over how 
successful government pressure is at influencing coverage. Many of the journalists, 
producers and BBC managers interviewed for this research are emphatic that, when it 
FRPHVWRLQYHVWLJDWLYHMRXUQDOLVPWKH&RUSRUDWLRQQHYHUµSXOOVLWVSXQFKHV¶XQGHU
government pressure (discussions with John Ware, Tom Mangold, Mike Rubin, David 
Lomax, Andy Bell). Others, some of whom remain off-the-record, are more sceptical and 
provide numerous examples of managerial caution or WKHµFKLOOLQJHIIHFW¶RIJRYHUQPHQW
pressure and inquiries (discussions with Roger Bolton, Michael Crick, Eamonn Mathews, 
Toby Sculthorpe) (see also 2¶0DOOH\Barnett and Gaber 2001; Davies 2008). 
 
&ORVHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKTXHVWLRQVRIWKH%%&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLVWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VOHJDO
UHTXLUHPHQWXQGHUWKHWHUPVRILWVFKDUWHUWRPDLQWDLQµEDODQFH¶DQGµLPSDUWLDOLW\¶DQGKRZ
this is carried out in practice, already briefly referred to in terms of the scope of the 
µOHJLWLPDWHGFRQWURYHUV\¶RI:HVWPLQVWHUSROLWLFV4XHVWLRQVDURXQGWKHLVVXHVRI
objectivity, bias, balance and impartiality are dealt with in the critical literature (see chapter 
4.3), but it is worth mentioning here that opinion differs as to how useful and effective the 
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%%&¶VRZQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHVHTXDOLWLHVKDVEHHQHYHQDPRQJVWSUDFWLFLQJMRXUQDOLVWV
(see Simpson 1999; Bell 2003). 
 
4.2.1 Management control 
 
4XHVWLRQVRIWKH%%&¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDUHLQH[WULcably linked to internal mechanisms of 
PDQDJHPHQWFRQWURODQGµVHOI-FHQVRUVKLS¶$QDVVHVVPHQWRIWKH%%&¶VFXUUHQWDIIDLUV
coverage requires careful examination of the freedom journalists have to do their job set 
against the obligations, constraints and levels of scrutiny imposed by the managers (see 
Bell 2003). A common theme of much comment and analysis is the degree to which the 
BBC is institutionally unsuited to producing controversial material. There is a perception 
amongst some observers that the BBC HPSOR\VµWURXEOHVSRWWHUV¶DQGµFRQWURYHUV\
VWRSSHUV¶DWPDQDJHULDOOHYHODSUDFWLFHWKDWDFFHOHUDWHGXQGHU-RKQ%LUWZDVFKHFNHG
somewhat under Greg Dyke and has reasserted itself since the Hutton Report (see Lindley 
2000; Born 2004). This viewpoint is vigorously opposed by many senior BBC managers 
and journalists (see Simpson 2004), including former Panorama journalist Tom Mangold 
ZKRDUJXHVWKDW%LUWSURWHFWHGWKH%%&¶VµJROGVWDQGDUG¶RIMRXUQDOLVPDQGEHOLHYHVWKHUH
ZDVDµFROODSVHLQHGLWRULDOFRQWURO¶XQGHU'\NHWKDWOHGWRWKHµ*LOOLJDQILDVFR¶0DQJROG
2004, p.1). 
 
Panorama staff spoken to for this research appear somewhat split on the issue of John 
%LUW¶VPDQDJHPHQWZLWKDPDMRULW\LGHQWLI\LQJKLVSHULRGLQFRQWURODVKLJKO\FDXWLRXV, 
over-managed and restrictive of good journalism. Amongst the most outspoken comments 
was the following off-the-record observation by a former member of the Panorama staff: 
 
Censorship is much more dangerous when it becomes self-censorship.  That's 
what happened under Birt.  Nobody ever said we couldn't make programmes on 
certain subjects.  Everybody thought they knew what would be acceptable, so 
they adjusted their proposals accordingly allowing a margin for safety.  Most 
wanted to keep their jobs, all hoped the troubles would pass. 
(personal communication) 
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Yet others spoken to were somewhat defensive of Birt including, somewhat surprisingly 
*UHJ'\NH:KHQDVNHGLIKHWKRXJKW%LUWµWDPHG¶3DQRUDPDRUZhipped them into line he 
replies: 
 
GD: %LUW¶VYLHZZDVWKDWWKHy were out of control. Some of those old Panorama 
guys, were pretty - ,¶PQRWVD\LQJWKH\ZHUHYLOODLQVEXWDORWRIWKHPOLYHG
pretty well off expenses and a lot of them cut corners I think. 
 
DM: 6R\RX¶YHJRWV\PSDWK\IRU%LUWWU\LQJWR« 
 
GD: Well I thiQNKHZDVULJKW$FWXDOO\LWZDVQRWP\«,UHPHPEHUJRLQJWR
talk to them and I complained to the whole Current Affairs Department that 
WKH\KDGQ¶WPDGHHQRXJKWURXEOHLQP\ILUVWWZR\HDUV 
 
 
When pressed on whether he thought Birt had a detrimental effect on current affairs he 
replies: 
 
GD: :HOO%LUWKDGDYLHZRQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVWKDW,«,FDPHRXWRIWKH/RQGRQ
Weekend stable and I tend to agree with him that the job of current affairs is to 
analyse and understand first and then to make a programme second. Panorama 
GLGQ¶WFRPHIURPWKDWWUDGLWLRQ7KH\VTXLUWHGILOPDWHYHU\ERG\DQGVDZZKDW
they could make of it in the cutting room. And they got terribly upset when you 
VDLGWKDW%XWLI\RXWDONWR-RKQKH¶OOWHOO\RXTXLWHEODWDQWO\WKDWKHIDLOHGWR 
change current affairs at the BBC in terms of analytical approach. 
 
(personal communication,  October 16, 2009) 
 
0RVWDFFRXQWVRIWKH%%&¶VUHFHQWKLVWRU\DSSHDUWRDJUHHRQWKHVXEVWDQWLDODQGPDUNHGO\
different influence of Director Generals Birt and Dyke. A common theme, expressed with 
VRPHYDULDWLRQLVWKDW%LUWLPSRVHGDGHJUHHRIµGLVFLSOLQH¶RQ1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV
and thereby helped strategically defend the Corporation from further attack by a 
Conservative government hostile to critical coveraJH-RKQ%LUW¶VRZQDFFRXQWHPSKDVLVHV
the economic necessity of his centralised control. He describes how the BBC had, before 
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KLVWHQXUHEHFRPHDµYDVWFRPPDQGHFRQRP\¶RIµHQWDQJOHGLQWHJUDWHGEDURQLHV¶ZKLFK
ZDVµ%\]DQWLQHLQPDQ\RILWVVWUXFWXUHV¶Dnd where creative freedom was frustrated. His 
description of the Corporation he came to manage, first as Deputy Director General (1987-
1992) and then as Director General (D.G.) (1992-1999) suggests that change was necessary 
and inevitable and that reforms were better self-imposed than forced upon the BBC by the 
government: 
 
The BBC could not fossilise.  The monolith could not continue.  If we in the 
BBC had not been ready to learn from the experience of others - and to take our 
destiny into our own hands - the job would have been done for us.  And as 
,79¶VH[SHULHQFHZLWKWKH%URDGFDVWLQJ$FWGHPRQVWUDWHVLWLVEHWWHUWRGRWKH
job yourself. 
 
(Birt 1993, p.9) 
 
%RUQ¶VHWKQRJUDSKLFVWXG\RIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQXQGHU%LUWDQG'\NHUncertain Vision 
demonstraWHVLQGHWDLOKRZWKHLUµUHJLPHV¶GLIIHUHG%RUQUHFRUGV%%&HPSOR\HH¶V
GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWK-RKQ%LUW¶VPDQDJHPHQWVW\OHDQGDOOHJHGRYHU-controlling tendencies 
LQ1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV7KHHYLGHQFHSURGXFHGHFKRHV/LQGOH\¶VDFFRXQWRI%LUW¶V
tenure as Director of News and Current Affairs and Deputy Director General (and later as 
Director General), and the largely negative effects on staff morale and the journalistic 
FXOWXUHRIWKH%%&,QFRQWUDVWWR%LUW¶VRZQDFFRXQW%RUQDOVRGRFXPHQWVH[DPSOHVRI the 
economic absurdities associated with elements of Producer Control.  
 
While Uncertain Vision UHFRJQLVHVVRPHRI-RKQ%LUW¶VDFKLHYHPHQWVWKHVWXG\JLYHVD
PRUHIDYRXUDEOHDFFRXQWRI*UHJ'\NH¶VFRPPDQGRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQDQGWKHGLUHFWLRQKH
took it bHWZHHQDQG7KHµUHLQYHQWLRQ¶RIWKH%%&XQGHU'\NHLQ%RUQ¶VYLHZ
LQYROYHGDVLJQLILFDQWµUHOD[DWLRQ¶RIWKHRIWHQKDWHGVFULSWDSSURYDOV\VWHPDQGµFHQWUDOLVHG
FRQWURO¶RIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVRXWSXWLQVWLWXWHGE\%LUWIXUWKHUGHWDLOHGLQUHODWLRn to Panorama 
by Lindley, 2002). Amongst the other changes Dyke introduced, this loosening and 
UHGXFWLRQLQPDQDJHULDORYHUVLJKWUHVXOWHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVWXG\LQDUHVWRUDWLRQRIµWUXVW¶
in, and the morale of, programme makers.  
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This view is supported in many, but not all, of the interviews for this study. For former 
Panorama SURGXFHU*DU\+RUQH*UHJ'\NH¶VDSSRLQWPHQWPHDQWµWKHFXOWXUHFKDQJHGLQ
WKH%%&DQGSHRSOHIHOWIRUWKHILUVWWLPHOLEHUDWHG¶+HDUJXHVWKDWWKDWDyke used to send 
round memos VD\LQJµ/RRNZHZDQWVWXIIWKDW¶VJRLQJWRPDNHVRPHZDYHV¶DQGFRQWUDVWs 
this approach with the BirtLVWµschool of boring, bland, non-FKDOOHQJLQJMRXUQDOLVP¶ in 
ZKLFKLQYHVWLJDWLRQVZHUHFRQGXFWHGLQVXFKDZD\WKDWµZRXOGULSWKHJXWVMXVWVXFNWKH
ideology out of anything, sucks the cold points out of anything and just produces a 
WHFKQRFUDWLFVRUWRIUHSRUW¶SHUVRQDOFRPPXQLFDWLRQ2FWREHU+RUQH is scornful 
of what he regards as the Birt-inspired folly of keeping closely to a carefully prepared script 
whilst making a current affairs programme. He suggests that Panorama staff had to 
produce heavily rehearsed VFULSWVEHIRUHILOPLQJEXWWKDWµVRPHWLPHVWKHVFULSWGLGQ¶W
correspond with what people were going to tell you.  So what happened?  TKH\GLGQ¶W
FKDQJHWKHVFULSWVWKH\FKDQJHGZKDWSHRSOHVDLGWRWKHP¶,ELG 
 
This ties in with similar observations made by Lindley (2003a) and by veteran Panorama 
reporter David Lomax who found the insistence on detailed pre-scripting absurd and 
complaLQVDERXWµWKHZKROHDZIXOQHVVRI%LUW¶ 
 
>«@WKHUHZHUHULGLFXORXVFKDUDGHVRIKDYLQJWRSURGXFHSDpered versions of 
ZKDW\RX¶GKDYe to be able to say and gaps for interviewees who would say X, 
<=DQGVRPHZRXOGVD\µ+DQJRQDPLQXWHZHKDYHQ¶WHYHQIRXQG,GRQ¶W
NQRZLIWKDW¶VWKHULJKWLQWHUYLHZHH:HFHUWDLQO\KDYHQ¶WGRQHWKHLQWHUYLHZ
ZHGRQ¶WHYHQNQRZZKHWKHUWKH\¶GVD\WKDW¶(YHU\ERG\IHOWWKDWWKDWZDV
EL]DUUHDQGULGLFXORXV,W¶VDOOYHU\ZHOOWDONLQJDERXWWKHQHHGWREHPRUH
disciplined, but that was absolutely fatuous. 
(personal communication,  November 14, 2007) 
 
 
John Birt was, and remains, an extremely divisive figure for many current and former BBC 
staff. For some he is credited with dramatically boosting spending in News and Current 
Affairs, transforming the BBC into a global brand to EHFRPHµWKHELJJHVWQHZVJDWKHULQJ
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RUJDQLVDWLRQWKHZRUOGKDVHYHUVHHQ¶6LPSVRQSZKLOVWHQFRXUDJLQJµwell-
funded, well-PDGHGHPDQGLQJDQGFRQFOXVLYHFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶ (Aaronovitch 2002, p.1). 
John Ware is one journalist who defends his record robustly, despite misgivings about his 
handling of a few programmes: 
 
The point is, in my dealings with John he was very supportive, and you really, 
UHDOO\VKRXOGQ¶WIRUJHWWKDWIRUQHZVMXQNLHVOLNe me he invested a huge amount 
of money into it and developed a very big department. He actually built up the 
BBC into a world player that it is today. Whatever people may say about him, 
he invested a vast amount, he was ahead of the technological curve, he helped 
EXLOGWKH%%&¶VEUDQGRIQHZVDQGFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLQWRWKLVJOREDOSOD\HUWKDWLW
LVWRGD\7KDW¶VZKDW,WKLQN 
(personal communication,  February 19, 2007) 
 
)RUPHU%%&&KDLUPDQ0DUPDGXNH+XVVH\TXHVWLRQV%LUW¶VSROLWLFDOMXGJHPHQWDW
poinWVLQKLVPHPRLUVEXWFUHGLWVKLPZLWKPDNLQJJRRGDSSRLQWPHQWVDQGµFOHDULQJRXWWKH
GHDGZRRGDQGVOLPPLQJGRZQWKHQXPEHUVLQWKHQHZVDQGFXUUHQWDIIDLUVGLUHFWRUDWH¶
(p.237). Two other long-serving former Panorama reporters and presenters Charles 
Wheeler and Richard Lindley remember Birt in less flattering ways. Wheeler is particularly 
VFDWKLQJRI%LUW¶VQRWRULRXVO\FRQWUROOLQJWHQGHQFLHVDFFRUGLQJWR%HOO 
 
³+H
GMXVWVDFNHG3HWHU3DJQDPHQWDZKRZDVKHDGRIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVRQHRIWKH
best cuUUHQWDIIDLUVSURGXFHUVZHHYHUKDGVRZHZHUHDELWXSVHW´VDLG
:KHHOHU³7KLVIDVFLVW- and I mean it, he really was behaving like someone 
with power - KDGFRPHLQIURPRXWVLGHWKH%%&VOLFLQJSHRSOH
VKHDGVRII´ 
(Bell 2006, p. 27) 
   
Tom Mangold arguHVWKDWZKLOHKHZDVQHYHULQWHUIHUHGZLWKE\WKHPDQDJHPHQWµDOOWKH
scripts had to be cleared three days in advance by whoever the media police were, whether 
6DPLU6KDKRU-RKQ%LUWKLPVHOI¶+HFODLPVWKDWµ%LUWZDVSUHWW\UXWKOHVVLQWKHEHJLQQLQJ¶
and even goes so far as to suggest that Birt wanted every Panorama reporter fired: 
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T.M. I mean he sacked several.  Mike Cockerell was fired, Richard Lindley 
was fired, he wanted me fired, but other people wanted me kept there.  
 
D.M. He wanted you fired?  Do you know that? 
 
T.M. He wanted all the reporters fired.  He told Tim Gardam that he wanted 
every single reporter fired. 
(personal communication,  September 4, 2009) 
 
Martin Bell suggests, along with Born (2004) and Lindley (2000) that the BBC suffered a 
cROODSVHLQPRUDOHXQGHU%LUWZKLFKZDVRQO\UHFRYHUHGµXQGHUWKHSLUDWLFDOOHDGHUVKLSRI
*UHJ'\NH¶%HOOS6LPSVRQ (2002) echoes this sense of a µUHQDLVVDQFHLQVHOI-
HVWHHP¶ for the Corporation (p.227) under Dyke. 
 
+RUULHDQG&ODUNH¶VELRJUDSKLFDODFFRXQWRI'\NH¶VULVHWRSRZHUDQGHDUO\
leadership of the BBC verges on hagiography and presents an oddly uncritical contrast to 
their previous scathing work on %LUW¶s tenure at the BBC (1994) or to +RUULH¶VDFFRXQWRI 
PDQDJHPHQWRI0XUGRFK¶s tabloid paper The Sun (Chippindale and Horrie 1990). They 
GHVFULEHµVSRQWDQHRXVFKHHULQJLQSDUWVRIWKH%%&¶ZKHQKHZDVDSSRLQWHG+RUULHDQG
Clarke 2000, p.xii) and how most of the people they spoke to emphasized GrHJ'\NH¶V
abilities as a leader who ZDVIUHTXHQWO\GHVFULEHGDVEHLQJDQµLQVSLUDWLRQDO¶SHUVRQWRZRUN
ZLWKRUIRU+RUULHDQG&ODUNHS[L:KLOH'\NH¶VUHSXWDWLRQUHPDLQVDFRQWHQWLRXV
issue amongst BBC journalists there is evidence of his real popularity. For Simpson (2004) 
Greg DyNHDQG*DY\Q'DYLHVZHUHµWKHEHVWDQGPRVWVXFFHVVIXOFKDLUPDQGLUHFWRU-general 
partnership it has been my privilege to work for in thirty-HLJKW\HDUVDWWKH%%&¶S
Tim Luckhurst, writing in The Independent TXRWHVµRQHVHQLRUIRUPHUH[HFXWLYH¶Gescribing 
WKHGD\%LUWOHIWDVµlike the overthrow of a communist regime. Greg Dyke was the Lech 
Walesa of TelevisioQ&HQWUH¶ (1995, p.1). 
 
+RUULHDQG&ODUNHDOVRDWWULEXWHVRPHRI'\NH¶VSRSXODULW\WRWKHIDFWWKDWKHZDVVXFKD
EUHDNIURPWKHµFOLPDWHRIIHDU¶RI%LUWUHJLPH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'\NH¶VDSSRLQWPHQWPLJKWQRWKDYHSOD\HGZHOOLQWKH7RU\SDUW\RULQWKH
Wapping headquarters of The Times, but it was an immediate hit with most 
people in the BBC and with the overwhelming majority of people in the TV 
business. Quite apart from his various qualities, Dyke had one huge and 
overwhelming advantage as far as the troops were concerned ± he was not John 
Birt. (Michael Grade later compared the end of the Birt era to the finale of 
%HHWKRYHQ¶V)LGHOLRDVSULVRQHUVJURSHWKHLUZD\RXWRI3L]DUUR¶VGXQJHRQ
µEOLQGHGE\WKHXQDFFXVWRPHGVXQOLJKWWKHLU\HDUVRILQFDUFHUDWLRQEHKLQG
WKHP¶ 
(Horrie and Clarke 2000, p.273) 
 
+RUULHDQG&ODUNH¶VELRJUDSK\VXSSRUWVWKHSHUFHSWLRQDPRQJVWPDQ\REVHUYHUVWKDWLQD
number of ways, Dyke GURYHWKH%%&LQDOHVVµHOLWLVW¶PRUHµSRSXOLVW¶GLUHFWLRQWKDQ%LUW
had done, being more concerned with BBC ratings and that, consequently, he was willing 
to allow Panorama to be moved to what Tom Mangold (2004) and others regarded as a 
6XQGD\QLJKWµJUDYH\DUGVORW¶ 
 
-RKQ%LUWDQG*UHJ'\NH¶VRZQPHPRLUVOHFWXUHV
and articles provide useful, if often self-serving, accounts of their periods of control and are 
referenced in the research alongside the memoirs and work of previous Director Generals ± 
Alasdair Milne (1989); Ian Trethowan (1984); Hugh Carleton Greene (1969) ± and other 
senior BBC managers and staff ± including Hussey (2001); Cotton (2001); Wyatt (2003, 
2004); Wyndham-Goldie (1977) and Sambrook (2002, 2004). These, and numerous 
academic accounts, suggest that, historically, the Director General has been a decisive 
LQIOXHQFHRQWKH%%&¶VZLGHUFXOWXUHDQG1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUVLQSDUWLFXODUZLWK
some disagreement over the merits and negative qualities of those who have occupied the 
SRVLWLRQ&HUWDLQ'LUHFWRU*HQHUDOVDSSHDUDVPRUHµOLEHUDO¶ILJXUHVVXFKDV+XJK&DUleton 
Greene and Greg Dyke) while RWKHUVKDYHPRUHµFRQVHUYDWLYH¶UHSXWDWLRQV,DQ7UHWKRZDQ
and John Birt) (see Snoddy 2006). 
 
Whilst the influence of Director Generals is widely acknowledged, there is also a 
SHUFHSWLRQWKDWWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VVKHHUVL]HDQGORQJHYLW\KDYHDFWHGDVDQDQFKRUDJDLQVW
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VXGGHQRUGUDPDWLFFKDQJHV)RU-RKQ6LPSVRQµWKLVVWUDQJHKXJHO\SRZHUIXORUJDQLVDWLRQ
>«@VWD\VYHU\PXFKWKHVDPHZKRHYHULVLQFKDUJHDWWKHWRS¶S).   
 
4.2.2 Selection of journalists, background and class composition 
 
Another issue pertinent to the research questions which emerges as significant in much of 
the literature on the BBC is tKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VMRXUQDOLVWLFFXOWXUHDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK
this is shaped or influenced by the selection, background and gender/race/class composition 
of the journalists, senior producers and managers employed$FFXVDWLRQVRIµHOLWLVP¶DQGRI
dominance by an unrepresentative, disproportionately-high number of white, male, middle 
class, Oxford and Cambridge University-educated staff have been made from various 
quarters (see Burns 1977; Born 2004) although the charge has been qualified elsewhere 
(Tunstall 1993)5XSHUW0XUGRFK¶V0DF7DJJDUWOHFWXUHDWWKH(GLQEXUJK79IHVWLYDO
FRQGHPQHG%ULWLVKWHOHYLVLRQJHQHUDOO\DQGWKH%%&SDUWLFXODUO\RIEHLQJLQWKHµJULSRID
self-VHUYLQJ2[EULGJHHOLWH¶DQDFFXVDWLRQ<RUN8QLYHUVLW\-educated Director General 
Greg '\NHODWHUGLVPLVVHGDVµTXLWHIODWWHULQJ¶+RUULHDQG&ODUNHSGHVSLWHKLV
RZQFRQFHUQVDERXWWKH%%&¶VUDFLDOFRPSRVLWLRQ%%&$VLPLODUFKDUJHRIHOLWLVP
ZDVPDGHDJDLQVWWKH%%&E\5XSHUW¶VVRQ-DPHV0XUGRFKLQsee Wray and Gibson 
2006). 
 
Studies often separate the highly-paid, well-connected and influential journalists, producers 
and managers from regular BBC staff and junior journalists. For Stevenson (2002) the 
%%&¶VQHXWUDOLW\KDVEHHQFRPSURPLVHGLQSUDFWLFHSDUWO\E\DµEXUHDXFUDWLFHOLWH¶VLWWLQJDW
the apex of the %%&
VRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHZKLFKKDVLQKLVYLHZµtraditionally been 
drawn from those with privileged social backgrounds, whose definition of the public 
interest has tended to bear a close resemblance to that of the government of the day¶
(Stevenson 1995, p.63). 
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+DOOLQDQG0DQFLQLPRUHJHQHUDOO\QRWHWKDWµMRXUQDOLVWLFDQGDGPLQLVWUDWLYH
SURIHVVLRQDOLVPLQYROYHVLPLODUZRUOGYLHZV¶SZKLOH-RKQVWRQHet al. (1976) assert 
WKDWµWKRVHLQFKDUJH of mass communication tend to come from the same social strata as 
WKRVHLQFRQWURORIWKHHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOV\VWHPV¶FLWHG0F4XDLOSSome of 
the Panorama staff interviewed suggested that while moves were being made to address 
traditional ethnic and gender imbalances at the BBC, those efforts towards ensuring greater 
diversity do not give enough attention to the question of class. This was a complaint by 
former Panorama producer Gary Horne, one of a minority with strong northern, working-
class roots to have worked at Panorama at this level: 
 
2EYLRXVO\\RX¶YHJRWWRDGGUHVVWKHIDFWWKDWSHRSOHDUHUHSUHVHQWHGIURPWKRVH
[ethnic] communities, but ultimately, diversity in the newsroom is a 
SHUVSHFWLYHLW¶VDSRLQWRIYLHZLW¶VDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKLQJVWKDW¶VWKH
essential thing to have that intellectual diversity, based on experience and 
perspectives and viewpoints and all the rest of it.  And the class element of the 
diversity argument has been out of the equation for fifteen years.   
(Gary Horne, personal communication, October 10, 2007) 
 
Born (2005) also suggests that the BBC has its own class divisions, arguing that the 
institution is riven by contradictions: µ>«@DWRQFHOLEHUDODQGHOLWLVWDUURJDQWDQGIUDJLOHD
cornerstone of BritisKGHPRFUDF\\HWUHSOHWHZLWKLQWHUQDOKLHUDUFKLHVPLUURULQJ%ULWDLQ¶V
broader social inequalities¶(p.5). Echoing this point, one former Panorama staff member, 
who prefers to remain anonymous, complained about growing divisions at the BBC under 
Director General John Birt: 
 
The BBC pay scale used to be based on the Civil Service.  It was a flat pyramid.  
Under Birt things began to change quickly.  Birt had his own pay deal - Private 
Eye has the details.  Managers began to think what they would earn if they ran 
British Airways.  This once nationalised industry had become a Corporation.  
The pyramid's shape changed rapidly.  I suspect if you compare a Panorama 
producer's salary with the DG before Birt and afterwards you would find a 
fourfold difference.  Money matters because it has a symbolic power.   Big 
differences divide.  People think about what they earn rather than what they do. 
0RQH\XVHGLQWKLVZD\SURGXFHVDOONLQGVRIFKDQJHV>«@ 
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This was not the BBC I joined.  I remembered sitting down in the canteen in 
Lime Grove in the 1960's.  Even technicians had a voice.  Controllers ate their 
chips with us.  It was all first name stuff.  People knew each other and we 
talked about work and politics.  It was an open and collegiate society.  Birt and 
his apparatchiks arrived in fleets of black limos that hovered in the forecourt of 
White City.  They disappeared up lifts to dine with managers.  I think they 
dreaded bumping into 'the great unwashed,' the many who made programmes, 
became the enemy. 
(personal communication) 
 
 
The sense of an increasingly remote and authoritarian managerial structure can be found in 
much of the literature dealing with the Birt era, but questions about the class composition 
and rigidly hierarchical nature of the corporation have a long history (see Audit 1937). 
5HLUD¶VVWXG\RIWKH%%&SLFNVXSRQFRQFHUQVDERXWWKHFRPSRVLWLRQRIWKH%%&
Governors, concerns also expressed by Dyke and Milne in their memoirs. Burns (1977) is 
VWUXFNE\WKHSUHVHQFHRIDµ%%&W\SH¶ with a similar educational background (cited 
Chignell 2006, p.94-95). A detailed study by the Sutton Trust in 2006 confirmed the 
unrepresentative class composition of the leading news and current affairs journalists in 
Britain, at least judged by their educational background. It revealed that the majority of the 
FRXQWU\¶VµWRSMRXUQDOLVWV¶RIZKLFKWKH%%&KDGWKHPRVWHQWULHV± twenty-nine) were 
SULYDWHO\HGXFDWHGDQGWKDWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHµPDLQWDLQHGVHFWRU¶DPRQJVWWKLVHOLWH
group had declined since 1986: µ>«@in 2006 just 14% of the leading figures in journalism 
had been to comprehensive schools, which now HGXFDWHDOPRVWRIFKLOGUHQ¶(Sutton 
Trust 2006, p.2). Furthermore, the Sutton Trust study appears to offer a small measure of 
support for those complainiQJDERXWWKH%%&EHLQJLQµWKHJULS¶RIDQµ2[EULGJHHOLWH¶ZLWK
seven Oxford and six Cambridge-educated senior journalists identified of the twenty-seven 
who attended university (i.e. 48% µOxbridge¶ graduates). 
 
The Sutton Trust study, while important, requires some reservations. It only indicates the 
educational background of 100 well-known national journalist, of which the BBC accounts 
for twenty-nine (some of whom have worked at Panorama) a statistically insignificant 
QXPEHU7KH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VZLGHUUHFruitment targets or records were not made available to 
the researchers, despite the Sutton Trust using the Freedom of Information Act to attempt to 
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obtain this information. Importantly, the report acknowledges that the BBC has made 
efforts in recent years to widen the soFLDOEDFNJURXQGRILWVUHFUXLWVQRWLQJWKDWZKLOHµLQ
WKHSDVW¶WKH&RUSRUDWLRQµattracted a high proportion of prLYDWHVFKRROHGXFDWHGW\SHV>«@ 
now recruitment policies are geared to meet targets for employing staff from a range of 
backgURXQGV¶(Sutton Trust 2006, p.14). Furthermore, the figures revealed reflect 
recruitment policies at the time these senior journalists were hired, in some cases decades 
ago, rather than present recruitment patterns. Nevertheless, the Sutton Trust (2006) report 
does indicate broad tendencies in the educational backgrounds of many leading BBC 
MRXUQDOLVWVZKLFKVLJQLILFDQWO\DUHVKDUHGE\DPDMRULW\RI%ULWDLQ¶VOHDGLQJSROLWLFLDQVDQG
MPs (see Sutton Trust 2005).  
 
Interviews carried out for this study give some anecdotal support for this concern. 
Panorama reporter Paul Kenyon who graduated from Trent Polytechnic observes how 
difficult it was for him to get into the BBC twenty years ago and notes that traditionally the 
C.V.s of Panorama staff showed that they ZHQWWRµDSDUWLFXODUXQLYHUVLW\¶DQGWRµD
SDUWLFXODUSXEOLFVFKRRO¶ - µWKHQXPEHURISHRSOHZKRZHQWWR6W3DXO¶V6FKRROLQ
Panorama RULQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLVTXLWHH[WUDRUGLQDU\¶  Paul jokes about his embarrassment 
DWDWWHQGLQJSRO\WHFKQLFµ,W¶VDOPRVWOLNHDVZHDUZRUG¶DQGDGPLWV that he spent much of 
KLVFDUHHUµWU\LQJWRGLVRZQWKDWELW¶DERXWKLVHGXFDWLRQDOSDVW+RZHYHUKH argues that 
under Editor Sandy Smith there were attempts to move away from the white, middle-class, 
Oxbridge-educated image that Panorama had. (personal communication, April 27, 2007). 
)RUIXUWKHUGLVFXVVLRQRIWKH%%&¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV'HSDUWPHQW¶VVKLIWLQJFODVV
gender and ethnic composition see Tunstall 1971; Scannell 1996; Curran and Leys 2000; 
Tumber and Prentoulis 2003. 
 
4.2.3 Journalistic culture 
 
6RPHRIWKHOLWHUDWXUHVXJJHVWVWKDWWKHVHOHFWLRQDQGEDFNJURXQGRIWKH%%&¶VMRXUQDOLVWV
LVSDUWO\UHIOHFWHGLQWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFXUUHQW-affairs journalistic culture which is often 
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FKDUDFWHULVHGDVµHOLWLVW¶see McNair 1999; Chignell 2006) and too close to the political 
class it reports on to offer dispassionate and critical commentary. Conversely, there are 
IUHTXHQWGHVFULSWLRQVRI%%&MRXUQDOLVPDVEHLQJLQVRPHZD\µUHPRWH¶RUµGHWDFKHG¶IURP
WKHDIIDLUVRIµRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶GHVFULSWLRQVZKLFKFDQHYHQEHIRXQGLQWKHPHPRLUVRI
BBC journalists. Martin Bell describes the traditional news reports from the BBC World 
6HUYLFHDVEHLQJµGHOLYHUHGLQWKHWRQHVRIWKHRIILFHUFODVV¶DQGKDYLQJ µa distinctive 
character -- cautious, Olympian, evenhanded, passionless, and strangely remote - as if it 
were reporting events on another planet (Bell 2003, p.154-155). Senior political 
correspondent John Sergeant, reflecting on his own experience of joining the BBC, 
suggests thDWWKHHOLWLVPDQGµ2O\PSLDQGHWDFKPHQW¶ZLWKZKLFKQHZVZDVUHSRUWHGKDGLWV
roots in the earliest history of the Corporation: 
 
I discovered that the BBC was a world of its own; many senior members of the 
staff were convinced that anything which might carry too much of a flavour of 
ordinary life was better left outside the imposing entrance of Broadcasting 
House. It was more than 40 years since the first director-general, Lord Reith, 
had decreed that staff who divorced could no longer be employed, and the days 
of announcers in dinner jackets and long since passed, but the impression was 
still given that you have signed up to an exclusive club and the sooner you 
adapted to its rules and manners the better.  
(Sergeant 2001, p.105) 
 
+RZHYHUµHOLWLVP¶DQGFRPSromise with the political establishment were not qualities 
unique to the BBC, particularly before the establishment of Channel 4 in 1982, according to 
Anthony Smith former BBC current affairs editor. In his view all British broadcasting 
institutions in the 1970s were hierarchical and self-important: 
 
>«@HPERG\LQJDQHWKRVWKDWLQIRUPHGDOOWKHLUDFWLRQDQGXWWHUDQFHVWKH\ZHUH
licensed by the state to fulfil a conformist and consensual role. Competing with 
each other in theory, in practice their output converged towards a norm. The 
institutions, unconsciously almost, schooled their staff to think safe and 
produce predictable work; bureaucracy lay heavy upon them. 
(cited Isaacs 1989, p.5) 
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This view commonly persists in critical academic studies of broadcast institutions. 
According to Corner (citing studies by Schlesinger (1978), Ericson et al., (1987) and Jacobs 
(1996)), there is a strand of workplace ethnographies which has opened up a broader 
theoretical agenda about the construction of public knowledge along these lines (Corner 
1998, p.160-7KH)UHQFKVRFLRORJLVW3LHUUH%RXUGLHXZULWHVRIDµMRXUQDOLVWLF
ILHOG¶GHILQHGDVµDPLFURFRVPZKLFKKDVLWVRZQUXOHVZKLFKLVFRQVWLWXWHGDXWRQRPRXVO\
and which cannot be understood from external factorV¶%RXUGLHX cited Marlière 1998, 
p.222-:LWKLQWKLVµILHOG¶DWWHQWLRQLVIRFXVHGTXLWHµF\QLFDOO\¶RQWKHPDQRHXYUHVRI
politicians, but the political establishment nevertheless depends on this attention to promote 
LWVULVLQJVWDUV7KLVµMRXUQDOLVWLFILHOG¶ 
 
>«@EHFRPHVDFDXFXVLQFUHDVLQJO\UHVSRQVLEOHIRUPDNLQJERWKSROLWLFLDQV
and their reputations.  In this exclusive attention to the political "microcosm" 
and to the facts and effects that can be attributed to it, tends to produce a break 
with the public, [especially] with those segments of the public most concerned 
with the real consequences of these political positions on their lives and on 
society at large.  This break is duplicated and greatly reinforced, particularly in 
the case of journalism's big television stars, by the social distance that comes 
with high economic and social status. 
(Bourdieu 1998, p. 5) 
 
%RXUGLHX¶VQRWLRQRIDµMRXUQDOLVWLFILHOG¶KHOSVVKHGOLJKWRQµKLGGHQIRUPVRIGRPLQDWLRQ¶ 
exercised by television (Marlière 19S%RXUGLHX¶VWKHRU\RIWKHµILHOG¶LVD
complex one and it is not the intention to engage in a detailed way with this theory here. It 
LVZRUWKQRWLQJKRZHYHUWKDW%RXUGLHXDUJXHVWKDWWHOHYLVLRQLVQRWDµIUHH¶PHGLXPVLQFHLW
is constantly the oEMHFWRIµFHQVRUVKLS¶IURPWKHSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFILHOGV0DUOLqUH
1998). This view is understandable given the particular context of French broadcasting 
institutions and their relationship to the French state (see Adamou, Gaillard and Mustata 
2008).  
 
Nevertheless, the notion of a predictable, consensual journalistic mindset has been 
recognised even within the BBC (BBC 2007b) and the desirability of challenging 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOµJURXS-WKLQN¶KDVJDLQHGVRPHUHFRJQLWLRQLQUHFHQW\HDUV7KLVLVSLFNHGXSLn 
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discussion with a former Panorama producer Eamonn Matthews who now runs his own 
documentary production company Quicksilver: 
 
I think the other difference if you're working outside the BBC is that clearly, 
again, as John's [Bridcut] recent report [BBC 2007b] dealt with, there can be 
GDQJHURIµJURXS-WKLQN¶ZLWKLQDQ\RUJDQLVDWLRQ1RWMXVWWKH%%&EXWDQ\
RUJDQLVDWLRQ\RXNQRZ«XQLYHUVLWLHV:KHUHHYHU\RQHKDVDVLPLODULVKYLHZRI
the world, or in the BBC because of the newsroom agenda and so on certain 
stories can get pushed to the fore, which perhaps aren't so relevant to the 
audience and other stories will get pushed to the back. 
(personal communication,  June 27, 2007) 
 
+RZPLJKWZHFKDUDFWHUL]HWKHFDWHJRU\RIMRXUQDOLVPWREHIRXQGZLWKLQWKH%%&¶V1Hws 
and Current Affairs Departments and more specifically at Panorama? Is there a distinct and 
XQLILHGµMRXUQDOLVWLFILHOG¶DVHWRIZRUNLQJSUDFWLFHVDVVXPSWLRQVDQGUHODWLRQVWRSRZHU
that mark the programme out from other current affairs series? Is there evidence of 
FRPSOLDQWMRXUQDOLVPUHPDLQLQJZLWKµDFFHSWDEOH¶SDUDPHWHUVRIGHEDWH, or what Hallin has 
GHVFULEHGDVWKHµ6SKHUHRI&RQVHQVXV¶? Or does the title Panorama provide an umbrella 
for various approaches, traditions of journalism and particular world views that defies such 
neat categorization? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[BLANK PAGE] 
 59 
4.3 Current Affairs 
4.3.1. Definitions and origins 
,QDUHSRUWRQµ7KH3URYLVLRQRI&XUUHQW$IIDLUV¶SXEOLVKHGE\2IFRPµcurrent 
affairs programming¶ is defined as: 
 
A programme which contains explanation and analysis of current events and 
ideas, including material dealing with political or industrial controversy or 
with public policy.  Also included are investigative programmes with 
contemporary significance. 
(p.2) 
This, a verbatim quotation from the BBC¶V own official definition, exemplifies many of 
the Corporation¶VµFODVVLFFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHVVXFKDVPanorama, Question 
Time, File on Four and )URP2XU2ZQ&RUUHVSRQGHQW¶ (BBC 2006b, p.1). However, 
uQOLNHWKHWHUPVµGRFXPHQWDU\¶RUµQHZV¶ZLWKZKLFKLWVKDUHVRYHUODSSLQJFRQFHUQV, 
µcurrent affairs¶LVQRWDFDWHJRU\ZLGHO\HPSOR\HGRUXQGHUVWRRGEH\RQGWKH8QLWHG
Kingdom and, even amongst British academics, institutions and practitioners there 
appear some vague and uneven applications of the generic designation, if not 
fundamental uncertainty as to its exact meaning (see Goddard et al. 2001; Corner 2006). 
2IFRP¶V&XUUHQW$IIDLUV$XGLWIRULQVWDQFHas summarised in their (2006) report 
includes Question Time, The Money Programme and 999 Frontline (p.10-11), yet 
H[FOXGHV%%&¶VNewsnight, Sunday AM and The Daily Politics from many of their 
calculations of current affairs provision µEHFDXVHWKH\DUHclassified by the BBC as news 
or politics even though they contain some current affairs style analysis¶ (p.12). Such 
definitional issues are significant in this case as it excludes 166 hours of programming 
in the sixth month period reviewed.  Confusion over the term appears to dog the report 
with programmes such as The Daily Politics and Sunday AM both excluded and 
included in the definition on the same page without any clear rationale (p.10). Possible 
FRQIXVLRQIRUWHOHYLVLRQDXGLHQFHVLVDOVRLQGLFDWHGE\2IFRP¶VDXGLHQFHUHVHDUFK
ZKLFKVKRZHGWKDWµYLHZHUVWHQGHGWRGHILQHFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPLQJTXLWHZLGHO\
citing examples such as Have I Got News for You and -DPLH¶V6FKRRO'LQQHUVas 
SURJUDPPHVWKDWWKH\IHOWKDGFXUUHQWDIIDLUVYDOXHV¶S2IFRP¶Vresponse to 
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apparent confusion over the meaning of current affairs is the introduction of a new 
µJHQUHWUDFNHU¶ZKLFKDOORZVIRUµFURVVgenre programming and therefore will enable 
VXFKSURJUDPPLQJWRKDYHERWKDSULPDU\FODVVLILFDWLRQDQGDVHFRQGDU\FODVVLILFDWLRQ¶
This dual classificationLQWHQGHGWRµPRUHDFFXUDWHO\UHIOHFWWKHUDQJHRISURJUDPPLQJ
with current affairs elements or valXHV¶,ELG, may explain many of the apparently 
contradictory passages in the report. 
 
Amongst academics there appears to be some hesitation to commit to a stated definition 
of current affairs. The form is usually explained through example and developing 
practice with reference to such well-known series such as Panorama, This Week/TV 
Eye, World in Action and Dispatches (Channel 4 1987-), or through its difference to 
news and documentary, rather than on its own clear-cut terms (see Tunstall 1993; 
Creeber 2001; Bignell 2004; de Burgh 2008). Holland (2000) identifies the core 
objectives of current affairs when she describes long-running series such as Panorama 
and This Week DVSURYLGLQJµa model of journalist-led programmes whose aim was to 
address the news and the political agenda in greater depth than the news bulletins 
DOORZHG¶SThis comes as close to a definition of the form as can be found in the 
mass of material written on British news and current affairs output, even amongst the 
few recent studies primarily focussed on particular current affairs series (see Curran 
2000; Lindley 2003; Holland 2006; Corner 2006; Goddard 2006; Goddard et al. 2001, 
2007; Gaber 2008; de Burgh 2008a, 2008b, 2008c, 2008d). Reluctance to employ a 
working definition extends to a suspicion of the term in Goddard et al.¶Vstudy of World 
in Action which frequently employs the description µcurrent affairs¶ for µthis particular 
type of television series¶, yet argues WKHWHUPµGRFXPHQWDU\MRXUQDOLVP¶ZKLOH
µDZNZDUG¶EHWWHUGHVFUibes the two central ingredients which µprovided the basis for the 
category of work in which World in Action achieved its success¶S. The authors 
further distance World in Action from the category µFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶LQWKHWLWOHRIWKHLU
study µ3XEOLF issue television: World in Action, 1963-¶ For the authors the term 
FXUUHQWDIIDLUVLVµthe most obvious, because most used label¶IRUWKLVNLQGRIZRUNEXW
DUHFOHDUO\XQFRPIRUWDEOHZLWKWKHWHUP¶VLPSUHFLVLRQ 
 
Current affairs is essentially a description of content and its way of 
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indicating news-related themes carries what has often been seen as a very 
British ring of the off-hand and the vague. 
(Ibid) 
The lack of an entry for the term µFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶as a televisual form in the Oxford 
English Dictionary [see OED online 2009] (unlike say, µdocumentary¶ or µsoap opera¶) 
is further indication of semantic and definitional uncertainty which can be traced back 
to WKHWHUP¶V earliest use. This is found in debates at the BBC in the early 1950s led by 
Grace Wyndham Goldie, then a producer in the Television Talks Department, and 
Richard Dimbleby who had made his reputation as a radio reporter in the war and who 
ZDVDWWHPSWLQJWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKHµLPPHGLDWHQHZV¶RIWKHQHZVUHHOWKH
µSHUPDQHQWQHZV¶RI WKHGRFXPHQWDU\DQGµFXUUHQWQHZV¶IRUZKLFKQRIRUPDV\HW
existed (Schlesinger 1987, p.43). $V6FKOHVLQJHU¶VIRRWQRWHVH[SODLQWKHFRQFHSW
µFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶DVUHIHUHQWRIDGLVWLQFWLYHIRUPRItelevision programming first 
appeared in the 1960 BBC HandbRRNVKRUWO\DIWHU+XJK*UHHQH¶VDSSRLQWPHQWLQ
1959. &XUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHVDUHODEHOOHGLQWKH+DQGERRNDVµWKHZLGHUDQJHRI
WRSLFDOSURJUDPPHV¶ZKLFKDUHµLQVRPHVHQVHFRPSOHPHQWDU\WRWKHQHZVEXOOHWLQV¶ 
(cited Schlesinger 1987, p.276). 
 
SchlesinJHU¶VFODVVLFVWXG\RI%%&1HZVILUVWZULWWHQLQLQFOXGHVDGHWDLOHG
discussion of the news/current affairs distinction which, at the time of writing, involved 
DFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHµZHOO-established orthodoxy regarding the division of journalistic 
ODERXULQEURDGFDVWLQJ¶ (p.247) between fact and comment. While such an absolute 
GLVWLQFWLRQLVIRUWKHDXWKRUµSKLORVRSKLFDOO\GXELRXV¶KHQRWHVµLWVLQVWLWXWLRQDOUHDOLW\
DWWKH%%&LVLQHVFDSDEOH¶GHVSLWHWKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQVDSSDUHQWLQSUDFWLFH of attempting 
to separate fact from value: 
 
News is supposedly about fact alone, current affairs coverage providing for 
explicit evaluation, commentary, contextualisation, informed speculation.  
The news correspondent, however, has an official brief as a kind of 
analyst/commentator, albeit in a very low-key style.  While the public image 
sought in such news evaluation is neutral, and the correspondents are 
generally low on personal charisma (unlike current affairs 'stars'), it is clear 
that the role itself, even in the BBC's questionable terms, is one which mixes 
the retailing of fact with evaluation.  The overall justifying account 
underlying the news/current affairs distinction is therefore weak, 
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undermined by internal organisational arrangements themselves. 
(Schlesinger 1987, p.247) 
 
 
6FKOHVLQJHU¶VDFFRXQWKHUHDQGKLVGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHGLVWLQFWµDttributes of news and 
current affairs in newsroom thinking¶ (Ibid, p.249-253) helps underline that while such 
distinctions were weak in 1977, they grew weaker over time, particularly following 
%LUW¶Vreorganisation of News and Current Affairs Divisions after his appointment in 
1987 (see Blumer and Gurevitch 1995) and have very much reduced force today. 
Contemporary British news programmes - whether the µrolling¶ news of Sky News 
(1989-) and BBC News 24 (1997-) or the in-depth reporting of Channel 4 News (1982-), 
BBC 4 News (2002-) and More 4 News (2005-) - provide far more µinterpretation¶, 
µanalysis¶, µbackground¶ and µopinion¶WKDQ6FKOHVLQJHU¶VVFKHPDVXJJests and in 
much greater volume (see Tunstall 1993; McNair 2003b). Furthermore, news 
FRUUHVSRQGHQWVDUHDVOLNHO\WRSRVVHVVµFKDULVPD¶$QGUHZ0DUU as political editor until 
2005 or Robert Peston as business editor come to mind) as any on-camera faces in 
current affairs today (see discussion of personalities below). Contemporary news 
programmes, such as GMTV (1993-) RUWKH%%&¶VBreakfast (2000-), also regularly 
include aspects of µentertainment¶ as well as µinformation¶, such as the inclusion of 
celebrity news and cultural reviews, further distancing contemporary news provision 
from that described by Schlesinger. Hence, iIWKHµHVWDEOLVKHGRUWKRGR[\¶UHJDUGLQJWKH
division of labour in broadcasting between objective, factual reporting, balanced and 
impartial commentary DQGµRSLQLRQ¶was opaque or under stress thirty years ago, it is far 
more so today (see McNair 2003a, 2003b).  
 
On occasion the difficulty in discerning EHWZHHQµREMHFWLYHUHSRUWLQJ¶µLPSDUWLDO
FRPPHQW¶DQGµRSLQLRQ¶KDVDOORZHG governments, the popular press and other vested 
interests to attack broadcasters and, most often, the BBC accusing the Corporation of 
partiality or lack of objectivity (see Leapman 1987; Moore 2003; Seaton 2003; Gaber et 
al. 2009). Significantly for this study, current affairs programmes have borne the brunt 
of some of the most sustained criticisms, including attacks against Panorama (see 
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Lindley 2003a; Bolton 1990; Leapman 1986); This Week (see Bolton 1990; Holland 
2006) and World in Action (see Goddard et al. 2007) (see discussion on impartiality 
below).  
 
The continuing erosion of boundaries between news and current affairs may partly 
explain the confusion over definitional issues which for Stewart Purvis, broadcast media 
professor at London's City University and former chief executive of ITN, lies at the root 
RIFRQFHUQVDERXWZKDWPDQ\KDYHDUJXHGLVDµFULVLV¶LQWHOHYLVLRQFXUUHQWDIIDLUV 
 
[..] if you call it [current affairs] topical journalism I think it is in one of its 
healthiest states for years.  Some of it is defined as current affairs and tends 
to be branded programmes, such as Panorama and Dispatches, but there is 
so much other journalism popping up in other places. 
(cited Snoddy 2007a, p.23) 
Claims for the abundance of current affairs and discussion of the blurred boundaries 
between different types of factual television are not especially new. As long ago as 
1993, Executive Producer of World in Action, Charles Tremayne, was arguing that the 
YLHZHUZDVµQRZEHWWHUVHUYHGWKDQHYHU¶ in current affairs and documentaries. 
Tremayne compared WKHµHDUO\GD\V¶RIMXVWWKUHHFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHVRQWZR
channels: Panorama, This Week and World in Action (broadcast historians might 
dispute this claim) against a list of ten programmes on four terrestrial channels: 
Dispatches, On the Record, The Money Programme, Public Eye, Channel 4 News, The 
Big Story, Assignment, Inside Story, Newsnight and First Tuesday as well as ten more 
VHULHVµZKLFKRIWHQFRPSHWHLQWKHVDPHWHUULWRU\¶ Heart of the Matter, Cutting Edge, 
Everyman, On the Line, The Cook Report, 40 Minutes, Secret History, Timewatch, 
Horizon and Nature (1993, p.18). Tremayne also explained that the dramatic decline in 
foreign coverage in current affairs was due to the introduction of electronic news 
gathering and portable satellite technology which meant that news bulletins could 
transmit images from locations around the world within minutes of being shot. Former 
BBC Director General Greg Dyke also identifies technology as the key reason for what 
he describes aVQHZV¶Vµtriumph¶RYHUFXUUHQWDIIDLUV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GD: When I came to the BBC there was an historic battle between news and 
current affairs. By the time I left news had won. Current affairs had become 
less and less important. Had less and less resources 
 
DM: Why do you think it became less important? 
 
GD: Oh, I think the technology of news meant it took over. If you watch 
>%%&@+RXU1HZV\RX¶YHJRWDOOWKDWLQIDFWYHU\IHZSHRSOHZDWFK
Hour News. The actual audiences are tiny. For 24 Hour News, I think the 
technology, the ability to be there became so much easier. 
(personal communication,  October 16, 2009) 
 
The expansion of broadcast news provision that has accompanied the development of 
cable and satellite television, including the availability of 24-hour news channels 
provided by the BBC, ITN and Sky is evidence, for McNair (2003b) that more 
broadcasting journalism is available to the British viewer than ever before DQGWKDWµWKH
SURVSHFWVIRUSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWMRXUQDOLVP>«@DUHJRRG¶S. The author 
acknowledges, however, that the expansion in provision has been accompanied by the 
need to maximise ratings in a much more commercial and competitive environment. 
:KLOHFKDOOHQJLQJWKHPRUHSHVVLPLVWLFµQDUUDWLYHVRIGHFOLQH¶DQGDFFXVDWLRQVRI
µGXPELQJGRZQ¶ZKLFKKDYHGULYHQmany of the debates on news and current affairs 
provision in the 21st Century, McNair admits that there has been a broad µVKLIWLQ
content away from the in-depth, often critical investigative journalism for which British 
public service broadcasting has been internationally renowned, towards the racier style 
characteristic of the tabloids¶,ELGSVHH%DUQHWWet al. 2000 for a discussion of the 
WHUPVµWDEORLG¶DQGµEURDGVKHHW¶DQGDGHWDLOHGVWXG\LQYHVWLJDWLQJFKDUJHVWKDW British 
television news between 1977-ZHQWµGRZQPDUNHW¶. The threat to current affairs 
posed by the proliferation of news programmes and analysis and the difficulty of 
maintaining audience ratings is raised repeatedly in interviews conducted for this 
research, as in the following comment by Michael Crick: 
 
:HOO,WKLQNFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLVLQGHHSWURXEOH>«@WKHSUREOHPLVWKDWLWLV
constantly squeezed by the explosion there has been in news programmes, 
both in television and radio in the last twenty-five years and the fact that 
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Newsnight and Channel 4 News are so much more powerful. I mean when 
Panorama began there was no bloody competition from anywhere really 
and then ITV had World in Action and This Week and there was some 
competition there and noZLW¶VYHU\GLIILFXOWIRUWKHSRRUEXJJHUVRXWWKHUH
to think of an item that they can work on for three months and be confident 
that nobody will scoop them on it. They are finding it increasingly difficult 
to find a role for themselves and they are finding it increasingly difficult to 
maintain audiences with 24 hour news and a lot more analysis in your basic 
QHZVSURJUDPPHVDVZHOOWKHQLQHR¶FORFNWKHWHQR¶FORFNQHZVWKHVL[
R¶FORFNQHZV7KHIXWXUHIRUFXUUHQWDIIDLUVGRHVQRWORRNEULJKW+DYLQJ
said that the new editions of Panorama DWR¶FORFNRQD0RQGD\QLJKWDUH
doing well but clearly they have had to be more populist and downmarket a 
ELW« 
(personal communication,  February 16, 2007) 
7KHSKUDVHµSRSXOLVW¶LVXVHGE\PDQ\RIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHVIRr this research to describe 
the post-2006 Panorama relaunched under Sandy Smith as Editor, although not always 
LQDQHJDWLYHFRQWH[W-RKQ:DUH¶VGLSORPDWLFFRPPHQWVDUHW\SLFDORIKRZWKHVKLIW
was viewed by several reporters: 
JW: I think they have become PRUHSRSXOLVWEXW,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWWKDW¶VD
EDGWKLQJ,¶YHDYRLGHGLQDQ\WKLQJ,¶YHVDLGXVLQJWKHZRUGVµGXPEHG
GRZQ¶EHFDXVH,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHSURJUDPPHVPanorama have put out so far 
are dumb at all. They are perfectly decent programmes. I think if the trend 
continues they will be a little too predictable for my taste, a little 
XQDPELWLRXV,PHDQ\RXNQRZWDJJLQJKDYHDJRKHURHV,9)FOLQLFV,W¶V
DOOJRRGDQGLPSRUWDQWFRQVXPHULVWVWXIIEXWLWLVQ¶WUHDOO\FRXQWHULQWXLWLYH
none of it is icRQRFODVWLFDQGFHUWDLQO\QRQHRILWLVZKDW,FDOOµELJVWDWHPHQW
79¶ZKLFKLVZKDW,¶PPRUHLQWHUHVWHGLQDQGZKDW,WKLQNWKHROG
Panorama used to do occasionally quite well, but too often badly. 
 
 
4.3.2. Genre boundaries, objectivity and impartiality 
Alongside the so-called µWDEORLGLVDWLRQ¶RIFXUrent affairs (see Sparks and Tulloch 2000) 
there has been continued blurring of the distinctions between current affairs, 
GRFXPHQWDU\DQGRWKHUIDFWXDODQGµUHDOLW\¶JHnres (a hugely complex area which this 
thesis can only touch on). This has manifested itself in various ways, but at an 
institutional level %RUQQRWHVµDWHQVHUHODWLRQVKLS¶EHWZHHQBBC Documentaries 
and Current Affairs (the departments). Her interviews with senior executives and 
producers from both departments expose rivalry and territorial ambition between a 
small, underfunded Documentaries µpunching above its weight¶ in terms of impact and 
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ratings and eager to take on Current Affairs on its own jealously guarded µSDWFK¶, 
LQFOXGLQJµPDLQVWUHDPSROLWLFV¶. One senior executive boasts how they PDGHDµEULOOLDQW¶ 
documentary on a pensions bill going through the Commons:  
 
,I&XUUHQW$IIDLUVKDGGRQHLWLWZRXOGKDYHJRWWKLVJRWPLOOLRQ>«@
The film speaks more about what makes politicians tick, the Tory Party, the 
DSS, than any Panorama,FDQ¶WWKLQNRIRQHJUHDW&XUUHQW$IIDLUVVHULHV
yet they have millions ring-IHQFHG,GRQ¶WKDYHDQ\JXDUDQWHHGPRQH\:H
should be allowed to fight those bastards for the money and slots. All I want 
is to be able to pitch for the territory. 
(cited Born 2004, p.402) 
The interviews with staff from Documentaries and Current Affairs, as with so many 
conducted by Born, are very revealing of the perceived roles and distinct output of each 
department, as well as underlying tensions, rivalries and power relations within the 
Corporation. Another executive producer in Documentaries points to an µanxious¶, 
bureaucratic structure in Current Affairs constantly ZRUU\LQJDERXWWKHµSROLWLFDO
UHSHUFXVVLRQV¶RISURJUDPPHVLQWKHZDNHRI%LUW¶VUHIRUPV (p.401). The unnamed 
producer wonders how Documentaries was unscathed by these reforms since, s/he 
argues, Real Lives and all the trouble it drew from the government came from 
Documentaries. The low opinion Current Affairs is held in by the producer is made 
explicit: 
 
&XUUHQW$IIDLUVGRQ¶WEHQHILWIURPDGLDORJXHZLWKWKHRXWVLGH; they could 
have more independent production in their strands, and it would be 
UHLQYLJRUDWLQJ7KH\¶UHREVHVVHGZLWKULJRXUWKH\WDONDORWDERXt being 
³MRXUQDOLVWLFDOO\VRXQG´,W¶VDOOLQWKHWRQHQHXWHUHGDXWKRULWDWLYHWKDW
³FRYHUVWKHZKROHVWRU\´WKDWFODLPVVRPHVHQVHRI³REMHFWLYLW\´ZKDWHYHU
that means. And you have a much bigger hierarchy in Current Affairs than 
in Documentaries. [original emphasis] 
(Ibid) 
The rather contemptuous language employed here disguises deeper parallels between 
WKHSURGXFHU¶VYLHZRIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVDQGa long history of critical academic discourse 
WKDWKDVGUDZQDWWHQWLRQWRµWKHP\WKRIREMHFWLYLW\¶ pervading broadcast journalism and 
the subtle culture of compliance and control particularly characteristic of the BBC 
(Mattleart 1972; Schlesinger 1992; Eldridge 1993; Philo 1995a, 2002; Tumber and 
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Prentoulis 2003). For Garnham (for instance) writing more than thirty years ago, this is 
achieved through recruitment, training DQGWKHLQFXOFDWLRQRIµ(VWDEOLVKPHQW¶YDOXHV and 
VWDQGDUGVµdefined as impartiality and objectivity in factual coverage of political and 
social affairs¶ (1978, p.31). The author then makes clear that a major mechanism for 
ensuring such µ(VWDEOLVKPHQW¶VWDQGDUGVLVWKHµUHIHUULQJ-XS¶SURFHVV 
 
This process gives to the producer the illusion of freedom while in fact 
inhibiting the exercise of that freedom.  A good producer learns to avoid 
worrying his [sic] over-worked boss by keeping off troublesome areas.  If he 
refers up too often he will be accused of lacking individual initiative.  If, on 
the other hand, he oversteps the mark without having referred up he will be 
labelled as irresponsible and will rapidly, in the words of an official BBC 
memo on Current Affairs coverage, 'use up all his creditworthiness'. 
(Ibid, p.32) 
 
*DUQKDP¶V sceptical account is worth contrasting briefly with former Panorama Editor 
5REHUW5RZODQG¶VSUDLVHIRUWKH
XSZDUGVUHIHUHQFH
SURFHVVRUµGHYROYHG
UHVSRQVLELOLW\¶DWPanorama in the 1960s, which he places at the heart of the success of 
the programme at that time: 
 
This was rarely defined, but all producers were expected to have an instinct 
for knowing when they needed advice, or when those senior to them needed 
to know that a course of action would be initiated which might need 
approval.  BBC staff selection processes probably underpinned the relative 
security of the system, together with a sense of pride in working for 
Panorama and the BBC which many of us felt and which we would not 
abuse.  Great freedom was given 'down the line'.  With that freedom went 
great trust.  And that trust was rarely unaccompanied with a sense of 
responsibility to the well-being of the corporation.  Trust given down the 
line was reciprocated by a transactional loyalty. 
(Rowland 2000, p.162) 
7KHµUHODWLYHVHFXULW\¶RIWKHV\VWHPWKDW5RZODQGUHIHUVWRVXJJHVWVWKDWµHUURUVRI
MXGJHPHQW¶FRQWLQXHd to occur from time to time, but were minimised by careful 
recruitment, training and loyalty to the Corporation. From all the interviews conducted 
with Panorama staff for this study a deep commitment to the Corporation continues to 
motivate current affairs producers and reporters, partly stemming from professional 
pride in the independence granted to those working on the Panorama team. This 
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independence is based on a very strong awareness of the responsibility to µbalanced and 
impartial¶, µfactually accurate¶ DQGµULJRURXV¶reporting which interviewees stress 
underpins their work as journalists and producers. A view that is repeated in many of 
the interviews conducted for this research is that if a report is factually accurate and 
gives fair space to different perspectives on an argument then no topic or vested interest 
is off limits, up to and including large corporations, the Government and the BBC itself. 
Panorama producer Mike Rudin comments as follows: 
 
>«@,PHDQ,¶GSRLQWWRWKHSURJUDPPHZHGLGDERXWWKH+XWWRQ5HSRUW
,¶PDOZD\Vamazed about how much freedom you get to make programmes 
DWWKH%%&3HRSOHIURPRXWVLGHDOZD\VVHHLWDV\RXNQRZZH¶UH
FRQWUROOHGDQGZHGRQ¶WJHWFKDQFHVWRPDNH,PHDQLW¶Vremarkable how 
much freedom you get.  Basically you get the chance to go off and spend 
several months doing something and at the end of it you have to justify what 
\RX¶YHGRQHLQ\RXUFRQFOXVLRQEXW\RX¶UHJLYHQDUHPDUNDEOHDPRXQWRI
freedom. 
(interviewed 15-06-2009) 
Former Panorama Deputy Editor Andy Bell (BBC Editorial Complaints) gives an 
example of a Panorama investigation of alleged corruption in the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) which the Corporation defended despite µKXJH¶pressure from the IOC 
to drop the case (presentation to Investigative Journalism Conference, University of 
Westminster, 13 June 2008). Similarly, John WareDOWKRXJKµXQGHUSUHVVXUHWRJHWLW
ULJKW¶ describes the freedom he was granted in reporting on alleged government and 
%%&¶VIDLOXUHVRYHUWKH*LOOLJDQ-Kelly affair in Panorama¶V A Fight to the Death [tx: 
21-01-04]: 
 
-:>«@7KHSUHVVXUHWRJHWLWULJKWDQGWREHIDLUZDVHQRUPRXVREYLRXVO\
because you knew you were going to be judged by your peers and if the tone 
RIWKHSURJUDPPHGLGQ¶WULQJEHOOVIRUVHQLRU%%&PDQDJHPHQWWKHQWKH\
were never going to trust anything else you did, because they would know 
in their heart of hearts if what you said was true or not, or fair or not. And 
DFWXDOO\WKHILUVWSHUVRQWRFDOOPHDQG,¶OOQHYHUIRUJHWLWDIWHUWKH
transmission of that programme was in many ways the person against whom 
many of the criticisms had been directed. 
 
DM: Greg Dyke? 
 
-:1RODXJKV«5LFKDUG6DPEURRN,PHDQ5LFKDUGLQWKHVHQVHWKDWKH
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had been, I think, too trusting of Gilligan. 
(Interviewed 19-02-07) 
Ware goes on to say that althRXJK'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO*UHJ'\NHZDVUHSRUWHGO\µOLYLG¶
he did not put any pressure on Ware after the broadcast. Writing in 2004, Ware also 
argues that the circumstances of the making of µA Fight to the Death¶ and the reaction to 
the transmission by senior H[HFXWLYHVZDVDµSRZHUIXOWHVWLPRQ\WRWKHKHDOWKRIWKH
%%&
VSXEOLFVHUYLFHHWKRVRIREMHFWLYLW\¶%RWK6DPEURRNDQG'DPL]HUZKRDUH
FULWLFLVHGLQ:DUH¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQWHOHSKRQHG KLPµTXLWHLQGHSHQGHQWO\¶VWUDLJKWDIWHU
WUDQVPLVVLRQµ%oth said that while they did not accept all our conclusions, it was clear 
we done our best to be objective and fair.  "I don't have a complaint," said Sambrook.  
³:HOOGRQH´¶(Ware 2004, p.15). 
 
The extent to which µEDODQFH¶DQGµREMHFWLYLW\¶DUH regarded as defining characteristics 
of Panorama is, to some degree, bound up in notional understanding of the current 
affairs form as well as legal requirements placed upon British broadcasters and the 
%%&¶VSDUWLFXODUSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJµUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶7KHVHUHVSRnsibilities, 
KLVWRULFDOO\LQFOXGHGWKHGXW\WRVHWRXWµLPSDUWLDOO\REMHFWLYHO\ZLWKWKHPRVWULJLG
standards of accuracy to ensure that the idea of the British nation as an informed 
GHPRFUDF\VKDOOEHQRWDQLGHDOEXWDUHDOLW\¶%%&FLWHG%ULJJVD, p.615).  
Holland (2000) explains how the exercise of µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶LVFUXFLDOWRbroadcast 
authorities¶ distinctions between news, documentary and current affairs. News µcarries 
the authority of the broadcaster, and so must be seen to be neutral and without editorial 
voice¶; current affairs, µcarries the authority of the programme team, and so may express 
carefully balanced editorial opinion, supported by eYLGHQFH¶DXWKRUHGGRFXPHQWDU\, in 
which the individual reporter is named, allows the expression of µPRUHH[WUHPHDQG
LGLRV\QFUDWLFRSLQLRQV¶S  
 
The legal framework in which current affairs operates is laid out, for the BBC, in Clause 
13 (7) of its Licence and Agreement which forbids the Corporation from broadcasting 
its own opinions on current affairs and matters of public policy (see Creeber 2001). This 
regulatory requirement is codified in a series of detailed instructions contained in the 
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%%&¶V3URGXFHU and Editorial Guidelines which, in 2004, describes µDFFXUDWHURbust, 
independent, and impDUWLDOMRXUQDOLVP¶DVWKHµ'1$RIWKH%%&¶FLWHG6WDUNH\
p.99) and which were substantially updated in 2005 following µWKH%%&¶VELJJHVW
editorial crisis, the Gilligan-.HOO\DIIDLU¶%%&DSµ%DODQFHRYHUWLPH¶KDV
also been the essence of WKH%%&¶VSROLF\KLVWRULFDOO\ according to Starkey (ibid). With 
British politics traditionally dominated by two main political parties balance was, for 
many years, achieved by apportioning approximately equal time to representatives from 
those parties. Wyndham Goldie writes of how political impartiality was preserved in 
current affairs E\PDLQWDLQLQJµrough equality in the number and nature of the 
appearances in current affairs programmes of Labour Party sympathisers and of 
Conservatives¶(Wyndham Goldie 1977, p.284). This situation, where Labour and 
Conservatives viewpoints dominated political debates, changed somewhat from the 
early 1980s with splits in the Labour Party and a new electoral force - the SDP - 
emerging, which finally allied itself with the Liberal Party and attracted more media 
attention to the minority third party than had previously been the case. Corner (1995) 
explores how what he terms a µVWRSZDWFK¶FXOWXUHoccurs both in the studio and at the 
headquarters of the major political parties, particularly around elections. This stopwatch 
culture is designed to present opposing views according to a sliding scale reflecting 
electoral popularity (see also Horrocks 2006). The stopwatch, in this way, can become 
the arbiter of 'balance' both figuratively and literally - with the main political parties 
dominating the debate and exercising enormous pressure and influence on TV news 
production. Such reductive stopwatch practices are further complicated when there are 
more than two positions or parties. Where the point of 'balance' for the presentation of 
different views would seem to be between two parties - the 'middle ground' - a further 
problem occurs when this position is occupied by a centrist party, in which case the 
slant of reports would tend to be 'biased' in favour of that party above others.  
 
Corner makes distinctions between the journalistic principle of 'impartiality' and the 
associated and often confused notions of 'accuracy', µobjectivity' and 'balance'. 
'Accuracy' he takes to mean the correctness of facts - names, dates, quotes and so on, 
although this is not always as straightforward as it sounds. Estimates of the numbers 
attending anti-war marches in Britain and around the world on the 15th March 2003, for 
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instance, varied so widely that news broadcasts reported both police and march-
organiser estimates, a long-standing practice that goes back to CND marches of the 
1980s and earlier. Panorama¶V generally sympathetic report µ%ODLU¶V:DU¶>W[
23.03.03] opts for a figure of one million ± significantly less than the  µXSWRtwo 
million¶ claimed by the Stop the War Coalition, but more generous than police 
estimates RIµLQH[FHVVRI¶%%&ES.  Clearly the dividing line 
between facts and opinion is sometimes a disputed one, but, as Corner notes, 'no one 
doubts the possibility of a journalist being 'accurate' about a lot of things for a lot of the 
time as agreed by the very widest spectrum of political and social opinion and very few 
people doubt the desirability of them being so' (cited McQueen 1998, p. 104).  
 
'Objectivity' as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as '..that which is external to 
the mind' and '..that which is unaffected by subjective mental operations' is clearly, 
Corner (1995) observes, philosophically and practically as impossible for journalists as 
for anyone else. To say 'objectivity' is possible assumes that an unarguable 
interpretation of an event exists. In fact, all reporting implies a point of view - in the 
selection or non-selection of stories, the placement and angle of the cameras, the 
selection of interviewees and relevant questions, and the language and tone adopted by 
reporters and presenters. Ironically, as Fiske (1987) points out, despite unanimous 
critical agreement that no communication can be totally 'neutral' or 'objective', the idea 
that, as both Panorama and This Week¶VVWUDSOLQHonce proclaimed, television is a 
µwindow on the world¶, QRZNQRZQDVWKHµWUDQVSDUHQF\IDOODF\¶, still survives, if 
anywhere, in television.  
 
/DFNRIµEDODQFH¶RU'bias', the term applied to the media when they give an 'unfair' 
advantage to one side in a dispute, either by misrepresenting, underplaying or ignoring 
alternative points of view (see Gill and Adams 1988) is an accusation which current 
affairs must be careful to avoid. 7KH%%&¶V(GLWRULDO*XLGHOLQHVDUHFOHDUµZH
strive to reflect a wide range of opinion and explore a range and conflict of views so 
WKDWQRVLJQLILFDQWVWUDQGRIWKRXJKWLVNQRZLQJO\XQUHIOHFWHGRUXQGHUUHSUHVHQWHG¶DQG
µZHPXVWHQVXUe we avoid bias or an imbalance of views on controversial subjects (BBC 
 72 
2005a, p.26).  As Holland (2000) remarks current affairs programmes have, throughout 
their history, been the centre of accusations of bias drawing fire from governments, 
corporations, the press and the academy:  
 
>«@risking attack either for bias or for cowardice.  If their position is 
overtly oppositional, the press and government have cried that television is 
peopled by left-wing activists; if their criticisms are too mild, academics and 
the left have complained that their very structure makes them unable to 
question the status quo.   
 
(Holland 2000, p.149) 
*UDKDPDUJXHVPRUHEURDGO\WKDWDQREOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHµEDODQFH¶LQFXUUHQW
affairs is a powerful constraint on current affairsDµOD]\RSWLRQIRU³GXHLPSDUWLDOLW\´¶
>«@ZKLFKVD\VµWKDWQRSDUWLFXODUSRLQWRIYLHZVKRXOGEHIDYRXUHG¶ (p.11). Graham 
GHVFULEHVWKLVDVLPSHGLQJWKHPRUHLPSRUWDQWDQGVRFLDOO\YDOXDEOHDLPRIµWU\LQJWR
convey the objective truth about a mDWWHURURIIHULQJDQKRQHVWH[SUHVVLRQRIRSLQLRQ¶
,ELG,QLWVPRVWµLQHUWIRUP¶WKLVKDVPHDQWUHVSHFWLQJWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHGRPLQDQW
parties more or less in proportion to their dominance, which may favour a government 
in office: 
 
>«@DQRSSRVLWLRQ¶V view is recorded and minor parties may or may not get 
a look in, depending on the scale of the items or perceived importance of the 
issue. This is not only a recipe for routine journalism, but it places the whole 
discussion of public affairs firmly within a context of Westminster, 
Parliament and the process of government. 
(Ibid) 
 
TKHDLPRIµEDODQFH¶RU avoidance of µbias¶ is, therefore, not only closely bound up in 
broadcasting organisations¶ legal obligation to show 'due impartiality', but also, more 
defHQVLYHO\WKHQHHGWRVDWLVI\µWKHSRZHUVWKDWEH¶DVUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKHPDMRUSROLWLFDO
parties in Parliament. As Chignell (2004) shows, discussions of balance and impartiality 
can be traced back to the earliest years of the BBC (when it was the British 
Broadcasting Company) and they became µcore values¶ of the Corporation, particularly 
following the lifting of government restrictions on EURDGFDVWLQJµFRQWURYHUVLDO¶PDWHULDO
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in 1928 (p.29). TKH%%&¶VILUVW'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO-RKQ5HLWKargued that if there was a 
balanced presentation of opposing views RQDFRQWURYHUVLDOPDWWHUµVWDWHGZLWKHTXDO
HPSKDVLVDQGOXFLGLW\WKHQDWOHDVWWKHUHFDQEHQRFKDUJHRIELDV¶ (Scannell and 
Cardiff, cited Ibid). This idea that balance might shield the BBC from accusations of 
partiality endures and is reiterated in in-house literature, although Lindley (2002) 
suggests that partial views were indeed expressed by an µearly generation¶ of Panorama 
presenters and reporters µDVORQJDVWKH\GLGVRLQDSHUVRQDOQRQ-party way¶ (p.71). 
7KLVZDVSRVVLEOHEHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHQRWSUHVHQWLQJµ%%&HGLWRULDORSLQLRQ¶EXWWKHLU
own view, based on their experience researching the story/LQGOH\¶VVZLWFKHVWRWKH
simple present tense in the following passage suggesting that Panorama reporters may 
VWLOORIIHUµRSLQLRQ¶LIWKH\EHOLHYHWKLVLVZKHUHWKHµEDODQFHRIWUXWKOLHV¶ 
 
A Panorama UHSRUWHU¶VMRELVWRGHFLGHZKHUHLQKLV>VLF@RSLQLRQDQGRQ
the evidence he offers, the balance of truth lies. Unlike the Pope speaking ex 
cathedra he is not laying down his interpretation of the facts as something 
that must be accepted. He is suggesting that his opinion is worth considering 
seriously. And whether we agree with him of course depends on the quality 
of the reporter, the evidence he has produced and they way he has presented 
it. 
(Ibid, p.73) 
As Chignell (2004) QRWHVDSUHVHQWHU¶VULJKWWRH[SUHVVWKHLUYLHZVHHPVERXQGXSIRU
Lindley, in ill-GHILQHGµSHUVRQDOTXDOLWLHV¶µRUEHFDXVHRIWKHLUµFDOLEUH¶¶ (p.30). Two 
conflicting definitions of µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶DOVRDSSHDUWREHLQRSHUDWLRQKHUHWKHILUVWLV
ERXQGXSLQWKHµVHDUFKIRUWUXWK¶WKHVHFRQGLQWKH%%&¶VµQHHGIRUDQDSSDUHQW
EDODQFHLQWKHFDXVHRIµVHOI-SUHVHUYDWLRQ¶¶,ELG Yet as a recent report by the BBC 
Trust (2007b) RQµVDIHguarding impartiality¶SRLQWVRXWWKH%%&&KDUWHUVSHFLILFDOO\
VWDWHVWKDWµGXHLPSDUWLDOLW\GRHVQRWUHTXLUHDEVROXWHQHXWUDOLW\RQHYHU\LVVXH¶ (p.42). 
The report also reiterates /LQGOH\¶VSRLQWDERXWJLYLQJVSDFHfor experienced journalists 
to express opinions ZKHQWKH\VWDWHWKDWµLmpartiality is no excuse for insipid 
programming¶DQGWKDWWKHUHPXVWEH room for µfair-minded, evidence-based 
judgements by senior journalists¶ 
 
Programmes would be bland and sometimes pointless, if they were never 
able to UHDFKFRQFOXVLRQVEDVHGRQHYLGHQFH7KDWLVDSURSHUUROHIRU%%&¶V
senior journalists and documentary-makers. There should also be greater 
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scope for contentious authored programmes, provided the authorship is 
clear, and that over time there is balance of opinion across the intellectual 
spectrum. 
  (Ibid, p.7) 
'Due impartiality' is, in fact, carefully defined by the BBC charter and the various Acts 
of Parliament covering independent broadcasting, as well as in detailed editorial 
guidelines (see BBC 2005a). It involves taking into account a µZLGHrange of views and 
RSLQLRQV¶HYHQDWWLPHVRIZDUIbid, p. 106) but also giving prominence to mainstream 
opinions, whilst UHIOHFWLQJµWKHUDQJHRISXEOLFDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRXUUHDOLVWLFDOO\¶
(Ibid, p.82). Where 'points of view' are given they must be clearly signalled as such and 
matched, where possible, by an opposing view. For ITV and the BBC this principle is 
supposed to operate within any programme; on Channel 4 impartiality is required only 
across the range of programming shown (McQueen 1998, p. 105). For a current affairs 
series such as Panorama, balance may be achieved across a number of programmes (see 
Seymour-Ure 1990). µ%LDV¶WKHUHIRUHQHHG not be thought of as the opposite of truth. As 
Goodwin (1990), notes: 'The real issue is whether the range of biases represented is fair. 
In other words, does it adequately reveal the range of points of view held by the public?' 
(Goodwin 1990, p. 54).  
 
The establishment of Channel 4 in 1982 which was required to present diverse 
viewpoints and reflect tastes and interests not normally catered for by other television 
channels was an acknowledgePHQWWKDW%ULWDLQ¶VUDFLDODQGFXOWXUDOPLQRULWLHVIRU
instance, were not being fairly represented and that political debate could be extended 
beyond the parliamentary µconsensus¶ represented by three political parties to include 
more marginal or extra-parliamentary movements and voices. Consequently, by the 
1990s, as Born (2005) points out, the doctrines of objectivity and impartiality which had 
RSHUDWHGDVµVWUDWHJLFULWXDOV¶binding the professional culture within news and current 
affairs were being challenged by a changing intellectual climate and conception of what 
broadcasting should achieve. The fresh approach Channel 4 permitted, particularly in its 
early years, to cultural and political coverage, combined with various critical academic 
studies by the Glasgow Media Group, Philip Schlesinger and others, had gradually 
enabled what Born describes as a more µsophisticated grasp of the interpretative nature 
of journalism¶ within the Corporation (2005, p.382). Consequently, notions of 
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µEDODQFH¶LQEURDGFDVWLQJWRGD\DUHPRUHFRPSOH[WKDQLQWKHHUDRI:\QGKDP*ROGLH¶V
Panorama, for instance, reflecting a shift towards a more pluralistic view of society. 
The metaphor of a wheel has recently been employed, rather than a pendulum or µsee-
saw¶, to characterise the diversity of political views that broadcasters, and specifically 
the BBC, should reflect (BBC 2007b). Public service requirements obliging the BBC to 
serve the whole nation, reflecting and responding to different tastes and views, are now 
also reflected in a drive by some current affairs programmes, including Panorama, to 
give expression to a wider range of political perspectives than might have been sought 
in earlier decades (see recent appearance of BNP leader Nick Griffin on Question Time 
tx: 22.10.2009). Contested notions of impartiality and objectivity are particularly 
important then in understanding debates about Panorama¶V political coverage, or in 
accounting for the range of voices found in its coverage of the Gulf Wars of 1991 and 
2003. 
 
7KHFRQWUDVWEHWZHHQFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶GXW\WRPDLQWDLQVWDQGDUGVRILPSDUWLDOLW\DQG
objectivity as compared to documentary are further explored in %RUQ¶V 
interviews (carried out in the example cited below in 1997). They include a 
characteristic defence of the values of impartiality by an unnamed Current Affairs 
senior executive. The executive complains that they can never have some of the 
µbrilliant documentary values¶ of a series like Modern Times because they are obliged to 
give µimpartial¶ DWWHQWLRQWRWKHDUJXPHQWµ/LIHKHUHLVPRUHFRPSOLFDWHG:H¶UHQRW
LQWRDGYRFDF\RUREVHUYDWLRQDOMRXUQDOLVPZH¶UHLQWRWKHFODVKRIELJvested interests. 
,W¶VOHVVJODPRURXV¶S.  
 
The distinctions made in this interview between documentary and current affairs 
VXSSRUWV7XQVWDOO¶s view of a µVSHFWUXP¶ of broadcast factual coverage which places the 
quick turnaround of daily television news journalism at one end and television 
documentary, usually crafted over several months, DWWKHRWKHUµ7HOHYLVLRQZHHNO\
journalism ± FDOOHGµFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶LQ%ULWDLQ± tends to have a turnaround time of 
several weeks, but even these programmes are much closer to British Sunday 
QHZVSDSHUVWKDQWRGRFXPHQWDU\¶S Newsnight¶VSROLWLFDOHGLWRU0LFKDHO
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Crick compares the work of television journalists to runners: 
 
I think reporters break down into.. they are like runners really. The hard 
news guys are the equivalent of sprinters; people like myself who work for 
Newsnight and Channel 4 News are sort of middle-distance runners and 
those working for Panorama are more of a sort of long-distance runner ± 
five thousand, ten thousand metres. 
(personal communication,  February 16, 2007) 
 
Crick goes on to observe that because Panorama reporters made around four 
SURJUDPPHVD\HDUWKH\ZHUHXQGHUKXJHSUHVVXUHIRUWKHSURJUDPPHVWREHµUHDOO\
JRRG¶VRWKDWµHYHQRQ\RXUGD\VRII\RX¶GEHZRUU\LQJDERXWLW¶ He also complains 
that it was a very producer run programme µVRWKH\GRQ¶WDOORZDQ\RIWKHSHUVRQDOLW\RU
LQGLYLGXDOLW\RIWKHUHSRUWHUWRFRPHRXWWKDW¶VZK\,KDWHGLW7KHZRUVWWZR\HDUVRI
my career¶,ELG. 
 
&ULFN¶VFRPPHQWVUHODWHWRPanorama in the period he worked there (1990-1992) and it 
could be argued that there has been more scope for the personality of the reporter to 
emerge in recent years, as in the work of mixed-race reporter Raphael Rowe whose 
South-East London background and wrongful imprisonment for twelve years are 
experiences drawn on in his investigations (BBC 2007c). Nevertheless, as Tunstall 
points out, in contrast to the more subjective RUµDXWKRUHG¶work of the individual 
documentary film-maker and his or her small team, current affairs operates within the 
requirements for political neutrality and objectivity legally placed on TV journalism. 
7XQVWDOO¶VLQWHUYLHZVZLWKSURGXFHUVVXJJHVWWKDWWKHVHQHXWUDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWVGR cause 
anxiety for producer and reporter, but less than do µWKHQRUPDOFRPSOH[LWLHVRI
journalism, overlaid by cumbersRPHWHOHYLVLRQORJLVWLFV¶S. The interviews 
conducted for this thesis confirm this view is still common within Current Affairs more 
than twenty years later, with anxiety over factual accuracy and evidential proof 
outweighing concerns over any supposed balance or µQHXWUDOLW\UHTXLUHPHQWV¶. Mike 
RudinIRULQVWDQFHZKRSURGXFHGµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶(tx: 8.12.02) argues that it is 
SRVVLEOHWRPDNHDFDVHRUµVWDWHDWKHVLV¶VRORQJDV\Ru make sure everything is fair as 
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you do it: µ>«@ WKHUH¶VDKXJHDPRXQWRIZRUNWKDWJRHVLQWRLWVRUWRIVZHDWLQJWKURXJK
it to make sure that you can stand by HYHU\WKLQJDQGWKDWLW¶VIDLU¶(personal 
communication,  June 15, 2009). 
 
Despite their quite different production routines and the distinct interpretive remits of 
news, current affairs and documentary, these and other factual formats have, in fact, 
continued to cross-IHUWLOL]HVLQFH%RUQ¶VLQWHUYLHZVcited above. Commercial pressures 
have played an important role in the rapid evolution of factual television, often leading 
to concerns about WKHµGXPELQJGRZQ¶RIFXUUHQWDIIDLUV (see Humphrys 1999; Sparks 
and Tulloch 2000; Aaronovitch 2002; Kuhn 2007) amounting for some, to a crisis in the 
form exemplified by Panorama¶V recent alleged µVRIWIRFXV¶, µVXSHUILFLDO¶µJLPPLFN-
OHG¶µKXPDQLQWHUHVWDSSURDFK¶ (Cummings 2004; Reevell 2005; Mangold 2007; Heffer 
2007).  
 
This view is far from universal, however, with some academics and industry personnel 
celebrating what they regard as a boom in lively, factual output in the digital, multi-
channel era, a boom that pays little respect to conventional generic boundaries (see Hill 
2005; Murray and Ouellette 2008; Oldenborgh 2008). &KDQQHO)LYH¶VVHQLRUSURJUDPPH
controller News and Current Affairs Chris Shaw, for instance, dismisses the notion of a 
crisis either for documentary or current affairs, suggesting that only definitions have 
changed. He wonders if a documentary is restricted to µthe sort of thing you'd see at the 
Grierson Awards or does it include Wife Swap, Faking It and a whole range of factual 
HQWHUWDLQPHQWRIIHULQJV"¶FLWHG6QRGG\DS6KDZZKRFRXQWVThe Wright 
Stuff, the call-LQ79VKRZDVµWKHEXON¶RI&KDQQHO¶VFXUUHQWDIIDLUVRXWSXW argues 
that the drama-documentary The Government Inspector SURYLGHGPRUHLQVLJKWWKDQµWKH
very good Panorama RQWKH.HOO\DIIDLU¶7KHUHOHYDQFHRIWKLVFRPSDULVRQLVPDGH
clear by a reminder that World in Action successfully used drama-documentaries to 
illustrate written accounts and testimonials RQµLQDFFHVVLEOH¶WRSLFV by a dedicated unit 
ILUVWHVWDEOLVKHGIRUWKHPDNLQJRIWKHDFFODLPHGµ7KH0DQ:KR:RXOGQ¶W.HHS4XLHW¶
(1970) about the trial of Soviet dissident Pyotr Grigorenko (cf Goddard et al. 2007; 
McQueen 2010). Furthermore, increasing use of dramatic recreation in current affairs 
based on the available evidence, once frowned on, is now so commonplace that it rarely 
 78 
provokes comment or censure (see Panorama; A Good Kicking tx: 13.03.07).  
 
George Entwistle, Head of Current Affairs at BBC in 2007, agrees that concepts of 
current affairs have been changing and dates the arrival of Jamie's School Dinners as a 
significant moment:  µIt was then that popular factual television started to explore topics 
that would previously have been the province of current affairs¶ (cited Snoddy 2007a, 
p.23). In fact, important changes mark each decade of Panorama¶VKLVWRU\ZLWKLGHDVRI
ZKDWLWLVµLPSRUWDQW¶WRFRYHUXQGHUFRQVWDQWUHYLHZVHHChapter 4.4). 
 
It is worth noting, for instance, that PRUHµVRIWIRFXV¶µKXPDQLQWHUHVW¶DQGµGRPHVWLF¶
themes were a common element in Panorama at the height of its popularity in the 1950s 
when Grace Wyndham Goldie affirmed a µmixed diet¶ of items was essential to secure 
the broadest possible audience, even cautioning against a third week of coverage 
devoted exclusively to Suez at the height of the crisis in November 1956 (see Thumim 
1998, p.98). Arguments over µsoft¶ and µhard¶FXUUHQWaffairs coverage are not, Thumim 
shows, new and are often expressed DVKLHUDUFKLFDOµREMHFWLYHVXEMHFWLYH¶VFDOHVµZKLFK
DOVRPDSRQWRWKHPDVFXOLQHIHPLQLQHRSSRVLWLRQGHWHUPLQLQJODQJXDJHLWVHOI¶,ELG
p.93). 
 
Finally, the issue of defining current affairs as a unique form is not simply an arcane 
academic question or obscure territorial dispute within the industry. Head of Channel 
¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUV'RURWK\%\UQHKDVZULWWHQKRZDFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURGXFHU
she commissioned to make a programme about Gordon Brown was refused admission 
into the Labour Party conference: 
 
She had completed and paid all relevant forms and had been assured of her 
pass when she turned up but she was barred from entering.  She didn't even 
have a camera crew with her.  All she wanted to do was to look at Gordon 
Brown - as anyone could if she turned on her TV.  So it seemed pointless to 
block her.  But we were told documentary filmmakers were not allowed into 
Labour Party conferences.  We protested that we were not documentary 
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makers but current affairs journalists.  We were told that current affairs was 
not recognized as a separate genre by the Labour Party.  Which is odd 
considering Gordon Brown used to be a current affairs television journalist. 
(Byrne 2007, p. 8) 
 
4.3.3 The Public Service Broadcasting role of current affairs 
 
The role of television current affairs in providing weekly, in depth monitoring of the 
social political and global landscape has led, as Holland (2006) notes, to occasional 
spectacular revelations, such as 7KLV:HHN¶V Death on the Rock (1988) on the shooting 
of three members of an IRA unit in Gibraltar. Existing histories naturally devote 
considerable attention to the more controversial episodes of particular current affairs 
series which have involved interventions or reprimands from governments, broadcasting 
authorities, the management of broadcasting institutions or the courts (see Lindley 
2003a; Holland 2006; Goddard et al. 2007). Beyond these more controversial episodes, 
the regular appearance until the late 1990s in the peak-time schedules of such 
prestigious series as This Week, World in Action, Panorama and Dispatches was 
UHJDUGHGDVDVLJQRIFRPPLWPHQWE\EURDGFDVWHUVWRµTXDOLW\WHOHYLVLRQ¶)RU+ROODQG
µWheir seriousness and sense of purpose underpinned television's, and particularly 
FRPPHUFLDOWHOHYLVLRQ¶VFODLP to nurture informed citizenship and the core values of 
GHPRFUDF\LWVHOI¶(Holland 2006, p.xiv). 
 
This sense of purpose for current affairs and its contribution towards sustaining an 
informed electorate and promoting wider debate in society is a common thread in much 
of the available literature.  For example, in setting out the context for their independent 
inquiry into 7KLV:HHN¶VµDeath on the Rock¶ Lord Windlesham and Richard Rampton 
QC make the following observation: 
 
We start out with the proposition that the freedom of the press and broadcast 
media is an integral part of free society. The degree of freedom and the 
pressures upon it will always be contentious, but the principle should be 
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beyond challenge that the public iQWHUHVWLVDGYDQFHGµE\SXEOLVKLQJWKH
facts and opinions without which a democratic electorate cannot make 
UHVSRQVLEOHMXGJHPHQWV¶5R\DO&RPPLVVLRQRQWKH3UHVV)LQDO5HSRUW 
(cited Windlesham and Rampton 1989, p.9) 
 
The importance of news and current affairs to what cultural theorist Jürgen Habermas 
FDOOHGµWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH¶KDVEHHQZULWWHQDERXWH[WHQVLYHO\see Stevenson 1996, 2002 
Curran 1997; Gripsrud 1999; Jensen 2002; Bignell and Orlebar 2005; McGuigan and 
Allan 2006). For Corner et alµFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶LVDSURJUDPPHFDWHJRU\ZKHUH
WHOHYLVLRQ¶VSRZHURISRSXODUHQJDJHPHQWDQGYLVXDOLPSDFWLQWHUVHFWPRVWGLUHFWO\ZLWK
its functions DVDSURYLGHURINQRZOHGJHDQGDVDPDMRUµIRUXP¶RIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH¶
(2001, p.74). While the language used here to characterise current affairs may be 
different, the sentiment is much the same as that expressed within broadcasting 
institutions. Describing its relaunch in January 2007, for instance, the new Panorama 
(GLWRU6DQG\6PLWKZURWHWKDWWKHSURJUDPPHµ>«@will be right at the heart of the 
QDWLRQ¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQ¶*XDUGLDQ, and in another article Panorama is 
described as FDUU\LQJWKHKHDY\EXUGHQRIWKH%%&¶VSXEOLFSXUSRVHWRµVXVWDLQ
FLWL]HQVKLSDQGFLYLOVRFLHW\¶/LGGLPHQWS. The notiRQRIDµSXEOLFVSKHUH¶ of 
debate to which current affairs contributes is clearly an influential one both for 
academics and for those working in broadcasting.   
 
As Gripsrud (1999) remarks, the ideals of the liberal public sphere still form the basis 
for notions of democracy and for the ethical principles which are, according to liberal 
pluralist perspectives, supposed to govern the functions of the media within democratic 
societies. This conventional account of the democratic role of the media, according to 
Curran (1997), rests on three key concepts in the liberal canon ± µthe media as 
ZDWFKGRJSXEOLFUHSUHVHQWDWLYHµIRXUWKHVWDWH¶DQGVRXUFHRISXEOLFLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ 
(p.83). &XUUDQ¶VFULWLFDOUHDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHVHFRQFHSWVLVDXVHIXOFRXQWHUZHLJKWWR
more QDwYHRUFHOHEUDWRU\DFFRXQWVRIWKHPDVVPHGLD¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHIURP, and 
relation to, power and privilege, but putting such a critique to one side for a moment, it 
is worth noting how current affairs programmes are often organised around the three 
concepts Curran identifies: watchdog/exposé, public representative/debate and public 
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information/reportage. Gaber, for instance, argues that Panorama¶V importance is bound 
XSLQLWVGXW\DORQJZLWKRWKHUPHGLDWRNHHSSHRSOHLQIRUPHGDERXWWKHRYHUDOOµVWDWH
of WKHQDWLRQ¶ZKLFKLWGRHVWKURXJKUHSRUWDJHDQGDQDO\VLVEXWDOVRWKURXJK
µVXEVWDQWLYH¶LQYHVWLJDWLYHMRXUQDOLVPZKHUHE\WKH\FDQFDUU\RXWWKHLUµRIW-quoted 
ZDWFKGRJUROH¶DSIn this respect television current affairs series such as 
the BB&¶VPanorama, Newsnight and Question Time continue to carry out an important 
µdemocratic function¶ as defined by liberal media theorists DQGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH%%&¶V
RZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILWVµSXEOLFVHUYLFHEURDGFDVWLQJ¶UHVSRQVLELOLWLHVsee Briggs 
1979a). This democratic function is achieved by maintaining and, where necessary, 
fighting to protect a public service tradition that has placed value on independent 
inquiry, communicative rationality and political dialogue. 
 
Former Panorama Editor Roger Bolton argues in relation to current affairs that this 
democratic function may at times extend beyond the limits of arguments and debates in 
Parliament to reflect the wider concerns of society. He suggests that as Panorama 
Editor he was made more aware by the academic work of the Glasgow Media Group 
and others of the need for inquiry and dialogue in areas that might challenge the 
µ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ 
 
>«@2ne of the great dangers there that came to bear in the seventies and 
eighties was this being drawn to the consensus.  The other danger was that 
people like Robin Day thought that essentially Parliament should establish 
the nature of the argument.  And I think what the Glasgow Media Group and 
others helped us to do in its awareness is that our approach was far too 
narrow.  So when it came to Ireland, for example, we realised that there 
never has been a debate on the unification of Ireland in the British 
Parliament.  And we knew this from polls saying that 45/50% British public 
WKRXJKW>«@WKHBritish should pull out [of Northern Ireland].  There was 
QHYHUDGHEDWH$QGVRZKDWZHWKRXJKWWKHQZHFDQ¶WGRWKDWZHKDYHWR
represent, find out what people want to talk about, represent their interests.  
$IWHUDOOWKH\¶UHYRWLQJDWHOHFWLRQVWKHLUFKLOGUHQDUHG\LQJHWFHWFWKHUH¶V
no debate, we must do that.  Not driven by the Republicans, driven by an 
awareness, a sudden sort of awareness, that often the Parliamentary 
consensus was not representative of the attitudes of the country.   
(personal communication,  October 23, 2008) 
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)RU+ROODQGZULWLQJDERXW,79¶VThis Week, the tension for current affairs 
SURJUDPPHVEHWZHHQµDGGLQJWRWKHGHPRFUDWLFGHEDWH¶DQGSOHDVLQJDVL]HDEOH
audience were never mutually exclusive options, but were constantly argued over and 
worked through in many different ways. However, legislative changes, particularly 
IROORZLQJWKH$FWZKLFKµIUHHG¶FRPPHUFLDOWHOHYLVLRQIURPWKHOHJDOREOLJDWLRQWR
VFUHHQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLQSHDNWLPHDPRQJVWRWKHUFKDQJHVOHGWRµDPRPHQWin current 
DIIDLUVKLVWRU\WKDWZDVIUDXJKWZLWKDQ[LHW\¶S+ROODQGFRQWUDVWVWKHVHOI-
FRQVFLRXVO\µVHULRXV¶ current affairs coverage that characterized -RKQ%LUW¶VUHJLPHDW
the BBC, µfrom an unashamedly populist approach taken by a restructured ITV¶(Ibid). 
Similarly, Ray Fitzwalter, former Head of Current Affairs at Granada, in his book The 
Dream that Died: the rise and fall of ITV (2008) describes the effect of the breakup of a 
regional ITV system following the 1990 Broadcasting Act which he shows contributed 
directly to the undermining of public service commitments, the release of raw 
commercial forces and the destruction, for instance, of the radical, challenging and 
popular current affairs culture at Granada. 
 
Subsequent government interventions, such as the 1994 White Paper, have accelerated 
moves towards a more audience-led, µFRQVXPHUDZDUHDQGFRPPHUFLDO¶ broadcasting 
environment (Born 2004, p.401). This has ultimately affected both public and 
independent broadcasting institutions and fed through to current affairs such as 
Panorama which, following its 2007 relaunch in peak viewing hours, has a greater 
obligation to maintain audience ratings, an obligation made explicit in its mission 
VWDWHPHQWZKLFKLVWRµGHOLYHULPSDFWHLWKHULQWHUPVRIDXdience size or in take-up by 
WKHZLGHUPHGLD¶FLWHG0DQJROGS 
 
Arguments over such moves, particularly in relation to current affairs, are a recurring 
feature of media commentary (see Holland 2001) and are regularly rehearsed in relation 
to Panorama, often by serving and former Editors, BBC managers and senior 
journalists. On the one hand there are those in the industry calling for the preservation 
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of a core public-VHUYLFHFRPPLWPHQWWRµLQWHOOLJHQW¶µFKDOOHQJLQJ¶µVXEVWDQWLYH¶DQG
µLQ-GHSWK¶FXrrent affairs coverage at peak viewing hours (see Cozens and Plunkett 
2004; Gibson 2007; Ingrams 2007); on the other those pressing for a more µrelevant¶, 
µFUHDWLYH¶, µcompetitive¶ and visually compelling DSSURDFKWKDWFRQQHFWVWRSHRSOH¶V
experience (see Wells 2004), RUWKDWDWOHDVWVFKHGXOHVµKHDY\-ZHLJKW¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUV
µrealistically¶ - outside peak viewing hours (Dyke 2004b). Fears that Panorama, like its 
erstwhile rivals This Week and World in Action (see Holland 2006; Goddard et al. 
2007), has shifted towards a more populist agenda have dominated discussion of the 
series in the post-Dyke era (2004-) and intensified dramatically around the time of its 
relaunch as a half-hour series in peak time in 2007 (see Gaber 2008a, 2008b). 
Arguments have often focussed on the perceived current health of Panorama as a kind 
RIµOLWPXVWHVW¶RIWKH%%&¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRSXEOLFVHUYLFHSULQFLSOHV, but as the 
DSSDUHQWVKLIWWRZDUGVPRUHSRSXODUVXEMHFWVIROORZLQJ6DQG\6PLWK¶Vappointment as 
Editor occurred outside the main period of interest for this study (1987-2004) this thesis 
does not deal directly with that particular controversy. Nevertheless, concerns about 
GHFOLQLQJUDWLQJVIRUµWUDGLWLRQDO¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVDQGKRZEHVWWRUHVSRQGWRWKLVDSSDUHQW
decline are a running motif in the literature on Panorama throughout the Birt-Dyke era. 
 
4.3.4 Ratings ± declining or increasing? 
 
A brief survey of available viewing figures for some of the longest running current 
affairs series, including Panorama, shows that mass audiences have been in significant 
decline for many decades. For example, DFFRUGLQJWR%ULJJVLQWKHVµRQH
out of every four in the United Kingdom was watching Panorama, presided over by 
5LFKDUG'LPEOHE\¶S-304). In 1960 both Panorama and Tonight could boast 
audiences of 9 ½ million, or around 20% of the population (BBC Memo cited Tracey 
1976, p.86). Panorama¶V audience shrank down to an average of 4 million in 1975 and 
briefly rose again to this level in 1998 before falling to around 3.1 million in 2001 (see 
Guardian 2004) IROORZLQJLWVPRYHWRWKH6XQGD\QLJKWµJUDYH\DUGVORW¶ the previous 
year, with viewers FRPSRVHGLQFUHDVLQJO\RIµROGHUPLGGOHFODVVPHQDQGOHVVE\
\RXQJHUSHRSOH¶/LQGOH\2003a, p.378). This decline has not been without periodic 
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reverses and Panorama¶VKLJKHVWHYHUDXGLHQFHof 22.8 million viewers was gained on 
20th 1RYHPEHUZLWK0DUWLQ%DVKLU¶VVHQVDWLRQDOLQWHUYLHZZLWKWKH3ULQFHVVRI
Wales (Ibid, p.369)EXWWKHJHQHUDOWUHQGVLQFHWKHSURJUDPPH¶VKH\GD\LQWKHlate 
1950s has been downwards. and since 2000 there have been occasional dips below the 
two million mark - DµGLVPDO¶DXGLHQFHVKDUH:HOOV. $V%ULWLVKWHOHYLVLRQ¶V
ORQJHVWUXQQLQJFXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHVDQGFRPSDUDWLYHO\ZHOOUHVRXUFHG%%&¶V
µIODJVKLS¶Panorama must settle for audiences around the three million mark in its new 
prime-time, half-hour, post-2007 form that has been criticised for populist tendencies 
but also praised for attracting a younger audience (Lindley 2008, p.9). However, 
declining audiences are not unique to Panorama and it is often lamented that the days 
when once-popular current affairs series such as World in Action and This Week could 
regularly manage ratings of ten million are gone. Perhaps one of the few remaining 
long-form current affairs flagships to take on major domestic and international stories ± 
&KDQQHO¶VZHOO-regarded Dispatches ± achieves µVRPHWKLQJFORVHUWRWKHRQHPLOOLRQ
mark a figure that may be in long-term decline now that the programme is in direct 
competition with Panorama and 7RQLJKW¶(Snoddy 2007a, p.22). Snoddy compares this 
with Celebrity Big Brother which saw its audience soar to more than nine million 
during some of its episodes. Historically Panorama has been rather more protected from 
ratings pressures than its commercial rivals, although industry observers seem agreed 
WKDWZLWKLWVPRYHEDFNWRSULPHWLPHWKHSURJUDPPH¶VIXWXUHZRXOGORRNXQFHUWDLQLI
ratings fell significantly from their present levels (see Mangold 2006c).  
 
Reevell (2005) arguHVWKDWµRIDOOWKHSXEOLFVHUYLFHSURJUDPPHJHQUHVFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLV
RQHRIWKHPRVWIUDJLOH¶SFRPSDULQJLWWRUHOLJLRXVSURJUDPPLQJDQGQRQ-news 
regional coverage as being under threat in the new competitive environment. Reevell 
(2006) reiterates this view a year later picking up on a metaphor employed by Barnett 
and Seymour (1999) by arguing that µwhile the ice caps of broadcasting are unlikely to 
GLVDSSHDURYHUQLJKWWKDWVRPHRIWKHµFRUHDVVXPSWLRQVRIWKHSDVW\HDUVabout 
public service genres will KDYHWREHUHWKRXJKW¶DQGWKDWFXUUHQWDIIDLUVLVOLNHO\WRFRPH
µXQGHUJUHDWHUSUHVVXUH¶LQWKDWWLPHSRVVLEO\EHLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\µPDUJLQDOLVHG¶
p.15). Rating emerges as a major concern with many of the Panorama staff interviewed, 
particularly since the post-2007 shift back to BBC1 (see Chapter 4.4). For John Ware, 
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reflecting on the tension between maintaining high ratings and investigating complex 
but important issues, the risk is that ratings may win out: 
 
I think there is a risk that the only currency that matters is ratings. Now the 
%%&ZLOOVD\LWLVQRWDQGWKDW¶VWUXHEXWRQO\XSWRDSRLQW7KHIDFWRIWKH
matter is that the first email that the editor sends around the department after 
a Panorama is a note of the audience and what the ratings were and if the 
ratings are good, irrespective almost of the quality of the programme that 
produces a note of heartfelt gratitude to the programme makers and 
generally says how well everyone is doing. So I think ratings are the driving 
force whatever the BBC might say.  And I think they would say they are for 
a good reason ± WRMXVWLI\WKHSURJUDPPH¶VH[LVWHQFH 
(personal communication, February 19, 2007) 
 
 
4.3.5 Personalities 
 
&ORVHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHLVVXHRIUDWLQJVLVWKHXVHRIµSHUVRQDOLWLHV¶LQFXUUHQWDIIDLUV
programmes. Panorama is well known for, and to some extent still trades on, a history 
LQZKLFKµVWDU¶SHUIRUPHUVVXFKDVRichard Dimbleby, Robin Day, Ludovic Kennedy, 
Charles Wheeler and David Dimbleby played a significant role in maintaining the 
SURJUDPPH¶VSRSXODULW\DQGUHSXWDWLRQ /LQGOH\¶VXQRIILFLDOKLVWRU\RIPanorama 
devotes a chapter to some of the more well-known reporters from the 1950s to the early 
VHQWLWOHGµ7KH\ZHUHJLDQWV¶S-118) and another to the prograPPH¶VµSRRU
well-SDLGSUHVHQWHUV¶S-EXWHDFKRI/LQGOH\¶VWKLUWHHQFKDSWHUV
focuses to some degree on the personalities both behind the scenes and on the screen. 
The list is impressive and includes still-active senior reporters such as Jane Corbin, John 
Ware, Peter Taylor and John Simpson, BBC senior management up to and including 
Director Generals, Sir Ian Trethowan and the present incumbent Mark Thompson 
(Panorama Editor at the time of the first Gulf War) and a roll call of well known faces 
and personalities which are listed at various points in this work. As a short film 
celebrating Panorama¶V history on the progUDPPH¶VZHEVLWHSXWVLWZLWKOLWWOH 
RYHUVWDWHPHQWµWKRVHZKRKDYHZRUNHGLQIURQWRIRU behind the camera reads like a 
ZKR¶V ZKRRI%ULWLVKMRXUQDOLVP¶ (Fifty Years of Panorama, 2009). Writing an account 
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of Panorama¶V coverage of the two Gulf Wars without reference to the personalities 
helping shape those programmes would be absurd, yet it is not the intention of this 
thesis to SULRULWLVHRUH[DPLQHLQJUHDWGHWDLOWKHUROHRILQGLYLGXDOVLQWKHSURJUDPPH¶V
make up.  
 
However, it is worth reflecting on WKHLQIOXHQFHRIµVWDU¶SUHVHQWHUVDQGUHSRUWHUVRQWKH
programme in general terms. Kumar (1975) expertly accounts for the role of such 
µSURIHVVLRQDOEURDGFDVWHUV¶RQFHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKPanorama presenters such as Robin 
Day, Richard Dimbleby (and son David), Ludovic Kennedy and Michael Barratt in 
controlling studio exchanges and steering debates away from very contentious areas and 
µLQKLELWLQJWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIDWWLWXGHVWKDWRSHQO\IORXWWKHFRGHVSROLWLFDODQGPRUDORI
WKHSRZHUVWKDWEH¶S Kumar makes the point, based in  part on his own experience 
as a BBC producerWKDWDµUHPDUNDEO\VPDOO¶group of µUHOLDEOH¶presenters µZKRWRD
GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHH[WHQWKDYHPDGHWKHLUQDPHVLQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHV¶GRPLQDWH
a whole variety of programmes (p. 80). Their power, Kumar suggests, extends to 
establishing the overall framework of any subject by drawing up the questions to be put 
as interviewer. If a FKDLUPDQµKH>VLF@KDVWKHSRZHUWRVHOHFWSUREOHPVDQGSHRSOH
raising and accentuating some and playing down others, thereby giving a definite and 
GLUHFWHGVKDSHWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQ¶S$VZHOODVLPSULQWLQJDSDUWLFXODUprofile on 
pre-recorded items, an experienced presenter is, almost uniquely, completely at home in 
the studio environment, a place that can be extremely intimidating to those brought in as 
contributors. In live topical programmes, Kumar argues, the orchestration of a debate by 
DµYLUWXRVRSUHVHQWHU¶FDQVXEPHUJHFRQWULEXWLRQs under the general onward flow of the 
programme. Thus, contributors, who are sought for their expertise, often find this 
H[SHUWLVHµHQJXOIHG¶E\WKHH[SHUWLVHRIWKHPHGLXPLWVHOI 
 
Kumar makes clear that producers are held responsible for programmes made and are 
WKHUHIRUHPDGHDZDUHWKDWWKH\µUHSUHVHQWWKH%%&¶ Presenters, by contrast, are not 
burdened with this responsibility and many, like the Dimblebys, Robin Day or Fred 
Emery, biOOHGDVµ)UHG(PHU\RIThe Times¶DFFRUGLQJWR/LQGOH\ZHUH
KLUHGRQDIUHHODQFHEDVLVDQGZHUHQRW%%&µVWDII¶DWDOO+RZHYHUDV.XPDr observes, 
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WKHSXEOLFµVWXEERUQO\¶UHIXVHVWRVHHLWOLNHWKDW and identifies the regular personalities, 
presenters, reporters and anchors with the BBC, a fact that µboth the producer and his 
VXSHULRUVDUHYHU\DZDUHRI¶S)XUWKHUPRUHµprofessional broadcasters¶ often have 
very long public lives, lasting for many decades in some cases (Simpson, Dimbleby, 
Ware, Taylor, Mangold and Corbin for instance, at Panorama) and many of the regular 
presenters and star personalities are highly paid, well-connected and influential. Kumar 
argues, provocatively, WKDWQRWRQO\DUHSUHVHQWHUVµDJHQWVRIFRQWURORYHUFRQWULEXWRUV¶
EXWWKDWWKH\DUHDOVRµSDUWRIWKHFRQWUROV\VWHPRYHUSURGXFHUV¶ 
 
Their broadcasting experience after all is usually much greater than that of 
producers (and indeed of most administrators, even the most senior).  
Moreover they had been selected and promoted precisely because they have 
shown the capacity to internalise the BBC's dilemmas and problems, and to 
resolve them in some sense by the style and manner of their presentation.  
Since producers in any case need these presenters, what better agents of 
producer socialisation could there be? 
(Ibid, p.75) 
 
Hence, Kumar goes on to argue that, whether µovertly¶ or more µsubtly¶ done, the 
producer finds that they are confined within certain µnorms and practices¶, which may 
be rationalized in technical terms but which nearly always involve other considerations, 
µRIZKLFKWKHSUHVHQWHULVWKHFDUULHUDQGHPERGLPHQW¶3URGXFHUVPD\WKHUHIRUHEH
FRQVWUDLQHGIURPDWWHPSWLQJFHUWDLQLQQRYDWLRQVRUµIURPLQYLWLQJFHUWDLQSHRSOHWR
SDUWLFLSDWH¶ by presenters who communicate µGLUHFWLRQVDQGSUHVVXUHVZKLFKDUHWKH
GLFWDWHVRIWKH%%&DVVXFKGLVWLOOHGIURPLWVZKROHKLVWRU\¶S 
 
.XPDU¶VDFFRXQWGRHVQRWVTXDUHZLWKWKHdescription of producer-reporter relationships 
at Panorama put forward by Lindley (2002), or from my own interviews with producers 
and reporters which suggests that partnerships are usually based on a more equitable 
power relationship. Nevertheless, it is clear from anecdotal material produced by Day 
(1990) and Lindley (2002) that relationsKLSVEHWZHHQSURGXFHUDQGµVWDU¶SUHVHQWHUV
could, indeed, be very fractious particularly as producers took on a more important, 
shaping role for filmed reports than had been the case in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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Furthermore, Lindley argues that there was a conscious decision at the BBC not to 
DOORZ5LFKDUG'LPEOHE\¶VVXFFHVVRUVDVSUHVHQWHUVDQ\WKLQJOLNHWKHVDPHcontrolling 
power over the programme: 
 
Though long one of the best-known figures on British television, Day had 
specifically been told not to think of himself as the new Dimbleby.  He was 
there, as he noted himself, to 'introduce the acts', and do the interviews, not 
be 'Mr Panorama'.  There was in general a growing feeling that television 
people were throwing their weight about, and that it was wrong for any 
individual to dominate a programme as Dimbleby had done. 
(Lindley 2003a, p.174-175) 
 
Panorama¶V various presenters: Robin Day, David Dimbleby, Charles Wheeler, Fred 
Emery, Robert Kee and Richard Lindley, Gavin Esler and, more recently Jeremy Vine 
have SOD\HGGLIIHUHQWUROHVVRPHWLPHVGRLQJOLWWOHHOVHWKDQµWRSSLQJDQGWDLOLQJ¶D
programme, at others ± especially as interviewers or in chairing debates ± they have a 
more substantial role in shaping the programme. Their role in such exchanges will be 
examined in more detail in the close analysis of coverage of both Gulf Wars (see 
chapters 5.4 and 6.2). 
 
For Kumar, the presenter¶s traditional role of what he calls µKROGLQJWKHPLGGOHJURXQG¶
became increasingly difficult from the mid-1960s as the BBC struggled to negotiate the 
beginning of the break-up of the so-called postwar coQVHQVXVµZKHWKHURUQRWVXFKD 
consensus existed and, if so, whether or not it has broken up, does not matter here. The 
point is that the BBC believed it, along with many otherV¶S8QDEOHWRDGGUHVVWKH
QDWLRQDVRQHJUHDWQDWLRQDODXGLHQFHµLQWKHVDPHILUPDQGUDWKHUDORRIPDQQHUWKDWLW
KDGDGRSWHGIRUVRORQJ¶WKH%%&QRZDGGUHVVHGDQDXGLHQFHWKDWZDVperceived to be 
more sectionalized, fragmented and less willing to be submissive if its demands were 
QRWPHW7KH&RUSRUDWLRQZDVWKHUHDIWHUDWWDFNHGIURP/HIWDQG5LJKWE\µSURJUHVVLYHV¶
DQGµUHDFWLRQDULHV¶E\µWKRVHRXWUDJHGDWLWVEROGQHVVDVPXFKDVWKRVHFRQWHPSWXRXVRI
FDXWLRQ¶,ELG+HQFHWKH%%&¶VPLVVLRQPRYed further away from the Reithian vision 
of raising public taste and speaking to and for a unified nation towards acting as a 
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µUHJLVWHU¶RIWKHPDQ\GLIIHUHQWµYRLFHV¶LQVRFLHW\ (p.84).  
 
6FKOHVLQJHUSLFNVXS.XPDU¶VWKHPHDUJXLQJWKDWWKLVQHZYLVLRQRIWKH%%&¶V
place in society presupposes a theory of the nature of that society in which there are no 
predominant groups or interests but only competing blocs of interests, whose 
FRPSHWLWLRQµLVVDQFWLRQHGDQGJXDUDQWHHGE\WKHVWDWHLWVHOI¶S 7KH%%&¶V
identification with a system of democratic pluralism in which power is supposedly 
diffused and balanced, for Schlesinger, puts it in a similar (mythical) position to that of 
the state: 
 
Just as the state is supposed to act to promote some hypothHWLFDOµQDWLRQDO
LQWHUHVW¶LQEDODQFLQJGHPDQGVVRLVWKH%%&VXSSRVHGWREHLQLWVHOID
market-place for ideas and competing viewpoints, endorsing none, 
admitting all, a national institution above the fray.  
(Ibid) 
 
Crucially, Schlesinger adds that µWKLV IRUPRIOHJLWLPDWLRQ¶ becomes untenable for 
broadcasters when consensus becomes increasingly strained because the very viability 
of the state presupposes a consensus. $GRSWLQJDUHPRWHµ2O\PSLDQYDQWDJH-SRLQW¶LV
not possible when there are fundamental disagreements RYHUµGHILQLWLRQRIVRFLDO
UHDOLW\¶DQGWKHQDWXUHRIFRQIOLFWVVXFKDVWKDWLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGS 
 
For Kumar (1975), however, this FRQFHSWLRQRIWKH%%&¶VUROH± DVµPLGGOHPDQ¶
µKRQHVWEURNHU¶µPDQDJHUDQGimpresario¶RQO\KHLJKWHQHGthe significance of the 
professional broadcaster whose role of keeping the BBC on an even keel DQGµZDUGLQJ
RIIWKHFOXWFKLQJHPEUDFHVRIDOODURXQGLW¶KDGJDLQHGIUHVKXUJHQF\ (p.84). One  
consequence of the breakdown of WKHµSRVW-war conseQVXV¶, Kumar argues, is that 
presenters must increasingly underline their professionalism and non-partisanship by 
standing far removed from political position either of the Left or Right. Neither for 
XQLRQVQRUIRUFDSLWDOQHLWKHUSURIHVVLRQDOµPRUDOLVWV¶nRUµOLEHUWDULDQV¶, but rather 
LGHQWLI\LQJZLWKDQGWDNLQJWKHUROHRIµXV¶WKHXQUHSUHVHQWHGYLHZHUV
WKHFRQVXPHUV

 90 
'the suffering public' against planners, public servants, powerful industrialists, selfish 
trade unions, property speculators and even politicians. Written thirty-five years ago, 
.XPDU¶VHVVD\PLJKWZHOOGHVFULEHD3D[PDQRUD+XPSKU\VZKHQKHZULWHV 
 
Ministers are questioned as aggressively as trade unionists, environmentalist 
pressure groups as much as planning agencies, along the lines of, µZKDWare 
the gains and losses in all this for usWKHSXEOLF"¶0RUHJHQHUDOO\WKHUHLV
displayed an attitude of faint cynicism and scepticism towards almost all 

RIILFLDO¶VRXUFHVZKHWKHULQJRYHUQPHQWDORUSULYDWHRUJDQLVDWLRQV 
(p.85) 
7KLVµTXL]]LFDODPXVHGDQGVOLJKWO\VFHSWLFDO¶VW\OHRIDGGUHVVZKLFK.XPDUDWWULEXWHV
WRWKHSRSXODULW\DQGLQIOXHQFHRIWKHµVHPLQDO¶FXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHVTonight passed 
down at the BBC through a series of Radio 4 presenters, in particular, including John 
Timpson, Jack de Manio and William Hardcastle, and can be found today, most clearly, 
LQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHVVXFKDV5DGLR¶VToday DQG%%&¶VNewsnight. It is a 
description, incidentally, ZKLFKFRPHVFORVHWR%RXUGLHX¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRI
the µcynicism¶ of star reporters in France, one effect of which, he suggests, is a general 
µGH-SROLWLFLVDWLRQRUPRUHSUHFLVHO\GLVHQFKDQWPHQWZLWKSROLWLFV¶ (p.7). It is in this 
VW\OHRISUHVHQWDWLRQIRU.XPDUµFRPSRXQGHGHTXDOO\RIDJJUHVVLYHQHVVVFHSWLFLVP
irony, and detachment, that we can most clearly observe the role played by the 
professional broadcaster in the B%&¶VVWUDWHJ\RIVXUYLYDO¶S). However, for 
some observers, this µaggressive¶ manner has degenerated into µK\SHUDGYHUVDULDOLVP¶
(Fallows cited McNair 2001), sometimes described as a µURWWZHLOHU¶MRXUQDOLVWLFculture 
which has contributed to a collapse in public trust in Westminster politics and 
politicians (see McNair 2001, 2003b; Richards 2007). So-FDOOHGµDWWDFNMRXUQDOLVP¶RI
the type typified by Jeremy Paxman and John Humphrys has come under fire from 
several quarters. Former Labour Minister Charles Clarke dismissed their interview style 
as µthe easiest interviews of all¶ - DµMRXVWLQJJDPH¶µULWXDOLVHGH[FKDQJH¶DQGµULGLFXORXV
WKHDWUH¶ from which viewers learn nothing (Bell 2007, p.23). However, former Director 
General Greg Dyke (2007b) defends the Paxman and Humphrys style as an inevitable 
FRQVHTXHQFHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V LQWURGXFWLRQRIµ1L[RQLDQSROLWLFV¶LQWR%ULWDLQ. 
According to Dyke, this approach, led by former Director of Communications Alastair 
Campbell, amounted to the view WKDWLI\RXZHUHQ¶WRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VVLGHµ\RX
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ZHUHWKHHQHP\¶,QWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHVKHFODLPVWKHUHLVOLWWOHURRPIRULQWHOOLJHQW
political debate: 
 
WeOOLW¶VWUXHWKDWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQPHGLDDQGSROLWLFLDQVLVDWDQDOO
time low but then that is hardly surprising after a decade of the most media 
manipulative government in British history. 
(Dyke 2007b, p. 9) 
 
By contrast, the (then) Director General Michael Grade decried µNQHHMHUNF\QLFLVP¶in 
a 2005 lecture which was interpreted by Leapman as DFDOOWRµPX]]OHWKHPDGGRJVRI
the Today and Newsnight VWXGLRV¶. Leapman described the speech as a µSUDJPDWLF¶
response to soured relations with the government which he supported (2005, p.1).  
/HDSPDQOLQNV*UDGH¶VFDOOIRUDµVFKHPHRIOLIHORQJOHDUQLQJLQZKLFKWKH%%&¶V
MRXUQDOLVWVZRXOGUHSHDWHGO\EHUHWUDLQHGLQZKDWZDVH[SHFWHGRIWKHP¶WRWKH+XWWRQ
Inquiry µGHEDFOH¶ of 2004 claiming that: 
 
The ceQWUDOGLOHPPDQHYHUSURSHUO\DGGUHVVHGLQWKH%%&¶V-year old 
history, is whether a state-owned broadcaster, relying for its funding on the 
goodwill of the government of the day, can insulate itself from its paymaster 
and be free to engage in journalism that denounces government policies. 
That is what the Gilligan row was about. 
(Ibid) 
 
/HDSPDQDUJXHVWKDWZKHQ$ODVWDLU&DPSEHOOWRRNRYHUWKH'RZQLQJ6WUHHWµSXEOLFLW\
PDFKLQH¶KHIROORZHGHDJHUO\LQWKHLQWLPLGDWRU\WUDGLWLRQHVWDEOLVKHGE\0DUJDUHW
ThatFKHUZKRKDGUHGXFHGµWKHJRYHUQRUVDQGPDQDJHPHQWWRTXLYHULQJMHOO\RYHU
FRYHUDJHRI1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGDQGWKH)DONODQGVZDU¶ (Ibid). With Charter renewal due in 
/HDSPDQFRQFOXGHVWKDWµLWLVWLPHIRUWKH&RUSRUDWLRQWRDFFHSWWKDWE\
definition, it can never be truly independent, and that political exposés are best left to 
those sections of the media not financed by the state¶,ELGS 
 
7KHµXQFRPIRUWDEOH¶OHVVRQ/HDSPDQGUDZVIRU%%&¶VFXUUHQWDIIDLUVFRYHUDJHPD\
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dismissed as a pessimistic over-reaction to the fallout over the Hutton Inquiry. 
Nevertheless, ZLWKWKHWRQHDVZHOODVWKHPDQQHURIWKH%%&¶VFXUUHQWDIIDLUVFRYHUDJH
QRZXQGHUDWWDFNLWLVZRUWKUHYLVLWLQJ.XPDU¶VFODLPVDERXWWKHGRPLQDQWVW\OHRILWV
star presenters. I would suggest WKDWWKHVW\OHDQGMRXUQDOLVWLFDSSURDFKRI%%&¶V
current affairs output is far from uniform or even very consistent and that a strong streak 
of µscepticism¶ is not WKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VRQO\µstrategy for survival¶. As the Panorama-
Tonight rivalry of the 1960s made clear, the somewhat rebellious air of detached irony 
and faint amusement that Tonight made its trademark was not universally welcomed by 
µSURIHVVLRQDOEURDGFDVWHUV¶ such as Richard Dimbleby (see Macdonald 1982).  It is 
interesting in light of that to note that while the more µsceptical¶ and aggressively 
challenging style which Kumar identifies, was continued by some journalists in some 
current affairs programmes, it has rarely been adopted by Panorama presenters, with the 
possible exception of Robin Day. Panorama¶V less confrontational and (at least under 
Richard Dimbleby) more µdeferential¶ presentational approach partly accounts for the 
SURJUDPPH¶VKLVWRULFDOUHSXWDWLRQ DVDPRUHµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶SURJUDPPHsee Rowland 
2000, p.166).  David DimbleE\DQG*DYLQ(VOHU¶VUROHDVSUHVHQWHUVLQWKHWZR*XOI
Wars will be examined in more detail in chapters 5 and 6 in relation to some of the 
issues raised here. 
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4.4 Panorama: a brief critical history 
 
7KH%%&¶VIODJVKLSFXUUHQWDIIDLUVVHULHVPanorama LV%ULWDLQ¶VORQJHVWUXQQLQJ
television programme and, according to the Panorama ZHEVLWHµWKHZRUOG¶VORQJHVW
UXQQLQJLQYHVWLJDWLYH79VKRZ¶%%&<HWDV*DEHr (2008) has pointed out, 
Panorama was certainly not an investigative show on its launch and for much of its 
history, following its re-launch in 1955, the programme was largely composed of 
straight reportage, analysis and landmark interviews, rather than investigations. 
 
Panorama GHYHORSHGDVDQLPSRUWDQWµIRUXPIRUSXEOLFSROLWLFDOGHEDWH¶'LPEOHE\
1975, p.362) and has often µFRQYH\HGWKHVHQVHRIVSHDNLQJRQEHKDOIRIDVRFLDOO\
FRQFHUQHGHVWDEOLVKPHQWIRUDQHTXDOO\FRQFHUQHGDXGLHQFH¶6DVVRRQS1201). In 
doing so it has provided a template for other current affairs series both in Britain, 
Europe and around the world, whilst undergoing several transformations in form and 
style since its launch in 1953, the latest and arguably most dramatic being in 2007. This 
section of the thesis will briefly chart the development of Panorama as a distinctive, 
'flagship' current affairs series over six decades. Much of this research is based on 
PDWHULDOIRXQGLQ%RXUQHPRXWK8QLYHUVLW\¶VPanorama archive, in the BUFVC 
Panorama 3URMHFWGDWDEDVHDQGLQWKH%%&¶VH[FHOOHQWRQOLQHPanorama archive in 
addition to the literature referenced. An attempt will be made to characterise and specify 
the Panorama µEUDQG¶RIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVDQGSLQSRLQWWKHVHULHVVXFFHVVHVDQGIDLlures in 
reinventing itself in a rapidly changing media context, whilst providing important 
historical context to help answer the research questions outlined in chapter 1. Some of 
the issues relating to Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRISDUWLFXODUFRQIOLFWVDUHVWXGLed in more 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
4.4.1 Panorama in the 1950s 
 
First broadcast on 11th November 1953 as a fortnightly topical, general-interest 
magazine programme Panorama was introduced on that opening night by presenter 
Patrick Murphy as reflectingµWKHOLJKWHUVLGHRIOLIHDVZHOODVPRUHVHULRXVPDWWHUV
ZKLFKDIIHFWXVDOO¶The early, fortnightly Panorama (1953-55) was a loosely topical, 
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magazine format programme with a broad remit that covered around five items dealing 
with culture and the arts, theatre and book reviews, debates on topics of the day and 
interviews with people in the news, mostly recorded on the British mainland for reason 
of costs. However, the early programme lacked a clear identity and failed to impress 
audiences and critics and b\WKHVXPPHURIWKH%%&¶V&RQWUROOHURI7HOHYLVLRQ
Programmes Cecil McGivern had decided that that programme was not making its mark 
or justifying its cost. McGivern met with Grace Wyndham Goldie, then Assistant Head 
of the Television Talks Department, and asked her to take charge of the programme. 
Goldie, a pioneer in early current affairs programme making, agreed on condition that 
she could appoint staff of her choosing to achieve the authoritative tone she wanted: 
µ:HDOOZDQWHGWRJLYHPanorama a new look; to make it harder, more concerned with 
WKHZRUOGRXWVLGH%ULWDLQDQGRXWVLGHWKHFRQILQHVRIWKHVWXGLR¶*ROGLHS 
 
 
As it was effectively going to be a new programme Goldie also wanted to change the 
title, but Cecil McGivern would not agree, insisting that the title 'Panorama' was too 
valuable a property to be discarded.  As Lindley (2003) writes Cecil McGivern 
µUHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKHPanorama brand was already woUWKWRRPXFKWRGLVFDUG¶S 
underlining a basic concern with brand properties at a very early point in the 
SURJUDPPH¶VKLVWRU\,QDQHIIRUWWRGLVWDQFHWKHUH-launched Panorama from its earlier 
manifestation WKHWHDPDGGHGZKDW*ROGLHGHVFULEHVDVWKHµsomewhat absurd¶ subtitle 
'A Window on the World' to indicate the programme's new intention of reporting on 
significant events at home and abroad. New music by Robert Farnon entitled µ2SHQLQJV
DQG(QGLQJV¶was added DQGµWKLVDVVXUHGDQGDXWKRULWDWLYHSLHFHILWWHGLQQLFHO\ZLWK
the heavyweight image of the BBC at the time¶%%&, p.1).  
 
The new-look weekly Panorama went on the air on Monday 19th September 1955 just 
days before the launch of ITV. Richard Dimbleby presented the programme from a set 
that resembled a tower, or lighthouse1  introducing films from various locations. These 
included a report by Woodrow Wyatt from Malta whose leaders were then engaged in 
URXQGWDEOHWDONVZLWK%ULWDLQRQWKHLVODQG¶VIXWXUHLQGHSHQGHQFH7KHUHZHUHDOVR
filmed interviews with foreign tourists in Britain and a direct line to France using the 
                                               
1 7KHHGLILFHGXEEHGµ7KH'LPEOHER[¶E\VWDJHKDQGVJRWLQthe way of the cameras and was quickly 
abandoned according to Goldie. 
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µ(XURYLVLRQ¶WHUUHVWULDOPLFURZDYHQHWZRUN3UHVVUHYLHZVWKHIROORZLQJGD\LQGLFDWHG
that Panorama¶Vre-launch had been a success and ratings for the programme quickly 
rose. 
 
A typical Panorama programme in the 1950s was 45 minutes long and made up of 
around three or four items, mixing more lightweight with more serious national and 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVWRULHV7KHVHVWRULHVRIWHQPDGH7XHVGD\¶VQHZVSDSHUKHDGOLQHVEHFDXVH
DV5RELQ'D\UHPDUNVµPanorama was not only explaining the news but making the 
QHZV¶S:\QGKDP*ROGLHFRQWLQXHGWRH[HUWLQIOXHQFHRYHUWKH
programme for some years and she believed Panorama could not afford to omit any 
major developments at home or in international affairs. If possible Panorama should 
interview those with the power to make vital decisions and politicians quickly learnt it 
ZDVDVXLWDEOHPHWKRGIRUµFRPPXQLFDWLQJZLWKWKHQDWLRQ¶*ROGLHS-192). 
 
Panorama¶V growing popularity and authority attracted politicians on to the programme 
to explain their plans and policies to the public, but in terms of more serious reports the 
programme maintained the tendency of political current affairs programmes at that time 
to favour international stories. Scannell (1991) argues that this preference reflected the 
%%&¶VDYHUVLRQWRFKDLULQJFRQWHQWLRXVGHEDWHVRQKRPHDIIDLUVDQGWRZDUGVUHSRUWLQJ
an arena of broad consensus, until the 1956 Suez Crisis,  
between the political parties on foreign policy: 
 
)RUHLJQ DIIDLUV KDG SUHVWLJH IRU WKH%%& >«@ LWZDV WKH terrain of grand 
issues, of global themes, of the balance of power between East and West. It 
transcended the local, the sectarian and the petty. Whereas to enter into the 
politics of home affairs might be to recognize divisions within the nation, 
with foreign affairs the nation could be presumed as united and presented as 
such. Not until after the debacle of Suez did the cracks begin to show. 
(1979, p.100) 
 
The reporting of the Suez crisis presented particular problems for Panorama. Forbidden 
from discussing domestic and parliamentary opinion on matters before Parliament for a 
fortnight before the debate by the so-FDOOHGµIRXUWHHQGD\UXOH¶WKH%%&ZDVXQDEOHWR
report on widespread domestic opposition to the invasion of Egypt by coordinated  
British, French and Israeli forces. The two week rule, a convention invented by the BBC 
itself in 1944 and given legal force in 1955 with cross party support, only allowed 
Panorama WRUHSRUWIRUHLJQUHDFWLRQWR%ULWDLQ¶VH[SHGLWLRQDU\IRUFH0DVVSURWHVWVLQ
  96 
London went unreported and editions of Panorama in November 1956 could only cover 
events in Egypt and reaction to those events abroad, with filmed interviews from 
America, Australia and India. 
 
According to the historian Tony Shaw the BBC, under the threat of funding cuts or 
PRUHGLUHFWJRYHUQPHQWµVXSHUYLVLRQ¶DGRSWHGDµZKROO\SDVVLYHUROHLQUHODWLRQWRWKH
VHQVLWLYHVXEMHFWRIWKHGHHSFOHDYDJHLQ%ULWLVKRSLQLRQ¶SPanorama was 
reduced to skirting around the fundamental issues involved, including the political 
storm on the home front; the pre-invasion military build-up in the Mediterranean; the 
Egyptian government position; and the widespread, and later substantiated, allegations 
of collusion between the British, French and Israeli governments (Morgan 1990; 
Hourani 2002). Once military action was underway Richard Dimbleby explained that 
Panorama FRXOGQRWµGLVFXVVWKHULJKWDQGZURQJVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ¶DQGUHOLHGLQVWHDGRQ
FRQGXFWLQJ5HDU$GPLUDO1LFKROURXQGKLVUHOLHIPDSVRI6XH]µDVLIKH'LPEOHE\ was 
LQFKDUJHRIWKHODQGLQJVDW6XH]WKDWPRUQLQJ¶Lindley 2003a, p.45). Panorama Editor 
Michael Peacock was even refused permission by the BBC Board of Governors to ask 
for an interview with Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Lloyd following the Anglo-French 
ODQGLQJVµ/LWWOHZRQGHUWKDW0LFKDHO3HDFRFN>«@ODWHUFODLPHGWKDWPanorama 
FRYHUHG6XH]µZLWKDGHJUHHRIQHXWUDOLW\ZKLFKGHQLHGWKHSURSHUIXQFWLRQRI
MRXUQDOLVP¶6KDZS 
 
As Lindley writes, this did not prevent the BBC and Panorama from being attacked by 
MPs supporting the war. Peter Rawlinson, Conservative MP for Epsom, for instance, 
DFFXVHGWKH%%&RIµV\VWHPDWLFELDVDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶GXULQJWKHFULVLV
Following more criticism during a Commons debate on 14th November, and subsequent 
DOOXVLRQVWRJRYHUQPHQWµSODQVDQGSURSRVDOV¶IURPWKH$VVLVWDQW3RVWPDVWHU-General, 
WKH%%&¶V'LUHFWRURI$GPLQLVWUDWLRQ6LU1RUPDQ%RWWRPOH\RUGHUHGDFRPSUHKHQVLYH
UHYLHZRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶V6XH]RXWSXW6KDZS-41). The Governors later 
reviewed the evidence and found the accusations of bias were groundless. But as the 
%%&¶VRZQDFFRXQWH[SODLQVLQWKHHQGLWZDVWKHJRYHUQPHQWQRWWKH%%&ZKLFKKDG
backed down. Faced with Soviet threats, pressure from the US and the United Nations, 
  97 
Eden was forced to withdraw British troops and, ultimately, resign (BBC 2006a)2 
(Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI6XH]LVH[DPLQHGDJDLQLQ&KDSWHU. 
 
Panorama showed in its coverage of the Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 that it was 
capable of brave and searching journalism. If clear parliamentary consensus was 
lacking, however, as it was with Suez or over domestic policy, a far more cautious line 
was taken. This was by no means unusual for the Corporation. Until the arrival of ITV 
in September 1955 politicians were usually interviewed by BBC journalists in what 
0LFKDHO&RFNHUHOOGHVFULEHGDVDµJURYHOOLQJ¶PDQQHUFLWHG+ROODQGS 
 
The launching of ITV in September 1955 was to change that situation. The relatively 
combative style of news and current affairs interviews on the independent channel soon 
forced BBC to review its approach.  Subsequently, as Robin Day writes in his memoir 
µ*UDQG,QTXLVLWRU¶SROLWLFDOLQWHUYLHZVEHFDPHµOHVVV\FRSKDQWLF¶5RELQ'D\¶VEULVN
style at ITN typified the new more challenging coverage of news and politics that was 
emerging - mixing description with evaluation, asking probing questions of politicians 
in unrehearsed interviews, assuming a more authoritative and less deferential air.  
 
In 1959 Leonard Miall, needing replacements for Panorama reporters Christopher 
Chataway and Woodrow Wyatt who had both been elected to Parliament that year, 
offered Robin Day a contract. The fact that the BBC was poaching ITN talent was a 
recognition of the need for a sharper, less stuffy aQGGHIHUHQWLDODSSURDFK'D\¶V
colleagues at Panorama, which he joined in November 1959, would include Charles 
Wheeler, Robert Kee, James Mossman, Ludovic Kennedy and John Morgan. Panorama 
ZDVWRHQWHUWKHVL[WLHVZLWKSUREDEO\µWKHVWURQJHVWUHSRUWLQJWHDm ever gathered 
WRJHWKHUIRURQHWHOHYLVLRQSURJUDPPH¶3 The programme had showed that it was ready 
to learn from its rivals and move, albeit at a stately pace, with the times. Panorama¶V
SODFHLQWKH%%&¶V0RQGD\HYHQLQJVFKHGXOHDQGLQWKHQDWLRQ¶VFXOWXUal and political 
life was now secure. 
                                               
2 7KHDUWLFOH¶VFRQFOXVLRQµ2Q this occasion, the BBC had faced down its government critics and upheld 
LWVLQGHSHQGHQFH¶SLVVRPHZKDWDWRGGVZLWKWKHYLHZRIPRUHFULWLFDODFFRXQWV, such as those by 
Shaw (1995). 
3 $FFRUGLQJWR0LFKDHO3HDFRFNµWRZKRPIODWWHU\ZDVIRUHLJQZKHQ(GLWRURIPanorama¶'D\
p.146) 
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4.4.2 Panorama in the 1960s 
 
Panorama entered the sixties at the peak of its power and influence with audiences 
frequently over 10 million in prime time and still very much at the centre of British 
cultural and political life. Yet Rowland (2000) reminds us that Panorama¶V success and 
µKHDY\ZHLJKW¶UHSXWDWLRQKDGWREHVHHQLQWKHFRQWH[WRIOLPLWHGFRPSHWLWLRQUHVWULFWHG
audience choice and the 'freshness' of everything to television. Reporter John Ware, 
reflecting on the challenge faced today in a multi-channel age compared with this 
period, observed that Panorama¶VPDLQDGYDQWDJHZDVWKDWµWKHUHZDVQRWKLQJHOVHWKDW
PDWWHUHG¶ 
 
 
,UHPHPEHUZDWFKLQJ LWZKHQ LWZDVWKHRQO\VKRZ LQWRZQ7KHUHZHUHQ¶W
any other shows dealing with those sorts of subjects in that sort of depth 
with reporters who were worldly and knowledgeable and confident and 
could write. I mean people like James Mossman could write a mean script 
and would hook you into a subject so that it made you feel like it was the 
most important thing going on in the world really. Now it is pretty well 
LPSRVVLEOHWRGRWKDWRQWHOHYLVLRQWRGD\DQGWKDW¶VJRWQRWKLQJWRGRZLWK
inadequate journalism or production staff. The multi-channel age has simply 
showered us with choice and with that choice ± ZHFDQ¶WGRLW6R,WKLQNZH
have laboured under a very difficult act to follow. 
(personal communication,  February 19, 2007) 
 
 
 
From the launch of ITV there had been an awareness, even amongst those working on 
the programme, that Panorama could no longer sustain an effective monopoly on the 
%%&¶VFXUUHQWDIIDLUVUHSRUWLQJ$VQHZFXUUHQWDIIDLUV-oriented programmes were 
launched on ITV and the BBC, Panorama¶Vµ:LQGRZRQWKH:RUOG¶ZDVVRRQ
competing against other perspectives of the sweeping political and social changes of the 
sixties. Tonight, (1957-65) provided the first serious challenge to Panorama from 
within the BBC. Then came the Arts strand Monitor (1958-65), :KLFNHU¶V:RUOG (1959-
88) first seen on BBC, 24 Hours (1965-72), the science programme Horizon (1964-), 
7RPRUURZ¶V:RUOG (1965-2003), Man Alive (1965-81) and Nationwide (1969-83). All 
of these - in addition to the strong documentary, news and current affairs competition 
ITV provided - strayed onto territory that was once almost exclusively Panorama¶V. By 
1960 current affairs had come to dominate television in the way Outside Broadcasts had 
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done in the early fifties and Panorama was forced to rise to the challenge of its 
competitors by adapting and specialising: 
 
With Tonight taking much of Panorama's local workload, and the News, 
SDUWLFXODUO\ ,71 
VFRRSLQJ
 WKH 
KRW¶ VWRULHV ZKLFK KDG RQFH EHHQ
Panorama's preserve, the BBC's longest-running programme was left with a 
narrower field.  It began to concentrate increasingly and almost exclusively 
on the major national and international events of the era; and they did so in 
ways that were to make the first years of the Sixties the heyday of serious 
television. 
(Dimbleby 1975, p. 353) 
 
 
Jonathan Dimbleby, writing his fatKHU¶VELRJUDSK\LQDUJXHVWKDW+XJK*UHHQH
was able to use the prestige of Panorama, and particularly the perception of Richard 
'LPEOHE\DVDQµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ILJXUHDVDFRXQWHUZHLJKWWRWKHPRUHIUHHZKHHOLQJDQG
critical programmes such as Tonight and its spin-off That Was the Week that Was 
(TW3). Richard Dimbleby also gave cover to more critical voices within Panorama. 
 
It is difficult almost fifty years later to appreciate Richard Dimbleby iconic status and 
fame at the start of the sixties, or his powerful influence over Panorama, the 
programme that he helmed. Having established his name in radio during the war, 
famously reporting from the bombing raids over Germany and the liberation of Belsen; 
making his mark on post-war radio in series such as Down Your Way and Twenty 
Questions; and on television - FRPPHQWDWLQJRQWKH4XHHQ¶V&RURQDWLRQ± he had 
VXUYLYHGFULWLFLVPRIDQµXQFWLRXV¶µSRPSRXV¶PDQQHUWKDWKDGRFFDVLRQDOO\EHHQ
noticed in the 1950s (see Dimbleby 1975, Chapters 7-13). By the early sixties, still 
working from his own scripts and always without a teleprompter, Dimbleby had grown 
µEH\RQGUHSURDFK¶DQGµGHVSLWHDQGSHUKDSVEHFDXVHRIKLVFULWLFV>«@KHKDGEHFRPH
WKHQDWLRQ¶VµIDWKHUILJXUH¶µDOPRVWDWULEXQHRIWKHSHRSOH¶5RZODQG0, p.167, 
Dimbleby 1975, p.328)  
 
Paul Fox, who became Editor in 1961 wanted Dimbleby to play a bigger part in 
Panorama WKDQVLPSO\µDQQRXQFHU¶DQGOLQNPDQ  )R[VKDUHG'LPEOHE\¶VµREVHVVLRQ¶
with the Outside Broadcast which he believed could add a sense of urgency to the 
programme. He soon employed his presenter in a number of historic broadcasts - 
speaking live without notes with the same relaxed authority that he had in the studio.  
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Some of these, by chance, were on Monday nights, while others were Panorama 
µVSHFLDOV¶7KH\PDGHXVHRIWKHODWHVWEXWOHVVWKDQUHOLDEOHWHFKQRORJ\WRLQWURGXFHG
'live' from France, Denmark, Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and within the UK. 
 
Memorable live broadcasts of this kind include reports from Moscow in 1961 on the 
return of Major Yuri Gagarin from the first manned space shot and the May Day Parade 
some days later (see Schwoch 2009); from America in 1962 with Dimbleby as the first 
Englishman to make a live trans-Atlantic broadcast; also in 1962 from the Macedonian 
town of Skopje almost totally destroyed by an earthquake, an appeal which helped raise 
IURPWKHSXEOLFDQGLQIRUWKH4XHHQ¶VYLVLWWRWKH%HUOLQ:DOO0LDOO
1966). In Panorama's special programme on the Cuba crisis in 1962, 'Flashpoint Cuba' 
[tx: 23.10.62]'LPEOHE\¶VWRQHµVRRWKHGWKHZDWFKLQJPLOOLRQV¶DIWHU.HQQHG\
announced the naval blockade that brought the two superpowers to the brink of war 
(Rowland 2000, p.167). One nervous viewer reportedly telephoned the BBC saying she 
would not VHQGKHUFKLOGUHQWRVFKRROµXQOHVV0U'LPEOHE\FDQSURPLVHPHWKDWWKHUH
ZLOOEHQRZDU¶:KHHQS 
 
Perhaps in order to keep up with the competition, Panorama, was now giving space to 
more sceptical, investigative voices and reports. Yet, as the sixties progressed the 
%%&¶V
\RXQJ7XUNV¶VDZLQPanorama - and in Dimbleby - the embodiment of all that 
they disliked about the BBC: 
 
>«@ LWV VXEVHUYLHQW DOOHJLDQFH WR WKH VWDWXV TXR DQG WKH(VWDEOLVKPHQW LWV
pontifical airs and: its self-imposed isolation from the people; its pervasive 
middle-class, middlebrow morality.  The young avant-garde who arrived on 
training courses, to work as researchers and producers, who saw the start of 
Tonight, and then Monitor, and a host of late-night satire shows, chose 
'LPEOHE\DVWKHLUV\PERORIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFRPSODFHQF\ 
(Dimbleby 1975, p. 321) 
 
By 1965 Panorama¶V lead in the ratings had shrunk to eight million against strong 
FRPSHWLWLRQIURP,79¶VThis Week (seven-and-a-half million) and World in Action (six-
and-a-half million). At the end of 1964 audience analysis showed that one in six Britons 
watched Panorama each week, one third of the µPLGGOHFODVV¶RQHTXDUWHURIWKH
µORZHU-PLGGOHFODVV¶EXWRQO\RQHVHYHQWKZDVµZRUNLQJFODVV¶+DOIRIWKHDXGLHQFH
was over fifty and only one in ten teenagers watched the programme (Rowland 2000, 
p.164). Panorama¶Vsupreme confidence at the start of the 1960s had slowly given way 
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WRGRXEWVDERXWWKHSURJUDPPHDQGLWVSUHVHQWHU$IWHU'LPEOHE\¶VGHDWKRIFDQFHULQ
1965 arguments about Panorama¶VVWUXFWXUHDQGIRUPDWEHFDPHµDOPRVWWKHRORJLFDO¶LQ
their complexity, according to Rowland (2000) who notes that the BBC archive 
µVPRXOGHUVZLWKPHPRVSXOOLQJWKLVZD\DQGWKDW¶S2QHRIWKHDUJXPHQWV
centred around the move by new Editor Jeremy Isaacs to single-subject, 40 minute 
episodes, a move fiercely resisted by Robin Day amongst others (see Day 1989, p.150-
,Q,VDDFVZRUGVµKHFRXOGQRWTXLWHPDNHLWVWLFN¶,VDDFVSDQGKH
returned to Associated-Rediffusion, but the single-subject programme would return in 
the seventies and remained a feature of Panorama thereafter.  
 
Arguments about Panorama¶VIRUPDWDQGDSSURDFKZRXOGFRQWLQXHWKURXJKWKHVL[WLHV
and subsequent decades fuelled by a perception that Panorama had become an 
important public institution that needed preserving and protecting from a range of ills ± 
elitism, populism, tabloid values, irrelevance, senior management interference and 
government manipulation. In fact for the sixties, at least, there is little evidence of 
µLQWHUIHUHQFH¶RUµPDQLSXODWLRQ¶IURPRXWVLGHWKHSURJUDPPH*UDFH:\QGKDP*ROGLH
describes one attempt in February 1965 when Harold Wilson wanted to broadcast from 
Downing Street into a Panorama debate on the economy rather than appear in the 
studio alongside Conservative Shadow Minister for Trade Edward Heath and other 
guests. Wyndham Goldie telephoned in protest. She argued that, if Wilson wished to 
µEURDGFDVWWRWKHQDWLRQ¶KHVKRXOGGRWKLVRXWVLGHRIPanorama: 
 
 >«@ LI WKH GLVWLnction between BBC programmes and 'Ministerials' was 
blurred, the assurance of the independence of broadcasting from 
Government interference in regard to its programmes and day-to-day 
administration was worthless. 
(Wyndham Goldie 1977, p.288) 
 
Downing Street accepted the objection and sent the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr 
Callaghan, to take part in the studio discussion. Furthermore, in 1968 Harold Wilson 
and Edward Heath were questioned live in the Panorama studio by three reporters after 
viewing a twenty minute film neither had seen before, which Roland argues no Minister 
KDVHYHUGRQHVLQFHS:KLOH:LOVRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH%%&ZDV
difficult, particularly after 1970, neither he not Heath were antagonistic to Panorama as 
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later Prime Ministers could be4. 
 
Panorama µZDVUDUHO\WROGZKDWWRGR¶LQ5RZODQG¶VYLHZDOWKRXJKKHQRWHVWKDW
former Editor Jeremy Isaacs felt that the BBC hierarchy was sometimes affected by the 

SROLWLFDOVWHHUV¶RIWKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHDQG0,5RZODQGS. Staff screening 
across the BBC was certainly subject to MI5 checks at this time (Hastings 2006) and 
Panorama¶VDXWRQRP\UHVWHGRQWKH%%&¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODUUDQJHPHQWVDWWKHWLPHZKLFK
devolved responsibility and authority, within a system of 'upwards reference' (see 
discussion in Chapter 4.3). 
 
Criticism of Panorama in the sixties centres on two perceived failures. The first, which 
was not unique to Panorama, was the almost complete absence of reporting of the civil 
rights abuses and mounting tensions in Northern Ireland. This has been explained by the 
FHQVRULDOHIIHFWRI%%&¶V&RQWUROOHU¶V2IILFHLQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGZKLFKDVSDUWRIWKH
SURYLQFH¶V3URWHVWDQWGRPLQDWLRQRIJRYHUQLQJLQVWLWXWLRQVKDGDKLVWRU\RIVWLIOLQJ
discussion of Catholic grievances (see Smith 1996, p.26-37). 
 
The second criticism, eloquently articulated in 1968 by Derrick Amoore, then the 
Assistant Head of Current Affairs (and formerly at Tonight), often remained an issue for 
Panorama in subsequent decades: 
 
Too often, it seems to me, Panorama stories, though indisputably the work 
of civilised and literate men, tell the similarly literate and civilised nothing 
they didn't know before.  The programme tends to be concerned with those 
issues which become explicit and can be covered through existing 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHERGLHV«LWLVLQWKLVVHQVHWKDWPanorama may be damagingly 
identified as a 'political' or 'establishment' programme.  The programme 
should take factual positions, as distinct from the acting as a high-powered 
vehicle for the often mutually exclusive positions of other authorities. 
(cited Rowland 2000, p.166) 
 
This criticism could be linked to Panorama¶V ODFNRIDWWHQWLRQWRµRUGLQDU\SHRSOH¶
particularly as Tonight had shown that a popular, incisive current affairs programme 
                                               
4 5RZODQGJLYHVDQLQWHUHVWLQJDFFRXQWRI(GZDUG+HDWK¶VYLVLWWR/LPH*URYHZKHQLWZDVFORVHGLQ
1991 suggesting that relations between the former P.M. and journalists working there may have been too 
µFRV\¶$QGKHDGGVµ7RVRPHH[WHQWLWLVLQHYLWDEOHWKDWWKRVHµLQWKHNQRZ¶ZLOODOZD\VWDNHSOHDVXUH
from their intimacy with power centres. The discreet sharing of knowledge ± µZKRNQRZVZKDWILUVW¶± is 
FHQWUDOWRPRVWSROLWLFDOMRXUQDOLVP¶S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was possible that was sceptical towards institutions and those in authority (McLuskie 
,QDQHFKRRI$PRRUH¶VFRPSODLQWFXOWXUDOFULWLF5D\PRQG:LOOLDPVFULWLFLVHG
Panorama¶V DWWHQWLRQWRµVXSHUILFLDOKLJKSROLWLFV¶DQGLWVKDELWRIEULQJLQJWRWKHVcreen 
µmen whom we know, because we have heard them so often¶ZKRµsay nothing, but say 
it purposively and with an official presence¶. (Williams 1968, 1972) 
 
'HUULFN$PRRUH¶VFULWLFLVPRIPanorama H[WHQGHGWRWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHSURJUDPPH¶V
investigative joXUQDOLVPZKLFKKHIHOWZDVRIWHQµVXSHUILFLDO¶and tended to be µDSXOO
together of the generally known, rather than a revelation of the unknown but 
VLJQLILFDQW¶+HDUJXHGIRUPRUHORQJ-WHUPLQYHVWLJDWLRQVPRUHµSUREHV¶UDWKHUWKDQ
µFRYHUDJH¶,QVSLUHGperhaps by a World in Action H[SRVpµ6PLWK¶V%DFN'RRU¶WKH
previous year (see Goddard et al 2007) Amoore pointed to the fact that sanctions over 
Rhodesia were often discussed, but the fact that they were being regularly broken was 
not investigated. For RoZODQG$PRRUH¶VFULWLTXHDQGFDOO
WRGLVFRYHUZKDWLVWKHFDVH
UDWKHUWKDQZKDWLVWKRXJKWWREHWKHFDVH
ZDVWKHYRLFHRILWVWLPHVµFKDOOHQJLQJ
DQ\WKLQJWKDWPLJKWVPDFNRIUHFHLYHGRSLQLRQ¶5RZODQGS5RZODQGDOVR
suggests that when Brian Wenham became Editor in 1969, he took the programme 
µVRPHZKHUHGRZQWKLVURDG¶EDFNLQWRDVLQJOHVXEMHFWDQGPRUH
LQYHVWLJDWLYH¶PRGH
that Isaacs had tried. 
 
Panorama began the sixties on a high, but ended it on a note of uncertainty with falling 
ratings, indifferent reviews, unresolved structural questions and no clear sense of 
GLUHFWLRQ:KLOHWKHSURJUDPPH¶VVWDWXVDVWKHµIODJVKLSRI%%&7HOHYLVLRQ¶V
MRXUQDOLVWLFIOHHW¶'D\SVHHPHGXQHTXLYRFDOLQE\Panorama 
had been reduced, according to the Director General of that time Sir Ian Trethowan, to 
µMXVWRQHRIDQXPEHURIUHJXODUIDFWXDOSURJUDPPHV¶7UHWKRZDQS
Trethowan, who had worked on the programme in 1965 and 1966, is ungenerous to the 
Panorama of the late 19VDUJXDEO\EHFDXVHRIWKHµIODN¶JHQHUDWHGRYHU&DUULFNPRUH
and later controversies. Nevertheless, his observation is accurate to the extent that 
competition for the kind of factual stories that Panorama once had a near monopoly on 
grew enormously in the sixties and seventies. This growth threatened the survival of a 
magazine-style programme that, in its early days, could touch so many bases and forced 
Panorama to specialise in single-subject, in-depth current affairs which inevitable 
would have a smaller audience. 
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It appears that while Panorama made a number of important changes in the sixties, 
particularly after the death of presenter Richard Dimbleby, it did not change as quickly 
RUDVUDGLFDOO\DVWKHFRXQWU\KDG*URZLQJFULWLFLVPRILWVµHOLWLVW¶µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶
perspectives were pertinent to the programme makers having to rethink Panorama¶V
structure, format and approach to reporting, but this issue remained largely unresolved. 
As Robert Rowland notes, Panorama UHPDLQHGDµIDLUO\VREHUEHDVWLQWKe television 
MXQJOHRIWKHVL[WLHV¶5RZODQGS7KLVVREULHW\ZRXOGUHPDLQDGHILQLQJ
feature of Panorama until a radical overhaul of the programme under Editor Sandy 
Smith in 2007. 
 
 
4.4.3 Panorama in the 1970s 
 
Examples of how Panorama attempted to update and refresh its image in the 1970s 
include the extension of the programme to one hour (8-9pm) from September 1970, 
making more use of the debate-type programme after success with this format earlier in 
the year on the South African cricket tour and hanging. Robin Day as main presenter 
chaired live discussions, including panel debates amongst politicians, union leaders, 
journalists, historians, Ministers and Prime Ministers (see McQueen 2010 for a more 
detailed account of Panorama in the 1970s). While there were single subject 
programmes most continued to have two or three segments. Richard Lindley suggests 
that as news programmes had developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s they had 
begun to take the wind out of Panorama¶Vsails, and that the programme had grown 
rather slow, old-fashioned, predictable and lacking in direction at a time of political and 
cultural upheaval: 
 
The 1960s had come and gone, yet Panorama continued on its stately way 
as if the Beatles, Profumo and That Was the Week that Was had never been; 
its manners remained polite, its judgements cool; its attitude to those at the 
top rather as if one member of a gentleman's club -- the Garrick perhaps - 
was talking to another.  
(Lindley 2003, p.114-15) 
 
It may be partly in response to this perception that David Dimbleby was appointed 
Panorama presenter in 1974 a position he held until 1977 and which he would return to 
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in the 1980s. David Dimbleby was a freelance reporter for Panorama in 1967 and was 
ILUVWRIIHUHGµ5RELQ'D\¶VYDFDWHG FKDLU¶LQ'DYLGKDGJDLQHGQRWRULHW\IURP
µ<HVWHUGD\¶V0HQ¶LQDGRFXPHQWDU\ZKLFKERWKPRFNHGDQGHQUDJHGIRUPHU
3ULPH0LQLVWHU+DUROG:LOVRQ8QOLNHµ*DUULFN&OXE¶DQFKRU5RELQ'D\WKH\RXQJ
'LPEOHE\FRXOGQRWHDVLO\EHFDULFDWXUHGDVµHVWDEOLVKPHQWIULHQGO\¶GHVSLWHLQKHULWLQJ
KLVIDWKHU5LFKDUG¶VUROHZKRKDGEHHQµYLUWXDOO\DOLYLQJHPERGLPHQWRIWKH
SURJUDPPH¶The Times Diary 1972, p.12). 
 
,QIDFWGHVSLWHEHLQJDQHIIHFWLYHSUHVHQWHU'DYLG'LPEOHE\¶VLQWHUYLHZVZHUHPHUHO\
µSHUVLVWHQWO\SROLWH¶FRPSDUHGWR5RELQ'D\¶VLQTXLVLWRULDOVW\OHDQGPanorama still 
lacked energy until the arrival of Peter Pagnamenta who became Editor in 1976. 
3DJQDPHQWDUHGXFHGWKHUROHRIµVWDU¶UHSRUWHUVDQGLQMHFWHGPRUHSDFHLQWRWKH
programme. According to Lindley, Pagnamenta forced Panorama WRµWHOOXVVRPHWKLQJ
QHZ¶WRIRFXVRQDVLQJOHDVSHFWOHDGLQJTXHVWLRQSHUVRQDOLW\LQVWLWXWLRQRUJURXS,Q
effect Panorama QRZUHTXLUHGDµQDUUDWLYHGHYLFH¶RIVRPHNLQGUDWKHUWKDQDPHUH
µVXUYH\¶WKHUHE\DYRLGing superficial or predictable coverage. Lindley suggests that the 
price for this more vigorous style was that Panorama would sometimes shrink from 
µWDFNOLQJWKHXQGHUO\LQJLVVXHV¶EXWSUDLVHV3HWHU3DJQDPHQWDIRUVKUHZGO\DQWLFLSDWLQJ
the next big story and boosting Panorama¶V reputation and audience. 
 
µ'XOO¶LVDQDGMHFWLYHXVHGless frequently by commentators to describe Panorama in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, despite the move towards more single subject programmes. 
Ruthless team rivalry was often encouraged and the programme gained notoriety over a 
number of stories, particularly in its coverage of Northern Ireland under Editor Roger 
Bolton (see Bolton 1990; McQueen 2010). Panorama did report extensively from 
Ireland in the 1970s but from 1971 a system of reference upwards operated in relation to 
interviews with the IRA.  As Anthony Smith (1996) explains permission had always to 
be sought and therefore was requested less and less often - and when requested it was 
more and more frequently refused. Yet, until 1979 this did not appear to trouble 
Panorama: 
 
>«@ WKH DSSDUDWXV RI LQWHUQDO VHOI-censorship did not interfere with the 
normal course of interviewing major political figures and Panorama staff 
for instance, did not to any great extent feel that their functions were 
becoming difficult to discharge.  It was World at One, World in Action and 
24 hours which found the new situation cramping. 
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(Smith 1996, p.31) 
 
While Panorama did, at the start of the decade, interview members of the Official IRA, 
who had HIIHFWLYHO\UHFRJQL]HGSDUWLWLRQWKH%%&¶VSRVLWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRWKHPRUH
militant Provisional IRA had been made clear in 1971 when the then Chairman Lord 
+LOOZURWHWRWKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\µ>«@EHWZHHQWKH%ULWLVK$UP\DQGWKHJXQPHQWKH
BBC is not anGFDQQRWEHLPSDUWLDO¶FLWHG&DUUXWKHUVS 
 
In September 1979, in the wake of the INLA controversy and the murder of 
Mountbatten, Panorama began planning a project on the Provisional IRA, examining its 
history, aims and tactics. Two ex-chiefs of staff of the Provisional IRA, David 
2¶&RQQHOODQG6HDQ0DF6WLRIDQZHUHWREHDPRQJWKRVHLQWHUYLHZHGDQGWKHLUQDPHV
along with the outline of the project, were cleared by the Director, News and Current 
Affairs (Clutterbuck 1981, p.115-116). 
 
On the 17th 2FWREHUIROORZLQJDQLQWHUYLHZZLWK'DYLG2¶&RQQHOODPanorama crew 
that included Jeremy Paxman filmed an IRA roadblock in the village of Carrickmore in 
Northern Ireland.  While paramilitary roadblocks in the province were not unusual and 
had been filmed before, the Panorama WHDPIHOWWKLVVKRZRIIRUFHKDGEHHQDµVWXQW¶
put on for their benefit. The next day they informed the Panorama office in London and 
the Northern Ireland Office. The Northern Ireland Secretary was informed on that day 
and told the Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, soon afterwards. The Panorama team 
also telephoned the BBC lawyers who told them if they could not recognize any of the 
men they were not obliged to inform the police. It is clear that the team believed they 
KDGµUHIHUUHGXS¶DV%%&GLUHFWLYHVLQVWUXFWHGEXWWKHUHZDVRQHSUREOHP 
 
7KH%%&¶VHead of Programmes and Head of News in Belfast was told by 
Panorama and Head of News in Belfast was also told by Panorama about 
the film but the BBC Controller Northern Ireland, James Hawthorne, was 
not informed and the first he heard of it was on 25 October, when he was 
asked about it at dinner by a senior Northern Ireland Office official. 
(Clutterbuck 1981, p.115-116) 
 
When news of the roadblock was leaked in Ireland, there was an outcry in the British 
press with the Daily Express claiming it was as if during the Second World War, a BBC 
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FUHZµKDGJRQHWRILOP1D]LV RFFXS\LQJWKH&KDQQHO,VODQGV¶5. Supported by strong 
condemnation from the Labour Party, Mrs Thatcher called in Parliament for the BBC to 
'put its house in order' (Walters 1989, p.381).  Shortly afterwards the police seized a 
copy of the untransmitted film under section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. As 
David Miller writes, this signalled: 
 
>«@ the willingness of the government to use the full force of the law 
against the broadcasters, a precedent for escalating further hostilities.  And 
they indicate the relative success of the government in their battle to keep 
the voice of armed republicanism off the screen.   
(1994, p.34-35) 
 
Roger Bolton was sacked following an enquiry by the acting Director General Gerard 
Mansell for not ensuring that the BBC Controller Northern Ireland had been informed 
by Head of News Belfast about the incident and Head of Current Affairs John Gau got 
an official reprimand (Cotton 2001). As Bolton recalls his own role in the affair today 
KHµIHOOGRZQWKHPLGGOHRIDKROH¶EHFDXVHµNH\SHRSOH¶DWWKHWRSRIWKH%%&ZHUH
saying one thing to the Governors and another to the journalists and he naively believed 
XQWUDQVPLWWHGIRRWDJHZKLFKµZHKDGQRWHYHQGHFLGHGZRXOGEHLQWKHSURJUDPPH¶
could cause such trouble (personal communication, October 23, 2008). 5RJHU%ROWRQ¶V
dismissal as Panorama Editor caused real anger at the BBC and threats of industrial 
action eventually led to his reinstatement. On resuming his position he was advised by 
*HUDUG0DQVHOOWRµUDLVHKLVVLJKWVZKHQGHDOLQJZLWKVXFKSUREOHPVDQGWRUHPHPEHU
WKHZLGHULQWHUHVWVRIWKH%%&¶Lindley 2003aS0DQVHOO¶VDGYLFHWRZHLgh the 
µLQWHUHVWVRIWKH%%&¶LQFRYHULQJSROLWLFDOO\FRQWHQWLRXVLVVXHVZRXOGQRWSUHYHQW
Panorama from becoming embroiled in further controversy over its coverage of the 
)DONODQG¶V:DUDQGWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\LQWKHV 
 
Panorama had shrugged off charges of complacency that had dogged it since the 1950s, 
but in the process had made itself and the BBC a target for politically motivated attacks 
that threatened the independence of the Corporation.  
 
 
 
                                               
5 Daily Express ± 9th November 1979. 
  108 
4.4.4 Panorama in the 1980s 
 
The 1980s mark a particularly troubled decade for the BBC in its relations with the 
Government. Panorama found itself at the centre of two major controversies involving 
alleged government pressure and interference in the 1980s: the first, in its coverage of 
the Falklands ConflLFWLQµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU"¶>tx: 10.5.82] which was the subject of 
intense anger from Conservative MPs (see Chapter 5.1); the second looking at the 
influence of racist groups and individuals within the Conservative Party iQµ0DJJLH¶V
0LOLWDQW7HQGHQF\¶>W[ 30.1.84] for which the BBC paid out of court damages, much to 
the dismay of the Panorama WHDPUHVSRQVLEOH+RZHYHU/LQGOH\¶VDFFRXQW
indicates a series of other controversies, of which only a small proportion involved 
direct Government pressure, some of which were not party-political matters at all, and 
many involving behind-the-scenes manoeuvres and interference that were not public 
knowledge at the time.  
 
)RUH[DPSOH,DQ7UHWKRZDQLVDFFXVHGLQ/LQGOH\¶VERRNRISXWWLQJVHULRXVREVWDFOHVLQ
the path of reporter Tom Mangold, who was attempting to investigate aspects of the 
British intelligence services. These obstacles included forbidding the reporter from 
interviewing former members of MI5 and MI6 and demanding that some sequences be 
removed from the completed film.  Trethowan apparently instructed Mangold not to tell 
either the press or Roger Bolton of the first meeting they had to discuss this issue, 
describing Panorama¶VWKHQ(GLWRUWR0DQJROGDVµDZHOO-NQRZQOLWWOH0DU[LVWVKLW¶ 
(Mangold 2004, p.1). In the year of his retirement Trethowan weathered the political 
VWRUPDURXQGWKH%%&¶VUHSRUWLQJRIWKH)DONODQG¶VFRQIOLFWZKLFKFHQWUHGRQ
particular reports in Panorama and its major in-house rival Newsnight  (launched in 
1980). However, under Alasdair Milne as Director General (1982-WKH%%&¶V
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK0UV7KDWFKHU¶V*RYHUQPHQWZRXOGZRUVHQFRQVLGHUDEO\ 
 
As Editor between 1983 and 1985 Peter Ibbotson steered the programme through 
heightened political and industrial tensions culmLQDWLQJLQWKH0LQHUV¶6WULNHRI-
,WZDVDOVRDWLPHZKHQUHSRUWLQJRQWKHµ7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGEHFDPHYHU\
difficult, as David Miller makes clear: 
 
The legacy of the Carrickmore affair, 1979 assassination of Airey Neave, 
and the 1984 Brighton bombing (in which Mrs Thatcher herself narrowly 
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escaped death), coupled with the major rows over the Falklands and the 
coverage of the miners strike in 1984/85, sets the context for government 
relations with the broadcasters.  In the summer of 1985, the government was 
at a critical stage in Anglo-Irish negotiations and there had been much 
controversy about the way in which US television had covered the hijack of 
a TWA plane.  The networks were accused of favouring the hijackers by 
interviewing them and televising their demands.  Referring to the hijacking 
Mrs Thatcher suggested, in a speech in the US, that the media had supplied 
the 'terrorists' with the 'oxygen of publicity'. 
(Miller 1994, p.35-36) 
 
Against this backdrop, programmes such as Peter Taylor report on allegations of a 
µVKRRWWRNLOO¶SROLF\>µ-XVWLFH8QGHU)LUH¶W[@FDPHXQGHUSDUWLFXODUO\
hostile scrutiny and within a few years the Government would introduce a draconian bill 
to prevent organisations believed to be supporting terrorism from directly broadcasting 
RQWKHDLUZDYHVµEURDGFDVWEDQ¶,WLVDOVRDURXQGWKLVWLPHWKDW0LFKDHO
&RFNHUHOO¶VUHSRUWRQLQILOWUDWLRQRIWKH&RQVHUYDWLYH3DUW\E\UDFLVWHOHPHQWVLQ
µ0DJJLH¶V0LOLWDQW7HQGHQF\¶LVWKHVXEMHFWRIKHDWHGGHEate. The allegation had first 
been made by the Young Conservatives in a report presented in January 1984 and the 
programme made well-substantiated links between the Tory Party and far right groups 
such as the Focus Policy Group led by the Holocaust-denying historian David Irving. 
Born writes of how: 
 
The broadcast led to a lengthy legal process when two Tory MPs issued 
writs for libel. The BBC eventually settled out of court and paid damages; 
the director-general, Alasdair Milne, who was inclined to allow the case to 
proceed, was ordered to settle by the acting chair of governors. The incident 
marked a serious rift between the director-general and the governors; for the 
BBC it amounted to a constitutional crisis.  
(Born 2005, p.48) 
 
The pressure to settle out of court mid-trial came from newly-appointed Chairman 
Marmaduke Hussey who had been advised by Conservative Chairman Norman Tebbit 
WRVHHWKHOHJDODGYLFHWKH%%&KDGEHHQJLYHQ/LQGOH\GHVFULEHVWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶V
unreserved apology and payout to the deIHQGDQWVDVµDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\KXPLOLDWLRQIRU
PanoramaDQGDSXEOLFYLQGLFDWLRQIRUWKH03V¶SDQGVXJJHVWVWKHGHFLVLRQWR
back down was motivated by political, rather than legal considerations. He also argues 
that: 
,QUHWURVSHFWµ0DJJLH¶V0LOLWDQW 7HQGHQF\¶ZDVWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKHHQGRI
Panorama¶VSRZHU± its power to do what its Editor wanted. Its pride was 
humbled by the court case and the verdict against it. Partly because of that 
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debacle, the Director General was soon to lose his job. A new Chairman had 
been appointed ± told to get the BBC journalists under control. And shortly 
afterwards Birt arrived to do the business. 
(Lindley 2003a, p.256)   
 
 
The sacking of Alasdair Milne in Jan 1987, over a series of current affairs and 
documentary programmes that had upset the government6 (see Milne 1989; 2¶0DOley 
DQGWKHDUULYDORI-RKQ%LUWDV'HSXW\'LUHFWRU*HQHUDOLVGHVFULEHGDVµ<HDU
=HUR¶E\/LQGOH\ZKRRQO\KDOI-MRNLQJO\FRPSDUHV%LUW¶VWHQXUHDWWKH%%&WRWKDWRI
Pol Pot in Cambodia, ZLWKKLVDVVLVWDQWVPDQ\IURP/:7FKDUDFWHULVHGDVµEODFN
$UPDQLVXLWHGUHYROXWLRQDULHV¶,ELGS%LUW¶VQHZUHJLPHUHVXOWHGLQGUDPDWLF
changes for News and Current Affairs, the closure of the Lime Grove studios that had 
been Panorama¶VKRPHDQGFORVHVFUXWLQ\DQGFRQWURORIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VRXWSXW
Panorama¶V(GLWRU'DYLG'LFNLQVRQZDVUHSODFHGE\7LP*DUGDPDQG+HDGRI&XUUHQW
$IIDLUV3HWHU3DJQDPHQWDZDVUHSODFHGE\%LUW¶VGHSXW\6DPLU6KDK$SURSRVHG
programme by John Ware on Peter Wright and the revelations about plots against 
former Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in Spycatcher >µ:ULJKWRU:URQJ"¶W[
13.10.1988] was initially blocked by Birt who insisted on seeing a detailed script before 
granting permission for Ware to even talk to Wright. In interview, Ware recalls that Birt 
µZDQWHGWRPDNHVXUHWKHUHZDVQ¶WJRLQJWREHDQ\WKLQJWKDWZRXOGUHERXQGRQKLV
ZDWFKDQGKHZDVYHU\PLVWUXVWIXORIWKHZKROHPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHP¶:KLOHJHQHUDOO\
defensive of Birt, Ware admits that the degree of control exercised over Panorama was 
µVXIIRFDWLQJWRDGHJUHH¶DQGWKDWKHVHULRXVO\FRQVLGHUHGUHWXUQLQJWRWorld in Action 
where management was hugely supportive for such projects (personal communication,  
February 19, 2007). 
 
 
Lindley gives many examples of interference by John Birt and the atmosphere of fear 
and caution it created at Panorama, including his own (effective) sacking for a critical 
film about the new Indian Prime Minister which had received complaints from the 
Indian High Commission7 . Birt anG&KDLUPDQ0DUPDGXNH+XVVH\¶VµJURYHOOLQJ¶
                                               
6 Particularly Panorama¶V0DJJLH¶V0LOLWDQW7HQGHQF\DQGWKHGRFXPHQWDU\VHULHVReal Lives portrait of 
political leaders in Northern Ireland 
7 µ5DMLY*DQGKL,QGLD¶V3LORW3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶W[ 
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apology for the film are seen by Lindley as wholly misplaced and aimed at pacifying the 
%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQWZKRZHUHDQJU\WKDWWKHGLVSXWHµFRXOGGLYHUWWUDGH± notably a 
potential multimillion pound order for AerRVSDFH+DZNWUDLQHUV¶The Guardian cited 
Lindley 2003, p.339). Further interference with, and delays to, programmes on an 
alleged SAS shoot-to-kill policy in Northern Ireland, corruption in Conservative-
controlled Westminster City Council and Conservative Party funding at the end of the 
GHFDGHRQO\IXHOOHGWKHVXVSLFLRQWKDWµVHOI-FHQVRUVKLS¶KDGEHFRPHDKDELWXDOUHVSRQVH
to politically sensitive issues at the BBC. 
 
Interviews with a number of former Panorama programme-makers give weight to 
/LQGOH\¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHHIIHFWRI%LUW¶VPDQDJHPHQWVW\OHRQFXUUHQWDIIDLUVFRYHUDJH
Roger Bolton couches his criticism in diplomatic language, but asserts that there was: 
 
[...] no doubt that once or twice, because he was determined to secure the 
future of the BBC, he postponed or fudged programmes in difficult areas. 
And for a period, and it was the period when Mrs Thatcher was at her most 
powerful, there undoubtedly was an unwillingness for the BBC to go first 
shall we say.  A belief that let other people establish what the row was about 
DQGWKHQZHPLJKWFRPHLQDQGWU\DQGGRVRPHWKLQJDXWKRULWDWLYHµ:HDUH
QRWLQWKHEXVLQHVVRIFUHDWLQJFRQWURYHUV\DURXQGXV¶,NQRZWKDWWREHKLV
position.   
(personal communication,  October 23, 2008) 
 
Former Panorama producer Eamonn Matthews describes witnessing a transformation at 
Panorama IURPWKHHDUO\HLJKWLHVZKHQWKHSURJUDPPHKDGµWRXJK¶MRXUQDOLVWVDQG
reporters like Tom Bower, John Pennycate, Tom Mangold, Richard Lindley and David 
'LPEOHE\ZKRZHUHµELJEHDVWVZKR were perhaps rather like big columnists on a 
QHZVSDSHUWKDWLI\RXWDQJOHGZLWKWKHP\RXKDGEHWWHUNQRZZKDW\RXZHUHDERXW¶WR
DVLWXDWLRQLQWKHHDUO\QLQHWLHVZKHQ\RXKDGµDYHU\IULJKWHQHGSURJUDPPHZLWK
people being sacked and with Weekend World being held up as the sort of thing which 
Panorama RXJKWWRDVSLUHWRLILWZHUHFOHYHUHQRXJK¶(personal communication,  June 
27, 2007). 
 
4.4.5 Panorama in the 1990s 
 
The early nineties are regarded by Born (2004) as a period of growing political 
sensitivity for the BBC, given the lead-in to Charter renewal in 1996 and she identifies 
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HYLGHQFHRILQWHQVLI\LQJµPDQDJHULDOFDXWLRQ¶DQGµSROLWLFDOHPDVFXODWLRQ¶within news 
and current affairs. This is particularly evident in the blocking or delayed transmission 
of two Panorama investigations: the first into how Britain supplied Iraq with a 
PDVVLYHO\SRZHUIXOSLHFHRIDUPRXU\LQWKHOHDGXSWRWKH*XOI:DUµ6DGGDP¶V
6XSHUJXQ¶>W[@DQG the second C6OLGLQJ,QWR6OXPS¶>W[ @µLQZKLFK
BritaLQ¶VHFRQRPLFSUREOHPVZHUHODLGDWWKHGRRURIWKHIRUPHU&RQVHUYDWLYH
FKDQFHOORU1LJHO/DZVRQ¶S 
 
 
Former Deputy Editor of Weekend World *OHQZ\Q%HQVRQUHJDUGHGDVDµ%LUWLVW¶WRRN
over as Editor between 1992-1994 and, notoriously, was quoted as VD\LQJµ,WZRXOGQ¶W
matter if only five people watched [Panorama@LW¶VDV\PEROWRWKHFRXQWU\WKDWWKH
%%&FRQVLGHUVWKHVXEMHFWZH¶UHFRYHULQJLVLPSRUWDQW¶Lindley 2003, p.359). Contrary 
to expectations, however, Benson soon moved Panorama away from the kind of 
ponderous, analytical, high-EURZVW\OHHQFRXUDJHGXQGHU%LUW¶VµPLVVLRQWRH[SODLQ¶
GRFWULQHZKLFKKDGDSSDUHQWO\HURGHG%%&¶V0RQGD\QLJKWUDWLQJV6KHDOVR
sometimes positioned the programme beyond the more predictable liberal concerns of 
investigative reporting, adopting, for instance, sceptical attitudes to people on welfare, 
as in WKHUHSRUWµ%DELHVRQ%HQHILW¶>W[@. This report filmed on an estate in 
Cardiff with high levels of unemployment received a record number of viewer 
complaints and one of which was upheld by the Broadcasting Complaints Commission 
(BCC), which GHVFULEHGDVSHFWVRIWKHSURJUDPPHDVµXQIDLUDQGXQMXVW¶(Ibid p.293-
294). 7KHDSSURDFKRIµ%DELHVRQ%HQHILWV¶FRXOGEHGHVFULEHGDVLQWXQHZLWKDUDGLFDO
right-wing agenda, and was characteristic of a tendency sometimes described as 
µFRQWUDULDQ¶MRXUQDOLVPHPERGLHGLQWKHZRUNRI$QGUHZ1HLOZKRZRXOGRIWHQIRFXV
negatively on some pressure groups such as Greenpeace or the Aids lobby (see Born 
2005, p.384).  
 
Perhaps the most famous Panorama episode, and certainly the most highly rated, was 
WUDQVPLWWHGXQGHU6WHYH+HZOHWW¶V(GLWRUVKLS-1997). 22.8 million people watched 
Diana, Princess of Wales give a revealing interview to Martin Bashir on the 20th 
November 1995. In the interview Diana describes her marriage to Charles, the post-
natal depression she suffered after giving birth to William and Harry, her three years of 
bXOLPLDWKHLQWHQVHPHGLDSUHVVXUHVKHH[SHULHQFHGDQGKHUDQGKHUKXVEDQG¶V
infidelities. 
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The huge interest in this episode, arguably, refocused attention on Panorama¶VUDWLQJV
and under Hewlitt WKHSURJUDPPHGHYHORSHGDPRUHµDFFHVVLEOH¶DJHQGDZLWK
SURJUDPPHVRQIRULQVWDQFHµ%RR]LQJIRU%ULWDLQ¶[tx: 08.01.96]µ&KLOdren Behaving 
Badly¶>W[@µ9LROHQW:RPHQ¶>W[@DQGµ0\UD+LQGOH\>W[@  
(BUFVC Panorama Project database). Classic investigations continued as in the report 
RQDGHFDGHRIRIILFLDOPLVWDNHVDQGFRYHUXSVLQWR%6(LQµ0DG&RZVDQG(QJOLVKPHQ¶
[tx: @DQGµ7KH'UXJV2O\PSLFV¶>W[@ which the BBC came under heavy 
pressure from the International Olympic Committee to drop (Bell 2008). There was also 
HPRWLRQDOHQJDJHPHQWLQPRUHFRPSOH[VWRULHVVXFKDVµRwanda: Journey Into 
Darkness¶>tx: 27.06.94] with Feargal Keane, and a report from Bosnia by John 
Simpson on the controversial mission of the UN protection force in Bosnia led by the 
%ULWLVK*HQHUDO6LU0LFKDHO5RVHµ$Q(QJOLVKPDQLQ6DUDMHYR¶[tx: 23.1.95]). More 
traditional political coverage continued, if at a somewhat reduced level. For example, in 
April 1997 David Dimbleby led a series of four separate pre-election interviews with 
the leaders of the three main political parties, as well as Plaid Cymru and the Scottish 
National Party. SimiODUO\µ7KH'HYROXWLRQ'HEDWH¶>W[@, held the day before 
the referendum in Scotland and a week before the referendum in Wales on support for 
an assembly/parliament, signalled how Panorama still saw its role as an important 
venue for national debates of this kind, although on a much reduced basis compared to 
earlier decades. 
 
Under the Editorship of Peter Horrocks (1997-2000) Panorama continued the mix of 
stories that Hewlitt had developed with a broad audience appeal. The Royal Family is 
the topiFRIWZRSURJUDPPHVµ7KH'LDQD'LYLGHQG¶W[DQGµ&KDUOHVD/LIHLQ
WaLWLQJ¶W[µ9LDJUD¶>W[@µ3RUQ:DUV¶>W[@DQGµ7KH
+RXVH3ULFH/RWWHU\¶>W[@ LQGLFDWHDFRQWLQXLQJµWDEORLG¶LQJUHGLHQWZKLOH
Steve BraGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWIURP5ZDQGDµ:KHQ*RRG0HQ'R1RWKLQJ¶>W[@, 
7RP0DQJROG¶VLQWHUYLHZZLWKweapons inspector Scott Ritter 8 µ6HFUHWV6SLHVDQG
9LGHRWDSH¶>tx: @DQGµ7KH.LOOLQJRI.RVRYR¶>W[@ are evidence of a 
FRQWLQXLQJµEURDGVKHHW¶HOHPHQWWRWKHSURJUDPPH,QPanorama became one of 
the first programmes to introduce a programme website and an email address, which 
                                               
8 Ritter blamed the CIA for the collapse of the UN weapons inspection programme in Iraq and admitted to 
spying on the Iraqis for the Israeli secret service, amongst other allegations. 
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+RUURFNVGHVFULEHVDVDµWXUQLQJSRLQW¶IURPDKLVWRU\RIVRPHZKDWµSDWURQLVLQJ
LQVWUXFWLRQ¶LQQHZVDQGFXUUHQW DIIDLUVWRDQHZµDQWL-HOLWLVWUHYROXWLRQ¶LQZKLFK
audience interactivity and feedback would play a major role (Horrocks 2006. p.3-4). 
Newspaper reports at the time suggest that Panorama suffered a 15% cut in budget 
between 1996-98 and a reduction in filming schedule from 14 to 11 days. There are also 
complaints about Panorama¶VQHZVFKHGXOHGVORWRISPEHLQJWRRODWHDOWKRXJKLW
continued to hold a healthy 25% share and averaged around 4.4 million viewers.  
 
 
 
4.4.6 Panorama post-2000 
 
,79¶VGHFLVLRQto axe the 2¶FORFN1HZV is thought to have had a major impact on 
Panorama in October 2000 when it was moved from its traditional Monday night, to 
ZKDWPDQ\GHVFULEHGDVD6XQGD\QLJKWµJUDYH\DUG¶VORWRIXQGHU(GLWRU0LNH
Robinson (2000-2006) and reduced the number of programmes per year from thirty-six 
to thirty. The move was to make way for a new 12¶FORFN%%&1HZVEXOOHWLQwas 
strongly opposed by the Panorama¶VMRXUQDOLVWVDQGSURGXFWLRQVWDII,QWKHILUVWZHHN
Panorama lost a quarter of its viewers with a fall from 4.2 PLOOLRQIRUµ:KR%RPEHG
2PDJK¶>W[@ to 3.2 million IRUµ*DSDQG1LNH1R6ZHDW"¶>W[@, and 
never really recovered with average viewing figures falling from a 3.6 million average 
in 2000 to 2.6 million in 2005. Robinson oversaw the heavily criticised coverage of the 
9-11 attacks (which Tom Mangold resigned over), as well as the invasions of 
Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). He also increased Panorama¶VXVHRILQWHUDFWLYH
technology, including the first live interactive forum 9 in which 19,000 people voted 
GXULQJWKHFRXUVHRIWKHSURJUDPPHRQZKHWKHUZDUZDVµLQHYLWDEOH¶DQGµSeroxat: 
(PDLOVIURPWKH(GJH¶>W[@ a follow XSWRµ7KH6HFUHWVRI6HUR[DW¶>W[
13.10.02] which contained an interactive application containing film and other content 
not being used in the transmitted broadcast. Debate about moving Panorama back to a 
prime-WLPHVORWZDVDFRQVWDQWIHDWXUHRI5RELQVRQ¶V(GLWRUVKLSEXWDV5HHYHOOSRLQWV
out, an internal BBC report rejected this idea on the grounds that other channels would 
then target the slot, audiences would fall to around the 1 million mark, talent would 
                                               
9 µPanorama ,QWHUDFWLYH,UDT&ULVLV¶W[ 
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µjump ship¶ and the show would be axed.  
 
A great deal of controversy and press coverage accompanied Panorama¶VHYHQWXDO
move back to prime time and a shorter thirty minute (down from forty minute) slot in 
January 2007 under its new Editor Sandy Smith (formerly Editor of the consumer 
affairs programme Watchdog$PLGVWDOOHJDWLRQVRIµGXPELQJGRZQ¶Panorama¶V
new approach was described by BBC Head of Current Affairs George Entwistle as a 
VLJQLILFDQWµVKLIWWRZDUGVDXGLHQFHIRFXVZKLOHUHWDLQLQJDQDJHQGDFRPPLWPHQWWR
UHSRUWWKHZRUOGDVLWXQIROGVWKDWZLOOQHYHUFKDQJH¶ (cited Brown and Wells 2006, p.2). 
The programme also had a new format: being introduced by Jeremy Vine, as it had been 
in previous years by the likes of Richard and David Dimbleby, and with a revamped 
WLWOHVHTXHQFHDQGDQHZµHGJLHU¶ILOPLQJVW\OHPanorama¶VIRUPHUORQJHVW-serving 
reporter Tom Mangold was one of many observers to prove disappointed in the re-
ODXQFKHGSURJUDPPHODPHQWLQJWKHXVHRIµWRRPDQ\LQFRQVHTXHQWLDOVWRULHV¶DQG
FRPSODLQLQJWKDWLWµSUDWIDOOVQRLVLO\EHWZHHQWZRVWRROVRIVLOO\WDEORLGJXIIDQGVHULRXV
HQGHDYRXU¶0DQJROGS3URJUDPPHVVXFKDVµ6KRXOG,ILght Back? [tx: 
@µ*%+RQWKH1+6¶>W[@µ6WDONHUV0XUGHULQ6ORZ0RWLRQ¶>W[
15.3.07]µ'RJILJKWLQJ8QGHUFRYHU¶>W[@µ0DUULHGWRWKH0RE¶>W[@
µ7HHQDJH6H[IRU6DOH¶>W[@ and, mRVWQRWRULRXVO\µ6FLHQWRORJ\DQG0H¶>W[
14.5.07] in which John Sweeney exploded with rage whilst interviewing a Scientologist 
suggested that Panorama KDGOXUFKHGWRZDUGVPRUHµWDEORLG¶YDOXHV7KHUHZHUHDOVR
concerns about programmes where there appeared to be a failure of investigative 
journalism, notably in the use of an apparently discredited scientisWLQµ:L-Fi: A 
:DUQLQJ6LJQDO¶>W[@ DQGWKHFODLPVXEVHTXHQWO\ZLWKGUDZQWKDW3DNLVWDQ¶V
cricket coach Bob Woolmer had been poisoned and then strangled in Jamaica in 
µ0XUGHUDWWKH:RUOG&XS¶>W[@. 
 
However, there remains some evidence of a recent, increasing commitment to what 
WUDGLWLRQDOLVWVKDYHEHHQFDOOLQJIRULQWKHSURJUDPPH¶VFRYHUDJHRIPRUHµEURDGVKHHW¶
and international storLHVVXFKDV-DQH&RUELQ¶Vµ5HWXUQWR*D]D¶>W[@ and 
Jeremy BoZHQ¶Vµ*D]D2XWRIWKH5XLQV¶>W[@+LODU\$QGHUVVRQ¶Vµ,V
American 5HDG\IRUD%ODFN3UHVLGHQW"¶>W[@DQGµ:KDW1RZ0U3UHVLGHQW"¶
[tx: 27.1.09]-DQH&RUELQ¶VUHSRUWVIURP,UDTDQG$IJKDQLVWDQµ%DVUD7KH/HJDF\¶>W[
10.12.07] DQGµ%ULWDLQ¶V7HUURU+HDUWODQGV¶>W[@DQG3DXO.HQ\RQ¶VUHSRUWVRQ
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HFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOPLJUDQWVDQGµ(XURSH RU'LH7U\LQJ¶>W[@DQGµ0LJUDQWV
JR+RPH¶>W[@. In interview, Kenyon confirms that Panorama¶VVWUDWHJ\LVWR
µKDPPRFN¶WKHPRUHµGHPDQGLQJ¶SURJUDPPHVDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWRULHVEHWZHHQPRUH
µDFFHVVLEOH¶GRPHVWLFWRSLFVµtwo popular programmes and then in between one which 
they think that the audience will dip on¶ (personal communication,  April 27, 2007). 
 
*DEHU¶VEVWXG\RIWKHUHODXQFKHGPanorama VKRZVVRPHHYLGHQFHRIµKLJK-
TXDOLW\UHYHODWRU\LQYHVWLJDWLRQV¶DOWKRXJKLWDOVRSRLQWVWRVKRUWFRPLQJVVXFKDVD
stress on production values at the expense of editorial content and worries that: 
 
>«@ WKH PDMRULW\ RI LWV SURJUDPPHV DUH QHLWKHU LQYHVWLJDWLYH EXW QRU DUH
they seeking to do what Panorama once did so well ± in the words of Tom 
0DQJROGµWRVSHQGWLPHHQHUJ\PRQH\DQGWUXHUHSRUWLQJWDOHQt to cover, 
in depth, the big strategic, vital issues of the day, whatever the [audience] 
ILJXUHV¶ 
(p.254) 
 
It may, however, be too early to say if Panorama has, in fact, abandoned this tradition. 
Panorama¶VDELOLW\WRUHLQYHQWLWVHOIKDVEHHQDQHQGXULQJfeature of its six decades of 
reporting current affairs. It may be that this willingness to adapt, innovate and yet 
remain true to a mainstream tradition of broadcast journalism will help it survive the 
increasingly competitive age of digital broadcasting.  
 
This thesis now turns to the debates around news and current affairs war coverage and 
specifically coverage of the two wars against Iraq of 1991 and 2003. Did British current 
affairs and specifically Panorama PDQDJHWREUHDNDZD\IURPµRIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHV¶WKDW
many critics allege dominated news coverage of both wars? Was the range of issues 
pertaining to the historical background to the wars, or the range of ethical questions 
involved, largely ignored as Kellner (1992) argues they were in US current affairs? To 
ZKDWH[WHQWZDVWKH%%&¶Vlegal REOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHµEDODQFHG¶DQGµLPSDUWLDO¶
coverage, as shown in this chapter, compromised as its critics suggested (see Philo and 
McLaughlin 1993; Cromwell and Edwards 2006, 2009)? And finally, did the very 
different levels of political consensus for the first and second Gulf Wars make any 
difference to the type of coverage which British current affairs programmes, and 
specifically Panorama, offered? 
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5.1 Coverage of Conflict 
5.1.1 Introduction 
 
:KLOHQXPHURXVGHILQLWLRQVRIµZDU¶KDYHEHHQH[SORUHGLIQRWDJUHHGDFURVVDYDULRXV
GLVFLSOLQHVµconflict¶, as Cottle notes, can be defined more straightforwardly as a 
VWUXJJOHµEHWZHHQRSSRVLQJinterests aQGRXWORRNV¶&RWWOHS Thereafter, 
&RWWOHVXJJHVWVWKHSLFWXUHLVOHVVVLPSOHDOWKRXJKWKHWHUPµPDMRUDUPHGFRQIOLFW¶LV
JHQHUDOO\SUHIHUUHGWRWKHPRUHSUREOHPDWLFµZDU¶LQDFDGHPLFOLWHUDWXUH%RWKWHUPVDUH
used in this study to mean: 
 
>«@prolonged combat between the military forces of two or more 
governments, or of one government and at least one organised armed group, 
involving the use of weapons and incurring at least 1000 battle related 
deaths.  
(Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, cited Allen 1999, pg.19-20). 
 
 
The literature exploring British and US media coverage of major armed conflicts is 
enormous and has grown significantly in recent years, particularly in the aftermath of 
the controversial invasion of Iraq in 2003. Existing literature on media coverage of the 
1992 and 2003 wars against Iraq (the specific focus of this study on Panorama¶V 
FRQIOLFWFRYHUDJHLQFOXGHMRXUQDOLVWV¶PHPRLUVFROOHFWHGLQWHUYLHZVZLWKPHGLD
ZRUNHUVDQGFRPPHPRUDWLYHLOOXVWUDWHGµKLVWRULHV¶recounting or celebrating a 
SDUWLFXODULQGLYLGXDOMRXUQDOLVWSKRWRJUDSKHURUPHGLDRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VHIIRUWVWRUHSRUW
from the front line (see Brown and Shukman 1991; Adie 2003;  Beck and Downing eds 
2003; Omar 2004; Simpson 2004; Ayres 2005; Abdul-Ahad et al. 2006; Bowen 2006; 
Hoyt and Palattela 2007). In addition to outlining the major events of the war and the 
deeds of our armed forces, these accounts often report on bureaucratic obstacles to 
reporting, including the various overt and covert efforts of governments or the military 
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(on both sides of the battlelines) to censor, shape or control the news being reported. In 
this respect, these works can provide first-hand evidence of journalistic practices, 
practical and institutional constraints and editorial or political pressures at times of war. 
 
Other studies include accounts which adopt a less reflectLYHPRUHµSUDJPDWLF¶PLOLWDU\
perspective emphasising what the authors regard as the largely benign effects and 
practical necessity of media management (Hudson and Stanier 1997; Taverner 2005; 
Laity 2005) against more critical accounts, including non-academic, journalistic and/or 
SROHPLFDWWDFNVRQWKHPHGLD¶VµVXSLQH¶RUµFRPSOLFLW¶UROHDQGFRQGXFWLQDJLYHQZDU
(Moore 2005; Borjesson 2004; Mackay 2006; Dadge 2006; Schechter 2006).  As 
Halliday notes in relation to the Gulf War of 1992, judgements on tKHPHGLD¶VFRYHUDJH
RIDSDUWLFXODUZDUWHQGWRFRUUHODWHZLWKWKHDXWKRU¶VYLHZVRIWKHZDULWVHOIZLWKµWKRVH
regarding the war as legitimate tending to endorse news coverage, those opposed to it 
UHJDUGLQJFRYHUDJHDVVXVSHFW¶+DOOLGD\S 
 
SWXG\RIWKHQHZVPHGLD¶VZDUFRYHUDJHLQFOXGHVVXUYH\VRIWKHSURGXFWLRQSURFHVVWKH
organisational contexts, professional practices, political constraints and changing 
dynamics of state-media-military relations. Significantly, many of these studies overlap 
in their focus on British and US war coverage suggesting a degree of interdependence or 
convergence in Anglo-American media-state relations, particularly in wars where both 
states fought side-by-side. Parallel developments are frequently located in historical 
QDUUDWLYHVWKDWVKRZKRZ%ULWLVKDQG86JRYHUQPHQWVDQGRUPLOLWDU\¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKH
media and its perceived performance in one war can have direct consequences on the 
µPHGLDPDQDJHPHQW¶RIVXEVHTXHQWZDUV.QLJKWOH\¶VXSGDWHGThe First Casualty 
(2003) is widely regarded as the definitive account of war journalism from the Crimean 
War to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, but there are numerous detailed studies that take a 
similar war-by-war approach (Stewart and Carruthers 1996; Hudson and Stanier 1997; 
McLaughlin 2002; Connelly and Welch 2005; Andersen 2006). 
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5.1.2 State-media-military relations: a brief history of media 
management 
Taylor (1998) argues, somewhat provocatively, that state, military, media and academic 
discourse in Britain shies away IURPXVHRIWKHWHUPµSURSDJDQGD¶ZLWKLWVQHJDWLYH
connotations. For Taylor, the term propaganda has become discredited by its association 
with totalitarian regimes and, consequently, the British have adopted more polite 
euphemisms such as 'political education', 'publicity', 'public relations' and more recently, 

PHGLDPDQDJHPHQW¶IRUSHUVXDVLYHSURFHVVHVDQGWHFKQLTXHVWKDWLQKLVYLHZ
FRQVWLWXWHµSURSDJDQGD¶DVSURSHUO\XQGHUVWRRGVHH-RZHWWDQG2¶'RQQHOOIRUD
useful definition and discussion of WKLVWHUP7KHXVHRIVXFKµSURSDJDQGD¶µPHGLD
PDQDJHPHQW¶RUHIIRUWVE\WKHVWDWHWRFHQVRUGLUHFWDQGFRQWUROWKHIORZRIQHZVDW
times of war has been the subject of a great deal of attention (see Mowlana et al.1992; 
Schlesinger 1992; Miller 1993, 1994, 2002, 2004; Eldridge 1993; Herman and 
Chomsky 2008; Ewen 1996; Pratkanis and Aronson 1997; Curtis 1998; Allen and 
Seaton 1999; Nohrstedt et al. 2000; Thussu and Freedman 2003; Borjesson 2004; 
Kamalipour and Snow 2004; Zaharna 2004; Connelly and Welch 2005; Altheide and 
Grimes 2005; Kumar 2006; Lewis et al. 2006, etc.).  
 
7KH%%&¶VVRPHWLPHVSUREOHPDWLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWHVSHFLDOO\
at times of war, has also been the subject of extensive commentary and critique (see 
Ward 1989; Walters 1989; Miller 1994; Barnett and Gaber 2001; Curran and Seaton 
2003; Dyke 2004; Wring 2005). Seaton (2003) articulates the view that the notion of the 
%%&¶VµLQGHSHQGHQFH¶HPHUJHGDURXQGLWVHVWDEOLVKPHQWDVD&RUSRUDWLRQXQGHU5R\DO
Charter on the 1st January 1927 and was less as a matter of principle, but rather as a 
SROLWLFDOO\H[SHGLHQWFRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQDJRYHUQPHQWµDQ[LRXVWRDYRLG
UHVSRQVLELOLW\IRUWULYLD¶SDQGDSLRQHHULQJ'LUHFWRUGeneral averse to 
interference. While not state controlled, Seaton argues that the BBC remained 
µYXOQHUDEOHWREXOO\LQJ¶LQWKHVDQGZDVµIRUFHGWRSDVVRIIJRYHUQPHQW
LQWHUYHQWLRQDVLWVRZQGHFLVLRQ¶S-120), an observation echoed in contemporary 
commentary (see Audit 1937). It is suggested that Reith had, partly under pressure from 
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newspaper owners and partly to avoid vulnHUDELOLW\WRµSXEOLFURZV¶%ULJJVE
p.191), somewhat limited the growth of news at the Corporation where it was felt 
µSROLWLFDOFRQWURYHUV\ZDVPRVWOLNHO\WRIODUH¶.XPDU975, p.71). To some extent, 
5HLWK¶VUHVLJQDWLRQLQDQGWKHRXWEUHDNRIZDULQXVKHUHGLQDQHZHUDIRUWKH
%%&7KH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VUHFRUGRIJHQHUDOO\FUHGLEOHDQGRFFDVLRQDOO\JURXQGEUHDNLQJ
reporting of the Second World War was, several accounts suggests, a significant 
advance on previous practice (see Briggs 1970). 
 
6HYHUDODFFRXQWVPDLQWDLQWKDWWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VUHSXWDWLRQIRUUHSRUWLQJ%ULWDLQ¶V
military defeats as well as its military victories in the Second World War lent the 
organisation a degree of credibility amongst its international audience in the post-war 
era (see Walters 1989). Crisell (1997) argues a common position amongst broadcast 
KLVWRULDQVWKDWµ3HUKDSVWKH%%&¶VJUHDWHVWZDUWLPHVXFFHVVZDVWRKRQRXULWVRULJLQDO
wise decisLRQWRWHOOWKHWUXWKDVIDUDVLWFRXOGUDWKHUWKDQFUHDWHSURSDJDQGD¶S
The war is also shown by several studies to radically expand and transform the BBC 
DQGHDUQERWKGRPHVWLFDQGLQWHUQDWLRQDODIIHFWLRQVHH:DUGZLQQLQJµDQ
honoured place in the hearts and minds of millions, who would long afterwards trust the 
UHSXWDWLRQRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶6WUHHWS:KLOH&ULVHOODGPLWVWKH%%&
VXSSUHVVHGFHUWDLQIDFWVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LWµFRQVFLRXVO\HVFKHZHG
liHVDQGGLVWRUWLRQV¶DQGWKHUHE\JDLQHGDQDGYDQWDJHRYHUWKHVWDWLRQVRIWKHHQHP\
whilst increasing public esteem for the Corporation (p.61). 
 
Seaton (2003) adds a more sceptical note, observing that while contemporary 
MXGJHPHQWVRIWKH%%&¶VSHUIRUPDQFH LQWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DUZHUHHQWKXVLDVWLFµ$
belief in its independence is little more than a self-DGXODWRU\SDUWRIWKH%ULWLVKP\WK¶
(p.145). There is general agreement, however, WKDWWKH%%&¶VQHZVFRYHUDJHUHWXUQHGWR
a more undistinguished and timid form between the re-launch of television broadcasting 
LQDQGZKHQWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VPRQRSRO\ZDVEURNHQE\,79DQGLWVQHZV
provider ITN (Seaton 2003; Day 1989). -RQDWKDQ'LPEOHE\¶VDFFRXQWRIKLVIDWKHU
5LFKDUG¶VZRUNDWWKH%%&VXJJHVWVWKDWWhe advances in reporting established in the 
Second World War were µVTXDQGHUHG¶RQFHWKHXQLTXHSROLWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIWKH
ODWWHUZDU\HDUVKDGSDVVHGDIWHUZKLFKWKH&RUSRUDWLRQµODFNHGWKHFRXUDJHWRWHVWLWV
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LQGHSHQGHQFH¶'LPEOHE\ 1975, p.270). CriVHOOGHVFULEHVWKH%%&¶V79QHZV
RXWSXWDVµEDFNZDUG¶ZLWKµQRWHOHYLVLRQQHZVDVVXFK¶XQWLOSEHLQJERXQG
DV:\YHUQRWHVWRDUDGLRIRUPDWZLWKµDQLQYLVLEOHDQQRXQFHUUHDGLQJDEXOOHWLQ
RYHUDFDSWLRQFDUGRQVFUHHQ¶S 
 
There is a degree of uniformity in the numerous descriptions by academics and BBC 
µLQVLGHUV¶RIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VWHOHYLVLRQQHZVVHUYLFHXQGHUWKHFRQWURORI7DKX+ROH
EHWZHHQDQGWKDWXQGHUOLQHWKH%%&¶VUHSXWDWLRQDWWKDWWLPHIRUSDUDO\VLQJ
caution in reporting the news (Dimbleby 1975; Schlesinger 1987; Miall 1994; Crisell 
1997; Simpson 1999; Attenborough 2002). Walters (1989) argues that, for the first 
WKLUW\\HDUVRI%%&KLVWRU\EURDGFDVWHUVµDFFHSWHGWKDWVHOI-censorship was the price of 
LQGHSHQGHQFH¶DOWKRXJKKHQXDQFHVWKLVREVHUYDWLRQE\HODERUDWLQJWKDWZLWKLQWKH
µOLPLWVRISROLWLFDOWROHUDQFH¶VSDFHZDVFUHDWHGIRUDGHJUHHRIHGLWRULDOLQGHSHQGHQFH
from which a less constrained tradition would emerge in the late fifties and sixties 
(Walters 1989, p.389). 
 
7KH6XH]&ULVLVPDUNVWKHILUVWPDMRUWHVWRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLQ
reporting armed conflict in the post-war period. Lindley (2002a) describes how WKHµ
GD\UXOH¶IRUELGGLQJGLVFXVVLRQRQWHOHYLVLRQRIDQ\WKLQg due for debate in Parliament 
in the next fortnight) was used to prevent broadcasters giving any reaction from the 
British public to news of the military action in Egypt. Panorama¶V reporting of the crisis 
reflected the effect of this restriction: 
 
>«@5LFKDUG'LPEOHE\KDGRSHQHGWKHSURJUDPPHE\VD\LQJµ:HFDQ¶W
WRQLJKWGLVFXVVWKHULJKWVDQGZURQJVRIWKHVLWXDWLRQ¶DQGZKHQWKHFULVLV
came no hint of the controversy that the intervention had caused could enter 
the studio.  
(Lindley 2002a, p.45) 
 
Wyndham *ROGLHGHVFULEHVµWKUHDWVRIDWDNHRYHURIWKH%%&¶SE\
(GHQ¶V*RYHUQPHQWDQGHIIRUWVE\WKH%%&WRUHVLVWLQWLPLGDWLRQVHHDOVR5DZQVOH\
1996). However, Shaw (1995) challenges the common view (see Ward 1989) that the 
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Corporation successfully fought for its independence in a test of strength against 
$QWKRQ\(GHQ¶VµSURSDJDQGDSROLF\¶DQGFRYHUWLQWLPLGDWLRQRIWKH%%&S+H
DUJXHVWKDWZKLOHWKHQHZVEXOOHWLQVZHUHµRQWKHZKROHDGPLUDEO\VWUDLJKWDQG
LPSDUWLDO¶LWVFXUUHQWDIIDLUVSURJUDPPHVµVKRZHGXQPLVWDNHDEOHVLJQVRIDSUR-
JRYHUQPHQWELDV¶S6KDZGHVFULEHVWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKERWKWKH%%&DQG,79
ZHUHZLOOLQJWRFHQVRUWKHPVHOYHVDQGµVDQLWL]H¶PLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQVE\FRPSO\LQJZLWK
KLJKO\UHVWULFWLYHµSRROLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV¶'-QRWLFHVDQGRWKHUµWRS-OHYHOJXLGDQFH¶S
338-343), and how: µ>«@WKHFRQVSLFXRXVDLURIVLOHQFHVXUURXQGLQJPDQ\RIWKHPRVW
contentious issues, most notably about the political storm on the home front, contrived 
WROHQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VDFWLRQVDQ ill-deserved respectability¶(Shaw 1995, p. 339). 
 
5DZQVOH\¶VDFFRXQWVXSSRUWVWKLVYLHZGHVFULELQJDYDULHW\RIµXQQHFHVVDU\¶
pressures from the government that were exercised to gain some semblance of 
PDQDJHPHQWRYHUWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VRXWSXWDQGLQZKLFKµWKH%%&ZDVDFRQYHQLHQW
VFDSHJRDWDWWKHPHUF\RIDJRYHUQPHQWZKLFKUHIXVHGWRTXHVWLRQLWVRZQSROLFLHV¶
(Rawnsley 1996, p.12). Following the fall of the Eden government the 14 day rule was 
regarded as an indefensible restriction on free speech, and was permanently suspended 
in 1957 (Lindley 2002a)1.  
 
According to several histories, poor coverage of the Korean War (1950-53) was, in part, 
due to censorship and media compliance with McCarthy-era Cold War ideology. This 
contributed, as Hudson and Stanier (1997) suggest, to Korea being the so-called 
µ)RUJRWWHQ:DU¶RUDµEODQNVSRWUDUHO\UHWULHYHGIURPWKH$PHULFDQPLQG¶$QGHUVHQ
2006, p.40). Eldridge (1993) cites examples of how the British media self-censored 
PDWHULDOWKDWGHWDLOHGµWKHEUXWDO treatment given by the South Koreans to political 
SULVRQHUV¶DQGH[SODLQVKRZMRXUQDOLVW5HQH&XWIRUWKEHFDPHGLVLOOXVLRQHGZKHQKLV
account of the effects of American napalm bombing of the population was not broadcast 
by the BBC (p.7).  
 
                                               
1 An account of this controversy and Panorama¶V coverage of Suez can be found in Chapter 4.4. 
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 If the reporting of the Korean War was hampered by strict military controls, the lifting 
of official censorship contributed to the Vietnam War (1959-75) being one of the most 
written about and photographed conflicts in recent history. While the prolonged war in 
Indo-China did not actively involve troops from the United Kingdom, developments in 
reporting from the region would have profound consequences for British media 
coverage of subsequent conflicts.  
 
7KH9LHWQDP:DULVRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVWKHILUVWµWHOHYLVLRQZDU¶VHe Mercer et al. 
1987). Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland, who led American forces in 
Vietnam from 1965 to 1968, noted in his memoirs how television was µfor the first time 
bringing war into living rooms and with no press censorship, the relationship of the 
military command in South Vietnam and the news media was of unusual importance¶
(cited Perlmutter 1999, p.179). &HUWDLQO\0DUVKDOO0F/XKDQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWµWKH
ZDULQ9LHWQDPZDVORVWLQWKHOLYLQJURRPVRIWKHQDWLRQ¶EHFDPHDFFHSWHGDWIDFH
value within key sectors of the American military (see Hammond 1988; Hooper 1982; 
Thussu and Freedman 2003; Wheen 1985) DQGWKLVµFRPIRUWLQJQRVWUXP>«@DIIHFWVLWV
PHGLDDQGSXEOLFUHODWLRQVSROLFLHVWRWKLVGD\¶3HUOPXWWHUS 
 
In fact, the US PHGLD¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH9LHWQDP:DULVWKHVXEMHFWRIDQXPEHURI
studies that challenge this widely held view (see Williams 1993; Culbert 2003; 
Patterson 1995; Alterman 2004 and notably, Hallin 1989). Hallin examines the 
assumption that the US media undermined the war effort and domestic morale through 
its critical reporting and by bringing bloody images of the conflict into the American 
home. His study shows how the media was generally supportive of the war effort due 
partly to its dependence on official sources coupled with an unquestioning commitment 
to Cold War ideology. Television reports were delivered in what amounted to an 
analytical vacuum - showing brave American soldiers at war against North Vietnamese 
DQG1DWLRQDO/LEHUDWLRQ)URQWµWHUURULVWV¶and with disturbing images of the conflict 
(particularly of Vietnamese casualties) self-censored by the networks at least until splits 
became apparent in the US political establishment, and arguably, with a few exceptions, 
for the duration of the war (see Herr 1978).  
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These political divisions emerged more publicly following the Tet Offensive of 1968 
when the progress and cost of the war became a topic of open discussion amongst 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VHOLWH7KH7HW2IIHQVLYHGUDPDWLFDOO\XQGHUPLQHG official assertions of 
µDGYDQFHV¶ on the battlefield DQGIXUWKHURSHQHGWKHµFUHGLELOLW\JDS¶ between what 
VHQLRUPLOLWDU\VRXUFHVZHUHVD\LQJDQGMRXUQDOLVWV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIWKHEDWWOH]RQHVVHH
also Mercer et al. 1987; Williams 1993; Zaller and Chiu 1996).  In the later years of the 
war the media entered a highly elite-critical phase of coverage taking a more 
independent and sceptical view of the military, becoming openly scornful of inflated 
accounts of success, particularly as reported at the daily military press briefings in 
6DLJRQRUµILYHR¶FORFNIROOLHV¶DVWKH\EHFDPHNQRZQVHH7LPH+HUWVJDDUG
1991). 
 
$OWKRXJK+DOOLQ¶VEURDGFRQFOXVLRQVKDYHEHHQFKDOOHQJHGE\VRPHVHHPorch 2002; 
Taverner 2005; McNair 2006), The Uncensored War has been highly influential on 
other studies of conflict. This influence is felt most keenly where - as happened over 
9LHWQDPLQ$PHULFDLQUHSRUWLQJµWKH7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGRUWKHLQYDVLRQRI
Iraq in the UK - fault lines in consensus opinion appeared. For Hallin, the predominant 
WHQGHQF\WRUHSRUWZLWKLQWKHµVSKHUHVRIFRQVHQVXV¶RUµOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶
HPHUJHGIROORZLQJWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIµSURIHVVLRQDOLVP¶DQGµREMHFWLYLW\¶LQ86
journalism, which was accompanied by a changing relationship to the state, and 
especially the President. As the press grew less openly partisan, journalists were granted 
greater access to political authorities whilst accepting for the most part, 'the language, 
DJHQGDDQGSHUVSHFWLYHVRIWKHSROLWLFDO³HVWDEOLVKPHQW´¶+DOOLQS7he effect 
LVWROHDYHWKHPHGLDµDXWRQRPRXVEXWGHHSO\HQPHVKHGLQJRYHUQPHQW¶ZLWKD
FRPPLWPHQWWRZKDW+DOOLQWHUPVWKHµQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\FRQVHQVXV¶WKDWSOD\VD
hegemonic role in framing political issues (cited Schlesinger 1992, p.297). 
 
In a later comparative study of Vietnam and the Gulf War of 1992 Hallin notes 
significant continuities in media-state relations, reiterating the relative and, to an extent, 
FRPSURPLVHGDXWRQRP\RIWKHPHGLDµ-RXUQDOLVPJLYHVWKHZRUOGSROLWLFDOPHDQLQJ
and it stands [«@LQDFORVHLIQRWDOZD\VFRPIRUWDEOHUHODWLRQWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVRIVWDWH
SRZHU¶+DOOLQDS 
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+DOOLQ¶VVWXG\RIWKHPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQ9LHWQDPLVHFKRHGE\+HUPDQDQG
Chomsky (1994) who argue that:  
 
Insofar as there is debate among dominant elites, it will be reflected within 
WKHPHGLDZKLFKLQWKLVQDUURZVHQVHPD\DGRSWDQ³DGYHUVDULDOVWDQFH´
with regard to those holding office, reflecting elite dissatisfaction with 
current policy. Otherwise the media will depart from elite consensus only 
rarely and in limited ways. 
(p.171) 
 
+HUPDQDQG&KRPVN\¶VµSURSDJDQGDPRGHO¶H[SODLQVWKDWZKLOHWKHWDFWLFVRIWKHDQWL-
war movement might be discussed in the media the actual opinions of those who viewed 
the US and not North Vietnam as the aggressor wHUHµXQWKLQNDEOH¶RXWVLGHWKH
µGRFWULQDOV\VWHP¶DQGVRIDUIURP:DVKLQJWRQSHUVSHFWLYHVDVWREHODUJHO\LJQRUHG
µ:KLOHGLVVHQWDQGGRPHVWLFFRQWURYHUV\EHFDPHDIRFXVRIPHGLDFRYHUDJHIURP
the actual views of dissidents and resisters were virtuDOO\H[FOXGHG¶S7KLV
QRWLRQRIDµERXQGHG¶GLVFXVVLRQLQZKLFKLGHRORJLFDODOWHUQDWLYHVDUHGHHPHG
µXQDFFHSWDEOH¶FDQEHVHHQDVDPRUHFDWHJRULFDOYHUVLRQRI+DOOLQ¶VYLHZWKDWWKHDQWL
ZDUPRYHPHQWVWRRGDWWKHERWWRPRIWKHPHGLD¶VµKLHUDUFK\¶RIOHJLWLPDWHSROLWLFDO
actors. 
 
Despite critical media analysis of this kind, the belief that the media, particularly 
television, were responsible for US government failures in Indochina remains 
widespread (see Williams 1993) ± a belief characterised by Tumber and Palmer as the 
µP\WKRI9LHWQDP¶S)URPWKH86DQG8.JRYHUQPHQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKH
µOHVVRQVRI9LHWQDP¶LQFOXGHGWKHQHHGWRPDQDJHWKHPHGLDPRUHFDUHIXOO\DWWLPHVRI
war. Maintaining domestic support and restricting or controlOLQJWKHPHGLD¶VDFFHVVWR
the battlefront became critical goals in the planning and execution of conflicts (see 
LaMay et al. 1991; Andersen 2006; McLaughlin 2002).  
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,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGKHUHWKDWWKHµ9LHWQDPV\QGURPH¶the belief that television could 
bring defeat on the domestic front without securing victory on the battlefield) played a 
major role in the structuring of the relationship between the military and the media in 
WKH)LUVW*XOI:DUSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH86DQG%ULWLVKPLOLWDU\GHYLVLQJµDYHU\
rHVWULFWLYHVHWRIUXOHVIRUZDUFRYHUDJH¶-RZHWWDQG2¶'RQQHOOS7KLVYLHZ
is supported by Lewis et al. ZKRDUJXHWKDWWKH9LHWQDPµP\WK¶>«@µhas 
fulfilled a useful function for the military in United States and in Britain: it legitimised 
LQFUHDVLQJFRQWURORYHUWKHPHGLD¶S 
 
According to several accounts it was in the Falklands/Malvinas War (1982) that many 
RIWKHµOHVVRQVRI9LHWQDP¶ZHUHILUVWSXWLQWRDFWLRQE\%ULWLVKPLOLWDU\SODQQHUVWR
ensure continued domestic support (see Andersen 2006; Knightley 2003). Logistical 
FRQVWUDLQWVHQVXUHGWKDWRQO\DVPDOOµKDQGSLFNHG¶JURXSRIMRXUQDOLVWVFRXOGEHVHQW
ZLWKWKH%ULWLVKWDVNIRUFHDQGµUHSRUWLQJUHVWULFWLRQV¶ZHUHWLJKWO\HQIRUFHGSDUWLFXODUO\
as all satellite communications from the taskforce and the islands were controlled by the 
Ministry of Defence (see GUMG 1985; Morrison and Tumber 1988). In fact, only 
British media organisations were represented (with the exception of one Reuters 
journalist) (Lewis et al. 2006, p.11). 
 
ThH%%&¶VRXWSXWHVSHFLDOO\HSLVRGHVRINewsnight and Panorama) became the focus 
of intense political scrutiny and disapproval by senior figures in the ruling Conservative 
Government (see Cotton 2001; Bolton 1990; Lindley 2002a; Morrison and Tumber 
1988; Milne 1989; Walters 1989). On the 3rd of May, Conservative MP John Page, 
FRPSODLQHGDERXWWKHSUHYLRXVHYHQLQJ¶VHGLWLRQRINewsnight on BBC2, which he 
GHVFULEHGDVµXQDFFHSWDEO\HYHQ-KDQGHG¶$FFRUGLQJWR0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHU3HWHU
6QRZ¶VREVHUYDWLRQVDERXW the credibility of Argentinean and British claims had 
µSURYRNHGIXU\¶DPRQJVW&RQVHUYDWLYHEDFNEHQFKHUVDQGPLQLVWHUVGHVSLWH6QRZ¶V
conclusion in the programme that British accounts had been shown to be more accurate: 
µ8QWLOWKH%ULWLVKDUHGHPRQVWUDWHG either to be deceiving us or to be concealing losses, 
ZHFDQRQO\WHQGWRJLYHDORWPRUHFUHGHQFHWRWKH%ULWLVKYHUVLRQRIHYHQWV¶%%&79
Newsnight 2nd May 1982, cited Morrison and Palmer 1988, p.228). Significantly, the 2nd 
of May Newsnight programme was transmitted on the same day as the controversial 
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sinking of the Argentine ship, General Belgrano, in which over 350 sailors died and at a 
WLPHZKHQWKHµFRQGXFWDQGGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHFDPSDLJQZHUHEHLQJLQFUHDVLQJO\
TXHVWLRQHG¶,ELG 
 
Eldridge (1993) describes the political repercussions of a Panorama episode on the 
)DONODQGVFRQIOLFWWUDQVPLWWHGHLJKWGD\VODWHUµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU"¶[tx: 10.5.82] 
which DLUHGVRPH/DERXURSSRVLWLRQEXWPDLQO\H[DPLQHGGLVVHQWLQJµPLQRULW\¶YLHZV
within the ConservaWLYH3DUW\WRWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\RYHUWKHFULVLVIROORZHGE\D
discussion with Cecil Parkinson, a member of the war cabinet. Conservative MPs 
SURWHVWHGDORQJZLWKVHFWLRQVRIWKHSUHVVDJDLQVWZKDWZDVWHUPHGWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶V
µORIWLO\QHXWUDO¶VWDQFHDQGLWZDVDUJXHGWKDWµVRPHSURJUDPPHVRQWKH%%&DSSHDUHG
to give the impression of being pro-Argentinean and anti-%ULWLVK¶FLWHG(OGULGJH
p.9). A more detailed account of the controversy can be found in Morrison and 
7XPEHU¶VVWXG\ZKLFK sets out the context for the controversy and shows wider 
events to be important. According to the authors, on the 6th of May an early evening 
news bulletin on BBC2 had reported the funeral of Argentine seamen killed in British 
attacks. Subsequently, conservative MP Robert Adley condemned the use of film of the 
funeral and also of an Argentine-Bulgarian World Cup football match where there was 
µDJUHDWVKRZRIQDWLRQDOIHUYRXU¶DFFXVLQJWKH%%&RIEHFRPLQJµ*DOWLHUL¶VILIWK
FROXPQ¶S&RQFHUQDbout the use of filmed material from Argentina had, 
according to the authors, grown into a wider concern in Government circles that 
µ$UJHQWLQHSURSDJDQGDZDVEHLQJLQDGHTXDWHO\FRXQWHUHG¶,ELGSDPLGVWWKHORVV
of the HMS Sheffield on the 4th May and the loss of more Harrier jets on the 6th of May 
(p.244). It is against this background that Panorama¶V broadcast on May 10th µSURYRNHG
WKHPLJKWLHVWVWRUP¶S$V0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUREVHUYH 
 
As soon as Panorama ended, outraged comments poured in from the public 
and from Conservative MPs. Geoffrey Rippon, a former Conservative 
PLQLVWHUFDOOHGLWµ«RQHRIWKHPRVWGHVSLFDEOHSURJUDPPHVLWKDVHYHU
EHHQP\PLVIRUWXQHWRZLWQHVV¶.HQQHWK:DUUHQ&RQVHUYDWLYH03IRU
+DVWLQJVGHFODUHGWKDWµ,WLVWLme the BBC came back to earth and 
UHPHPEHUHGLWVUHVSRQVLELOLWLHV¶>«@7KHDWWDFNVFRQWLQXHGRQWKHQH[WGD\
11 May. A letter in The Times IURP-RKQ3DJHDVVHUWHGWKDWµ,WLVWKH
superior tone of superneutrality which so many of us find to be 
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objectionable and unacceptable when our forces are in action ± we expected 
WKH%%&WREHRQRXUVLGH¶ 
(Morrison and Tumber 1988, p.231-232) 
 
Cockrell, Hennessy and Walker (1984) write how the day following transmission of the 
Panorama, Sally Oppenheimer, a senior figure in the Conservative Party referred to the 
SURJUDPPHLQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V4XHVWLRQ7LPHDVµDQRGLRXVVXEYHUVLYHWUDYHVW\LQ
which Michael Cockrell and other BBC reporters dishonoured the right to freedom of 
VSHHFKLQWKLVFRXQWU\¶FLWHG(OGULGJHS0UV7KDWFKHU¶VUHSO\LQGLFDWHVWKDW
the BBC Chairman had made efforts to placate the government over its coverage: 
 
I know how strongly many people feel that the case for our country is not 
being put with sufficient vigour on certain ± I do not say all ± BBC 
programmes. The Chairman of the BBC has assured us, and has said in 
vigorous terms, that the BBC is not neutral on this point, and I hope his 
words will be heeded by the many who have responsibilities for standing up 
for our task force, our boys, our people and the cause of democracy. 
(cited Eldridge 1993, p.9) 
 
Panorama ZDVGHQRXQFHGDVµTraitorama¶E\ The Sun IRUµGDULQJWRH[SORUHWKH
DUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWWKH%ULWLVKFDPSDLJQ¶'DYLHVSGHVSLWHPRVWRIWKHVH
views being expressed by Conservative Party MPs. Mary Whitehouse, of the National 
9LHZHUV¶DQG/LVWHQHUV¶$VVRFLDWLRQGHQRXQFHGWKHVW\OHDQGWRQHRIWKHSURJUDPPH
declaring that:  
 
Panorama was arrogant and disloyal. It prostituted the power their 
profession gives broadcasters. To spread alarm and despondency was a 
treasonable offence in the last war. One wonders what succour this sort of 
broadcasting gives the people in Argentina. 
(cited Morrison and Tumber 1988, p.233-234) 
 
In fact, as Morrison and Tumber point out, few critics detailed the grounds for their 
objections. Subsequently, the programme was criticised for giving too much time to 
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µLUUHOHYDQWLQWHUYLHZVZLWK0HPEHUVRI3DUOLDPHQWSDUWLFXODUO\&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶ZKR
ZHUHUHJDUGHGDVDKDQGIXORIµFUDQNV¶DQGµHJRPDQLDFV¶(p.233) by some MPs. The 
Panorama Editor George Carey defended the choice of four interviewees by claiming 
WKH\KDGGHOLEHUDWHO\DYRLGHGLQWHUYLHZVZLWKµSUHGLFWDEOHFULWLFV¶RIWKH*RYHUQPHQW 
(cf. chapters 5.4, 6.2), seeking instead people who were not really public figures of great 
standing. Their views were described in the introduction as representing a minority view 
but one reflecting uncertainty both inside and outside the House: 
 
According to Carey, Panorama had talked to between thirty and fifty 
Members whom they believed to have doubts about the progress of events. 
µ7KHVH¶&DUH\PDLQWDLQHGµZHUHVD\LQJRQHRIWZRWKLQJVHLWKHU³,DP
DJDLQVWWKLVVKRZ´RU³,¶PYHU\ZRUULHGDERXWWKLVVKRZEXW\RXDUHQRW
JRLQJWRJHWPHRQILOPVD\LQJVR´RU³0\chums are worried about it, 
HYHU\ERG\¶VZRUULHGEXWREYLRXVO\ZHKDYHJRWWREDFN0DJJLHQRZ´¶
Panorama had several times plainly stated that it was examining a minority 
YLHZDQGWREDODQFHLW&DUH\HPSKDVLVHGµZHQRWRQO\LQFOXGHGSDUWVRI
the fifty-minute interview with Mrs Thatcher shown in the previous edition 
but also an interview with the Party Chairman, Mr Parkinson. He had ample 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRSXWWKHPDMRULW\YLHZDFURVV¶ 
(Morrison and Tumber 1988, p. 234) 
 
According to several accounts the presenter of the offending Panorama, Robert Kee, 
had expressed strong reservations about the programme in a pre-screening the night 
before transmission. The subsequent discussion of the rough cut had led to thirty-eight 
changes to the film being requested by Editor George Carey. Nevertheless, with attacks 
on the programme from so many fronts, Kee distanced himself from the programme in 
an open letter to The Times on the 14th 0D\ZKLFKHIIHFWLYHO\GLVRZQHGWKHµSRRU
REMHFWLYHMRXUQDOLVP¶RIKLVFROOHDJXHVVee Lindley 2000, p. 161-162). While Kee 
DFNQRZOHGJHGWKDWLWZDVµZKROO\DSSURSULDWHWRH[DPLQHWKDWPLQRULW\YLHZ¶KHDUJXHG
that it should either have occupied a shorter part of the programme or there should have 
been other voices to question it (Morrison and Tumber 1988, p. 235). 
 
While the BBC was subject to frequent, forceful criticism from the media and 
politicians, the IBA also came under pressure from the Government, especially after 
7KDPHV7HOHYLVLRQ¶VTV Eye ran a scoop interview with General Galtieri on the 13th of 
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May following five weeks of reports from Buenos Aires (Holland 2006, p.187). 
0DUJDUHW7KDWFKHU¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKLVIXUWKHUH[DPSOHRIµXQSDWULRWLF¶UHSRUWLQJZDV
FRQYH\HGWRWKH,%$¶V'LUHFWRU*HQHUDOE\WKH+RPH6HFUHWDU\:LOOLDP:KLWHlaw and 
SURJUDPPHFKLHIVDW7KDPHVZHUHFDOOHGWR,%$¶VKHDGTXDUWHUIRUµGLVFXVVLRQV¶EHIRUH
WKH,%$µDSSURYHGPRVWLILWIRUWUDQVPLVVLRQ¶(Morrison and Tumber 1988, p. 238).  
 
Nevertheless, the literature appears to indicate that the most stinging Government and 
press criticism was reserved for the BBC with three issues dominating: the use of film 
shot in Argentina, the use of retired military officers for commentary and the use of 
language. Exploring each of these issues, Morrison and Tumber conclude thaWµLQQR
FDVHKDVLWEHHQSURYHGWKDWPLOLWDU\VSHFXODWLRQKHOSHGWKH$UJHQWLQHV¶S2QWKH
WKLUGJURXQGRIFRPSODLQWWKDWWKHODQJXDJHXVHGZDVµORDGHG¶$ODVGDLU0LOQH
remarked, in answer to repeated complaints on the subject, that they had referred to 
BBC-style books from the Second World War and Suez and found that the BBC had 
DOZD\VVSRNHQRIµWKH%ULWLVK¶UDWKHUWKDQµRXUWURRSV¶ 
 
>«@RQHUHDVRQLVWKDWLI\RXVWDUWWDONLQJDERXWµRXUWURRSV¶DQGµRXUVKLSV¶
WKHQLWLVQDWXUDOWRVSHDNRIµRXUSROLF\¶ZKHQ\RXPHDQWKHSUHVHQW
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\DQGWKHQRXUREMHFWLYLW\ZRXOGQRORQJHUEHFUHGLEOH
There would be a risk of our credibility collapsing in our external overseas 
EURDGFDVWLQJ&UHGLELOLW\LVDYHU\WHQGHUWKLQJ6RµXV¶LVRXW 
(cited Morrison and Tumber 1988, p.242)  
 
In fact, close attention to the Panorama episode that caused most anger amongst 
Conservative MPs and Ministers makes it clear that the BBC departed on many 
occasions from the policy outlined by Milne. The programme begins with a sequence of 
UDSLGO\HGLWHGVKRWVRIWKHWDVNIRUFHRYHUWKHSURJUDPPH¶VGUDPDWLFVLJQDWXUHWXQHDQG
WKHQPRYHVWRRXWOLQLQJWKHLVVXHVZLWK5REHUW.HH¶VLQWURGXFWLRQLQVWXGLRWRFDPHUD 
 
Good evening, the government, the country, perhaps the world itself sits 
precariously balanced this evening between what Mr Haig has called terrible 
ILJKWLQJDQGDSHDFHIXOVROXWLRQWRWKH)DONODQGV&ULVLV$QGWKLVHYHQLQJ¶V
report of more naval bombardment of military targets around Port Stanley 
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seems to suggest that things may be becoming more precarious by the hour. 
So far attempts at a diplomatic solution, which our task force was sent to the 
South Atlantic to support, have failed through no fault of our own. Both Mr 
+DLJ¶VSODQDQGWKH3HUXYLDQSODQEULQJing in the UN, which we accepted, 
KDYHEHHQWXUQHGGRZQE\$UJHQWLQD,WORRNVDVLI0UV7KDWFKHU¶VRSWLRQV
have become increasingly restricted to military options and I will be talking 
later to Cecil Parkinson - D0LQLVWHURI0UV7KDWFKHU¶VPHPEHURIKHU War 
Cabinet and Chairman of her party. However, further attempts at the United 
1DWLRQVWRDUULYHDWDSHDFHIXOVROXWLRQZKLFKLVVWLOO%ULWDLQ¶VWRSSULRULW\
still do continue in New York so first over to New York and to Peter 
7D\ORU« 
(Panorama µ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU¶- tx: 10.5.82) 
 
As Milne indicatedWKHGDQJHUWKDWWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFODLPVWRREMHFWLYLW\ORVHV
FUHGLELOLW\ZKHQUHIHUULQJWRµRXUWURRSV¶RULQWKLVFDVHµour WDVNIRUFH¶DUHYHU\FOHDU
particularly in the close identification the commentary makes between the viewer, the 
Panorama SURJUDPPHPDNHUVDQG*RYHUQPHQWSROLF\LQWKHREVHUYDWLRQWKDWµ6RIDU
attempts at a diplomatic solution, which our task force was sent to the South Atlantic to 
support, have failed WKURXJKQRIDXOWRIRXURZQ¶ or tKDWµ0U+DLJ¶VSODQDQGWKH
Peruvian plan bringing in the UN, which we accepted, have been turned down by 
$UJHQWLQD¶>P\HPSKDVLV@ 
 
While the programme goes on WRKHDUDUJXPHQWVIURPµ6HQLRU>VLF@ Jorge Herrera 
9HJDV¶WKH$UJHQWLQHDQ0LQLVWHUWRWKH810ission and critics of government policy, 
there is never the same explicit identification between the views expressed and those of 
the government, Panorama DQGµWKHQDWLRQ¶DVWKHUHLVLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQ,QIDFWWKH
criticism Robert Kee levelled at the epLVRGHWKDWLWµLGHQWLILHGLQDFRQIXVLQJZD\
Panorama¶V own view of the Falklands crisis with that of the minority view it was 
FODLPLQJWRORRNDWREMHFWLYHO\¶VHH/LQGOH\SZRXOGVHHPWRWDOO\
misplaced in this case. Here, as Glasgow University Media Group commented generally 
DERXWWKHFRYHUDJHRIWKH)DONODQG¶V&ULVLVLWVHHPVWKHEURDGFDVWHU¶VµLGHDRIµQDWLRQDO
FRQVHQVXV¶FDQOHDGWRDEOLQGQHVVWRVRFLDOFRQIOLFW± leaving the coverage open to the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWVRIµQDWLRQDOXQLW\¶DQGWKHµQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶
p.126). 
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There is not the space to deal in any greater detail with the Panorama episode that 
FDXVHGVXFKFRQWURYHUV\EXWLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWIROORZLQJWKHRXWFU\RYHUµ&DQZH
$YRLG:DU¶in the following ZHHN¶VPanorama episode there was a report from the 
constituency of David Crouch, one of the dissenting MPs, using interviews at his 
Conservative Club which showed he did not represent local views, as well as interviews 
with Yarrow shipyard workers in Glasgow who supported the Task Force (GUMG 
1985, p. 128) 
 
0RUULVRQDQG7XPEHUVXJJHVWWKHµIODN¶H[SHULHQFHGE\WKH%%&LQWKHILUVWZHHNVRI
May 1982 which was directed largely at current affairs programmes was because the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VPRRGKDGFKDQJHGIURPRQHRITXLHWFRQILGHQFHLQ$SULOWRµQHUYRXV
H[SHFWDWLRQ¶DQGXQFHUWDLQW\DVKRVWLOLWLHVFRPPHQFHGDQGFDVXDOWLHVPRXQWHGLQ0D\ 
 
The Government and its supporters were nervous but sure that the conflict 
must be sustained to the end; criticism of the BBC was forced, unripe, to the 
surface. If current affairs programmes led the public to believe that policy 
was awry, the news ± any news ±might be misinterpreted. It was indeed, 
current affairs programming, not news, which attracted the complaints. 
(Morrison and Tumber 1988, p. 244) 
 
<HW-RKQ6LPSVRQ¶VDFFRXQWRIKLVexperience as a BBC news presenter somewhat 
contradicts this view. In another example apparently showing the pressures exerted on 
the Corporation, Simpson, who fronted the evening news with John Humphries at the 
time, writes of the consequences of a news µEDFNJURXQGUHSRUW¶ he prepared on the 
FRQWH[WIRUWKHLQYDVLRQGXULQJDµTXLHW¶GD\LQ0D\7KLVUHSRUWVXJJHVWHGWKDW%ULWLVK
foreign policy had unwittingly encouraged the invasion: 
 
There was nothing particularly startling in my report, and a government 
HQTXLU\ODWHUPDGHDOOWKHSRLQWV,GLGSOXVSOHQW\RIRWKHUV>«@But 
Downing Street, already nervous about the fate of the naval task force which 
had now reached the Falklands, was furious that we should have focused 
attention on the government's own failings at this key moment.  There were 
angry phone calls of complaint to the BBC at various levels.  
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(Simpson 1999, p.259) 
 
While Simpson makes it clear he has no proof his immediate sacking from the position 
RIQHZVUHDGHUZDVDUHVXOWRISROLWLFDOSUHVVXUHKHZDVWROGKHZRXOGQ¶WEHDOORZHGWR
UHVLJQWRVDYHIDFHRUHYHQWRVWD\LQWKHFRXQWU\µIf I said anything about all this to the 
newspapers, I would be sacked¶ (Simpson 1999, p.260).  
 
As several studies show, with the commencement of hostilities in the South Atlantic 
pressure on the BBC became much more overt and public, and was not only directed at 
current affairs programmes. Questions about the origin or conduct of the war were 
regarded b\µDGHHSO\LGHRORJLFDO3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶DVµLQWULQVLFDOO\XQSDWULRWLF¶0RUJDQ
S0UV7KDWFKHUZDVLQKHURZQZRUGVµYHU\XQKDSS\DWWKHDWWHPSWHG
µHYHQ-KDQGHGQHVV¶RIVRPHRIWKHFRPPHQWDQGWKHFKLOOLQJXVHRIWKHWKLUG-person ± 
WDONRIµWKH%ULWLVK¶DQGµWKH$UJHQWLQHDQV¶RQRXUQHZVSURJUDPPHV¶(Thatcher 1995, 
p.181). 
 
Leapman (1986), Milne (1989), Lindley (2002a) and Snoddy (2006)  describe the anger 
and vitriol unleashed against the Chairman of the BBC Governors George Howard and 
Designate Director General AlasdDLU0LOQHZKRZHUHXVHGµIRUED\RQHWSUDFWLFH¶E\D
Conservative backbench media committee (see Lindley 2000, p. 160). Lindley describes 
KRZ*HRUJH+RZDUGVSRNHDERXWWKH%%&¶VUROHLQUHSRUWLQJ:RUOG:DU,,EHIRUH
Winston Churchill, grandson of the wartime leader retorted furiously that the BBC had 
QRWWKHQµVHHQILWWRJLYHHTXDOWLPHWR*RHEEHOVSURSDJDQGDPDFKLQH¶,ELGS
The meeting left both Howard and Milne visibly shaken and was later described by 
David Holmes, Chief $VVLVWDQWWRWKH'LUHFWRU*HQHUDODVµDQH[HUFLVHLQLQWLPLGDWLRQ¶
(cited GUMG 1985, p.14). Walters (1989) also details how backbenchers put down a 
&RPPRQVPRWLRQFDOOLQJXSRQWKH%%&WRGHVLVWLQXQSDWULRWLFUHSRUWLQJµLILWFDQQRW
speak up for Britain, DWOHDVWQRWWRVSHDNDJDLQVWLW¶DQGZULWHVRIKRZ0UV7KDWFKHU
strongly identified herself with such view in the House: 
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I understand that there are times when it seems that we and the Argentines 
are being treated almost as equals and almost on a neutrDOEDVLV«,FDQ
only say if this is so, it gives great offence and causes great emotion among 
many people. 
(cited Walters 1989, p.382), 
 
Whether such pressure was effective in shaping BBC coverage cannot be easily judged 
but Born (2004) provides one of several studies that record examples of self-censorship 
during the Falklands campaign, such as a ban on interviewing bereaved relatives 
(revealed in an interview with former Panorama Editor Steve Hewlett p.383-384). In 
fact, research by Glasgow University Media Group shows that Government concerns 
about the effect on morale of such interviews emerge in News and Current Affairs 
minutes the day after the Panorama storm. The Director General encouraged editors: 
µTo be extremely self-critical with regard to items such as interviews with the bereaved, 
and invitations to Argentine diplomats to contribute to programmes in one-to-one 
interviews¶1&$cited GUMG 1985, p.15). 
 
*ODVJRZ8QLYHUVLW\0HGLD*URXS¶VGHWDLOHGVWXG\RIQHZVDQGFXUUHQWDIIDLUVFRYHUDJH
in the war reveals that the pressures against interviewing the bereaved at the BBC 
hardened into an absolute ruling within three weeks, with the exception of a Nationwide 
LQWHUYLHZZLWKDZLGRZZKRZRUNHGIRUDQDYDOZLYHV¶VHOI-KHOSRUJDQLVDWLRQVD\LQJµI 
FHUWDLQO\GRQ¶WIHHOELWWHU¶ZKLFKKDGEHHQJLYHQWKHJR-ahead by senior management as 
JLYLQJµQRFRQFHUQRQDQ\VFRUH¶*80*S-98).  
 
Surveying the restrictions, controls, censorship and attacks against dissidents and 
management of news organisations in the reporting of the Falklands, Knightley (2003) 
DUJXHVWKDWLWµSURYLGHGDPRGHORIKRZWRPDNHFHUWDLQWKDWJRYHUQPHQWSROLF\LVQRW
XQGHUPLQHGE\WKHZD\DZDULVUHSRUWHG¶S,QGHHGWhe PHGLD¶VUHSRUWLQJRIWKH
Falklands campaign and tKHORQJUXQQLQJµ7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGDUHWKHVXEMHFW
of many detailed studies showing the extent of British government efforts to shape the 
news agenda; the persistent over-reliance by the broadcast media on official sources and 
of the difficult, if not stormy, relationship between the BBC and the Thatcher 
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government in particular (see GUMG 1985; Walters 1989; Barnett and Curry 1994; 
Bolton 1990; Curran and Seaton 2003; Curtis and Jempson 1993; Curtis 1998; Kiberd 
2002; Lindley 2002a; Miller 1993, 1994; 2¶0DOOH\ It is frequently argued 
that this tense relationship and the government appointment of more conservative 
Governors, such as Marmaduke Hussey, resulted in the sacking of Director General 
Alasdair Milne in 1987, the first in the FRUSRUDWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\/HDSPDQ0LOQH
1989; Walters 1989), although this version of events has not remained unchallenged 
(see Hussey 2001). For further details of this event and its consequences see chapter 4.2. 
 
Shaw and Carr-Hill (1992), Schlesinger (1992), Tumber (2004) and Knightley (2003) 
are amongst many studies suggesting that Pentagon officials learnt the value of the 
%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VHIIRUWVWRFRQWUROWKHQHZVIURPWKH)DONODQG¶V:DULQLQ
order to restrict media coverage of future American wars. This strategy came into force 
in the 1983 invasion of Grenada when the Pentagon did not permit correspondents to 
MRLQ86IRUFHVXQWLOVL[GD\VDIWHUWKHLQLWLDOLQYDVLRQµEHFDXVHRIFRQFHUQVIRUWKHLU
VDIHW\¶$QGHUVHQSDQGLWVaid, their presence would jeopardize security and 
create logistical problems. Then in 1989, the Pentagon selected a dozen reporters to 
cover the invasion of Panama but subsequently restricted them to a warehouse in 
Panama until nearly all the fighting had ended (Knightley 2003; Kumar 2006). 
 
In between these two invasions, the 1986 American bombing of Libya from airbases in 
Britain brought further pressure to bear on the BBC, with Party Chairman Norman 
Tebbit presenting a study conducted by Conservative Central Office into BBC Kate 
$GLH¶VUHSRUWVIURP7ULSROLZKLFKFODLPHGHYLGHQFHRI$QWL-American bias (Leapman 
1986; Walters 1989; Holland 1997; Adie 2003). While this particular attack was 
successfully resisted (see Simpson 1993, 1999; Snoddy 2006), it was viewed by many 
as part of a wider campaign of Government pressure on, and intimidation of, the BBC. 
Disputes such as this and controversy over reporting on the Security Services (the 
Zircon affair) and Northern Ireland (especially Real Lives) (see Cotton 2001; Milne 
1989) provided a backdrop to the changes in management and news and current affairs 
µFXOWXUH¶LQWURGXFHGE\WKHQHZO\DSSRLQWHG'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO0LFKDHO&KHFNODQGDQG
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his deputy John Birt following the sacking of Alasdair Milne in 1987 (see Born 2004; 
Cotton 2001; Lindley 2002a).  
 
Reviewing the literature on war reporting in the twentieth century - and the more 
VSHFLILFPDWHULDORQWKH%%&¶VWHOHYLVLRQFRYHUDJHRIFRQIOLFWV- reveals attention to a 
number of continuities, developments and concerns. These include evidence that 
successive British and American governments and the military have systematically 
attempted to shape and control the media agenda at times of armed conflict (Kellner 
1992; Boyd-Barrett 2004, Tumber 2004; Schechter 2004, 2006); that the media have 
often failed to play their perceived adversarial role with officialdom (Mowlana 1992; 
2¶+HIIHUQDQ6QRZDQG7D\ORUWKDWQHZVµIUDPHV¶VHH5HHVHet al. 2001) 
and explanatory discussion of particular conflicts are often narrow and overdetermined 
by elite and official sources (Bennett 2005; Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008); that 
FRPSHWLWLRQµUROOLQJQHZV¶DQGµSDWULRWLFUHSRUWLQJ¶KDYHGHJUDGHGWKHDELOLW\WRUHSRUW
in depth (Knightley 2002; Alan and Zelizer 2004; Alterman 2004; Bell 2008) and that 
military restrictions, misinformation, censorship and self-censorship in various forms 
have prevented the public from gaining a real understanding of the nature of a particular 
war (Curtis and Jempson 1993; Knightley 2004; Cottle 2006; Kumar 2006).  It is 
DJDLQVWWKLVFRQWH[WWKDWZHH[DPLQHPHGLDFRYHUDJHDQGSDUWLFXODUO\WKH%%&¶V
reporting of the two Gulf Wars of 1992 and 2003. 
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5.2. The Gulf Wars 
5.2.1 State-media-military relations and media management 
 
'HDOLQJVHSDUDWHO\ZLWKWKHWZRµ*XOI:DUV¶LVLQVRPHZD\VPLVVLQJWKHSRLQWPDGH
E\KLVWRULDQVVXFKDV+DJDQDQG%LFNHUWRQWKDWWKHLQYDVLRQRI,UDTZDVµDQ
extension of ± or the completion of ± 7KH)LUVW*XOI:DU¶RIS). As Roy 
QRWHVEHWZHHQWKHWZRFRQIOLFWV,UDTZDVVXEMHFWWRWKHµORQJHVWVXVWDLQHGDLU
DWWDFNRQDFRXQWU\VLQFHWKH9LHWQDP:DU¶SZKLFKFRPELQHGZLWKSXQLWLYH2LO-
for-Food sanctions and damage to the infrastructure had devastating consequences for 
the Iraqi population (Ali 2002; Soloman and Erlich 2003; Curtis 2003, p.30).  
 
The WHUPµ)LUVW*XOI:DU¶also ignores the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 that had raged for 
many years at the cost of a million lives and which is considered a major contributory 
factor in the events leading to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on the 2nd August 1990 
(Hashem 2004). For Corcoran (1992), the links between the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf 
War and the HFRQRPLFPRWLYHVXQGHUO\LQJWKHODWWHUZDUZHUHµLQYLVLEOHDVSHFWV¶RIWKH
conflict, barely reported in the mainstream media: 
 
>«@WKHGD\DIWHUWKH,UDQ-Iraq ceasefire, Kuwait increased its oil output in 
violation of an OPEC agreement and increased extraction from the disputed 
border wells of Rumalah.  These moves marked the beginning of the 
countdown to the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991.  
(Salinger cited Corcoran 1992, p.110) 
 
Nevertheless, despite the various continuities and linksµ*XOI,¶DQGµ*XOI,,¶DV they 
are sometimes called (with a nod to the sequel-like character of the conflicts) are 
separated by more than a decade and are distinct from each other in important ways. For 
this thesis a key difference is the degree of unanimity in British parliamentary support 
for both wars. For the First Gulf War support in the House of Commons in a vote on the 
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21st -DQXDU\ZDVKLJKZLWKYRWHVLQIDYRXURI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH81-
backed military action and only 34 against (Hansard 1991). This compares to a much 
lower level of consensus for military action against Iraq in 2003, this time without a UN 
mandate. Following a crucial debate on the 18th March, the vote in the Commons was 
396 to 217 in favour of such an intervention, with only a narrow majority of Labour 
03VLQVXSSRUWRIWKHLURZQ*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ+DQVDUG7KHUHYROWE\
/DERXU03VDJDLQVWWKH:KLSKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµWKHODUJHVWSDUOLDPHQWDU\UHYROW
VLQFHWKHSDVVLQJRI&RUQ/DZUHIRUP¶FLWHG,QJOHS 
 
Significantly, British Parliamentary support for the two Gulf Wars was almost the 
reverse of the situation in the US where support in Congress for the 2003 war was far 
higher (77 Senate votes to 23) (see Ricks 2006), compared to a far narrower vote of 
support (the 52 Senate votes to 47 in favour) for the 1991 war (see Entman and Page 
1991; Zaller 1994). How this split profile of elite national support for the two wars may 
have affected Panorama¶V coverage is the subject of further enquiry (see chapters 5.4, 
6.2, 7.1). 
 
A comparative analysis of US and British media coverage of the two conflicts reveals 
similar patterns of sourcing, reporting and explanatory structures deployed in discussion 
of the origins and conduct of the wars against Iraq. However, the analysis also reveals 
differences, including adjustment to the military constraints imposed on the media, 
particularly on broadcasters. This thesis will look for evidence to support the hypothesis 
RIµIUDPHLQGH[LQJ¶VHHGroshek 2008) in British media coverage of both wars which 
would, given the much lower levels of elite consensus for the 2003 invasion in Britain, 
LPSO\PRUHVXEVWDQWLYHO\IUDPHGFRYHUDJHRIWKDWZDUFRPSDUHGWRµ*XOI,¶LQ
While commentary on British coverage is the main focus, this cannot be divorced from 
scholarly study of US media performance, particularly as Anglo-American news 
organisations shared material and dominated the flow of international news to the 
GHWULPHQWRIDOWHUQDWLYHVRXUFHV7KLVGHYHORSPHQW7D\ORUQRWHVZDVµIXUWher 
XQGHUOLQHGE\WKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VPHGLDDUUDQJHPHQWVZLWKWKHLU$QJOR-American 
HPSKDVLV¶S  
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A review RIWKHOLWHUDWXUHRQRIWKHµ)LUVW¶*XOI:DU (chapter 5.3) is followed by close 
textual discussion and content analysis of 3DQRUDPD¶V coverage of the war (chapter 5.4) 
drawing on several issues raised in the scholarly debates pertinent to the focus of this 
thesis. The literature review (chapter 6.1) and examination of Panorama¶VFRYHrage of 
WKHµ6HFRQG¶*XOI:DUchapter 6.2) follows a similar patterns, picking up on 
continuities and differences from the first war. This approach allows for a fully 
contextualised reading of 3DQRUDPD¶s coverage of the wars against Iraq and situates 
discussion of particular programmes within a rich tradition of critical research 
examining WKHEURDGFDVWPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHVHZDUV 
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5.3. The First Gulf War of 1991 
5.3.1 Introduction 
In the First Gulf War, as Taylor (1998) notes, there is general academic consensus that 
PHGLDFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDUµGLIIHUHGYDVWO\IURPLWVUHDOLWLHV¶S[YL7KHJDSEHWZHHQ
reality and representation has been put down to a number of factors - particularly state-
military efforts to control and subordinate, or at least manage, the media - and perceived 
compliance by large sections of the media to such efforts (see McLaughlin 2002). While 
government and milLWDU\µSHUFHSWLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶see Brown 2003, Awad 2004) and 
media strategies were, in many cases, a well-documented reality (see Young and Jesser 
1997); the extent to which the British broadcast media was able to resist and challenge 
these strategies has been disputed. 
 
For Philo and McLaughlin (1993) the British media acted, on the whole, as cheerleaders 
for war. Their analysis of media coverage assumes strong effects by pointing, for 
instance, to the shifting attitudes of the British public in the lead up to war as evidence 
of successful opinion management by ruling elites and a complicit media that largely 
excluded anti-war opinion. Philo and McLaughlin identify four main elements to that 
campaign including the portrayal of a war against Iraq as a war against its leader 
6DGGDP+XVVHLQZKRZDVµVKRZQDVDPRQVWHUVLPLODUWR$GROSK+LWOHU¶S
:KLOHWKH\QRWHWKDWWKHUHZDVµDQHOHPHQWRIWUXWK¶Ibid, p.2) to such a claim they 
suggest the threat was in no way equal to the threat that Hitler had posed in 1939.  
 
For these authors the demonisation of Saddam Hussein enabled a second element - the 
µLQHYLWDELOLW\¶RIZDUWREHHPSKDVLVHGLQWKHPHGLDZKLOVWFDOOVIRUDQHJRWLDWHG
VHWWOHPHQWZHUHPDUJLQDOLVHGRUGLVPLVVHGDVµDSSHDVHPHQW¶7KHWKLUGHOement was the 
SRUWUD\DORIWKHFRQIOLFWDVDµFOHDQDQGHDV\ZDU¶SZLWKHPSKDVLVRQDQGPLOLWDU\
supplied images of, hi-tech weaponry and surgical strikes largely supplanting questions 
about civilian casualties. The fourth element was the post-war doubts and questions 
raised by the media: especially the slaughter of an Iraqi army largely composed of 
RSSUHVVHGHWKQLFDQGUHOLJLRXVJURXSVVXFKDV.XUGVDQG6KL¶DEXWDOVRDUHDOLVDWLRQE\
VRPH%ULWLVKEURDGFDVWHUVSDUWLFXODUO\WKDWµWKHPHGLDKDGEHHQ manipulated for crude 
SROLWLFDOSXUSRVHV¶S 
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Despite such doubts, the authors maintain that it is not correct to see British media 
workers as being simply forced along by politicians, particularly in the early stages of 
WKHZDUµ0DQ\RIWKHPHVSHFially the popular press, were willing participants in the 
PRRGRISDWULRWLVPDQGQHDUHXSKRULD¶S7KH\DOVRTXRWHDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO3UHVV
Institute statement from April 1991 condemning reporting restrictions during the Gulf 
War which had: 
 
>«@SUHYHQWed a balanced picture of events, including the full extent of 
KXPDQVXIIHULQJ´(YHQLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKHZDUZKHQVWULFWPHGLD
management was no longer in effect, current affairs and documentary output 
on British television tended to focus on what was happening outside Iraq. A 
SLFWXUHRI³WKHIXOOH[WHQWRIKXPDQVXIIHULQJ´ZDVVWLOOPLVVLQJ 
(Ibid, p.13) 
 
However, it is not only in critical accounts (see Chomsky 2002) that evidence of the 
successful management and co-option of the media in Gulf I is found. Military accounts 
and descriptions within Conflict Studies provide evidence for many of the media 
PDQDJHPHQWWHFKQLTXHVDQGµLQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQV¶WKDWFULWLFDOVFKRODUVKDYH
complained of (see Hudson and Stanier 1997; Taverner 2005; Young and Jesser 1997). 
Furthermore, there were measures of that success in official statements after the war, 
such as when the US Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams celebrated the Gulf War 
FRYHUDJHDV³WKHEHVW\HW´%RRWFLWHG0F/DXJKOLQ,QFLGHQWDOO\0LOOHU004) 
observes similar satisfaction in the British military with media performance in the 
Second Gulf War. This study will return to overt censorship and control strategies 
employed after considering issues around framing, use of sources, the range of views 
DFFHVVHGDQGDOOHJDWLRQVRIµVHOI-FHQVRUVKLS¶LQWKH)LUVW*XOI:DU 
 
5.3.2 Framing  
 
Framing is a key concept in this study and one which has become increasingly popular 
in media research in recent years (see Reese 2001). There are numerous definitions for 
the concept, but perhaps the most popular is that proposed by Entman (1993): 
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To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation. (p.52) 
 
 
Framing suggests not only that an issue is defined through selection and emphasis of 
µUHOHYDQW¶PDWHULDOEXWDOVRWKURXJK µSOD\LQJGRZQ¶RUH[FOXGLQJZKDWLVGHHPHG
µLUUHOHYDQW¶or of marginal interest. Gitlin views frames as persistent over time, enabling 
MRXUQDOLVWVWRDVVLJQLQIRUPDWLRQWRµFRJQLWLYHFDWHJRULHV¶6HHQLQWKLVZD\IUDPHVDUH
DFWLYHDQGµLQIRUPDWLRQJHQHUDWLQJDVZHOODVVFUHHQLQJGHYLFHV¶FLWHG5HHVH
p7KHUHDUHDQXPEHURIVWXGLHVRIWKHPHGLD¶VEURDGFDVWFRYHUDJHRIWKH)LUVW*XOI
War which have attempted to identify what was included and emphasised, as well as 
what was omitted or marginalised. By reading these studies side by side a clear pattern 
of framing emerges. 
 
)LUVWO\WRWKHDEVHQFHV%HIRUHWKHFRQIOLFWEHJDQPHGLDFRYHUDJHRI,UDTZDVµVSRUDGLF¶
and rarely headline news - even the gassing of Kurds at Halabja in March 1988 was not 
the lead item on US networks or, in Britain, on BBC 1 or ITV (it did lead on Channel 4 
News) (see Aburish 2001). Furthermore, news coverage of Iraq, when it happened at all, 
was largely muted on the topic of American, British and European support for Saddam 
+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHsee Lang and Lang 1994; Dorman and Livingston 1994; Ali 2002). 
,QWKHUXQXSWRWKHZDUIROORZLQJ,UDT¶VLQYDVLRQRI.XZDLWnd August 1990 ± 16th 
January 1991) there is widespread critical agreement on the lack of attention to the 
historical and economic context for the conflict (Morrison 1992; Kellner 1992; 
Corcoran 1992, Taylor 1998); limited coverage for organised opposition and expert 
opinion against the proposed military action (Frank 1992; Morrison 1992; Reese 2004); 
a lack of consistency in upholding international law with respect to recent US and 
Israeli occupations (Said 1994a, 1994b); and, to a lesser extent, evidence that sanctions 
had worked and that diplomatic solutions were within reach (Iyengar and Simon 1994; 
Aburish 2001).  
 
Morgan et al. (1992) suggest that the lack of attention to historical context and broader 
questions about the looming conflict in US media coverage led to a cyclical process in 
which support for the war, lower levels of knowledge, and greater media exposure 
interacted and reproduced one another in dynamic and systemic ways. This situation 
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grew worse with the onset of war as media indexing of elite opinion produced more 
univocal coverage: 
 
Once the war began, the political establishment in the United States closed 
ranks on the issue.  The media coverage reflected this narrowing of opinion, 
which in turn influenced public opinion.  The media were therefore able to 
justify their partiality with the notion that they were simply reflecting public 
opinion - allowing public opinion to further solidify on the issue.  Raising 
the broader issues could have encouraged contingent, rather than moral, 
positions, thereby avoiding the simplistic misconceptions that characterised 
public opinion during the Gulf War. 
 
 (Morgan et al. 1992, p. 230-231) 
 
Studies show how the framing of the conflict shrank further away from questions about 
the necessity or morality of war in the period of fighting (17th January ± 28th February 
1991), narrowing to a considerable degree around military and strategic questions, 
expressed in many cases WKURXJKµPLOLWDUL]HG¶ODQJXDJHDQGMDUJRQsee Kellner 1992). 
Nevertheless, despite this focus studies have shown how the media generally avoided 
reporting on allied carpet bombing, use of anti-personnel devices, cluster bombs and 
depleted uranium; the still unknown but probably enormous number of Iraqi troop 
casualties (Eldridge 1993+DOOLGD\DQGWRDOHVVHUH[WHQWµGLVWUHVVLQJ¶LPDJHVRI
the civilian and (much lower) coalition casualties (Morrison 1992; Hoskins 2004; 
Andersen 2006).  
 
The end of hostilities sees media management by the military and British and US 
governments greatly reduced and there is some evidence of more substantively framed 
coverage. Nevertheless, in the post-war period there are concerns about under-reporting 
of the following developments: the persistence of autocratic rule in the Gulf region, 
including Kuwait (Jowett DQG2¶'RQQHOOWKH µQHDUDSRFDO\SWLFUHVXOWV¶RIGDPDJHWR
the economic, electrical and water infrastructure in the immediate post-war period (UN 
1991, p.5); the ruthless crushing of the uprising in the north and south of the country 
and allegations of Allied indifference to this (Said 1994a; Aburish 2001; Simpson 
2004); WKHVWUHQJWKHQLQJRI6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VJULSRQSRwer (Gerbner 1992; Paletz 
1994); medical concerns on the legacy of cluster bombs and depleted uranium (Bodi 
2004; Pilger 1998); the medical side-effects or so-called µGulf War Syndrome¶ amongst 
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many army veterans (Eddington 1997; Yetiv 1997); DQGWKHµKRUULI\LQJ¶HIIHFWVRI\HDUV
of sanctions on the Iraqi civilian population (Denis Halliday 1999, p. 1).  
 
5.3.3 %ULWLVKSROLWLFDOFRQWH[W-RKQ0DMRU¶V3UHPLHUVKLS 
 
To some extent the BBC came under far less political pressure in covering the First Gulf 
War than it did covering the Falklands/Malvinas ConIOLFWWKHµ7URXEOHV¶LQ1RUWKHUQ
Ireland or even, twelve years later, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. John Major, who had 
become Prime Minister during the crisis in November 1990, was a less confrontational 
figure than Margaret Thatcher and his leadership signalled a shift in relations between 
the government and the BBC. Furthermore, Taylor (1998) argues that efforts were made 
to ensure the British governments relations with media were in tune with those of its 
closest ally the United States in order to avoid the kind of acrimonious exchanges that 
had occurred between the government and the media in 1982. A Cabinet Media 
Committee was established to coordinate the British government's handling of the war 
coverage which met daily after the War Cabinet had concluded its business. 
Significantly, one of its first acts was to ask the backbench Conservatives to tone down 
their criticisms of the BBC. Taylor writes that: 
 
>«@ on the very first day of the Gulf War, Tory backbencher Patrick 
Nicholls used Prime Minister's Question Time to criticise the BBC for 
referring to 'British' rather than 'Our' troops.  But John Major did not rise to 
the bait as his predecessor might be expected to have done.  Instead he 
commended the BBC for its impartiality and its 'remarkable reporting'.   
(Taylor 1998, p.34) 
 
That may have been interpreted by some as meaning the government was generally 
satisfied with the media coverage because it could see that its restrictions were being 
REVHUYHGUHVXOWLQJDV7D\ORUFRQWLQXHVµLQWKHGHVLUHGNLQG of interpretation and 
SHUVSHFWLYHEHLQJWDNHQ¶S&HUWDLQO\DV+DOOLGD\ (1999) has observed the same 
British government that banned interviews with Sinn Fein spokesman Gerry Adams saw 
no need to do the same to Saddam Hussein.  Yet there was almost no coverage of 
fighting, carnage and loss of life, partly as a result of restrictions and censorship of 
various kinds that require explanation in order to understand the full reporting context 
of the First Gulf War. 
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5.3.4 µ0HGLD0DQDJHPHQW¶ 
 
Writing on media coverage of the Gulf War revolves around familiar questions of 
µPHGLDPDQDJHPHQW¶WKHEUHDGWKRIRSLQLRQDOORZHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHPHGLD
simply echoed official sources and, very often, on the associated question of how far 
military control, restrictions and censorship affected reporting. Journalists who 
remained in Iraq to report were unevenly supervised by the Iraqi authorities (Simpson 
1999, 2004) restricting movement and access and censoring most reports, except when 
reporting heavy civilian casualties as in the bombing of the Amiriya shelter. Gurevitch 
(1997) suggests that reporters broadcasting from Iraq during the Gulf War were aware 
WKDWWKH\ZHUHEHLQJµXVHG¶E\WKHLU,UDTLKRVWVµWRSUHVHQWDYLHZRIWKHKRVWLOLWLHVDV
seen through Iraqi eyes, yet were criticized by television viewers in the west for 
VSUHDGLQJ,UDTLµSURSDJDQGD¶¶S:LWKUHJDUGWR$OOLHGFRQWUROV military 
academics Hudson and Stanier (1997) argue there were no serious restrictions claiming 
that unlike Panama and GrenDGDµWKHUHZDVQRTXHVWLRQRIOLPLWLQJPHGLDDFFHVVWRWKH
scene; indeed, the war which followed proved to be arguably the greatest media event in 
KLVWRU\¶S7D\ORURIIHUVVRPHVXSSRUWIRUWKLVFODLPVXJJHVWLQJWKDW
µFHQVRUVKLSRInews was FRQILQHGODUJHO\WRPDWWHUVRIRSHUDWLRQDOVHFXULW\¶DQGWKDW
µFHQVRUVKLSRIviews was comparatively rare, being confined largely to religious 
PDWWHUV¶+RZHYHU7D\ORUTXDOLILHVWKLVE\QRWLQJWKDWµJLYHQWKDWPRVWRIWKHPHGLD
supported the conflict, WKHUHZDVYHU\OLWWOHQHHGWRFHQVRUYLHZV¶S 
 
A slightly different viewpoint is provided by Young and Jesser (1997) who explain that 
controls were regarded by the military as a practical necessary in the early 1990s given 
the speed at which sensitive information could be passed on using new technologies. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\WKHPLOLWDU\µKDVPRYHGLQWRDFORVHUDOOLDQFHZLWKJRYHUQPHQWLQWKH
development of new and increasingly sophisticated media management systems¶ 
designed to control the media at times of µOLPLWHGZDU¶SShaw and Carr-Hill 
(1992) support this view, arguing that the control of the media in Britain during the Gulf 
:DUZDVµRYHUGHWHUPLQHG¶E\WKHHIILFLHQW86-organised coalition control of 
information, by the lack of domestic political legitimation for criticism of coalition 
policy, and by the desire of both the media and government to learn from their 
disagreements during the Falklands/Malvinas War and produce a way of working that 
ZRXOGµSUHVHUYHDGHJUHHRIMRXUQDOLVWLFDXWRQRP\within a framework of military-
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SROLWLFDOFRQWURO¶S7KLVDJUHHPHQWEHFDPHNQRZQDVWKHµ*UHHQ%RRNOHW¶RUWR
JLYHLWLWVIXOOWLWOHWKHµ3URSRVHG:RUNLQJ$UUDQJHPHQWVZLWKWKH0HGLDLQ7LPHRI
7HQVLRQDQG:DU¶ 
 
Thomson (1992) gives very detailed evidence of the way this agreement, which seemed 
quite reasonable to journalists at first sight, was interpreted unevenly and, on occasion, 
with draconian consequences for the freedom to report on the realities of war. He 
interviews many journalists whose descriptions of battle casualties, or even preparation 
by the British Army for casualties, were excised from the copy by censors at the 
Forward Transmission Units (FTUs). Guidelines issued by the BBC, for instance, 
indicate that broadcasts should normally VD\µLIUHSRUWVDUHFHQVRUHGRUPRQLWRUHGRULI
we withhold information, and explain, wherever possible, the rules under which we are 
RSHUDWLQJ¶%%&DS%XW7KRPVRQDGGVµbeing Britain¶ everyone, from 
senior broadcasters to the Ministry of Defence, have a µmortal terror of usLQJWKHµ&¶
ZRUGFHQVRUVKLS¶SUHIHUULQJWKHWHUPVµUHVWULFWLRQV
DQG
JXLGDQFH
which, in the 
DXWKRU¶VYLHZLVDµnonsense¶ >«@µWKDW does nobody in Whitehall or the media any 
credit¶(Thomson 1992, p.14). 
 
Taylor (1998) agrees, pointing out the language of BBC guidelines which state that 
SURJUDPPHVVKRXOGµPDNHLWNQRZQLQJHQHUDOWHUPVWKDWVRPHLQIRUPDWLRQZLOOEHKHOG
EDFNIRUPLOLWDU\UHDVRQV¶ZKLOHUHSRUWVRXWRI%DJKGDGDUHµULJRURXVO\FHQVRUHG
7KLV
suggests to 7D\ORUµWKDW
WKH\
FRQGXFWHGFHQVRUVKLSZKHUHDV
RXU
PLOLWDU\LVVXHG
reports subject to guidelines of operational security.  This in itself was µexcellent 
SURSDJDQGD¶S 
 
For Thomson, however, the most egregious acts of censorship were those exercised 
over virtually the entire ground offensive. Under pool restrictions reporters at the front 
were obliged to wear full uniforms and were under the command of the unit officers. 
7KH\OLYHGLQWKHµGLUWDQGGXVWRIWKHGHVHUW¶IRUZHHNVLQSUHSDUation for µ*'D\¶WKH
launch of the ground offensive) digging trenches, eating the same food and preparing 
for possible chemical, biological and nuclear attack.  Then on the morning of the 23rd 
with the ground offensive already underway reporters were told by army censors of a 
WRWDOµ-KRXUQHZVEODFNRXW¶WKDWKDGFRPHIURPKLJKHUXS in the American command. 
Thomson reports that the British went even further than the US, banning any live 
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interviews with London for a period beyond the forty-eight-hour American blackout, 
leading to a near collapse in the relationship between the censors John King and Chris 
Sexton and the reporters at the FTU (see Thomson 1992, p.32-33). 
 
5.3.5 Conclusion  
In an echo of $WKHLGHDQG*ULPHV¶VµZDUSURJUDPPLQJ¶ Young and Jesser 
(1997) describe a pattern of media management that winds down quickly following the 
end of hostilities, with the military moving to distance themselves from any further 
comment on the operation. From this point the media may begin to operate more freely 
and critically although any claims of mismanagement, unlawful acts, or proven 
exaggerations will continue to be disclaimed by military sources. Debates on the rights 
DQGZURQJVRIWKHZDUWKHDXWKRUVDUJXHZLOOEHODUJHO\OHIWIRUµLQWHOOHFWXDOFLUFOHV¶DQG
wiWKWKHSXEOLFODUJHO\FDXJKWXSµLQDFDUHIXOO\RUFKHVWUDWHGVHQVHRIQDWLRQDOLVWLF
SULGH¶VXFKGHEDWHVDUHXQOLNHO\µWREHDQLVVXHIRUWKHSRSXODUPHGLDRUWRJUDEWKH
DWWHQWLRQRIWKHYRWLQJSXEOLFIRUORQJ¶S 
 
Amongst the various accounts of the First Gulf War surveyed here a number of 
conclusions have been drawn. For Hudson and Stanier (1997) the Gulf War received 
more media coverage than any other military event in history up to that time.  Most of 
this coverage, they believe, gave strong support to the coalition in the conduct of an 
apparently just war, despite anxieties about the length and cost of the conflict.  The 
PHGLD¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKFDVXDOWLHVDQGEORRGVKHGSURYHGRQWKH$OOLHGVLGHWREH
XQZDUUDQWHGDOWKRXJKLWVµGLVPLVVDORIFRncern about Iraqis¶ suffering (except for that 
RIFLYLOLDQVVKRZHGDVXUSULVLQJLQVHQVLWLYLW\¶S 
 
For Taylor (1998) The Gulf War was one of the most clear-cut and one-sided military 
victories in the history of warfare with an Iraqi death toll of between 40,000 and 
200,000 compared with fewer than 150 soldiers from the entire coalition.  The absence 
of cameras in Kuwait or at the Iraqi front-line meant that neither the main reason for the 
war, nor the battlefields where it was mainly won and lost, were being seen. It was in 
the interest of neither side for this unseen war to be shown. Taylor concludes that the 
VXFFHVVRIDOOLHGµSURSDJDQGD¶DQGWKHDSSDUHQWO\FUXVKLQJGHIHDWRIWKH,UDTLDUP\
meant that: 
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Although the Gulf War will undoubtedly be remembered as CNN's war or 
television's war, it was no such thing.  The conflict belonged to the 
coalition's armed forces, and to the victors went the spoils of the information 
war. 
(Taylor 1998, p.277-278) 
 
Morgan et al. (1992) challenge the US media to re-examine the way they cover foreign 
policy events such as the Gulf War, pointing to the findings of their study which found 
WRRPXFKUHOLDQFHRQRSLQLRQDQGXQVXSSRUWHGµRIILFLDO¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVDQGQRWHQRXJK
on historical facts. For Mowlana, critical conFHUQDERXWWKHµODFNRIFRYHUDJH¶RU
µIDLOXUHWRFRYHU¶WKHZDUPLVUHFRJQLVHVORQJHVWDEOLVKHGKLVWRULFDOWUHQGVDQG
international relations: 
 
>«@WKHPHGLDGLGQRW³IDLO´LQUHSRUWLQJRQWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI:DU,QIDFW
they succeeded in their continuing support of the international status quo.  
7KHPHGLD¶VUHSRUWLQJRIWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI:DULQVXSSRUWRIWKHH[LVWLQJ
regional system was no different from that of other wars.   
(Mowlana 1992, p.31) 
 
)RU0RZODQD86DQG(XURSHDQPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKH*XOI conformed to the 
pattern of coverage shown in previous studies. As mentioned earlier, these studies (see 
Hallin 1989) show how the mainstream media have consistently supported their 
country's foreign policy decisions - at least in the initial stages when the defeat of a 
particular foreign policy was not yet on the horizon - without seriously challenging their 
EDVLFDVVXPSWLRQV0RZODQD¶VFRQFOXVLRQVDUHLQOLQHZLWKPRUHFULWLFDOVWXGLHVWKDW
claim the Gulf War coverage was largely in uncritical alignment with elite opinion and 
SURYLGHGHYLGHQFHRIWKHVXFFHVVRIµLQIRUPDWLRQDQGRSLQLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶6FKLOOHU
1992, p.22). 
 
)LQDOO\SHUKDSVPRVWGDPQLQJRIDOOLV0RUJDQHWDO¶V86-based research which, 
DQWLFLSDWLQJ3KLORDQG%HUU\¶V%ULWLVKVWXdy a decade later, indicated a highly 
selective understanding of contemporary history and events in the Middle East amongst 
the general public. Television - the information source most American people depended 
on - apparently amplified this ignorance, because despite all the coverage, people in the 
United States knew remarkably little about many critical aspects of the background and 
context of the war. Disturbingly: 
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The more people knew, the less likely they were to support the war; the less 
they knew, the more strongly they supported the war.  People who generally 
watched a lot of television showed dramatically lower levels of knowledge 
and were substantially more likely to strongly support the use of military 
force against Iraq. 
(Morgan et al. 1992, p. 222) 
 
Morgan HWDO¶V conclusion is scathing and lends some weight to the radical critiques 
presented by Philo and McLaughlin (1993) and Chomsky (2002), although it is posed 
KHUHDVDIDLOXUHWRUHSRUWUDWKHUWKDQDµVSHFWDFXODUDFKLHYHPHQWRISURSDJDQGD¶ 
 
We cannot blame the Pentagon and the Bush administration for only 
presenting those facts that lent support for their case - it was not their job, 
after all, to provide the public with a balanced view.  Culpability for this 
rests clearly on the shoulders of the media, particularly television, which has 
a duty to present the public with the relevant facts.  Our study suggests that 
they failed dismally in performing this duty. 
(Ibid p. 222) 
 
+DOOLGD\VHHVFXUUHQWDIIDLUVDVWKHSODFHIRUµEUHDNLQJRXW¶IURPthe tendency to 
produce compliant and highly constrained news coverage of the war, but claims that this 
did not happen. Unfortunately, Halliday made this claim without reference to any actual 
current affairs coverage: 
 
7KHIDLOXUHWRµEUHDNRXW¶LQFXUUHQWDffairs had nothing to do with state 
controls, or restrictions on the ground in Saudi Arabia, but with the lack of 
initiative, and timidity, of editors back in the broadcasting countries, and 
with acceptance, common to critics and conformers alike, of the priority of 
µQHZV¶7KXVDUDQJHRILVVXHVSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHKLVWRULFDOEDFNJURXQGWRWKH
war, or the range of ethical issues involved, which could, and arguably 
VKRXOGKDYHEHHQGLVFXVVHGDWWKHWLPHZHUHQRW>«@ 
(Halliday 1999, p.137) 
 
This thesis now moves to look at Panorama¶V reporting on the First Gulf War to 
ascertain if +DOOLGD\¶VFULWLFLVPEHDUVDQDO\VLVDQGWRDVFHUWDLQLImany of the same 
issues and concerns raised here in studies of Anglo-American news coverage also apply 
WRWKH%%&¶VIODJVKLScurrent affairs programme.  
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5.4 Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI*XOI 
5.4.1 Introduction 
 
On the 2nd of August 1990 140,000 Iraqi troops and 1,800 tanks invaded and overran the 
small Gulf kingdom of Kuwait, an action swiftly condemned by the international 
community (Hagan and Bickerton 2007). Between August and November a US led UN 
coalition built up its forces in the area to around 700,000, mainly in neighbouring Saudi 
Arabia, and on 29th of November UN Security Council Resolution 678 was passed 
which DXWKRUL]HGWKHFRDOLWLRQµWRXVHDOOQHFHVVDU\PHDQV¶LI,UDTKDGQRWZLWKGUDZQ
from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 (Ibid, p.167). Operation Desert Storm commenced on 
16th January and was halted on the 28th of February 1991 with PresidenW%XVK¶V
declaration of a ceasefire and the liberation of Kuwait. This would mark the end of 
major hostilities between Iraq and the coalition forces, but not of violence in the region 
and the aftermath of the war would continue to be a focus of sustained interest for 
British news and current affairs programme makers for several months. 
 
Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHFRQIOLFWFRYHUVVHYHQWHHQHSLVRGHVVWDUWLQJRQWKHrd 
September 1990 (after Panorama¶V traditional summer break) and concluding almost 
exactly one year later on the 2nd September 1991 (see Appendix 1.1). Later Panorama 
episodes would deal with Iraq, especially the ongoing issue of weapons inspections, but 
these seventeen episodes are the focus of this study as they deal directly with the build 
up to and execution of the military campaign as well as the direct aftermath. These 
programmes form a corpus of material with which to compare Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI
the 2003 war (see chapter 6.2). As previously discussed (chapter 5.3)%ULWDLQ¶V
contribution to the UN action received cross party support in the House of Commons 
with only 34 MPs voting against the use of military force, compared to 563 votes in 
support (Hansard 1991). By contrast, in the United States the Senate voted narrowly in 
favour of authorizing force by 52 votes to 47 and by 250 to 183 in the House of 
Representatives (Hagan and Bickerton 2007, p. 167). 
 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, much of the available literature suggests that British 
and US television news and current affairs coverage of the war was largely uncritical 
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and over-UHOLDQWRQµRIILFLDO¶VRXUFHVDQGQDUUDWLYHV&RQFHUQVDERXWa culture of 
SROLWLFDOµFDXWLRQ¶ and micro-management at the BBC under Director General John Birt 
FRPELQHGZLWKORQJHUUXQQLQJGHEDWHVDERXWWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH
government and, more broadly, with dominant political and economic elites, form the 
backdrop to the discussion of Panorama¶V reporting of the conflict in this chapter. 
 
Is there evidence that Panorama SULYLOHJHGµHOLWH¶RSLQLRQDQGPDUJLQDOLVHG dissenting 
viewpoints? To what extent was the apparent µparliamentary consensus¶ supporting 
military action echoed in the seventeen programmes dealing with the war? Did splits 
DPRQJVWWKH86SROLWLFDOHOLWHKDYHDQ\EHDULQJRQWKHSURJUDPPH¶VSUHVHQWDWLRQRI
opinions? Was there an over-reliance on official RUµLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\HQGRZHG¶sources, 
such as military spokespersons, government officials and other members of the political 
establishment? Was Panorama¶V framing of the conflict in line with the parameters of 
parliamentary debate and criticism circulating in official circles?  
 
5.4.2 Hypotheses for all phases of conflict 
 
Answering these questions requires the formulation of four hypotheses (see discussion 
in Chapter 1) which can be examined in relation to Panorama episodes that deal with 
the conflict. These are articulated as follows: 
 
H1. Frames of debate in Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDUDUHLQGH[HGWRWKH
degree and level of µSDUOLDPHQWDU\FRQVHQVXV¶ 
 
Following from this a second hypothesis suggests itself: 
 
H2. There is less substantively framed coverage1 in Panorama¶V coverage 
of the First Gulf War of 1991 when parliamentary consensus was greater 
[563 M.P.s in support of military action, 34 against] compared to the 2003 
Gulf War where consensus was considered low [396 to 217 without UN 
mandate] (cf. chapters 5.2; 5.3; 6.1). 
                                               
1 Substantively (as opposed to narrowly) framed coverage examines a range of policy options: 
µVSHFLILFDOO\ZKHWKHUZDURUVDQFWLRQVVKRXOGEHSUHIHUUHGDQGWKHFRVWVDQGMXVWLILDELOLW\RIWKHSROLF\¶
(Entman and Page, cited Groshek 2008, p.319)  
  
153 
 
A third deals with the issue of (over)reliance on official sources: 
 
H3. 2IILFLDO 8.86 VRXUFHV µSULPDU\ GHILQHUV¶ SUHGRPLQDWH LQ DOO
Panorama coverage (cf. chapter 6.1). 
 
A logical corollary of the first three hypotheses is a fourth hypothesis: 
 
H4. Dissenting opinion on the morality, motives and historical context for 
the war2 (rather than timing, strategy or conditions) have a marginal 
presence in Panorama. Arguments against the war are usually advanced 
only when they emerge within powerful institutions, such as Parliament, the 
US Congress or the military establishment and echo divergent views 
discussed withLQWKHµ6SKHUHRI/HJLWLPDWH&RQWURYHUV\¶FIFKDSWHU). 
 
Following Altheide and Grimes (2005), Panorama¶VFoverage is divided into three 
PDMRUSHULRGVLQRUGHUWRWHVWK\SRWKHVHVWKDWWDNHDFFRXQWRIWKHLUµ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶
model, whilst retaining attention to the interrelated issues of framing, sourcing and 
indexing. This predictive model, as explained (see chapter 6.1), describes a pattern of 
war reporting that includes the demonising of certain individual leaders, such as 
Slobodan Milosevic or Saddam Hussein, in the pre-war phase; a focus on the battlefront 
during the war; and a post-war shift to more critical coverage on the conduct of, and 
questions regarding the necessity for, the war. It is hoped that this study will go some 
ZD\WRIXUWKHUGHYHORSLQJDQGLOOXVWUDWLQJWKHµ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶PRGHODPRGHO
which the pilot study appeared to support (McQueen 2008).  
 
5.4.3 Method 
 
Content analysis of the seventeen episodes of Panorama dealing with the war covering 
the period from September 1990 to September 1991 was conducted to test the 
hypotheses. Two quantitative measures of the programmes were undertaken and were 
then repeated, with some variations, in relation to Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH6HFRQG
                                               
2 )RUH[DPSOHSUHYLRXVZHVWHUQVXSSRUWIRU6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPH 
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Gulf War (cf. chapter 6.2). The first was a simple count and basic identification of any 
persons interviewed for the programmes (see Appendix 2.1, 2.5). Interviews were 
defined as sequences in which a person was interviewed for any length of time and 
which was included within the transmitted Panorama HSLVRGHV%ULHIVRFDOOHGµYR[
SRSV¶, questions from the public, library and news footage and reporter or interviewer 
comment (unless answeULQJTXHVWLRQVDVµH[SHUWV¶ZHUH excluded. Categories for 
identifying the interviewees have been kept as simple as possible whilst indicating the 
VSHFWUXPRIVRXUFHVDQGVRXUFHLQVWLWXWLRQVXVHG7KHFDWHJRU\µ%ULWLVKDUPHGIRUFHV¶
for example, was considered too broad and was subdivided into senior (Captain and 
DERYHUHJXODUVHUJHDQWDQGEHORZVHUYLQJRUUHWLUHGDQGµIDPLO\RI¶(for parents, 
wives etc.) to gain a richer insight into the different types of µmilitary¶ interviewees 
found in Panorama¶V coverage of both Gulf Wars. Only interviews conducted by the 
Panorama team (and marked as such within the Infax records) were included. These 
were counted only once per person, per episode. Hence, five interview clips of one 
interviewee in a programme amounting to four minutes count the same as once brief 
interview segment with another person lasting only twenty seconds. This count was 
undertaken primarily to indicate the range and type of voices accessed by the 
programme makers and to judge if they might be regarded as predominantly official or 
µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶VRXUFHV It should be stressed that the length of the interviews was not 
included in this count and so while, for instance, in the category $UDELFµSXEOLF¶there 
are sixteen µLQWHUYLHZV¶ in total, many of these exchanges were very brief compared to 
the two, much longer, interviews with former British civil servants or five interviews 
with former US intelligence officers (see Appendix 2.1). The Infax records appear to 
distinguish between pre-recorded speeches, overheard exchanges, fragmentary 
FRPPHQWVTXHVWLRQVDQGµLQWHUYLHZV¶>PDUNHGµ,179¶@and this research adopted the 
Infax database definition of µLQWHUYLHZ¶ZKHQ given. 
 
The second quantitative measure was more extensive and complex, looking at the full 
range of spoken material within each episode which was coded according to a set of 
criteria designed to establish degrees of support, criticism of, or opposition to, the war 
(see Appendix 2.2). These codes (1-7) were designed to establish if arguments were 
ZLWKLQWKHµVSKHUHRIFRQVHQVXV¶µVSKHUHRIOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶RUµVSKHUHRI
GLVVHQW¶VHHFKDSWHU+DOOLQ 1994b). The unit of measurement was the single 
word within a transcribed script in order to allow different coding where shifts of 
emphasis and tone occur and for ease of measurement (sentences were coded using the 
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coloured highlight function in Microsoft Word, separated according to code (1-7) and 
then counted using the word count function). The unit of analysis was the sentence, so 
any one sentence could only be coded a single value according to the coding 
mechanism. These values were then imported into a database to calculate percentage 
values per programme for each of seven categories of coded material, before total 
values were calculated for each category for the three phases of the war (see Appendix 
2.3). It should be noted that the same speaker might present a mixture of views or 
evidence coded as (1) µVXSSRUW¶IRUWKHZDUµSDUWLDOVXSSRUW¶ (3) µneutral¶, (4) 
µSDUWLDO oppositioQ¶µRSSRVLWLRQ¶ (6) µRIILFLDO,UDTLYLHZ¶ in a single programme 
depending on the range of positions presented. Speech by reporters and presenters was 
coded as (7) and set aside from the measure of positions presented due to the 
problematic nature of coding all their statements (see Chapter 6.2 for further discussion 
and reporter/presenter coding exercise in relation to pre-war coverage of 2003 conflict). 
The coding exercise presented a number of significant challenges, not least to do with 
the fundamental and, arguablyLQWUDFWDEOHSUREOHPRIµREMHFWLYHO\¶DVVHVVLQJFRPSOH[
and sometimes uncategorizable meaning potentials within any utterance (cf. discussion 
RQµREMHFWLYLW\¶LQFKDSWHU). $V)DLUFORXJKUHPDUNVµWKHUHlationship of words to 
meanings is many-to-one rather than one-to-RQH¶DQGWKHµSRWHQWLDOIRUDPELYDOHQFH¶LQ
any speech act is enormous (2006, p.185, 188). I have foregrounded several of these 
issues in the discussion and conclusion (5.4, 6.2, 7.1). 
 
 
Concurrent with the quantitative analysis and partly to highlight the issues raised, close 
textual analysis was employed to focus, in a more nuanced and sensitive manner, on the 
different arguments and evidence presented within the complex audio-visual narrative. 
Particular attention was paid to the various frames of understanding and discourse 
strategies employed by Panorama reporters and presenters to tease out possible 
µreadings¶FI+DOOet al. 1981) and to assess the validity of criticisms made within the 
VFKRODUO\PDWHULDOLQUHODWLRQWRWKH%%&¶VQHZVDQGFXUUHQWDIIDLUVRXWSXWDWWLPHVRI
war. 
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Findings 
 
5.4.4 Findings: Pre-War Phase (-16/01/91) 
 
The range of interviewees found in the seventeen programmes ranged from senior 
British and American politicians to members of the public, including eyewitnesses to 
events in Kuwait and the Kurdish speaking areas of Iraq and Turkey. It is interesting to 
note that neither the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher (at the start of the crisis), John 
Major (for the war and its conclusion), or the leader of the Opposition, Neil Kinnock 
were interviewed (in contrast to Panorama¶V coverage of the Falklands, Northern 
Ireland and Suez conflicts). However, seven Conservative and five Labour MPs 
including Ministers and Shadow Ministers were interviewed, two of whom (Ted Heath 
and Denis Healey) were resolutely opposed to the use of military force before sanctions 
had been given an opportunity to work (see discussion below). In fact, some of the more 
critical commentary on the ZHVW¶VSUHYLRXVUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH,UDTLUHJLPHRURQWKH
µUXVKWRZDU¶DQGWKHORQJ-term potential outcome of military confrontation comes from 
some British and American politicians. 
 
 
The first Panorama programme to deal with the Gulf crisis following IUDT¶VLQYDVLRQRI
Kuwait in August LVµ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UP¶V5LQJ¶>W[@ZKLFKLVa 
critical account of how the Iraqi regime was sold equipment by western firms, often 
with western government backing, to develop advanced weapons technology, including 
nuclear and chemical capability. The programme looks at several British-based 
companies with links to Iraq who were able to provide or purchase western equipment 
and expertise that was used to help boost ,UDT¶VWMD (weapons of mass destruction) 
programme. Evidence presented in the programme shows that the British government 
either encouraged or turned a blind eye to much of the trade. Furthermore, it is clear that 
western governments IDLOHGWRUHVSRQGVLJQLILFDQWO\WR,UDT¶VUHSHDWHGXVHRIFKHPLFDl 
weapons both in the Iran-Iraq War, or against its own people.  Over library footage 
showing a grief-stricken man walking amongst the bloated corpses of men, women and 
young children lying in the Kurdish town of Halabja&RUELQ¶VYRLFHRYHUQRWHVWKH
µPXWHG¶UHVSRQVHLQ:DVKLQJWRQDQG(XURSH at the time: 
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CORBIN: Even when Saddam used chemical weapons on his own people, 
Washington did not reverse its policy on Iraq.  In the town of Halabja an 
estimated 5,000 Kurdish men, women and children were gassed in 1988.  
But the response in Washington and in Europe was muted and a few 
congressmen in America who advocated sanctions found their proposals 
blocked by the administration. 
 
US Congress Foreign Relations Committee member Howard Berman, filmed 
conventionally in medium close up (MCU) against a shelf of books and a US flag, then 
provides highly critical testimony to support this view: 
 
HOWARD BERMAN: :HGLGQ¶WUHDFWWRWKH use of chemical gasses on his 
RZQ SHRSOH  :H GLGQ¶W UHDFW WR WKH VPXJJOLQJ RI QXFOHDU ZHDSons 
technology out of the United States and Great Britain.  We did not react to 
the fact that he gave sanctuary to known terrorists.  I think he thought we 
would, er .. he was always going to have a favourite spot in our eye and that 
he could do anything. 
 
 
This contribution is coded 5 (oppositional) because the tone and tenor of the comment is 
in line with arguments made by anti-war protestors who argued that Saddam was a 
µIDYRXULWH¶RIWKHZHVWXQWLOKLVRFFXSDWLRQRI.XZDLWDQGWKDWWKH%ULWLVKDQG86
governments effectively gave him a green light to develop and even employ outlawed 
weapons against his own citizens. Hansard (1988, 1989) records only two Parliamentary 
questions on the Halabja attack between 1988-89 (RQHE\/DERXU¶V Jeremy Corbyn 
another by the Liberal Democrat Sir Russell Johnston) which includes criticism of the 
then Conservative government¶V (of Margaret Thatcher) decision to grant export credits 
to Iraq two weeks after the attack. However, the call to freeze export credits (by Jeremy 
Corbyn) was not given front bench Opposition support at that time, suggesting a degree 
RIFURVVSDUW\FRQVHQVXVIRUWKHµPXWHG¶UHVSRQVHWRZKLFK&RUELQDOOXGHV 
 
 
Further support for the charge WKDW6DGGDP¶VUHJLPHZDVDEOHWREX\WKHWHFKQRORJ\LW
needed without great difficulty is given by Dr. Seth Carus of the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy. Dr. Carus, filmed against a map of the Middle East, alleges that 
most western governments turned a blind eye, or even encouraged arms supplies to Iraq: 
 
DR SETH CARUS: The real question is not who supplied them but rather 
who did not supply them, because basically they were going over the entire 
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world and buying weapons and military industrial capabilities from whoever 
would sell it to them ± if they had something that the Iraqis wanted. 
 
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, according to the database Spinprofiles, 
was established in 1985 µWRH[SDQGWKH,VUDHO/REE\¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHUSROLF\¶and is 
described as DµKLJKO\HIIHFWLYHWKLQNWDQNGHYRWHGto maintaining and strengthening the 
US-Israel alliance through advocacy in the media and lobbying the executive bUDQFK¶
(Spinprofiles 2009a, p.1). Israeli perspectives are an important element in Panorama¶V
coverage of the war. In addition to the use of Israeli video clips dramatising the threat 
posed to the State of Israel by Iraqi missile technology, an interview with the Israeli 
Defence Minister Moshe Arens reinforces the view that western governments had 
LJQRUHGUHSHDWHGZDUQLQJVDERXW,UDT¶VYDULRXVZeapons programmes and hostile 
intentions in the region. In total (and excluding US-based think tanks) eleven Israeli 
spokespersons are interviewed over the seventeen episodes dealing with the war 
compared, for example, to forty-four British spokespersons.   
 
Further evidence potentially embarrassing to the British government is revealed in 
forensic detail in the forty-one minute programme.  Jane Corbin reminds viewers that 
Panorama KDGSURYLGHGHYLGHQFHIRU,UDT¶VVHFUHWZHDSRQVSURJUDPPHVIRXU\HDUV
earlieU>µ7KH6HFUHWVRI6DPDUUD¶W[@, replaying images of aerial photographs 
taken of a secret weapons production complex in Samarra. Using internal company 
documents and the testimony of former employees such as Dr Chris Cowley whose 
testimony is cenWUDOWRWKLVDQGWRWKHFRQWURYHUVLDOµ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶>W[@
episode, the programme makes several damaging claims about the Department of Trade 
DQG,QGXVWU\¶V oversight of exports to Iraq. Dr Cowley, who is filmed jogging in a park 
and then interviewed in his home in jacket and tie, provides some of the most sharpest 
criticism: 
 
DR CHRIS COWLEY: This was a very, very large cake that had to be cut 
up.  We were talking about not millions or hundreds of millions, we were 
talking about billions of pounds.  And every European Government wanted 
their share of that cake and Britain made certain they got their share. 
 
*RUGRQ%URZQWKHQ/DERXU¶V7UDGHDQG,QGXVWU\spokesman, lends some support to 
these accusations and demands that the Iraqi front company TDG, charged with 
breaching the arms embargo, be immediately closed down. Three clips of the interview 
which takes place in what appears to be a simple office with a single row of books 
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behind him are interspersed with the other evidence, mainly presented by British 
technicians and experts previously employed by Matrix Churchill and other companies 
in Iraq. Most of the interviews for Panorama around the First Gulf War employ a 
simple, fairly high-key lighting set up which lacks the crafted and dramatic quality that 
characterises many of the interviews for the Second Gulf War (see Chapter 6.2). Gordon 
Brown says a total of 318 words (approximately 12% of total interview time) and is 
JLYHQWKHODVWZRUGEHIRUH-DQH&RUELQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQ 
 
BROWN: It would be tragic if weapons that had been procured by Iraq from 
Britain in the 1980s and indeed in 1990, are now being targeted on British 
soldiers and the British forces near Iraq and around Iraq and the lessons that 
we have got to learn are that the tightening of an arms embargo has got to be 
effective .. that we must look at the methods that have been used by powers 
to acquire arms and we must certainly not allow companies like TDG to be 
based in Britain procuring arms throughout the world from a base in London 
and even now I think the Government ought to act immediately to ban the 
company from operating in Britain. 
 
CORBIN: Last week the defence secretary inspected British forces in the 
Gulf and readied them for possible conflict.  But, if the British and other 
Governments had taken a tougher stance on Saddam Hussein and his arms 
build up, those Western forces might not now be preparing for war. 
 
While the evidence presented is, in many respects, highly critical of both the British and 
86JRYHUQPHQWV¶UHFRUGLQUHODWLon to Iraq, most of it has been coded 4 (partly 
oppositional). This is because the evidence largely points to lax oversight of an existing 
arms embargo rather than active or cynical attempts to ignore sanctions. It is also 
revealed in the programme that TDG, which had previously bought the machine tools 
manufacturer Matrix Churchill, was being monitored by intelligence agencies 
worldwide and was subject to a US legal investigation. Hence, the company could be 
VHHQDVWKHVXEMHFWRIµOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶ and a matter of concern for elements of 
the British (and US) State: 
 
&25%,1 >«@ %XW LI WKH *RYHUQPHQW KDVQ¶W VWRSSHG 0DWUL[ &KXUFKLOO¶V
trade with Iraq, what has been the attitude to the parent company ± TDG?  
Intelligence agencies world-wide have been moQLWRULQJ7'*¶VDFWLYLWLHVIRU
more than a year now.  The Foreign Office signalled their interest when last 
October they blocked a TDG attempt to buy the Lear Fan factory in Belfast.  
That would have given Iraq access to carbon composite technology for 
missile work.  But TDG is still operating unhindered out of London.  
+RZHYHU LQ $PHULFD 7'*¶V DFWLYLWLHV DUH SDUW RI D PDMRU OHJDO
investigation. 
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Certainly the controversy over the company and export licence supervision appears to 
be the focus of Gordon Brown¶VFRPSODLQWVUDWKHUWKDQWKHZLGHULVVXHRIZHVWHUQDUPV
supplies to dictators around the world or the sudden change in heart by the British 
government to an erstwhile ally.  Nevertheless, Panorama¶VILUVWSURJUDPPHLQ
UHVSRQVHWR,UDT¶VLQYDVLRQRI.XZDit is in many respects a hard-hitting investigative 
programme devoted to predominantly critical viewpoints with 61% of interview 
material drawing attention to Western governments¶ tacit support for the export of 
materials that could be used to develop WMD.  Interviews that gave partial or implicit 
VXSSRUWIRUWKHPLOLWDU\DFWLRQE\SURYLGLQJHYLGHQFHRIWKHUHJLPH¶VGXSOLFLW\DQG
aggressive intentions in the region accounted for 32% of the total transcripts. Here, as in 
all Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHLWZDVRIWHQ difficult to assign codes to speeches that could be 
FULWLFDORIWKHZHVW¶VUHFRUGZKLOHDFNQRZOHGJLQJ6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VDWURFLRXVUHFRUGRI
war crimes and aggression. Such problematic issues with the coding of the transcripts 
are discussed in detail later in this thesis. Many of the issues raised in the programme 
would be revisited in a second programme dealing with the export of military 
WHFKQRORJ\µ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶>W[@an episode that would result in 
controversy due to scheduling delays and managerial interference by Director General 
-RKQ%LUWµ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶LV dealt with later in this chapter (see below). 
 
 
The second Panorama SURJUDPPHGHDOLQJZLWKWKHLPSHQGLQJZDUµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK
&ROXPQ¶looks at Palestinian support for Saddam and rising tensions within the State of 
Israel and the occupied territories. Reporter Robin Denselow interviews a wide range of 
Israelis and Palestinians including an IDF Brigadier, right-wing settlers, Likud and 
Labour leaders Benjamin Netanyahu, Ariel Sharon (then Housing Minister) and Shimon 
Peres, the liberal Mayor of Jerusalem Teddy Kollek, Palestinian farmers and journalists, 
PLO executive committee member Mohammed Milhem and various young Palestinian 
activists and militants, including some recently drawn to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 
Sharply divergent views of the root of the problems facing both Jews and Palestinians 
are voiced and Denselow skilfully negotiates and weaves together these different 
perspectives to produce a complex picture of the precarious state of relations in the 
region and an understanding of the roots of the continuing Intifada. It becomes clear that 
peaceful coexistence has been put in grave peril by a combination of factors including 
µthe most Right-wing government of ,VUDHO¶V forty-two year history¶ pushing through 
continued land confiscation and settlement building and failing to commence 
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negotiations with the PLO, the arrival of thousands of new Jewish immigrant from the 
IRUPHU6RYLHW8QLRQDQG,UDT¶V invasion of Kuwait and popular Palestinian support for 
Saddam Hussein. 
 
'HVSLWHWKHVRPHZKDWOXULGWLWOHµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶3DOHVWLQLDQIUXVWUDWLRQDQG
support for Saddam Hussein is contextualised and made coherent, as is a range of Israeli 
views, including right-wing extremists who turn to mob violence in response to the 
murder of two young Jews. The balance of views can be seen in the following extract 
which is typical of the way the programme sets the experiences of one community or 
political faction against another. Over shots of Palestinian men queuing to join the Iraqi 
DUP\'HQVHORZ¶VYRLFHRYHUDWWHPSWVWRmake rational sense of their motives for 
enlisting and their apparently self-destructive enthusiasm for the Iraqi leader: 
 
DENSELOW: Pan-Arab enthusiasm for Iraq already exists in Jordan where 
3DOHVWLQLDQV TXHXH WR MRLQ 6DGGDP¶V DUP\  )RU WKHP WKH*XOI FULVLV DQG
3DOHVWLQH DUH OLQNHG EXW WKH\ DUJXH WKDW WKH :HVW¶V DFWLRQ RYHU 81
resolutions on the Gulf should be compared with the lack of action on UN 
resolutions on the Occupied Territories. 
 
S. NUSSEIEH: Now this is what the Palestinians see when they look at the 
Gulf.  They do not see Saddam invading Kuwait they see the Americans and 
the Western governments behind them applying a double standard, being 
hypocritical.  Basically, apparently, valuing oil and the interests of their 
own, you know, their own economies more highly than Palestinian human 
blood.  I mean, this is how we look at it and how the Palestinians look at it. 
 
NETANYAHU: What possible relations does the Palestinian problem have 
to the plunder and conquest of Kuwait by Iraq?  None.  And Saddam 
Hussein would like to link the two precisely in order to fray the alliance and 
to divert the attention and the issue  ,GRQ¶WWKLQNVHULRXVFRXQWULHVVKRXOG
fall into that trap.  
  
3DOHVWLQLDQDFWLYLVW6DUL1XVVHLHK¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ, filmed in what appears to be his 
garden, is coded 5 (oppositional) because he articulates a position common amongst 
anti-war protestors that the west was applying double standards in its hasty response to 
.XZDLW¶VLQYDVLRQFRPSDUHGWR,VUDHO¶Vtwo-decades-old illegal occupation of land 
including Gaza and the West Bank. %HQMDPLQ1HWDQ\DKX¶VUHSO\, filmed in front of a 
large map of the Middle East unmarked apart from Hebrew script over the state of 
Israel, is coded as (1) fully supportive of the war. Netanyahu rejects the link between 
the occupation of Kuwait and the occupation of East Jerusalem, Gaza and the West 
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%DQNDQGFODLPVWKH3/2¶VVXSSRUWIRU6DGGDP+XVVHLQLVQRWERUQRXWRIµIUXVWUDWLRQ¶
as the Panorama programme appears to suggest, but from shared aims ± namely µthe 
destruction of Israel¶. 
 
CRGLQJRIµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶VKRZVVOLJKWO\PRUHDLUWLPHJLYHQWRYRLFHVLQ
favour of Saddam Hussein (coded 6) 24% (of contributors) than to those giving very 
strong support for a war against Iraq (coded 1) 18.2% and yet both viewpoints are 
VRPHZKDWFULWLFDOO\IUDPHGDVµH[WUHPLVW¶SRVLWLRQVWKDWKDYHJURZQLQVWUHQJWKVLQFH
WKHRFFXSDWLRQRI.XZDLW,QIDFWWKHSURJUDPPH¶VµV\PSDWKLHV¶DUHKDUGWR pin down 
and the larger part of the transcript has been coded (3) as neutral because it deals 
exclusively with Israeli-Palestinian relations rather than the issue of the coming war. 
Denselow narration, comprising 56% of all spoken words, attempts to give a broad, 
µHYHQ-handed¶ view of events that is historically grounded. He appears attentive and 
respectful of all views and interviews ordinary Jews and Palestinians in a variety of 
locations as well as senior figures on both sides. At forty minutes, the programme is a 
well-balanced introduction to the realities and complexities of Middle Eastern politics. 
It shows a degree of compassion both for the plight of the Palestinians and for the newly 
arrived Soviet Jews, who are filmed in one scene arriving at Jerusalem airport with a 
mournful piano solo which we later see is being played by a former Russian concert 
pianist in her new home. This is a rare, but effective use of music in what is otherwise a 
very soberly-constructed film. There is none of the faux hand-held camera work, moody 
lighting, fast cuts and intrusive use of music that characterises the worst of more recent 
current affairs practice (cf. chapter 6.2). It could be countered that this earlier Panorama 
style of filmmaking is somewhat µdry¶ and µdull¶, a µturnoff¶ for many viewers. In its 
defence, I would argue that µ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶shows evidence of a serious 
commitment to understand a complex situation and give space to a genuinely wide 
UDQJHRIYLHZV,QWKLVVHQVH'HQVHORZ¶VILOPFRXOGEHUHJDUGHGDVH[HPSODU\RI%LUW¶V
much publicised µPLVVLRQWRH[SODLQ¶ (cf. chapter 4.3) although, on closer inspection, it 
also fits into a longer Panorama tradition of filmed reports from foreign nations and 
may well have been criticised for being lacking iQDFOHDUµDQDO\WLFDOOLQH¶VHH'\NH¶V
criticism of how Panorama µVTXLUWHGILOPDW HYHU\ERG\¶in Chapter 4.2). 
 
The film ends following further interviews with a range of figures including Benjamin 
1HWDQ\DKXZKRVWDWHVµSo, from our point of view, Palestinians yes, the PLO no; 
negotiations yes, suicide no¶DJDLQVWPLO executive committee member Mohammed 
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0LOKHPZKRFDOOVIRUWKH3DOHVWLQLDQLVVXHWREHFRQIURQWHGVHULRXVO\µsolve the 
Palestine problem and then you extinguish all the fires all over the Middle East¶
'HQVHORZ¶VFRQFOXVLRQGHOLYHUHGRYHUVKRWVRIFKHHULQJ3DOHVWLQLDQVLQWKHVWUHHW
showing their support for Saddam Hussein, seems prescient when replayed two decades 
later: 
 
DENSELOW: Support for Saddam is the latest, most desperate attempt to 
break the deadlock but if there are no moves towards a settlement in the 
aftermath of the Gulf crisis, the festering problem of the Palestinians will 
endanger the Middle East long after Saddam is gone. 
 
 
The third Panorama HSLVRGHµIn Our Defences¶>W[7.09.90] is structured in a way that 
was quite common in current affairs programmes in the 1970s and 80s (notably in 
Weekend World and Panorama), but has mostly fallen out of favour today: a filmed 
report followed by studio discussion or interview. The thirty minute report, by Fred 
Emery, is on the state of British armed forces in light of their expected role in the Gulf. 
It focuses on several detailed questions including how suitable the forces are that are 
being sent to the Gulf and whether Britain could be dragged into a conflict through 
military rather than political considerations. These themes are then taken up in a ten 
minute studio interview of Defence Secretary Tom King conducted by David Dimbleby.  
 
There is a fairly technical discussion of the battle-readiness of the British Challenger 
and Chieftan WDQNVDQGZKHWKHUVHQGLQJDQHQWLUHEULJDGHQHFHVVDU\LQWKHDUP\¶VYLHZ
for logistical reasons, might be viewed as a hostile escalation by other nations. The 
interviewees are drawn from the ranks of the Conservative Government and Labour 
Opposition as well as former and serving armed services personnel. There is also an 
interview with Colonel Michael Dewar, a spokesman for the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, a think tank which describes itVHOIDVµWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJDXWKRULW\RQ
political-PLOLWDU\FRQIOLFW¶DQGZKLFKLVGHVFULEHGDVKDYLQJµVWURQJHVWDEOLVKPHQWOLQNV
ZLWKIRUPHU86DQG%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOVDPRQJVWLWVPHPEHUV¶6SLQSURILOHV
2009b, p.1). Only 6.8% of the interview material for µ,Q2XU'HIHQFHV¶takes a critical 
line (coded 4), and this comes entirely from three clips of an interview with MP Denis 
Healey who sees the deployment of a brigade as making premature military action more 
likely. He accuses Mrs Thatcher of aWWHPSWLQJWRµFXUU\IDYRXU¶ZLWKWKH$PHULFDQ
  
164 
President, a more polite variation of the µ%XVK¶VSRRGOH¶ODEHOJLYHQWR7RQ\%ODLUE\
various sceptics in the Second Gulf War: 
 
DENIS HEALEY, MP: 7KHUH¶V QR GRXEW WKH UHDVRQ LV WKDW VKH ZDQWV WR
curry favour with President Bush.  We were told by Tom King some weeks 
ago that the air-naval thing was what we needed and not troops on the 
JURXQGLQ6DXGL$UDELD,WLVDELJFKDQJHEHFDXVHHYHU\WKLQJZH¶YHVHQWVR
far has been strictly relevant to enforcing the blockade.  This, of course, as 
Mr Waldegrave made clear a few days ago, is intended to add to our 
strength if we attack Iraq. 
 
There is other criticism in the programme, but it is confined to questions of strategy, 
rather than fundamental questions of policy. Coding finds that interviewees, other than 
Healey, ZHUHRQO\µFULWLFDO¶RIHTXLSPHQWRUWDFWLFVUDWKHUWKDQRIWKHneed to go to war 
at all, with 43.6% giving full support and 49.7 giving qualified support. However, the 
comment by the think tank expert shRZVWKDWWKLVµSURFHGXUDO¶FULWLFLVPFRXOGEHKDUVK
and potentially embarrassing to the government: 
 
COLONEL MICHAEL DEWAR: First of all at least fifty per cent of our 
tank fleet is, if I my use jargon, so clapped out that really it cannot ± a repair 
job just cannot be done on it.   
 
Similar criticism of battle readiness and long-term military strategy is found in the 
programme and is implicit in many of the questions posed by Dimbleby in the studio 
discussion: 
 
DIMBLEBY: Can we come back briefly to the Challenger tank ± the 
HTXLSPHQWWKDW¶VEHLQJVHQWZLWKWKLVEULJDGH :HKHDUGFRPSODLQWVDERXW
the former tank ± the Chieftain ± that had only started fifteen percent of the 
time.  There had been reports that the Challenger a couple of years ago was 
only fifty-five percent effective. At its current rate of effective use, how 
does it compare with the German tank, for instance ± that they were 
indicating they would rather have than the Challenger? 
 
 
'LPEOHE\¶VTXHVWLRQVHFKRLQJVRPHRIWKHFRQFHUQVRIWKHDUPHd forces and military 
experts, do QRWVWUD\EH\RQGWKHµVSKHUHRIOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶EXWGRoccasionally 
put Tom King on the spot and require convincing answers in a live transmission. While 
µ,Q2XU'HIHQFHV¶UDLVHVsome rather arcane and specialised points it could be argued 
that these were also important questions. Nevertheless, the narrow range of discussion 
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and selection of interviewees meant that no firmly anti-war perspectives could be 
presented. This situation was repeated in other Panorama episodes that focused on 
military questions such as µ7KH*DWKHULQJ6WRUP¶>W[@WUDQVPLWWHGGXULQJWKH
air campaign, but before the launch of the land campaign and also presented by Fred 
Emery. The post-war autopsy of military DQGVWUDWHJLFVXFFHVVµ7he Allies in the Eye of 
WKH6WRUP¶>W[@SUHVHQWHGE\6WHYH%UDGVKDZZDVDOVRFRQILQHGWRVSOLWV
amongst the military and political establishment on strategic questions (see discussion 
below).  
 
µBehind the Desert SKLHOG¶>W[.91], presented by David Lomax, is closer to the 
foreign, µUHSRUWer-on-the-JURXQG¶VW\OHLQYHVWLJDWLRQIRXQGLQµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶ 
and shares many of its strengths, including a willingness to seek out a range of views 
and ask awkward questions of senior foreign leaders. Lomax quizzes a member of the 
Saudi Royal family with pertinent and challenging directness, casting doubt on the 
RIILFLDOQDUUDWLYHRIµDZDUWRGHIHQGGHPRFUDF\¶: 
 
LOMAX: Your Royal Highness, why should the West defend a country 
which has no democracy? 
 
PRINCE KHALID: Why should every country have a democracy? 
 
LOMAX: But here there is a country without any opposition, with no 
elections, with no free press.  Why should the West be interested in helping 
to defend that country? 
 
PRINCE KHALID: We have our own system and that is the Islamic system. 
 
µ%HKLQGWKH'HVHUW6KLHOG¶ WRXFKHVRQ6DXGL$UDELD¶VKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGLWVXVHRI 
public executions, and gender apartheid amongst other issues and David Lomax is quick 
to dismiss complacent answers when he comes across them: 
 
35,1&(.+$/,':HGRQ¶WKDYHSROLWLFDOSULVRQHUVLQ6DXGL$UDELD 
 
LOMAX: Amnesty International has alleged that there are sixty ± I think 
LW¶VPRUHWKDQVL[W\QDPHV 
 
 
As well as including remarkable footage of a (car) protest by Saudi women at their lack 
of freedom even to drive, the report points to the potential long-WHUPµEORZEDFN¶RI
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western military involvement in the region. In a passage that seems grimly far-sighted 
today, Lomax points to stirrings of anti-western fundamentalism against the presence of 
western troops: 
 
LOMAX: But some Saudis believe that the Western military presence may 
have another effect ± that of encouraging those who want to see 
fundamental social change. Recently there have been indications that 
political debate in Saudi Arabia has started to move outside its traditional 
ERXQGDULHV7KHUH¶VQRGRXEWWKDWVLQFHWKHDUULYDORIIRUHLJQWURRSVWKHUH¶V
a new atmosphere. We understand that groups of younger Princes are 
organising what amount to regular political PHHWLQJV7KH\¶YHKHOGSULYDWH
GHEDWHVWRWDONDERXWSRVVLEOHFKDQJHV LQWKHZD\WKHFRXQW\¶VUXQ 7KRVH
ZKR¶YHDWWHQGHGWKHVHPHHWLQJVDUHQDWXUDOO\UHOXFWDQWWRWDONDERXWWKHPLQ
public, but they say that before the Gulf crisis such a challenge to the 
authorities would have been unthinkable. 
 
DR AL JABBAR: Well because it could .. you see the ± I will tell you there 
is a difference.  There are the official religious men, those who are 
appointed by the government and there are those fanatics ± and my fear is 
that the fanatics and the zealots ± and the number have increased over the 
years ± and my fear is the backlash of those fanatics. 
 
Here, in embryonic form, is a description of the small group of wealthy Saudi militants 
(that we now know included Osama Bin Laden) whose opposition to western presence 
in their country would ultimately lead to the events of 9-11, the subsequent µWar on 
Terror¶ and invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The coding strategy employed indicates 
a small majority of voices in support of war - 14% (coded 1 and 2) to 8% partly 
RSSRVHGFRGHGLQWKLVSURJUDPPH<HWWKHµQHXWUDO¶interviewees (coded 6) or 
60% (of all speech) reporter¶VQDUUDWLRQDQGWR-camera talk (coded 7) fails to indicate the 
overall tone of programme, which quietly undermines various official narratives, 
particularly claims about the war being about democracy, rather than oil. It is, therefore, 
significant that David Lomax reveals how the programme was carefully scrutinised by 
senior management in the editing process in London, including by what he believes was 
the Saudi Minister of Information, and may have narrowly avoided further cuts at the 
6DXGLJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHTXHVWpersonal communication, November 14, 2007). 
 
µ,V:DU,QHYLWDEOH"¶ [tx: 14.01.91] was the last Panorama to be transmitted before the 
start of hostilities which began on the 16th of January. In an extended hour-long episode 
a report by Tom Mangold in Washington and another by John Ware in Salisbury are 
linked by David Dimbleby, who is televised on a rooftop in Washington with the 
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Whitehouse behind him in the gloom of a cold, mid-winter afternoon. 'LPEOHE\¶VEULHI
introduction before the title sequence poses three questions that the programme hopes to 
answer and tKHVHQVHRIµWLPHUXQQLQJRXW¶LQthe first sentence gives these questions an 
XUJHQF\WKDWLVDLPHGDWKRRNLQJDQDXGLHQFH¶VLQWHUHVW 
 
DAVID DIMBLEBY: As the deadline approaches for Saddam Hussein to 
leave Kuwait, Panorama reports on the prospect of war: is President Bush 
committed to use force?  Have the arguments all been thought through?  Is 
war inevitable? 
 
 
Structured in a similar way to µ,Q2XU'HIHQFHV¶µ,V:DU,QHYLWDEOH"¶FRQVLVWVRIWZR
twenty-minute filmed reports, followed by a twenty-minute studio interview conducted 
by Dimbleby with US Defence Secretary Richard Cheney. After a brief introduction 
7RP0DQJROG¶VUHSRUWEHJLQVwith atmospheric establishing shots of Washington and 
the Whitehouse at night and cuts to a close up of several windows and glimpses of 
activity in the brightly-lit, high-ceiling rooms. The various images are flattened by the 
use of a telephoto lenses and composed and lit in such a way to produce a sequence that 
would not be out of place in a Hollywood thriller. 0DQJROG¶VYRLFHRYHULVW\SLFDOO\
dramatic: 
 
TOM MANGOLD: The lights are burning through the night in George 
%XVK¶V :KLWH +RXVH DV WKH FORFN FRXQWV GRZQ WR WKH HQG RI WKH 8QLWHG
1DWLRQ¶V GHDGOLQH  7RPRUURZ FRXOG EH µ+LJK1RRQ¶ IRU WKH PDQZKR LV
leading the international effort.  The President has almost single-handedly 
managed the alliance end of the Gulf crisis, seizing what he believes is his 
moment to leave his mark in history.  As the crisis reaches its climax, Bush 
contemplates the biggest engagement of American troops since the Second 
World War. By midnight tomorrow, January 15th, all else failing, and all 
else is failing, George Bush will have to make the most momentous decision 
of his life: whether or not to unleash the huge forces sent to the Persian 
Gulf.  The decision will be taken alone because he alone chose full 
responsibility. 
 
The sequence could be regarded as an example of what Corner has termed the 
µLOOXVWUDWLYHPRGH¶LQZKLFKLPDJHVDUHILOPHGWRPDWFKDVFULSWµThe lights are burning 
WKURXJKWKHQLJKWLQ*HRUJH%XVK¶V:KLWH+RXVH >«@¶2IFRXUVH0DQJROG¶VVFULSW
PD\DOVRKDYHEHHQZULWWHQDURXQGWKHµSUR-ILOPLF¶IRRWDJHEXWWKLVLVXQOLNHO\JLYHQ
-RKQ%LUW¶VVWUHQXRXVHIIRUWVWRSULRULWLVHµVFULSWEHIRUHILOP¶ and the careful monitoring 
RIWKLVSROLF\GRFXPHQWHGLQ/LQGOH\¶V (2003) history of Panorama and discussed in the 
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interviews with Tom Mangold and John Ware0DQJROG¶VVFULSWHPSKDVLVHVWKH
urgency of the task facing the Whitehouse, but also personalises the conflict by 
FRPSDULQJ*HRUJH%XVK¶VGLOHPPDWRWKDWRIWill Kane (Gary Cooper) LQµ+LJK1RRQ¶ 
7KHFKRLFHRIPHWDSKRULVKLJKO\UHVRQDQWJLYHQWKDW)UHG=LQQHPDQQ¶VILOPKDV
EHHQLQWHUSUHWHGDVµDSUDJPDWLFHQGRUVHPHQWRIWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVUHWXUQWRDUPHG
FRQIOLFWLQ.RUHD¶Buscombe 1991, p.269). µ+LJK1RRQ¶ pits a lone sheriff against his 
old enemy Frank Miller and his gang. Comparing Bush to the lonely hero Kane, who 
has been abandoned by his Quaker (pacifist) bride and cowardly or indifferent 
townsfolk seems an odd choice, in some respects, given the overwhelming size of US 
(and Allied) forces ranged against Iraq1HYHUWKHOHVV%XVK¶VGHFLVLRQWRRSSRVH
6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VLQYDVLRQZLWKIRUFHLVFDVWDVDbold and courageous one, made by 
the President alone: 
 
PETER TEELEY: +HLVWKHFRPPDQGFHQWUHWKHUH¶VQRTXHVWLRQDbout that 
at all.  This is the situation:  George Bush did not call his advisers together 
DQGVD\µ*HQWOHPHQZKDWVKRXOGZHGR"¶KHFDOOHGKLVSHRSOHWRJHWKHUDQG
VDLGµ*HQWOHPHQWKLVLVZKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRGR¶ 
 
Mangold now poses the µGLOHPPD¶IDFHGEy the President and the world:  
 
MANGOLD: But has the man in charge of the control centre already made 
up his mind?  Is the military strategy, selected by the President from the 
outset, one that has prematurely closed off his diplomatic options?  And if 
that is the case, has President Bush no alternative but to go to war with all 
its horrific and unpredictable consequences? 
 
The report then goes on to give expression to some of the doubts widely expressed 
within the American political establishment, particularly through interviews with three 
figures: Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton; former Director of the Defence 
Intelligence Agency Lt. General Leonard Perroots; and Professor Jerrold Post, a 
psychologist and µUS government advisor¶. Perroots goes beyond the question of 
timing, which is a central concern for the speakers to the likely consequences of the 
ZDUKHUHFRGHGDVµSDUWLDORSSRVLWLRQ¶ 
 
PERROOTS: If we do go to war and we kill a lot of Arabs and Iraqis in a 
dirty war, which is going to happen, there are those that say that the 
consequences, both cultural and political consequences of that are that we 
will be stigmatised for years.  One needs to weigh these consequences and 
make some judgments as to what we can do to damage-limit and I think 
there are some things we can do. 
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MANGOLD: But have they been discussed? Are they being discussed now? 
 
PERROOTS: , GRQ¶W KHDU HQRXJK GHEDWH HLWKHU LQ WKH 3HQWDJRQ RU LQ WKH
Congress. 
 
MANGOLD: There is a sense of the calm before the storm in Washington, a 
sense of inevitability as the last diplomatic moves end in stalemate and the 
lights burn on in the offices of those who, having wished for peace, are now 
girding for war. 
 
Perroots is calling for restraint rather than a complete halt on the advance to war, but his 
concerns are long-term and put the conflict in a broader context. Only former Bush 
Press Secretary Peter Teeley is on hand to provide reassurance that the President is 
making the right decision and reaffirms the emerging official view that sanctions will 
not shift Iraq from Kuwait. 0DQJROG¶VFRQFOXVLRQRIIHUVDSHVVLPLVWLFLIUHDOLVWLF
DVVHVVPHQWRIWKHFKDQFHVIRUSHDFH7KHUHLVµDVHQVHRILQHYLWDELOLW\¶DQG86OHDGHUV
DUHµJLUGLQJIRUZDU¶,QLQWHUYLHZ0DQJROGQRWHVWKDWKHKDGDVHQLRU%%&µPLQGHU¶
with him in Washington during his reporting on the Gulf War to make sure he 
µEHKDYHG¶KLPVHOI7KLVOHQGVVXSSRUWWR/LQGOH\¶VFRPSODLQWWKDWPDQDJHULDO
LQWHUIHUHQFHZDVDSHUVLVWHQWDQGGDPDJLQJIHDWXUHRI-RKQ%LUW¶VSHULRGLQRIILFHDWWKH
BBC: 
 
John Birt had just come in and he sent a very high-powered executive out 
with me to Washington to make sure that I behaved myself.  Because that 
was at the time when John Birt had absolutely no understanding of how 
Panorama reporters worked and he assumed that all our scripts would be 
written by the EGLWRU LQ /RQGRQ DQGZH¶G VLPSO\ JR RXW DQGPRXWK WKHLU
scripts and do their pieces to camera, and ask the questions that they wrote 
for us in London.  That was a bizarre period.  
(personal communication, September 4, 2009) 
 
 
Following the Mangold report, John Ware reports from the UK where he looks at some 
areas of British public and parliamentary opinion which show that not everyone is in 
favour of war. He follows the parents of a young man who had been sent to the Gulf 
two weeks before, as they light candles at a special church service and replay an 8mm 
film they have of him at home. Ware then joins them briefly on an anti-war 
demonstration in London, the first we have seen of the mass protests: 
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WARE: On Saturday, peace rallies were held in four major cities.  About 
fifty thousand gathered in London, larger than some marches in the Sixties 
against the Americans in Vietnam and among them were the Easthams from 
Salisbury, whose son was sent to the Gulf two weeks ago.  The marchers 
urged that sanctions should be given a chance. 
 
What would your son think? 
 
SUE EASTHAM: If he could see us QRZ":HOOKH¶VNQRZQWKDWZHKDYH
always been of a mind for peaceful negotiations out of any ghastly situation 
so it would be no surprise for him. 
 
As in Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHPDUFKLQ/RQGRQDJDLQVWWKH,UDT it is the 
µXQOLNHO\¶VRQ-in-army), middle-class supporters of the demonstration that are selected 
for interview. The thirty-three words spoken here represent the entire coverage of anti-
war protestor opinion in Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI*XOILQFOXGLQJWKRVHSROLWLFLDQV
such as Tony Benn who spoke at the demonstrations. Other than the family of soldiers, 
all other interviewees in the hour-long programme are drawn from the British and 
American political establishment, lending support to criticism that the BBC has 
traditionally avoided the µH[SUHVVLYHSROLWLFVRIWKHVWUHHW¶ (Seaton cited Born 2004, 
p.32). 
 
Ted Heath and Denis Healey (who both appear in several Panorama programmes on the 
war) are interviewed by Ware: 
 
Ted Heath: $WWKLVVWDJH,WKLQNLWZRXOGEHPDGQHVVWRJRWRZDU:H¶YH
only had sanctions for some four months, they are beginning to have an 
effect.  Nobody thought they would be effective in four monWKV  , GRQ¶W
WKLQNWKH*HQHUDOVDUHDVLPSDWLHQWRQH*HQHUDOVDLGWKHRWKHUGD\µ:HOOLI
LW¶VDTXHVWLRQRIGHDWKRUVLWWLQJLQWKHVXQDELWORQJHU,SUHIHUWRVLWLQWKH
VXQ¶DQGKH¶VTXLWHULJKW 
 
+HDWK¶VDUJXPHQWOLNH+HDOH\¶VLVDFULWLFDORQHexpressed in forthright language. It is 
also, as the programme makes clear, out of step with the broad thrust of Parliamentary 
opinion as expressed in the public vote. Reporter John Ware describes Heath and 
+HDOH\¶VµGLVVLGHQWYLHZV¶DVµYRLFHVLQWKHZLOGHUQHVV¶1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHVHYLHZVDUH
FRGHGKHUHDVSDUWLDORSSRVLWLRQEHFDXVH+HDWKHPSOR\VWKHµQRW\HW¶DUJXPHQWLQ
calling for time for sanctions to work and, as expressed by two senior and respected 
politicians from both sides of the House can be VHHQDVZLWKLQWKHµVSKHUHRIOHJLWLPDWH
FRQWURYHUV\¶ although perhaps at the PDUJLQVRIWKDWµOHJLWLPDWHGHEDWH¶+HDWKDQG
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+HDOH\¶VVHUYLFHLQWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DULVVWUHVVHGLQWKHSURJUDPPH, as is their elder 
statesmen status. The fact that they were coming to the end of their distinguished 
SROLWLFDOFDUHHUVLQSHUKDSVHQDEOHGWKHPWRH[SUHVVµGLVTXLHW¶IHOWE\RWKHU03V
Ware indicates that, despite the apparent parliamentary consensus indicated in the 
public debate, such disquiet was real: 
 
WARE: In fact, only a handful of politicians have raised any questions 
about the potentially catastrophic consequences of a war.  Indeed, with 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats agreeing with the government line almost 
entirely, there has been very little publLF DUJXPHQW DERXW %ULWDLQ¶V YDVW
PLOLWDU\FRPPLWPHQWLQWKH*XOI%XWWKDWGRHVQ¶WPHDQWRVD\WKHUHDUHQ¶W
UHDOXQGHUO\LQJGRXEWV2QHRI0UV7KDWFKHU¶VH[-Cabinet Ministers told us 
WKDWDOWKRXJKKH WKRXJKWZDUZRXOG EH IROO\ KHZRXOGQ¶WGDUH VD\ WKDW in 
public now. 
 
Footage of Heath addressing the US Congress on his doubts underline the impression 
that public dissent amongst senior politicians was far more common in America than in 
Britain. It may be for this reason that, remarkably, there are more Panorama interviews 
with US persons (52) than British ones (44). As the breakdown shows, a large majority 
of these interviews are with figures from the US political, military and intelligence 
establishment, the same sectors that make up the bulk of British interviews (see 
Appendix 2.1). Other than the thirty-three words spoken by Sue Eastham, speaking in 
her role as a mother of a soldier, there are no interviews with any US, British or 
European protestors, activists, peace groups or demonstrators. These findings provide 
powerful evidence for hypotheses H1, H3 and H4.  
 
Nevertheless, on the brink of war 44% of views presented offer at least partial 
RSSRVLWLRQFRGHGWRWKHZDU2QHH[FKDQJHZLWKDQRWKHUVROGLHU¶VPRWKHULVFRGHGDV
(5) fully oppositional because her opposition to the war is total and unqualified: 
 
JAN STEWART: It should be the Arab nations that sort it out.  I mean, we 
ZHUHQ¶WYHU\TXLFNWRMXPS LQZLWKWKH,UDQ,UDTZDUEXWQRZZH MXPS LQ
for this.  Yes, I would be very .. I would be desolate if I lost my sons over 
something which I think is really nothing to do with us. 
 
µ%DODQFH¶WRWKHYDULRXVGRXEWHUVDQGVFHSWLFVLVSURYLGHGLQWKHODVWWKLUGRIWKH
programme when Dimbleby interviews Richard Cheney, who coolly answers the 
twenty-one questions put to him that deal with some of the issues raised in the two 
reports. It is interesting that no US politician of similar rank appeared on the Panorama 
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episodes dealing with the Second Gulf War and, in fact, lengthy detailed interviews of 
this kind FI7RP.LQJLQWHUYLHZIRUµ,Q2XU'HIHQFHV¶DUHQRWDIHDWXUHRIDQ\RIWKH
post-2000 Panorama programmes reviewed for this study. This shift away from 
lengthy, detailed interviews which give an opportunity to understand and scrutinise 
government thinking lends some weight to the argument that Panorama LVOHVVµKHDY\-
KLWWLQJ¶WKDQLQWKHSDVW (cf. chapter 4.4). A flavour of the interview, which is twenty 
minutes (3,700 words) ORQJVXJJHVWV&KHQH\¶VFRPPDQGRIWKHIDFWV+HLVFRPSOHWHO\
unruffled by any of the questions put to him, speaking quietly and deliberately, 
knocking each point or objection away with understated ease: 
 
DIMBLEBY: Are you still looking for a political solution? 
 
CHENEY: It is difficult to be optimistic about one with the failure of the 
81 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO¶V PLVVLRQ WR JHQHUDWH DQ\WKLQJ  6DGGDP +XVVHLQ
reiterating that he will keep Kuwait, his convening of his puppet parliament, 
FODLPLQJWKDWQRZWKH\KDYHHQGRUVHGNHHSLQJ.XZDLW,W¶VGLIILFXOWWRVHH
where the opening might be for his compliance with those Resolutions. 
 
DIMBLEBY: But are you encouraging people who are still trying, like the 
French, to find a diplomatic way out? 
 
CHENEY: , WKLQN LWZRXOGEH IDLU WR VD\ZHKDYHQ¶WGLVFRXUDJHGDQ\RQH
But, on the other hand, we have also insisted, as have our British allies and 
others, that the only acceptable grounds for a solution is compliance with 
the UN Resolutions.  That is the bottom line.  He has to get out of Kuwait.  
Without complete and total withdrawal from Kuwait, there is no basis upon 
which you can talk. 
 
&KHQH\¶VLQWHUYLHZLVFRGHGIXOOVXSSRUWDQGVRwhile the first forty minutes has lent 
towards more sceptical or cautious interviews, the programme now gives fairly 
uninterrupted attention to the official line (comprising 50.7% of all interview material). 
 
Coding for all five pre-war episodes shows that pro- and partially pro-war voices made 
up 49.8% of all interviews. µOppositional¶ µpartially oppositional¶ DQGµSUR-6DGGDP¶
voices made up 33.4%. Just under 2% of FRQWULEXWLRQVZHUHFRGHGµIXOO\RSSRVLWLRQDO¶
and no anti-war leaders or protestors were given airspace providing some support for 
WKHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQRIWKLVWKHVLVWKDWµPanorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIFRQIOLFWUHIOHFWVWKH
Westminster FRQVHQVXV¶(see Appendix 2:3, 2.4). Panorama¶V framing of pre-war 
debate and discussion is dominated by official US/UK sources as hypothesised (H3) as 
clearly demonstrated by the breakdown of inteviewees (Appendix 2.1). The second 
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hypothesis (H2) that Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI*XOIwould be (relative to Gulf 2) 
QDUURZO\IUDPHGDURXQGPDWWHUVRIµOHJLWLPDWHFRQWURYHUV\¶LVRQO\SDUWO\XSKHOG:KLOH
much of   Panorama¶V coverage of the historical context for the war is framed to 
HPSKDVLVH6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VGDQJHURXVFKDUDFWHUDQGUXWKOHss rule, rather than the 
ZHVW¶VSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQGPLOLWDU\VXSSRUWIRUKLVUHJLPHXQWLOWKHLQYDVLRQRI
Kuwait, -DQH&RUELQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQ µ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UPV5LQJ¶UHYHDOVDKLVWRU\RI
western support for the dictator, up to the invasion of Kuwait. Much of the evidence 
pointed to bureaucratic incompetence or indifference amongst government agencies 
charged with enforcing the arms embargo, but there was also evidence of a longer 
history of the government encouraging trade in technology, such as specialist furnaces, 
despite warnings from the US government that they ZRXOGHQKDQFH,UDT¶VQXFOHDURU
missile capabilities. There was also brief DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI%ULWDLQ¶VµPXWHG¶
response to ,UDT¶V use of chemical weapons on Kurdish civilians in Halabja, an incident 
that would be recalled in the lead up to the 2003 war by some of the same Conservative 
and Labour politicians who resisted calls for an export credit freeze and UN sanctions 
against Iraq in 1988 (Hansard 1988; Pilger 2003).  
 
While dissenting opinion as expressed outside Parliament was largely absent, 
explanations for the conflict which foregrounded energy resources, previous western 
help for the regime and the effects of the war on the Iraqis and the region do begin to 
emerge in the five programmes studied. The question of oil is not central to any of the 
studio discussions, but the point is made several times by Palestinian critics in 
µ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶DQGLVDVWURQJWKHPHLQµ%HKLQG'HVHUW6KLHOG¶:RUULHV
about the devastating effects of the war on the Iraqi population and on the likely impact 
RIDµGLUW\ZDU¶RQVROGLHUVRQERWKVLGHVDUHVRPHWLPHVH[SUHVVHG&RQFHUQVDERXWWKH
long-term consequences of the war are brought up in three of the five programmes and 
ZHVWHUQµGRXEOHVWDQGDUGV¶RQ81VDQFWLRQVWKH2FFXSLHG7HUULWRULHVFRPSDUHGWR
Kuwait ± a major concern for anti-war groups) is explored in some depWKLQµ6DGGDP¶V
)LIWK&ROXPQ¶Only the episode µ*XOI,Q2XU'HIHQFHV¶FRXOGEHVDLGWRfully support 
all four hypotheses. Despite quite low levels of Parliamentary dissent alternatives to 
military action, such as continued UN sanctions are presented, in some episodes, as a 
serious alternative to war, although these discussions are usually brief, rather than 
substantive. 
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5.4.5 Findings: Invasion Phase (17/01/91-28/02/91) 
 
Six Panorama episodes deal with the six weeks of military action that began with an air 
campaign and ended with a one-hundred hour ground assault and ceasefire at the end of 
)HEUXDU\7KHILUVWSURJUDPPHµ'HVHUW6WRUPDIWHUILYHGD\V¶ (tx: 21.1.91) is an 
extended one hour programme that includes a twenty minute report by Gavin Hewitt on 
the progress of the air campaign and the likelihood of continuing public support both in 
Britain and the United States followed by a forty minute studio discussion led by David 
Dimbleby with British, French, American, Israeli and Syrian diplomats or former 
diplomats and politicians on the range of options for building a viable peace after the 
war. 
 
Whether it was right or wrong to go to war is now regarded as a settled matter and 
discussion tends to be framed around the progress of the war and the prospects for long-
term peace in the region. There is a brief reference to continuing anti-war rallies, but as 
before (and after the war), no one from any of the demonstrating movements are given 
air time. Over images of demonstrations in Britain, Germany and the United States, 
+HZLWW¶VYRLFHRYHU suggests that public support for the war remains strong. However, 
the interview with Richard Murphy, US Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs 
that follows indicates that this situation could easily change if (Allied) casualties rise: 
 
HEWITT: Since hostilities began, opposition to the war has not grown in 
the West.  Support for the conflict has even strengthened.  Only in West 
Germany do protests seem to be mounting.  In the United States anti-war 
rallies have continued, but the public mood is solidly behind the President. 
 
RICHARD MURPHY: If there are major casualties, public opinion here, 
which is already demonstrating in several of our cities against the war, 
against any war, then the intensity of those demonstrations will rise and it 
will have its effect in the Congress. 
 
Murphy, who had earlier argued that the administration was hoping for µVKRUWGHFLVLYH
ZDU¶EXWUHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKDWµPD\QRWEHSRVVLEOH¶LVRQHRIVHYHUDOYRLFHVFDOOLQJIRU
patience. SDP leader David Owen makes a similar point and cautions that the casualties 
of a long land campaign could threaten the coalition: 
 
OWEN, 03>«@I think there is an advantage of this measured strategy of 
using the Air Force first.  The problem will come once land battle is 
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engaged.  If the land battle goes on for a long time, there will be very 
substantial casualties and I think, at that time, the coalition will come under 
much greater danger. 
 
0RVWRIWKHRWKHULQWHUYLHZHHVDOVRVXSSRUWWKLVµPHDVXUHGVWUDWHJ\¶$VZLWK
programmes in the pre-war period, the majority of the interviewees for the programme 
are drawn from the British and US political establishment or from the senior ranks of 
the military. These include Air Chief Marshall Sir Michael Armitage and Major General 
Julian Thompson who discuss the progress of the war, although there is one brief 
comment from the µlower ranks¶: 
 
UNNAMED SOLDIER 1: :H¶UH JRLQJ WR WDNH VRPH FDVXDOWLHV EXWZH¶UH
going to come out alright.  There are times when you feel ± OLNHµ:K\DUH
ZHKHUH"¶,UHDOO\GRQ¶WFDUHDERXWRLO,GRQ¶WFDUHDERXWPDWHULDOWKLQJV,
DPKHUHVRP\OLWWOHEURWKHUVZRQ¶WEHLQWen years. 
 
7KHVWXGLRGLVFXVVLRQZKLFKIROORZV+HZLWW¶VUHSRUWLQFOXGHVIRXUVSHDNHUVOLQNHGE\
satellite and two speakers in the studio. The composition of the interviewees is typical 
of Panorama¶V coverage generally leaning towards serving or former political and 
diplomatic figures. They include Henry Kissinger from New York; Jean-Pierre Cot 
(Leader of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament) from Strasbourg, Sir Crispin 
Tinkell (former British Ambassador to the UN) from Oxford and Dan Meridor (an 
Israeli Cabinet Minister) from Jerusalem. The studio guests are Zuhair Diab (a former 
Syrian diplomat) and Hosery Khashaba (an Egyptian journalist). Discussion centres on 
three major issues: whether Saddam Hussein should be allowed to remain in power, the 
danger of regional nuclear proliferation and the Palestinian question. More hawkish 
views on the need to remove Saddam Hussein are offered by Kissinger, Tinkell, 
Meridor and Diab; Cot and Khashaba, by contrast, warn of dangers to the stability of the 
region if the Allies go beyond the UN mandate of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. 
Coding these discussions is problematic but as all the guests subscribe to the coalition 
objectives and are allied, directly or indirectly, to governments that had contributed to 
the Allied military action, the discussion is, as might be expected, predominantly 
supportive, or partly supportive, of the war. However, some of the discussion by Cot 
and Khashaba has a critical edge and is coded as partly oppositional (4). Coding the 
former British Ambassador 7LFNHOO¶VFRQWULEXWLRQSUHVHQWV an interesting challenge. It 
varies IURPDKDZNLVKOLQHRQ6DGGDP¶VIXWXUHFRGHGWRDFULWLFDOOLQHRQ,VUDHOL
occupation of Palestinian lands (coded 4) as in the following extract: 
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7,&.(//>«@ And that brings us straight on to the question of Israel, and 
,VUDHO LQ VSLWH RIZKDWZH DOO VD\ DQGZH¶UH ULJKW LQ VD\LQJ WKDW 6DGGDP
Hussein was wrong to link the two problems, the fact is that the Israeli 
problem looms larger and larger, the closer we get to the end of this 
particular war over Kuwait. 
 
DIMBLEBY: %XW \RX ZRXOGQ¶W KDYH  , PHDQ \RX GLGQ¶W µJHW¶ 6DGGDP
+XVVHLQEHFDXVHRI,VUDHO"7KH\GLGQ¶WLQYDGH.XZDLWEHFDXVHRI,VUDHO" 
 
TICKELL: No. But the Israeli problem has been lingering on year after 
year, and the way in which the West reacted to an invasion of Kuwait, 
obviously made a lot of people think ± and not only Arabs, that why should 
WKH,VUDHOLVEHOHIW LQSRVVHVVLRQRIWHUULWRULHVWKH\GLGQ¶WRZQHLWKHU" $QG
so, the weakest part of the whole western case is the position of Israel.  And 
, KDYH QR GRXEW DW DOO WKDW ZKHQ ZH¶YH JRW WKH ILUVW SKDVH ZKLFK LV WKH
relative disarming of Iraq, the second phase, which is the attempt to produce 
some arms control regime for the area as a whole, our minds will turn, very 
fast, towards the question of the Occupied Territories, and the future place 
of Israel in the area. 
 
 
'LPEOHE\¶VTXHVWLRQ, posed with something of an air of surprise, indicates that this view 
sails close to the µdissenting¶ opinion of many Arab nations and indeed of the anti-war 
movement. In total, µ'HVHUW6WRUPDIWHUILYHGD\V¶ had 83% either supportive or partly 
supportive interviewees and 17% partly oppositional, with no fully oppositional views 
offered. This sets the pattern for coverage of the six week period of the war, which saw 
a total of only approximately 2% fully oppositional voices compared to 33% partly 
oppositional, 4% neutral, 28% partly supportive and 33% fully supportive (see 
Appendix 2:3, 2.4). 
 
Other Panorama episodes during the war show very little footage of front line action, of 
casualties or any of the more disturbing effects of the war. There is a great deal of 
GLVFXVVLRQRIPLOLWDU\VWUDWHJ\FIµ7KH*DWKHULQJ6WRUP¶W[DQGORQJWHUP
political oSWLRQVµ$IWHUWKH'HVHUW6WRUP¶W[VRPHRILWV\PSDWKHWLFWRWKH
plight of Palestinians, but almost nothing on the experience of war either for Allied 
soldiers or for Iraqi civilians. µThe Mind of Saddam¶ (tx: 11.02.91) transmitted half-way 
through the war and with Iraqi casualties mounting is a precursor to µ7KH0LQGRI
0LORVRYLF¶W[DQGµ6DGGDPD:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶W[IRU
which several clips were recycled (see chapter 6.2). It is a psychological portrait and 
history of the dictator which draws parallels not with Hitler, as George Bush had done, 
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but with Stalin. Saddam Hussein is shown as a cold, ruthless and brutal political 
survivor who murders current and potential rivals and uses fear to rule Iraq: 
 
WARE: Even the psychiatrist who advises US Presidents says that Saddam 
is not insane. 
 
POST: Saddam is not crazy, he has the most dangerous personality 
configuration, what we call malignant narcissism.  Such extreme self-
absorption ± he has no concern for the pain or suffering of others.  A 
paranoid outlook, no constraint of conscience and will use whatever 
aggression is necessary in pursuit of his own Messianic drives. 
 
7KHWHUPµmalignant narcissism¶LVDSKUDVHIRUPHU&,$DGYLVRU-HUUROG3RVWXVHVDJDLQ
when intervieZHGHOHYHQ\HDUVODWHULQIRUWKHPDNLQJRIµ6DGGDP: a Warning 
IURP+LVWRU\¶VHHFhapter 6.2).  The framing of the Iraqi leader as a murderous despot 
(no doubt an accurate account) allies the programme with those elements of the British 
and American elite who were calling for the overthrow of the regime (cf. µ'HVHUW6WRUP
After Five Days¶). It concludes, somewhat presciently, with a pessimistic prediction for 
,UDT¶VIXWXUH 
 
POST: This man is the quintessential survivor, we must remember that, 
and I think it is quite possible for him to be highly creative and innovative in 
KLV VWUXJJOH WR VXUYLYH DQG VXUYLYHZLWK KRQRXU  ,W LVQ¶W MXVW D PDWWHU RI
surviving and breathing, he needs more than vital signs, he needs to survive 
with his reputation, not only intact, but magnified. 
 
WARE: 6DGGDPVXUYLYLQJDZDUDIWHUWKH:HVW¶VUKHWRULFDQGDPPXQLWLRQ
are spent has been described as the nightmare scenario.  Kuwait may be 
liberated and much of Iraq destroyed, but if Saddam survives all that, he 
may actually gaLQPRUHRIWKHRQO\WKLQJWKDW¶VHYHU\UHDOO\PDWWHUHGWRKLP
power for its own sake. 
 
µ7KH0LQGRI6DGGDP¶LVFRGHGDVFRQWDLQLQJSDUWLDOO\VXSSRUWLYHDQG
fully supportive (1) interview material. As the interviews draw mainly on the account of 
Iraqi exiles and a US psychologist and government advisor, Dr Jerrold Post, this is 
XQVXUSULVLQJ,QFRQWUDVWWRµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHGVRPHVXSSRUWIRU
the Iraqi leader from Palestinian militants (expressed with reservations about his record 
against the Kurds)WKLVSURJUDPPHRIIHUVQRVXFKµEDODQFLQJ¶RSLQLRQ This approach 
underestimated the small but significant proportion of Sunni Iraqis (and other Arabs) 
who supported Saddam Hussein, not simply out of fear, but for a complex variety of 
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other reasons ± including material self interest, national and Arab pride and defiance of 
Israel and the west. Furthermore, the programme only makes two brief mentions of oil, 
no mention of the well-documented CIA support for the Ba¶ath Party coups of 1963 and 
1968 (see Aburish 2000) or of western support for Saddam Hussein for much of his rule 
(see Simpson 2003). 7KHSURJUDPPHFRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHVHHQDVJLYLQJDQµLQFRPSOHWH¶
picture of the dictator and avoided a full rational debate as to his role iQWKHUHJLRQ¶V
long history of conflict. Taken in isolation, µ7KH0LQGRI6DGGDP¶DQGLWV2002 variant 
µ6DGGDPD:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶SURYLGHVWURQJHYLGence in support of hypotheses 
H1, H3 and H4. 
 
The next Panorama SURJUDPPHµ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶W[8.02.91) does not fit the 
pattern set by previous Panorama programmes transmitted during the armed conflict. It 
LVUDWKHUDFRPSDQLRQSLHFHWRµ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UP¶V5LQJ¶WUDQVPLWWHGILYHPRQWKV
previously and uses two of the same interviewees: Dr. Chris Cowley and Shadow Trade 
& Industry Secretary Gordon Brown. These contributions are complemented by military 
experts or technicians DQGµZKLVWHEORZHUV¶IURPZLWKLQWKHFRPSDQLHVFKDUJHGZLWK
helping Iraq build a huge gun that could be used to fire shells at Israel. &RUELQ¶V
introduction indicates the line of argument that is carefully supported in the fifty-minute 
programme that follows  
 
JANE CORBIN: Panorama tonight reveals the existence of an Iraqi 
supergun.  In this secret mountain site, the gun is hidGHQ  ,W¶VSRLQWLQJDW
Israel.  We investigate how Saddam Hussein obtained this deadly 
technology, the ease with which he got Western scientists and British 
companies to help him and why, despite strong warnings, the British 
government failed to stop SaddaP¶V6XSHUJXQ 
 
$VLQµ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UP¶V5LQJ¶VHYHUDORIWKHLQWHUYLHZHHVreveal how keen the 
government was to promote trade with Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait: 
 
MARK HIGSON: 5LJKW XS XQWLO ZKDW , UHIHU WR DV WKH ³5DSH RI
.XZDLW´%ULWLVKSROLF\towards Iraq was one of ± ³:HPXVWKDYHDSRVLWLYH
HFRQRPLFWUDGHDQGDVIDUDVLVSRVVLEOHSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLS´,UDTZDV
seen, coming out of the conflict with Iran, as potentially the big prize in the 
Middle East.  It has the second largest known oil reserves, a skilled 
workforce and, further to that, as far as Britain is concerned ± excellent 
relations with Britain in the past. 
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The intervLHZVLQµ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶DUHIRUWKHPRVWSDUWcritical of government 
policy (90.4% coded 4 ± partly oppositional). The contributions might also have been 
coded (5) fully oppositional, except the issue of the Supergun and other arms and 
technology exports had become a parliamentary issue with Gordon Brown, amongst 
other Opposition MPs, making political capital from WKH&RQVHUYDWLYH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
embarrassment at these revelations. Despite the fact that this was a matter taken up in 
Parliament the programme had been blocked by John Birt (it was originally scheduled 
for 7th January ± a week before the UN Security Council deadline expired) and was only 
finally transmitted (six weeks later) once Dr. Chris Cowley ± impatient at the delays, 
had gone to ITV and helped make a programme with Panorama¶V rival This Week (see 
Lindley 2003, p.345-348). The blocking of Supergun is often cited as evidence of the 
political caution and micromanagement that many accuse Birt of (see chapter 4.3). 
 
The final Panorama LQWKHSHULRGRIDUPHGDFWLRQLVWKHPRUHFRQYHQWLRQDOµ3HDFH
'LDU\¶ZKLFKH[DPLQHGGLSORPDWLFPRYHVE\WKH6RYLHW8nion. The programme, like 
many others in the crisis, is composed of a filmed report (by Steve Bradshaw) followed 
by a live link to a BBC reporter, Daniel Brittan-Caitlin, at the UN for an update on the 
Security Council meeting (in progress) called by the Soviets. David Dimbleby then 
leads another studio discussion, this time with Republican Senator Orrin Hatch who 
accuses the Soviets of aiding the Iraqis; Professor Vitaly Naumkin (a Foreign Affairs 
Advisor to Supreme Soviet) who denies the charge and puts the case for a diplomatic 
solution; and former British Ambassador to the UN Sir Crispin Tickell (who had 
previously appeared in µ'HVHUW6WRUPDIWHUILYHGD\V¶) who, like Hatch, is opposed to 
the Soviet peace plan. 
 
Soviet diplomacy is often framed in Steve %UDGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWDQGLQWKHVWXGLRGHEDWHDV
an attempt to secure influence in the region, or as a symptom of deeper tensions within 
the Soviet Union. The following exchange illustrates this second tendency: 
 
',0%/(%<>«@why did the President say that he appreciated the Soviet 
help if he believes, as you do apparently, that Soviet advisors are still 
helping the Iraqi Army and indeed supplying them? It would be odd to say 
they appreciated what the Soviet Union was doing in those circumstances 
ZRXOGQ¶WLW? 
 
HATCH: :HOOWKHUH¶VHYHQPRUHWKDQWKDW:HKDYHJRRGLQIRUPDWLRQWKDW
indicates that the Soviets were telling the Iraqis when our satellites were 
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coming over, so that they could hide their Scud launchers, which is kind of 
bad.  But all of that said, the President still has a great personal relationship 
with President Gorbachev, who we know has a lot of pressure from the 
hardliners over there, the military hardliners, and he still appreciated the 
efforts that were made to try and get the Iraqis to wake up and realise that 
this problem is for real. 
 
The alleged tensions between Gorbachev and hardliners within his government and the 
military command are explored in more detail in other Panorama episodes at this time 
(cf. Gorbachev ± A Tarnished Leader tx: 4.3.1991). µ3HDFH'LDU\¶JLYHVWKHJUHDWHVW
proportion of coverage to interviewees supportive of the war (34.8%), then to partial 
supporters (30.3%), with just 23.6% of interviewees offering partial opposition (mostly 
from the Soviet interviewees). As with previous Panoramas only a small fraction of the 
interview statements could be FRGHGDVµRSSRVLWLRQDO¶OHQGLQJweight to 
hypotheses H1, H3 and H4 (see above). 
 
5.4.6 Findings: Post-War Phase (29/02/91-) 
 
There are six Panorama episodes in the post-war period: two dealing with the aftermath 
of the occupation of Kuwait; one with the Kurdish area in northern Iraq; one looking 
behind the scenes at the work of the US intelligence agencies in the war; and the last 
two considering the survival of Saddam Hussein and debates within the United States 
DERXWWKHµPLVVHGRSSRUWXQLW\¶WRUHPRYHKLPIURPSRZHU The first of these 
programmes, µKuwait: out of the ashes¶(tx: 11.03.91), is a report by Jane Corbin filmed 
in the first two weeks after the Iraqis pulled out of Kuwait and before the Kuwaiti 
government had returned from exile. The opening minutes of the film capture live fire 
fights between Palestinians and the Kuwaiti resistance on the day of the ceasefire as 
Kuwait City slowly comes under Allied control. In a city still darkened by the black 
smoke of burning oil fields Corbin, apparently working independently of any press 
pools or army units, interviews victims of Iraqi torture and witnesses arrests and scenes 
of revenge against Kuwaiti and Palestinian collaborators. She also finds many of the 
Kuwaitis who endured the months of Iraqi occupation FDOOLQJIRUµUDGLFDOFKDQJH¶DQG
unhDSS\DERXWWKHSURVSHFWLYHUHWXUQRIWKHµROGRUGHU¶ 
 
&25%,1>«@ LQWKHVHILUVWGD\VRIIUHHGRPLW¶VEHFRPLQJFOHDUWKDWPDQ\
of those who actually lived through the Iraqi occupation will accept nothing 
less than radical change.  For them, the experiences of the past seven 
months have made a return to the old order impossible. 
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Having organised supplies of food and water and resistance to the occupying Iraqis, the 
Kuwaitis &RUELQLQWHUYLHZVZDQWDUHWXUQWR.XZDLW¶VROGIRUPRIGHPRFUDF\HQVKULQHG
in the 1962 constitution. Anger at the Al-Sabah government for failing to respond to the 
threat posed by Iraqi forces before the invasion is expressed by Opposition politicians 
DQGRUGLQDU\FLWL]HQV$VZLWKµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶DQGµ%HKLQGWKH'HVHUW6KLHOG¶
there is a sense of a reporter on the ground attempting to give a full picture of events 
and talking to a wide range of subjects, not just senior politicians, diplomats or military 
figures. There is also a cautiously-expressed, but sustained critique of the Al-Sabah 
regime as it attempts to reassert power in the traumatised Kingdom. The issue of 
ZRPHQ¶VULJKWVLQWKH*XOIDGGUHVVHGEULHIO\LQµ%HKLQGWKH'HVHUW6KLHOG¶LVDIRFXV
RI&RUELQ¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQ 
 
CORBIN: The resistance poses another problem for the returning 
government.  Its mobilisation of civilians like Dr Fawzia has provoked 
demands for social changes too.  She is treating a victim of the current 
violence, a member of the resistance herself, she risked her life and now 
believes that women can no longer be denied the vote and equal rights. 
 
DR FAWZIA ALOMAIR: Women today, Kuwaiti women today, have 
changed from women yesterday, so I think they have the right to vote, at 
least to have their opinion as loud as the men. 
 
The exchange is particularly significant given the overwhelming majority of male 
interviewees that dominate Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH*XOI:DU&RUELQ¶VUeport is 
unsparing in its revelations of Iraqi brutality during the occupation, detailing repressive 
tactics, kidnapping for ransom and various torture methods used against many Kuwaitis. 
It also looks candidly at mistreatment of Palestinians by angry Kuwaitis; the use of 
violence by individuals allied with the ruling regime against Opposition forces; distrust 
and cynicism about the ruling family; and how US corporations are quick to exploit 
opportunities presented by the war. The grinning AT&T HPSOR\HH¶VHxchange is 
difficult to code because it can be read both as evidence of Kuwaiti gratitude for 
American intervention, and as US corporate self-interest: 
 
CORBIN: AT&T have provided the Kuwaiti government with a hundred 
and twenty international lines at a bargain price.  The phone calls are free 
DQ\ZKHUHLQWKHZRUOG1RZLW¶VSHUVRQDOFDOOVVRRQEXVLQHVVOLQHVZLOOEH
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DGGHG DQG ODWHU RQ $7	7¶V JHQHURVLW\ PD\ EH UHPHPEHUHG ZKHQ WKH
JRYHUQPHQWLVWHQGHULQJWKHFRQWUDFWWRUHEXLOG.XZDLW¶VSKRQHV\VWHP 
 
GARY GEARHEART: :HOO,¶YHZRUNHGKHUHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWIRUDOPRVW
five years and during that five year period under no circumstances have I 
ever had an Arab lady speak to me, even if you happen to bump into one 
accidentally walking down the street.  But here, several times, the Kuwaiti 
ZRPHQZRXOGEHRQWKHSKRQHVFU\LQJDQGWKH\¶GSXWWKHSKRQH down and 
ask if I was American. ,¶G UHVSRQG µ<HV¶ DQG WKH\¶G DQVZHU EDFN ZLWK
VRPHWKLQJOLNHµ*RGEOHVV$PHULFD¶RUµ*RGEOHVV$7	7¶ 
 
 
*HDUKHDUW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQZDVFRGHGµSDUWLDOO\VXSSRUWLYH¶DVWKHILQDOOLQHVXJJHVWV
that the war has been blessed by those liberated in Kuwait, a claim convincingly 
supported by the film&RUELQ¶VIUDPLQJKRZHYHU casts the remark in a broader context. 
The US stands to gain both in terms of influence in the region and in terms of economic 
advantage ± a fact Jane Corbin is not afraid of underlining. This, again, shows the 
limitations of any coding exercise which assumes a simple, binary relationship between 
isolated spoken utteraQFHVDQGµREMHFWLYH¶PHDQLQJ,WDOVRKLJKOLJKWVWKHNH\UROH
UHSRUWHUVSOD\LQIUDPLQJWKHFRQWULEXWLRQVRIDQ\LQWHUYLHZHHV&RGLQJ&RUELQ¶V
narrative as (7) µUHSRUWHUFRPPHQW¶H[FOXGHVLWIURPDQ\empirical measure RIµELDV¶ or 
point of view, yet this isolated example shows that, on closer examination, an 
DVVXPSWLRQRIµQHXWUDOLW\¶LVdifficult to maintain. In fact, DPRPHQW¶VDWWHQWLRQUHYHDOV
that HYHU\µUHSRUWHUFRPPHQW¶KDVVRPH SRLQWRIYLHZRUµVODQW¶, no matter how 
strenuous the effort to suppress it, either by the institution or individual. Reporter 
comment has been effectively excluded in this content analysis because it presents an 
even greater challenge to code than other interviewee material, but that should not rule 
it out from questions of IUDPLQJDJHQGDVHWWLQJRUµELDV¶ (see Chapter 6.2 coding 
exercise and discussion). 
 
&RGLQJRIµKuwait: out of the ashes¶VXJJHVWVWKDWSDUWLDOO\VXSSRUWLYHYRLFHV
dominated: 62.7%, against 34.9% partly oppositional (4), with no wholly oppositional 
or ZKROO\VXSSRUWLYHYRLFHVLQFOXGHG<HWZKLOH&RUELQ¶VUHSRUWVWURQJO\XQGHUOLQHVWKH 
appalling nature of the Iraqi occupation, it is a critical programme in many ways. It 
offers an unexpected perspective ± that of the Kuwaiti µUHVLVWDQFH¶DQGRUGLQDU\citizens 
who had endured occupation but did not look forward to the return of the ruling family. 
$VZLWKµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶DQGµ%HKLQGWKH'HVHUW6KLHOG¶LWLOOXVWUDWHVWKH
strengths of having good investigative reporters on the ground in a crisis, recording the 
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views of a wide GLYHUVLW\RIµVWDNHKROGHUV¶DQGDFWRUV, rather than simply inquiring into 
the various perspectives of a narrow political class. Unlike most Panorama 
programmes, no British, US or Israeli government, military or intelligence 
spokespersons (serving or retired) were interviewed. Only Kuwaitis and Palestinians 
drawn from both working-class and middle-class backgrounds as well as one Kuwaiti 
royal and one representative of the police, Colonel Adel Mohammed Al-Sabbagh, were 
interviewed. The broader class composition is characteristic of Panorama UHSRUWVµRQ
WKHJURXQG¶ both in the First and Second Gulf Wars (see µThe Price of Victor\¶W[
28.09.03). 
 
&RUELQ¶VVHFRQGUHSRUWIURP.XZDLWµ7KH9LFWLPVRI9LFWRU\¶W[LV
something of an update WRµKuwait: Out of the Ashes¶that focuses on the plight of 
Bedouin and Palestinians in Kuwait. Many of these had been resident for three decades, 
or longer, yet were quickly tarred with the same brush as those who had collaborated 
with the invading forces, whatever their record during the war. $VLQ&RUELQ¶VHDUOLHU
report which included footage of the miles of wreckage on Mutla Ridge, including some 
still burning vehicles, the devastation of the retreating Iraqi army sets the scene for a 
different story ± WKDWRIWKHDSSDUHQWµFROOHFWLYHSXQLVKPHQW¶RIWKH3DOHVWLQLDQ
community: 
 
CORBIN: The last people to flee along the Mutla Ridge, were the retreating 
,UDTL$UP\1RZLW¶VWKH3DOHVWLQLDQVWXUQ6RIDUWKHQXPEHUVRSHQO\DQG
forcibly deported, total a couple of thousand.  But now it appears the 
Government wants the whole Palestinian population out of Kuwait. 
 
$V&RUELQ¶VUHSRUWVKRZVPDQ\Palestinians and Bedouin had been forced to join the 
Iraqi army or were threatened in various ways if they did not continue working in their 
usual jobs. Retribution by the Kuwaiti government was harsh: a headteacher, for 
example, who had kept her school open during the occupation was given a life sentence. 
Seven months after Iraqi forces had left Kuwait, many citizens from these ethnic groups 
had been expelled from the country. This in-depth, background report of a news story 
that was usually only briefly dealt with, if at all, shows some of the strength of current 
affairs ± WKHDELOLW\WRµVHUYHZLWQHVV¶Wo, and provide a context for, and some degree of 
understanding of, a complex series of events. Coding of µ7KH9LFWLPVRI9LFWRU\¶shows 
QRµVXSSRUWLYH¶LQWHUYLHZVSDUWO\RSSRVLWLRQDODQGµQHXWUDO¶DOWKRXJKWKLV
FDWHJRU\µQHLWKHUIRUQRUDJDLQVWPLOLWDU\DFWLRQ¶IDLOVWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHPDQ\VXEWOH
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inflections contained within each statement and is ultimately difficult to justify as a 
category for the purpose of serious, detailed analysis. 
 
µThe Dream of Kurdistan¶ (tx: 17.06.91) is a report by Robin Denselow from the 
Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and southern Turkey and also from the training camps of 
the 3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\RI.XUGLVWDQ 3..LQ/HEDQRQ¶V%HNDDU9DOOH\, close to 
the Syrian border. The PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan is interviewed and justifies the 
group¶s use of violence in terms of its effect on the Turkish government: 
 
DENSELOW: The Turks say the PKK caused a thousand deaths in the past 
four years but lost over eight hundred guerrillas.  The PKK claim they killed 
four thousand Turkish troops last year alone and that their campaign has 
FKDQJHG3UHVLGHQW2]DO¶VSROLF\ 
 
OCALAN (interpreted): 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ LV WR DQQLKLODWH WKH .XUGV  7KLV
has been the policy for centuries.  Now Ozal has admitted there are Kurds in 
Turkey.  This is because of our struggle. If they had had their way, they 
would have got rid of the Kurds once and for all.  Now, thanks to our 
VWUXJJOH WKH\¶YH UHSHQWHG EXW WKHUH¶V VWLOO GDQJHU  ,IZH UHOD[HG WKH\¶G
return to their old ways. 
 
Critics such as Noam Chomsky (2008) have long complained that brutal Turkish 
repression of the Kurds, including the repression of their language and culture, the 
destruction of 3,500 villages and the displacement of 1.5 million people, has continued 
without significant protest by western governments. Curtis (2003), for instance, notes 
that the peak period of British arms supplies to Turkey (1994-96) (three years after this 
film) coincided with the worst period of abuses against the Kurds (p.39)µ7KH'UHDPRI
.XUGLVWDQ¶LVDUDUe example of British PHGLDDWWHQWLRQWRWKHLVVXHDQG'HQVHORZ¶V
report gives clear examples of both Iraqi and Turkish human rights violations in the 
area. It VKRZVWKDWWKHµWDVWHRIIUHHGRP¶ given by the removal of Iraqis in free 
Kurdistan has fuelled an intensification of the guerrilla war between Kurds and Turks. 
While many of the contributions are supportive of the Allied war against Iraq, other 
FRQWULEXWLRQVDUHKLJKO\FULWLFDORI7XUNH\¶VUHFRUG$V7XUNH\LVD1$72PHPEHU
WUDGHSDUWQHUDQGµIULHQG¶ of the British government these exchanges are coded as (4) 
partly oppositional, as in this example: 
 
'(16(/2:>«@,W¶VRQHRI WKHPHDVXUHVWKDWZRUU\+DWLS'LFOHZKR¶V
been jailed for his work in monitoring the Turkish response to the PKK 
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attacks.  Toda\ KH¶V EULHIHG RQ QHZV RI QHZ GHWHQWLRQV DQG IRUFHG
evacuations. 
 
HATIP DICLE (interpreted): The emptying and burning of villages is 
VLPLODUWRZKDW¶VKDSSHQHGLQ,UDTEXW7XUNH\LVPRUHH[SHUWPRUHVXEWOH
They conduct their policies behind a smokescreen.  If you ask the regional 
JRYHUQRUDERXWYLOODJHVEHLQJHPSWLHGKH¶OOGHQ\LW,I\RXDVNKLPDERXW
WKHKLJKSDVWXUHEDQKH¶OOVD\LW¶VIRUWKHQRPDG¶VVDIHW\+H¶OOQHYHUDGPLW
the real reason for the ban is to make the people leave the area.  The Turkish 
DXWKRULWLHVHYHQWU\WRKLGHEHKLQGDIDoDGHRIKXPDQULJKWVVRWKH\¶UHPRUH
expert than Saddam, more hypocritical and, therefore, more dangerous. 
 
µ7KH'UHDPRI.XUGLVWDQ¶is an example of a Panorama episode apparently out of step 
with tKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶DV a search of the Hansard records between 1991-92 
UHYHDOVRQO\DKDQGIXORIFRPPHQWVE\03VRQHLWKHUVLGHRIWKHKRXVHRQ7XUNH\¶V
WUHDWPHQWRIWKH.XUGVQRWDEO\E\-HUHP\&RUE\QDQG'HQLV+HDOH\&RGLQJRIµ7KH
'UHDPRI.XUGLVWDQ¶VKRZVSDUWO\VXSSRUWLYHµQHXWUDO¶RII-topic) and 
SDUWO\RSSRVLWLRQDO$VLQ'HQVHORZ¶VSUHYLRXVUHSRUWµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶
there are no senior British or American politicians interviewed, only Turkish, Iraqi and 
Kurdish interviewees drawn from a cross section of society, including a local Turkish 
politician, a deserting Iraqi soldier and Kurdish farmers. 
 
Three remaining Panorama episodes that deal with the war against Iraq share a 
common focus: that Saddam Hussein had survived the war and that senior voices in the 
86SROLWLFDOHVWDEOLVKPHQWEHOLHYHWKHZDUGLGQRWJRIDUHQRXJK7KHILUVWµ$PHULFD¶V
6HFUHW:DU¶W[ORRNVFDQGLGO\DWVRPHRIWKHIDLOXUHVRI86LQWHOOLJHQFH$W
one point Tom Mangold describes relations between the US and Iraq up to the invasion 
of Kuwait, before we hear supporting evidence from former National Security Council 
analyst Howard Teicher: 
 
MANGOLD: In fact, the Gulf crisis began with an American intelligence 
disaster: the CIA failed to predict SaGGDP+XVVHLQ¶V LQWHQWLRQRI LQYDGLQJ
Kuwait, not least because, for years, the CIA had been involved in 
$PHULFD¶VSROLF\RIIULHQGVKLSDQGFR-operation with Saddam.  That policy 
had sprung up during the Iran/Iraq War, when American fears of Iranian 
Fundamentalism led it to support the Iraqi leader. In 1983, the Iraqi dictator 
was being honoured by a visit from US Envoy, Donald Rumsfeld.  
$PHULFD¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHDQDO\VWVFDPHXQGHU6DGGDP¶VVSHOODVZHOO 
 
HOWARD TEICHER: The analysts at the lower level undoubtedly knew 
the facts, they knew what Saddam was doing, there were no illusions on 
DQ\RQH¶VSDUW+RZHYHUWKHUHZDVFOHDUO\DFOLPDWHKHUHZKHUHWKHSROLF\
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VDLG³/HW¶VWU\WRFKDQJH6DGGDPE\ZRUNLQJZLWKKLPQRWZRUNLQJDJDLQVW
KLP´$QGDVORQJDVWhat was the policy, people wanted that to work and 
they would deny the reality of what he was doing because it ran counter to 
the policy. 
 
The exchange continues with a revealing passage about the much disputed meeting 
between Ambassador April Glasby and the Iraqis that some critics of US policy claimed 
JDYHWKHµJUHHQOLJKW¶WR,UDTLDJJUHVVLRQ 
 
MANGOLD: Shortly before the invasion, the American Ambassador met 
Saddam Hussein.  She assured him the Americans had no interest in his 
border dispute.  Saddam, in turn, told the envoy he would not invade 
Kuwait.  These mixed signals further confused the CIA. 
 
TEICHER: ,¶GVD\WKDW$PEDVVDGRU*ODVE\¶V meeting was perhaps the 
ultimate crystallisation of the tendency of American Middle East experts to 
deny reality, even as it stares them in the face. 
 
Apart from this contribution, most of the programme consists of recounting the work of 
US intelligence during the war (who take some of the credit for the small number of 
Allied casualties) and gives an opportunity for a defence, or explanation of the 
controversial attack of the Amariya shelter (see chapter 5.3) by a former Defence 
Intelligence Agency analyst: 
 
PERROOTS: ,W FHUWDLQO\ ZDVQ¶W D UXQ-of-the-mill air raid shelter.  The 
fact remains that civilians were there, whether those civilians were placed 
there within the last twenty-four/forty-HLJKWKRXUVZHGRQ¶WNQRZEXW,¶P
convinced that, in the effort to not only identify appropriate military targets, 
but identify targets in the immediate Baghdad area, so that we could not 
only hit military targets but send an overt message, probably led us to hit a 
target like that bunker without the most current information.  In most cases, 
if I had the evidence before me, I probably would target it again. 
 
Perroots later argues, if indirectly, that the war did not go far enough and that Saddam 
Hussein FRXOGKDYHEHHQUHPRYHGIURPSRZHUZLWKDµFRXSOHPRUHWXUQRIWKHQRRVH¶ 
 
PERROOTS: There were some, including myself, that would have liked 
to have seen the war prolonged perhaps a day or two more, to tighten the 
noose even further around Saddam Hussein, actually, to bring him down.  
That was a political call and not a military call and we stand with that call, 
but certainly there were some people in the intelligence community and 
outside intelligence communities that thought that a couple more turns of 
the noose would have been probably a good thing. 
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µ$PHULFD¶V6HFUHW:DU¶DFNQRZOHGJHV$OOLHGPilitary successes, achieved with the 
sophisticated technological assistance offered by the intelligence agency, but asks if the 
µjob¶ was finished. 7KLVYLHZLVFRGHGµSDUWO\VXSSRUWLYH¶DQGFRQVWLWXWHVRIWKH
contributions compared to 25.4% supportive and 11.5% offering partial opposition. As 
with five out of six post-war episodes there was no contribution coded as (5) full 
opposition.  
 
µ6DGGDPWKH6XUYLYRU¶W[DUHSRUWE\-RKQ6LPSVRQIURP,UDTGRHVLQFOXGH
contributions coded as (5) full opposition, such as this one by a former Iraqi National 
Assembly member commenting on the failed uprising: 
 
AL-SHBECHA: The Americans betrayed the rebels.  This is something I 
ZDQWWRJHWDFURVVWRWKHZRUOG,¶PQRWVXJJHVWLQJWKH\ - Americans were 
the sole cause of the failure of the uprising, but they did help to foil it by 
disarming some of the rebels.  They took their weapons off them, and 
stopped them reaching ammunition dumps in the areas they controlled.  
7KHQ ZKHQ 6DGGDP¶V KHOLFRSWHU JXQVKLSV FDPH DQG ERPEHG WKH UHEHOV
American planes flew above and formed a protective cover above and 
below. 
 
6LPSVRQ¶VYRLFHRYHULVDOVRFULWLFDOFODLPLQJWKDWµWKH:HVWVWRRGDVLGHDQGGLGQRWKLQJ
WRKHOS¶WKHXSULVLQJLQ1DMDIWKDWKDGEHHQHQFRXUDJHGE\3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VVWDWHPHQWV
about the need for Iraqi people to get rid of their leader. However, again, coding is 
shown to be too blunt a tool to reveal the variety of framing and positioning strategies 
within Panorama. The KLJKO\FULWLFDOPDWHULDODERXWWKHZHVW¶VDbandonment of Shiites 
who rebelled also gives implicit support to more hawkish voices who argue that the war 
did not go far enough. While not the official line, this was emerging as an influential 
view, both in Washington and London, (as Panorama shows through its interviews) and 
ultimately became an important element in the µneo-conVHUYDWLYH¶ agenda that informed 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A more radical analysis would be that the war and the ZHVW¶V
continuing support for dictatorships throughout the Middle East has had unforeseen and, 
for the most part, disastrous consequences (Chomsky 1992, 2002, 2007). The following 
exchange with a former National Security Council advisor (who also appeared in 
µ$PHULFD¶V6HFUHW:DU¶KLQWVDWWKLVSHUVSHFWLYHDQGLVFRGHGSDUWO\RSSRVLWLRQDO
GHVSLWHWKHVSHDNHU¶VYLHZ(expressed elsewhere) that the war did not go far enough: 
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HOWARD TEICHER: From my reading of the situation at the time, and 
discussions with people then in power, though it was clear that as much as 
the US government sought to promote that sort of political change as we 
move toward a new world order following the end of the Cold War, there 
was equal, if not greater, concern about the possibility for injecting 
democracy, leading to instability in other states in the region, notably Saudi 
Arabia. 
 
SIMPSON: Do you mean that the SaudLV ZHUHQ¶W HQWKXVLDVWLF DERXW WKH
whole idea? 
 
TEICHER: I think it would not be an understatement to say the Saudis were 
unenthusiastic about the idea of democratic reform in Iraq. 
 
SWHYH%UDGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWµ,QWKH(\HRIWKH6WRUP¶, the last programme to deal with the 
war in 1991, gives further airtime to the new consensus emerging amongst hawkish 
neo-conservatives that the ZDUGLGQ¶WJRIDUHQRXJKThere is also a strong sense of how 
the war boosted US confidence in its military, a confidence that was clearly lacking in 
the pre-war period. Bradshaw begins his report from the desert set of a feature film 
µ+HURHVRIWKH6WRUP¶DERXWWKH*XOI:DUDQGDFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKWKHPRYLH¶V
producer who sums up the new, more confident mood in the country: 
 
BRADSHAW: The producers know this is one war America wants to 
celebrate, not just for the bravery of individuals, but for what their leaders 
achieved for the nation. 
 
DON OHLMEYER: I think it was a tremendously cathartic experience for 
the country.  The Vietnam syndrome was really a reality so I think, when 
$PHULFD ORRNVEDFNRQWKLVZDU WKH\¶OO ORRNEDFNRQLWZLWKDSULGHDWWKH
way we conducted ourselves and what we were able to accomplish and that 
the casualties were very light, as opposed to Vietnam, which people look 
back on with very mixed emotions. 
 
%UDGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWUHYHDOVWKDWWKH%ULWLVKKDGEHHQVRPHZKDWXQKDSS\DWWKHVSHHG
with which the ceasefire was called. Sir Charles Powell (Downing St 
Foreign Affairs Adviser 1984-91) makes the point and recalOVWKHSKUDVHµXQDFFXVWRPHG
FKLYDOU\¶EHLQJXVHGDWWKHWLPH 
 
BRADSHAW: As the Foreign Secretary reached the White House, we 
KDYH EHHQ WROG WKDW %ULWLVK RIILFLDOV LQ /RQGRQ WHOHSKRQHG WKH 3UHVLGHQW¶V
office to stress their misgivings.  But at midnight a ceasefire was declared. 
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POWELL: I think perhaps it did come as a surprise, certainly to me 
and I think perhaps to quite a lot of people in London that there had been an 
RXWEUHDN RI ZKDW , UHPHPEHU VRPHRQH GHVFULEHG DV ³XQDFFXVWRPHG
FKLYDOU\´ RQ WKH :HVWHUQ side.  Which perhaps, with all the benefits of 
KLQGVLJKW LI ZH¶G JRQH RQ WZHOYH PRUH KRXUV JUHDWHU PLOLWDU\ GDPDJH
would have been caused. 
 
It is instructive to compare this description with accounts of the destruction on Mutla 
Ridge and the possible contribution of television pictures to the decision taken by 
George Bush to announce a ceasefire (see chapter 5.3).  
 
%UDGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWFRQVLVWVDOPRVWHQWLUHO\RIDnarrative stitched together from the 
accounts of senior members of the British and US political and military establishment 
(see Appendix 2.1). More hawkish critics of the campaign are shown to have been, in 
some cases, converted from pre-war scepticism and caution to more aggressive 
militarism by the success of the campaign. Democratic CongressPDQ/DUU\6PLWK¶V
contribution is coded (2) partial support and is representative of the dominant point of 
view in the programme: 
 
LARRY SMITH: ,W¶VKDUGWRHYHQFULWLFLVHWKH3UHVLGHQWIRUVWRSSLQJWKHQ
But I will say, having been one of those opposed, that once, having done 
what we did and going in there and engaging in military activity, we all 
supported the President.  I did too, because the troops then were engaged.  
$QG LI,ZDVDVNHGµ6KRXOGZHJR IXUWKHU"¶,ZRXOGKDYHVDLG µ<HV¶ 7R
me, removing that cancer, which still remains there, was our primary 
objective ultimately. 
 
Senator John McCain, filmed in his office, makes a similar point with the prophetic 
REVHUYDWLRQWKDWµWKH$PHULFDQSHRSOHEHOLHYHWKDWWKLVERRNZLOOQRWEHFORVHGDQGLW¶V
a very heroic book in American history, until Saddam Hussein is removed from power¶. 
As in previous Panoramas dealing with the war we see that the majority of interviews 
are not with representatives of the British Parliament, but rather with figures within, or 
DWWKHHGJHRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSROLWLFDODQGLQWHOOLJHQFHHVWDEOLVKPHQWDick Cheney is 
interviewed, in medium close up and then close up against an office bookshelf and 
house plant, WRH[SODLQWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWRFDOODFHDVHILUHDQGSRXUVFRUn on 
those who switched from being opposed to military action before the war to critical it 
did not go far enough: 
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&+(1(<>«@ I think the President made a very sound decision when he 
decided to stop military operations when he did.  We did not want to get 
involved in a quagmire inside Iraq.  We avoided that.  I think we would be 
under much greater criticism today if we had, in fact, gone all the way to 
Baghdad, if we had, in fact, taken on the responsibility of trying to govern 
Iraq. 
 
%UDGVKDZ¶s conclusionYRLFHGRYHULPDJHVRIWKHFUHZDWZRUNRQµ+HURHVRIWKH
6WRUP¶expresses something of the range of views sampled in the post war period, that 
DUHHLWKHUµVXSSRUWLYH¶µSDUWO\VXSSRUWLYH¶RUFULWLFDOEHFDXVHWKHZDUGLGQRWJRIDU
enough:  
 
BRADSHAW: Like Hollywood, the Administration knows America 
wanted a victory in the desert, not another Vietnam.  If the allies had 
become bogged down in Iraq, Hollywood would not be making films like 
³+HURHV RI WKH 6WRUP´ But while Saddam survives, the mood of self-
congratulation will be tempered by doubts that the commanders stopped too 
soon. 
 
 
As already mentioned, this episode gives DQHDUO\LQGLFDWLRQRIµQHR-FRQVHUYDWLYH¶
views (here coded 2 and comprising 41%) that would become very influential in George 
W. Bush¶V3UHVLGHQF\LURQLFDOO\XQGHUWKHLULQIOXHQWLDOFKDPSLRQ'LFN&KHQH\ and 
ZKLFKZRXOGEHUHSRUWHGDJDLQEXWIDUPRUHFULWLFDOO\LQ6WHYH%UDGVKDZ¶VUHSRUWDIWHU
the Second GXOI:DUµ7KH:DU3DUW\¶± see chapter 6.2). In total, Panorama¶VSRVW-
war coverage sees the majority of interviewees giving a partly supportive view (44%), 
with 19.1% fully supportive, 19.3% partly opposed and only 1.7% fully opposed. None 
of this opposition came from members of anti-war groups, but was expressed by Iraqis 
angry at WKHZHVW¶VFRPSOLFLW\DVWKH\VDZLWLQPDVVDFUHVSHUSHWUDWHGE\6DGGDP
+XVVHLQ¶VIRUFHVGXULQJWKHXSULVLQJVLQWKHVRXWKRI,UDTA more radical view 
expressed by the peace movement, a number of prominent dissident intellectuals, 
academics and journalists and a very small number of voices in the British Parliament, 
such as Denis Healey, Tony Benn and Tam Dalyell that the war had been premature, 
violent and potentially counter-productive exercise in the long run (Chomsky 1991; 
Hansard 1991; Pilger 1992) was given little or no space. 
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7KHµ6HFRQG*XOI:DU¶ 
 
6.1.1 Introduction 
 
The invasion of Iraq that began on March 19th, 2003 remains one of the most 
controversial conflicts of recent times. It followed more than a decade of crippling UN 
sanctions, air attacks and several months of extraordinary diplomatic debate and public 
protest (see Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2005). The invasion was part of a wider military 
response by the US and its allies to the 9-11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon. This response became known aVWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶DQGLQFOXGHGWKH
invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in October and November 2001. The military 
action in Afghanistan quickly led to the removal of the Taliban government, which was 
accused of offering a safe haven for Osama Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda training camps, 
although its leader Mullah Omar and Bin Laden himself escaped capture (O'Hanlon 
2002). Iraq was subsequently identified by President George W. Bush in his January 
WK6WDWHRIWKH8QLRQDGGUHVVDVSDUWRIDQµD[LV RIHYLO¶WKDWLQFOXGHG,UDQDQG
1RUWK.RUHDDQGZDVWDUJHWHGIRUµUHJLPHFKDQJH¶EHFDXVHRILWVVXSSRVHGSRVVHVVLRQ
RIZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ:0'DQGLWVDOOHJHGOLQNVZLWKµWHUURULVW
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶LQFOXGLQJ$O4DHGDVHH5LFNV%HFNDQG'RZning 2003; Stauber 
and Rampton 2003; Kellner 2005; Snow and Taylor 2006; Bennett et al. 2007). 
 
Hence the 2003 invasion took place against a backdrop of tumultuous and fast-moving 
international developments, mobilisation and mass protest (particularly in Europe) and 
ZLWKLQZKDW0\WKHQDQG:DONODWHGHVFULEHDVDµFXOWXUHRIIHDU¶DQGµSUHYDLOLQJ
GLVFRXUVHRILQVHFXULW\¶S1. In Britain, public opposition to the war against Iraq 
remained high until the onset of war, with only 30 percent in favour of unilateral action 
in January 2003 (Couldry and Downey 2004, p.267) rising to 53 percent backing for the 
                                               
1 See also Zelizer and Allan 2002 for a discussion of the post 9-µQHZHUDRIUHSRUWLQJ¶ 
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action on the commencement of hostilities (Ingle 2004, p.237). This compares, as Snow 
and Taylor (2006) point out, to levels of between 70 and 80 percent enjoyed by most 
post-Second World War warring British governments (p.391). A nation still divided 
about the justification for war, a bloody conflict, post-war chaos and the subsequent 
lack of evidence of any WMD in Iraq all contributed towards pressure on the Blair 
government and helped create the conditions for a political storm involving the BBC in 
ZKDWLWGHVFULEHGDVRQHRIWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VµELJJHVWHGLWRULDOFULVHVWKH*LOOLJDQ-Kelly 
DIIDLU¶%%&DS 
 
Some of the literature relating to this conflict is usefully reviewed by Robinson et al. 
(2005) who look at four publications2 WKDWVKDUHDFRQFHUQZLWKµJRYHUQPHQWPHGLD
PDQDJHPHQWVWUDWHJLHVDQGLGHRORJLFDOIDFWRUV¶S7KHUHYLHZILQGVYDOXHLQHDFK
of the titles although it is critLFDORIDJHQHUDOIDLOXUHWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQµSURFHGXUDO
criticism, for example, relating to the likelihood of military success, and substantive 
FULWLFLVPFRQFHUQLQJWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHZDULQTXHVWLRQ¶S%DVHGRQWKHVH
findings the authors suggest further research directions, including the need for a more 
comprehensive framing analysis, empirical support and methodological clarity in future 
studies. McQuail (2006) surveys nine titles rather more swiftly, and picks out similar 
common themes, such as the concern about media-state relations. In fact, the academic 
OLWHUDWXUHRQWKHPHGLD¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHLQYDVLRQLVIDUPRUHH[WHQVLYHWKDQWKLV
consisting of many books, collected essays and journal articles alongside a great deal of 
material produced by journalists, media commentators and a vast amount of Web-based 
criticism and analysis. This material is of variable quality and ranges from dispassionate 
DVVHVVPHQWWRLPSDVVLRQHGFULWLTXHRIWKHPDVVPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFH7KHEUHDGWKRI
commentary is itself indicative of the spectrum of diverse and often intense debate 
about the war carried out in the wider public sphere. The literature also reveals some 
striking similarities to the coverage of the 1992 Gulf War, whilst also underscoring 
significant differences and developments. As with the First Gulf War most of the work 
has been on news (rather than current affairs) coverage, with the bulk of studies 
examining British and US media. However, more international and Arab perspectives 
have been evident (see Kamalipour and Snow 2004), particularly given the growth in 
                                               
2 The books reviewed are by Hoskins (2004); Domke (2004); Knightley (2003) and Miller ed. (2004). 
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importance of regional broadcasters and news providers, such as Qatari-based Al 
Jazeera whose rise to prominence during the Afghan and Iraq campaigns mirrored, to 
some extent, that of CNN in the 1992 war (see Straus 2001; Seib 2005; Snow and 
Taylor 2006). 
 
It is generally agreed that the transnationalisation of media organisations had continued 
and, to some extent, accelerated in the period between the First and Second Gulf Wars 
driven by a series of media mergers and the launch of various satellite broadcasting 
operations (see Sreberny 2000; Thussu 2004; Pintak 2007). These technological and 
economic developments offered new challenges to the ability of states to control 
information flows and forced domestic broadcasters to compete and offer a product 
attractive to local audiences. For example, CNN and BBC World which had been 
winning audiences in the Middle East in the mid to late 1990s quickly lost them again to 
Arab alternatives (ironically, in the case of Al Jazeera - BBC trained) around the turn of 
the century (see McQueen 2000; Iskander and el-Nawawy 2004; Snow and Taylor 
2006). By the time of the 2003 invasion there were already a number of twenty-four-
hour, satellite-based Arab news channels running news-gathering operations staffed by 
experienced, indigenous reporters who proved more attuned to Arab sensibilities than 
their western competitors (see Bodi 2004; Maluf 2005). Channels such as the Saudi-
backed Al-Arabiya, Abu Dhabi TV, LebanRQ¶V$O0DQDU6\ULD¶V6SDFH&KDQQHODQG
Al Jazeera gave greater emphasis than many western broadcasters to global and regional 
anti-war sentiment as well as unflinching coverage of the suffering of Iraqi civilians 
during and after the period of conflict (see Berkowitz 2003; Hammond 2005; Pintak 
2006). Some of these channels also offered sharply critical perspectives on the role of 
the US in the region, detailed charges of torture in the Abu Ghraib scandal (Bennett et 
al. DQGV\PSDWKHWLFFRYHUDJHRIµ,UDTLUHVLVWDQFH¶DJDLQVWIRUHLJQRFFXSDWLRQVHH
Hashem 2004; Iskander and el-Nawawy 2004; Miladi 2006), as well as countering what 
VRPHFULWLFVODEHOOHGPLOLWDU\µPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ¶.HOOQHU&OD\SROHDUJXHV
that the military underestimated the influence of the Arab news channels, especially Al 
-D]HHUDDQGLWVµDUFKULYDO¶$EX'KDEL79 
%RWKRUJDQLVDWLRQVZHUHHPEHGGHG´LQWKHELJFLWLHVRI,UDT7KH\KDGLQ
VRPHLQVWDQFHVUHQGHUHGWKHFRDOLWLRQ³LQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQDOHIIHFW- psy-
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ops - impotent, volleying back on propaganda about the collapse of the Iraqi 
regime and the liberation or uprisings in Basra. 
(Claypole 2003, p.11) 
 
%RGLDOVRQRWHVKRZ$O-D]HHUD¶VUHSRUWLQJIURP%DVUDDQG8PP4DVUSURYLGHG
DµFKHFNIRU86FODLPVWKDWZHUHGXWLIXOO\EHLQJUHSRUWHGE\ZHVWHUQQHZVFKDQQHOV¶
(p.245). However, it should be noted here that Arab channels were not alone in doing 
WKLV)RUH[DPSOHWKH%%&¶V$GDP0\QRWWDQµHPEHGGHG¶UHSRUWHUZLWKWKH
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, details his own counterclaims to the initial 
DQQRXQFHPHQWWKDW8PP4DVUKDGEHHQµVHFXUHG¶E\86IRUFHV,QGHHGWKH%%&¶V
more sceptical attitude to coalition claims compared to US broadcasters is a running 
feature of several (mostly American) studies (see Lori and Zenitha 2004; Kellner 2005) 
 
1HYHUWKHOHVVWKH%%&¶VRFFDVLRQDODQGVRPHZKDWWHQWDWLYHTXDOLILFDWLRQVRIFRDOLWLRQ
claims is some way from the detailed refutation and eye-witness denunciation that Arab 
satellite news channels provided throughout the war. While some critics remarked on a 
QHZDQGKRSHIXOµFRQWUD-IORZ¶RIQHZVIURPWKH$UDEZRUOGFKDOOHQJLQJWKHSUH-
dominantly western (and often pro-war) discourse of broadcast television (see Thussu 
2007), such optimism is largely misplaced according to Wessler and Adolphsen (2008) 
who note a frequently selective, sanitised or sceptical reframing of much of the material, 
ZKHQLWLVLQFOXGHGDWDOO3LQWDNIRULQVWDQFHZULWHVRI$O-D]HHUD¶VFRYHUDJHµ$OPRVW
nothing was too gruesome to show: close-ups of open wounds, limbs torn asunder, 
people collapsing in agony. But those pictures were largely ignored by the US 
QHWZRUNV¶S)RU%URZQWKHWHFKQRORJLFDODQGSROLWLFDO
transformations, of which Arab satellite broadcasting is a part, created a situation in 
which the potential visibility of conflict was dramatically enhanced. Thus, 'perception 
PDQDJHPHQW
EHFDPHDQHYHQPRUHLPSRUWDQWLQVWUXPHQWRIWKHFRQIOLFWµWKURXJK
encouraging the involvement of new groups or attempting to win over hostile JURXSV¶
(p.89). This could be seen even in the name given to the invasion by the US 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQµ2SHUDWLRQ,UDTL)UHHGRP¶± a tag used uncritically by some broadcasters 
such as Fox News (see Thussu 2004; Alterman, 2004). 
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Media scholarship has been generally united in its concern about the rise of 0XUGRFK¶V
Fox News Channel which came to prominence in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Fox 
1HZVJDYHVWULGHQWDQGXQFULWLFDOVXSSRUWWRWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vµ:DURQ7HUURU¶
encouraged its correspondentVµWRH[SUHVVDQJHUDQGDWKLUVWIRUUHYHQJH¶.QLJKWOH\
SDQGDJJUHVVLYHO\FKDPSLRQHGWKHZDULQ,UDT7KHµRpenly partisan 
DJHQGDRI)R[¶$OODQDQG=HOL]HUSZDVD major departure for television 
broadcasting and the continual bOXUULQJRUGHOLEHUDWHHUDVXUHRIWKHOLQHEHWZHHQµQHZV¶
DQGEHOOLJHUHQW5HSXEOLFDQµRSLQLRQ¶VHWUHPDUNDEOHQHZEHQFKPDUNVLQSUR-
HVWDEOLVKPHQWUHSRUWLQJDWDWLPHZKHQµQHR-FRQVHUYDWLYH¶YLHZVZHUHDWWKHLUSHDN
influence (see Kellner 2005). Fox importeGPXFKRILWVµVKRFN-MRFN¶ODQJXDJH
presentational style and interview techniques from American radio and the hyper-
patriotic and unrestrained cheerleading for the war proved extremely popular, especially 
LQWKH86ZKHUH)R[¶VUDWLQJVUHSRUWHGO\LQFUHDVHG by 300% during the conflict (BBC 
2003) making it the most watched cable news channel (see Bennett 2005; Kitty and 
Greenwald 2005; Kumar 2006))R[¶VUDSLGO\ULVLQJIRUWXQHVDGGHGDVHQVHRIXUJHQF\
to the competition for national and international audiences and further intensified some 
of the features of 24-hour news that had been developing since the First Gulf War, 
LQFOXGLQJµDVKLIWIURPDVHULRXVWRDPRUHSRSXODUQHZVDJHQGD¶PRUHµKXPDQLQWHUHVW¶
VWRULHVDQGµWKHIUDPLQJRIQHZVLQWHUPVRILQIRWDLQPHQW¶(Thussu 2004, p.98-99).  
 
Another growing feature of 24-hour news noted by media scholars is the increased use 
of live reporting from various locations, including the military front. This was enabled 
by low-cost and lightweight communications technology which permitted satellite 
transmission and new military-PHGLDDUUDQJHPHQWVJLYLQJµHPEHGGHG¶UHSRUWHUVLQ
some cases, the opportunity to report directly from the front-OLQH7KHXVHRIµUHDO-WLPH¶
EXWµVDQLWLVHG¶LPDJHVKDGLQFUHDVHGGXULQJWKHUHSRUWing of wars in the Balkans, Central 
Africa and Afghanistan bringing with it charges of superficiality and sensationalism by 
QHZVRUJDQLVDWLRQVZKRLQWKHRSLQLRQRIVRPHVFKRODUVPDGHµDYLUWXHRXWRID
minimal approach to analysis and avoiding criticism of powerful government and other 
HQWUHQFKHGLQWHUHVWVZKLFKMHRSDUGLVHGWKHLUJOREDODFFHVV¶$OOHQS-39). 
However, as Livingstone and Bennett (2003) note, the technology also had potential 
ramifications for the traditional reliance of war reporters on official sources and in the 
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framing, gatekeeping and managing of news material, although their study of event-
GULYHQQHZVIRXQGWKDWRIILFLDOVZHUHµDVPXFKDSDUWRIWKHQHZVDVHYHU¶S 
 
While the use of new technology by broadcasters did allow some on-site reporters to 
SURYLGHGRFXPHQWDWLRQRIµWKHPRUHUDZDQGEUXWDODVSHFWVRIZDU¶.HOOQHUS
LWEURXJKWDGGHGGDQJHUVDVZHOO7KH%%&¶V1LN*RZLQJLVRQHRIVHYHUDO
commentators to note the increase in the targeting of journalists that has followed from 
WKHLPSDFWRIWKHLUµFDSDELOLW\WREHDUZLWQHVVLPPHGLDWHO\¶*RZLQJZKRLQYHVWLJDWHG
WKH$PHULFDQERPELQJRI$O-D]HHUD¶V.DEXORIILFHVHH+RVNLQVFODLPVWKDW
UHSRUWHUVDUHEHLQJDFWLYHO\WDUJHWHGµE\ZDUULRUVZDUORUGVDQG forces of even the most 
KLJKO\GHYHORSHGJRYHUQPHQWVZKRGRQRWZDQWXVWRVHHZKDWWKH\DUHGRLQJ¶*RZLQJ
2003, p.233). Former BBC reporter Martin Bell agrees, denouncing attacks by US 
military forces on Belgrade television in May 1999, the Al Jazeera office in Kabul in 
November 2001 and Baghdad television in March 2003 (see also Miller 2004b). These 
FLYLOLDQRSHUDWLRQV%HOODUJXHVZHUHIDOVHO\ODEHOOHGµOHJLWLPDWHPLOLWDU\WDUJHWV¶DQG
GHVWUR\HGZLWKRXWDµZKLVSHURISURWHVW¶IURPWKH$PHULFDQPHGLDBell 2003, p.40). 
Brown (2003) alleges WKDWWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRI$O-D]HHUD¶VRIILFHDQGWKHMDPPLQJDQGDLU
strikes against Taliban Radio in Afghanistan can be understood within the context of 
$OOLHGµLQIRUPDWLRQRSHUDWLRQV¶,2ZKLFKYLHZPHGLDRUJDQLVDWLons as potential 
elements of an opponent's military effort (p.92). Bodi (2004) describes similar attacks 
on Arab journalists including the shelling of the Sheraton hotel in Basra which was 
being used as a base by Al Jazeera correspondents and the air strike on Abu Dhabi TV 
DQG$O-D]HHUD¶V%DJKGDGbureau.  7XPEHUDQG3DOPHU¶VVWXG\JLYHVIXUWKHU
details of US military strikes against media including the bombing of Voice of Sharia 
radio station in Afghanistan and the shelling of the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad on 8th 
April 2003 (see also Knightley 2002, 2003; Carpentier 2006).  
 
Byrne (2006) writes of the difficulty of critical or investigative reporting in Iraq, 
particularly in the post-invasion phase as the security situation slipped out of control. 
She notes that more journalists have died in Iraq than in Vietnam, or even covering 
Second World War battlefields, with the overwhelming majority of the victims being 
,UDTLVZKRDUHRIWHQµGHOLEHUDWHO\WDUJHWHG¶6KHFRQWUDVWVWKHGDQJHUVRIWKHµSRVW-ZDU¶
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SKDVHIRUµXQLODWHUDOV¶ZLWKWKHUHODWLYHIUHHGRPRIPRYHPHQWH[SHULHQFHGE\MRXUQDOLVWV
until the fall of Baghdad: 
 
It is easy to forget that immediately following the invasion, journalists 
moved with relative freedom.  As the dangers increased for Western 
journalists, their movements became increasingly restricted to the Green 
Zone (the heavily guarded Central area of Baghdad where the US authorities 
live and work) or nearby fortified compounds from which they could 
venture out only under heavy guard - or embedded with the military. 
(Byrne 2006, p.30) 
 
7XPEHUQRWHVWKHSUREOHPIRUµXQLODWHUDO¶MRXUQDOLVWVDQGUHSRUWHUVQRWHPEHGGHG
ZLWKPLOLWDU\XQLWVGXULQJWKHLQYDVLRQµWKHSK\VLFDOGDQJHUVWKH\HQFRXQWHUHGQRW
only from Iraqi attack but also from so-FDOOHG³IULHQGO\ILUH´¶S7KH%%&OLNH
other broadcasters, used a great deal of live and recorded footage of coalition forces in 
DFWLRQLQUHSRUWVIURPWKHLUµHPEHGGHG¶VRPHWLPHVXQLIRUPHGUHSRUWHUVVXFKDV%HQ
Brown, Gavin Hewitt and 3DQRUDPD¶V Jane Corbin. There were also reports from 
Baghdad and other parts of the country by non-embedded correspondents such as Rageh 
Omaar, Fergal Keane and John Simpson ± KLPVHOIWKHYLFWLPRIDVHULRXVµIULHQGO\ILUH¶
incident in northern Iraq (see Panorama Special: in the Line of Fire tx: 9/11/03). There 
were also daily press conferences by political and military leaders; running commentary 
from journalists, presenters, retired military personnel and a considerable amount of 
other information presented through interactive services, rolling text and frequent 
µEUHDNLQJQHZV¶KHDGOLQHV 
 
Comparisons were often made in the media between the First and Second Gulf Wars 
(see Adams 2003; Simpson 2004) and it was noted that the overthrow of Saddam 
+XVVHLQ¶Vregime was achieved in just twenty-one days and with a smaller force than 
had been deployed in the forty-three-day military action to remove the Iraqi army from 
Kuwait in 1991 (Hashem 2004, p.158). The relatively low number of US troops 
deployed in 2003 was subsequently condemned as a strategy imposed on the US Army, 
against expert advice, by Donald Rumsfeld and others at the Pentagon which 
contributed significantly to the chaos and violence in Iraq that followed (see Ricks 
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2006; Hagan and Bickerton 2007). The inability of the occupying powers to restore 
order or basic services and allegations of beatings, torture and human rights violations 
became the focus of widespread media criticism of the post war occupation (see Hull 
2004; Kellner 2005; Bennett et al. 2007), criticism echoed in 3DQRUDPD¶Vcoverage. 
 
However, for most commentators the first three weeks of the campaign to topple the 
,UDTLJRYHUQPHQWUHSUHVHQWHGDQµDVWRQLVKLQJO\VXFFHVVIXO¶PLOLWDU\RSHUDWLRQ+DJDQ
and Bickerton 2007, p.182) with the inLWLDOIDOORI%DJKGDGPDUNLQJµWKHPRVW
conspicuously pro-JRYHUQPHQWPRPHQWRIQHZVFRYHUDJHGXULQJWKHZDU¶/HZLVet al. 
S$V86WDQNVHQWHUHGWKHFDSLWDOWKH%%&¶V1LFKRODV:LWFKHOOGHVFULEHGLW
DVµDEVROXWHO\ZLWKRXWDGRXEWDYLQGLFDWLRQ RIWKHVWUDWHJ\¶BBC News at 18:00, 9-04-
DQGWKH%%&¶V0DUN0DUGHOOFODLPHGWKDWIRU7RQ\%ODLUWKHZDUµKDVEHHQD
YLQGLFDWLRQIRUKLP¶%UHDNIDVWQHZV%%&-04-7KH%%&¶VSROLWLFDOHGLWRU
Andrew Marr drew similar conclusions, stating WKDWµ0U%ODLULVZHOODZDUHWKDWDOOKLV
FULWLFVRXWWKHUHLQWKHSDUW\DQGEH\RQGDUHQ¶WJRLQJWRWKDQNKLP± EHFDXVHWKH\¶UH
only human ± IRUEHLQJULJKWZKHQWKH\¶YHEHHQZURQJ¶%%&1HZVDW7HQ%%&-
04-2003, cited Edwards and Cromwell 2006, p.51-)RU0LOOHUWKH%%&¶V
selective and sanitised reporting of the war, over-reliance on military sources and 
HPEHGGHGMRXUQDOLVWVDQGWKHXVHRIWHUPVVXFKDVµOLEHUDWLRQ¶WRGHVFULEH86DQG8.
YLFWRULHVPHDQWWKDWµWKH%%&HQXQFLDWHGDYHUVLRQRIevents very similar to that of the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶7KHVHFKDUJHVDUHUHMHFWHGE\WKH%%&¶V+HDGRI1HZVDQG&XUUHQW
$IIDLUV5LFKDUG6DPEURRNZKRFRXQWHUVZKDWKHUHJDUGVDV0LOOHU¶VµVHOHFWLYH¶
use of research and cites a study in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung which showed 
that the BBC ZDVµHYHQ-KDQGHG¶LQLWVUHSRUWLQJRIWKH86PLOLWDU\DFWLRQDQGLQ
reporting of casualties. 
 
Contrasting jubilant media commentaries on the fall of Baghdad on April 9th to the 
highly critical reports some months later detailing the abuse, torture and killing of 
prisoners, and the apparent inability of the interim authority to govern or even stabilise 
Iraq amidst a violent insurgency illustrates how the broadcast media coverage of the 
conflict underwent significant change over time. This view is supported by Tumber and 
3DOPHU¶VDQDO\VLVZKLFKVKRZVDGHJUHHRIVFHSWLFLVPRIWKHQHHGIRUZDULQ
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VHFWLRQVRIWKH%ULWLVKSUHVVSDUWLDOO\DOLJQHGZLWKWKHQHZVSDSHU¶VSROLWLFDODOOHJLDQFHV
(see also Goddard et al. 2008; Hammond 2003) in the pre-invasion phase (until 19th 
0DUFK,QWKHLQYDVLRQSKDVH7XPEHUDQG3DOPHU¶VDQDO\VLVVKRZVWKDWWKHPHGLD
JHQHUDOO\UHWUHDWWRZKDW+DOOLQFDOOVWKHµVSKHUHRIFRQVHQVXV¶UHWXUQLQJWRPRUH
critical coverage after the fall of Baghdad (see also Altheide and Grimes 2005). For 
FRPSDUDWLYHSXUSRVHVWKLVVXUYH\RIFRYHUDJHDQGIUDPLQJRIWKHµ6HFRQG*XOI:DU¶LV
considered in three distinct phases (which for convenience are referred to in this study 
DVµSUH-ZDU¶µZDU¶DQGµSRVW-ZDU¶EHIRUHGXULQJDQGDIWHUWKHSHULRGRIµPDMRUFRPEDW
RSHUDWLRQV¶th March-30th April 2003). Clearly, however, conflict characterised all 
WKUHHSHULRGVDQGZDVDUJXDEO\XQGLPLQLVKHGIRUVHYHUDO\HDUVLQWKHµSRVW-ZDU¶SHULRG
when casualties amongst occupying forces rose to levels more than ten times higher 
than suffered in the forty-WZRGD\VRIµPDMRUFRPEDWRSHUDWLRQV¶>FRDOLWLRQGHDWKV
and more than 30,000 wounded by April 2009] (see Hammond 2005, CNN 2009). 
 
6.1.2 Framing 
 
Current research indicates that official sources increasingly build, set and frame 
FRQVLGHUDEOHSRUWLRQVRIWKHDJHQGDIRUWKHPHGLDDQGWKDWµRIILFLDOVRXUFHVVXEVWDQWLDOO\
LQIOXHQFHMRXUQDOLVWVLQWKHSURFHVVRIUHIUDPLQJWHOHYLVLRQQHZV¶-HOHQS
As in the First Gulf War there were numerous studies which critically examined the 
framing of events by the media and found, in many cases, an over-reliance on a narrow 
spectrum of sources and viewpoints that reflected levels of official agreement and 
consensus (see Lewis et al. 2006; Bennett et al. 2007).  However, several critics 
DFNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKHPHGLD¶VSHUIRUPDQFHZDVIDUIURPKRPRJHQRXVDQGUHIOHFWHGWRD
greater or lesser degree, the lack of consensus on the need for military action at a 
national DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOOHYHOERWKDPRQJVWSROLWLFDOµHOLWHV¶DQGRUGLQDU\FLWL]HQVDQG
the diverse response within distinct national journalistic cultures (see Dimitrova and 
6WU|PElFN7KLVLVXQVXUSULVLQJJLYHQWKDWµWKHPHGLDGRQRWH[LVWRXWVLGH 
WKHSROLWLFDODQGVRFLDOZRUOGWKH\GHVFULEH¶$OOHQDQG6HDWRQSJDQGSOD\D
key role in publicising discussion and disagreement amongst political actors as well as, 
in a more limited manner, reaction and debate in the wider public sphere. Furthermore, 
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as Thussu and Freedman (2003) note, at a time when consensus starts to break down, 
sections of the media are forced to respond to major public debates, not out of a deep-
URRWHGFRPPLWPHQWWRµREMHFWLYHMRXUQDOLVP¶EXWDWOHDVWLQSDUWIRUFRPPHUFial 
UHDVRQV7KH\DUJXHWKDWZKLOHµWKHVWDNHVLQUHSRUWLQJFRQIOLFWDUHKLJK¶WKH\DUHQRW
µLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHWHQVLRQVWKDWDULVHRXWRIWKHVWUXJJOHRISROLWLFDOHOLWHVWRJHWWKHLU
ZD\DQGWKHGHWHUPLQDWLRQRIFLWL]HQVWRVWRSWKHP¶7KXVVXDQG)UHHGPDn 2003, p.8). 
 
Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging a degree of plurality in British media coverage, 
particularly in the press, patterns of framing emerge from the various studies which bear 
FRPSDULVRQZLWKWKDWRIWKHµ)LUVW*XOI:DU¶7KHVHVDPHSDWWHUQVRf framing can also 
be found in 3DQRUDPD¶V coverage and are noted in parenthesis here, before a fuller 
H[SORUDWLRQEHORZVHH$WWHQWLRQWRFODLPVWKDW6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHSRVHGD
threat to the world through its possession and continued development of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) were central in the pre-war phase. Associated with this was 
the progress of UN inspections led by Hans Blix and Mohamed Elbaradi and debates 
UHODWLQJWRWKHLUHIILFDF\µ&KDVLQJ6DGGDP¶V:HDSRQV¶W[6DGGDP¶s 
GXSOLFLWRXVW\UDQQLFDOOHDGHUVKLSDQGWKHFUXHOQDWXUHRIWKH%D¶DWKLVWVWDWHµ6DGGDP$
:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶W[,UDT¶VOLQNVZLWKWHUURULVWRUJDQLVDWLRQVJLYHQ
JUHDWHUHPSKDVLVLQWKH86WKDQLQ(XURSHµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶Wx: 
28.10.01) and divisions at the UN and in the British parliament on the timing or 
MXVWLILFDWLRQIRUPLOLWDU\DFWLRQµ%ODLU¶V5RDGWR:DU¶W[,QWKHLQYDVLRQ
phase: military action, reverses and successes feature prominently along with the use of 
µVPDUW¶ZHDSRQVWKHUDSLGDGYDQFHRQDQGµOLEHUDWLRQ¶RI%DJKGDGµ7KH5DFHWR
%DJKGDG¶W[DQGWKHFROODSVHRIWKHUHJLPHV\PEROLVHGE\WKHIHOOLQJRIWKH
statue of Saddam Hussein in Paradise Square (see Lewis et al. 2006) 
 
,QWKHµSRVW-ZDU¶SKDVHPRUHQHJDWLYHFRYHUDJHGRPLQDWHVZLWKLQLWLDOFHOHEUDWLRQV
giving way to reports of looting, the breakdown in law and order and loss of control by 
coalition forces; anti-RFFXSDWLRQGHPRQVWUDWLRQVDQGYLROHQFHµ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶W[
28.09.03); ethnic and religious tensions and anti-FRDOLWLRQLQVXUJHQF\µ6LPSVRQLQ,UDT¶
WKHKXQWIRU6DGGDP+XVVHLQµ6DGGDPRQWKH5XQ¶W[HYLGHQFH
RIKLVUHJLPH¶VKXPDQULJKWVDEXVHVDQGWKHGLVFRYHU\RIPDVVJUDYHVWKHDEVHQFHRI
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any WHDSRQVRI0DVV'HVWUXFWLRQµ6WLOO&KDVLQJ6DGGDP¶V:HDSRQV¶W[µ$
)DLOXUHRI,QWHOOLJHQFH¶W[86DQG%ULWLVKWURRSFDVXDOWLHVDQG,UDTLFLYLOLDQ
deaths; allegations of beatings, torture, indiscriminate killings, murder and collective 
punishment by coalition troops and security forces (Shamed tx: 19.05.04; A Good 
Kicking tx: 13.03.07); and political fallout from the war - including the Hutton Inquiry 
into the circumstances surrounding the suicide of a former British weapons inspector 
DaYLG.HOO\µ$)LJKWWRWKH'HDWK¶W[VHH:ULQJ). 
 
There is a great deal of detailed, critical commentary on these various aspects of the 
PHGLD¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKH,UDTFRQIOLFWSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKHSUH-war and invasion 
phase. There is not the space here to deal with all of this material, but attention is 
sharply focussed on how the media uncritically reported various definitive claims and 
assurances made on WMD by the British and U.S governments and related agencies 
which subsequently proved to be without foundation (Dorril 2004; Lewis et al. 2004; 
Kumar 2006; Bennett et al. 2007). Edwards (2003) accuses British broadcasters and the 
SUHVVRIDµUHVSHFWIXOVLOHQFH¶RYHUWKHFODLPWKDW,UDT¶VDOOHJHGZHDSRQVRIPDVV
destruction represented a serious threat. Edwards suggests the argument that there was 
DPRUDOFDVHIRUZDUDQGµWKDWWKH868.JRYHUQPHQWVZHUHPDNLQJGHVSHUDWH
efforts to find a diplomatic alternative" to war - went almost completely unchallenged 
by the BBC and the media gHQHUDOO\¶S:KLOHWKHUHZDVFRYHUDJHRIDQWL-war 
protests and the largest march in British history on 15th February when one and a half 
million people marched through London was headline news (Couldry and Downey 
2004), the arguments of the anti-war movement and those highly credible experts who 
FKDOOHQJHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPVZHUHODUJHO\H[FOXGHGDFFRUGLQJWR0LOOHU
2004a, 2004c), Edwards and Cromwell (2004), and Kumar (2006), although this charge 
ZDVUHMHFWHGE\WKH%%&¶V+HDGRI1HZV and Current Affairs Richard Sambrook 
(2003). 
 
$VLQWKH)LUVW*XOI:DUVLPSOLVWLFDQGVWRFNLPDJHVRI6DGGDPDVDµVXSHU-human 
PRQVWHUZKRWKUHDWHQHGWKHSHDFHRIWKHHQWLUHZRUOG¶:DOGHQFLWHG+RVNLQV
p.105) were readily reproduced in the media. Hiebert (2003) argues that framing a 
nation as a person has been used in many conflicts to justify a war against his or her 
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SHRSOHµ,QWKHFDVHRI,UDTWKHSHUVRQZDV6DGGDP+XVVHLQ7KHLQGLYLGXDOEHFRPHV
GHPRQL]HGLQDOOWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIHUHQFHV¶S.244) a fact reflected in previous 
decades in much of the Anglo-$PHULFDQPHGLD¶VSRUWUD\DORI1DVVHU&DVWUR+R&KL
0LQK1RULHJDDQG0LORVHYLF$V6HDWRQKDVREVHUYHGµGHSLFWLQJ\RXUHQHP\DV
a mad, ravaging tyrant has been part of the stock in trade of propagandists since war 
EHJDQ¶DQGWKHUROHRIWKHPHGLDLQLQFLWLQJWKHVHIHHOLQJVLVSDUWRIPRGHUQZDUIDUH
(pg.46). 
 
Hiebert (2003) also points out that when the French refused to join the US and U.K. in 
ZKDWWKH:KLWH+RXVHGHVFULEHGDVµ2SHUDWLRQ(QGXULQJ)UHHGRP¶, President Jacques 
Chirac was briefly demonized and Reese (2004) notes how reactions in elements of the 
86PHGLDµYHUJHGRQWKH[HQRSKRELFHYHQLQWKHVR-FDOOHGUHVSHFWDEOHSUHVV¶S
$FFRUGLQJWR/DNRIIWKHµQDWLRQDVSHUVRQ¶PHWDSKRUEHFRPHVSDUWRIDQ
HODERUDWHV\VWHPµLQZKLFKWKHUHDUHIULHQGO\QDWLRQVURJXHVWDWHVDQGVRIRUWK¶FLWHG
Hiebert 2003, p 244). In fact, numerous studies, including that by Tumber and Palmer 
(2004), VKRZKRZµUeferences to policy disagreements between major players were 
IUHTXHQW¶SLQPHGLDFRYHUDJHRIWKHSUH-invasion phase (see Goddard et al. 2007, 
2008), both at national and international level. 
 
The thematic structure or framing of the news coverage at the beginning of the war 
shifts away from questions of the necessity or morality of the invasion towards 
description of the military action. According to research carried out by Semetko and 
Kolmer for Media Tenor in the first week of the war, military action was at the centre of 
the coverage in the media in all analysed countries, particularly in the US and in Great 
%ULWDLQ$FRPSDULVRQZLWK8679QHZVUHYHDOHGWKDWµWKH$UDEODQJXDJHQHZV
channel Al Jazeera and the German satellite channel Deutsche Welle featured almost 
twice as muFKLQIRUPDWLRQRQWKHSROLWLFDOEDFNJURXQGRIWKHZDU¶0HGLD7HQRU
p.1).  
 
As in the First Gulf War the British and US media focus on military action and strategy 
GRHVQRWUHVXOWLQZLGHVSUHDGWHOHYLVLRQUHSRUWLQJRIWKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VFDUSHWERPELQJRf 
enemy targets, the use of anti-personnel mines, depleted uranium shells, Iraqi troop 
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casualties or, to a lesser extent, the kind of visceral images of civilian injuries and 
deaths found on several Arabic television channels (Soloman and Erlich 2003). For 
7KXVVXDQG)UHHGPDQWKH3HQWDJRQ¶VIRFXVRQµVPDUW¶ERPEVDQGLQQRYDWLYH
FRPSXWHULVHGFRPEDWV\VWHPVDOORZHGµWKHPLOLWDU\HVWDEOLVKPHQWLQWKHLU35HIIRUWVWR
SUHVHQWDQHZDQGµEORRGOHVV¶YLHZRIZDUWKDWORRNVJRRGRQGRPHVWLFWHOHYLVLRQ
screens¶S$VLQSUHYLRXVFRQIOLFWVWKLVLPDJHRIDµYLUWXRXVZDU¶FRPELQHVDQ
HPSKDVLVRQµYLUWXDOWHFKQRORJLHVZLWKDFODLPWRHPEUDFHKXPDQLWDULDQPRWLYHV¶
(Derian 2002 cited Thussu and Freedman 2003 p.7). 
 
Chouliaraki (2005) brings a slightly different ePSKDVLVWRWKHPLVVLOHDWWDFNVRIµ*XOI¶
ZKHQKHH[DPLQHVWKH%%&¶VIUDPLQJRIWKHMarch 2003 aerial campaign on Baghdad 
DVDVSHFWDFOHRIµVKRFNDQGDZH¶7KHDXWKRUDUJXHVWKDWWUDQVPLWWLQJWHOHYLVLRQLPDJHV
RIVXFKDµFRPSHOOLQJVSHFWDFOH¶RIGHVWUXFWLRQWRDVFHSWLFDOSXEOLFµGRHVEHJIRUWKH
WHPSRUDU\LPPHGLDWHPDQDJHPHQWRIHPRWLRQRQVFUHHQ¶S&KRXOLDUDNL
identifies a dilemma for broadcasters in how to avoid representing coalition forces 
targeting the city as aggressors, posing it as a quesWLRQRIKRZµWKH%%&>FDQ@GHDOZLWK
this, essentially political, question of distributing the potential for emotion in the 
spectacle of a city blasted with missiles every night, by its own liberators? (Ibid, p.146). 
The answer, for Chouliaraki lies partly through the exclusion of certain images, sounds 
RUOLQJXLVWLFH[SUHVVLRQRIKXPDQVXIIHULQJ7KH%%&¶VSODFLQJRIFDPHUDVDQG
QDUUDWLYHIUDPLQJRIWKHDLUDWWDFNHQDEOHGµREMHFWLYH¶UHSRUWLQJDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VSXEOLFVHUYLFHFRPPLWPHQWV,ELG, p.153-155). However, the broadcast 
IRRWDJHDOVRHQVXUHGWKHµUDGLFDOHIIDFHPHQW¶RI,UDTLKXPDQLW\WKURXJKWKHFLQHPDWLF
SUR[HPLFVRIDµVSHFWDFXODU¶OLJKWVKRZZKLFKVLPXOWDQHRXVO\UHQGHUHGWKH
bombardment devoid of human agency: 
 
>«@WKHVHPLRWLFFKRices of this footage construe the bombardment of 
Baghdad as a regime of pity, whereby the aesthetic quality of the spectacle 
effaces the presence of Iraqi people as human beings and sidelines the 
TXHVWLRQRIWKHFRDOLWLRQWURRSV¶LGHQWLW\HLWKHUDVEHQHIDFtors or bombers.  
This combination is instrumental in aestheticising the horror of war at the 
expense of raising issues around legitimacy and the effects of the war. 
(Chouliaraki 2005, p.143) 
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:LWKWKHZDUXQGHUZD\DVLQWKHUHSRUWLQJRIµ*XOI¶WKHIRFus moved to the 
performance of the coalition forces, with considerable attention given to military 
reverses and set-backs. This was particularly the case on the BBC, as already 
mentioned, which adopted a more sceptical attitude to some CENTCOM claims. More 
critical commentators suggest that such scepticism remained at the level of assessing 
WDFWLFVDQGSHUIRUPDQFHRUµSURFHGXUDOFULWLFLVP¶UDWKHUWKDQWKHZLGHULVVXHVRIWKH
legitimacy of the war (Lewis et al. 2006; Chomsky 2006). Freedman (2004) sees this 
failure to address deeper questions as symptomatic of a relationship between 
JRYHUQPHQWVDQGWKHPHGLDWKDWGHVSLWHµPRPHQWVRIWHQVLRQ¶LVXOWLPDWHO\Euilt on 
mutual dependency and a historical reluctance by editors and correspondents to question 
the eIILFDF\RIZDUDVDPHDQVRIDFKLHYLQJSHDFHµ5HSRUWHUVKDYHFULWLFLVHGSDUWLFXODU
military operations often in the hope of facilitating military objectives rather than 
FKDOOHQJLQJWKHPRISURVHFXWLQJZDUUDWKHUWKDQTXHVWLRQLQJLW¶S 
 
Media reporting of the fall of Baghdad is analysed in several studies, with the television 
coverage of the toppling of the statue of Saddam Hussein in Paradise Square on 9th 
April attracting considerable scrutiny (see Lewis et al. 2006). Hammond (2003) 
describes how tightly framed television images of the dozens of men around the statue 
gave the impression of a large ecstatic crowd, an impression reinforced on the BBC by 
5DJHK2PDU¶VH[FLWHGFRPPHQWDU\+DPPRQGFRPSDUHVWKHVHLPDJHVVXJJHVWLYHRI
the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the wide angled shots of the same event circulating on 
the Internet which showed a largely empty square guarded by the US army. According 
to Lewis et al. WKHORQJVKRWVRIDµIDLUO\HPSW\VTXDUH¶PDGHWKHFHOHEUDWLRQV
much less impressLYH\HWWKHUHµZHUHQRORQJVKRWVXVHGLQany of the reports on the 
PDLQHYHQLQJUHSRUWVRQ%%&,79&KDQQHORU6N\¶S>RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV@
The episode underscores, in the clearest terms, the ideological dimension of mediatized 
conflict in which the (literal) framing of an event and the contested meanings implicit in 
the shot selection and editing of any televised sequence can become a matter of dispute. 
Hammond links the doubts expressed about television coverage of the statue to broader 
concernVDERXWWKHPHGLD¶VDELOLW\WRPDQLSXODWHLPDJHVDQGSURGXFHLOOXVLRQVRI
UHDOLW\µ'LJLWDOLVDWLRQWKH,QWHUQHWDQGWKHJURZWKRIJOREDOPHGLDDXGLHQFHVDOOSOD\D
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role in promoting a greater self-consciousness about image construction in the context 
of SRSXODUSROLWLFDOGLVHQJDJHPHQW¶+DPPRQGS 
 
In the post-war period critical reports on the military campaign and occupation appeared 
LQWKHEURDGFDVWPHGLDZLWKIDUJUHDWHUIUHTXHQF\7XPEHUDQG3DOPHU¶VFRQWHQW
analysis of British television cRYHUDJHVKRZVµDPDVVLYHDQGFOHDUFKDQJHLQIRFXVDV
television reporters switch their attention from the conduct of the campaign [..] to 
PDWWHUVUHODWHGWRWKHHIIHFWVRIWKHPLOLWDU\FDPSDLJQ¶SZLWKDµGRPLQDQW
IRFXVRQEDGQHZV¶LQ,UDTDQGVFHSWLFDOUHSRUWLQJRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VMXVWLILFDWLRQIRU
going to war (Ibid. p.162). Altheide and Grimes¶ US study notes a similar shift towards 
µVWURQJHUFULWLFLVP¶ZLWKFORVHUDWWHQWLRQSDLGto WKHPDMRUFODLPVDERXW,UDT¶VVXSSRUW
for the 9/11 attacNVDQGWKHµHOXVLYH¶:0'DVZHOODVQHZVFRYHUDJHDQGYLVXDOVRI
µ,UDTLVULRWLQJUHVLVWLQJUS UXOH¶DQGWKHµFROODSVHGLQIUDVWUXFWXUHWKDWZDVGLIILFXOWWR
JHWUXQQLQJDJDLQVRWKDWWKHQHZUHJLPHFRXOGJRYHUQ¶S 
 
Altheide and Grimes argue tKDWWKHPRYHWRZDUGVPRUHFULWLFDOFRYHUDJHLQWKHµSRVW-
ZDU¶SHULRGLVDSUHGLFWDEOHVWHSLQDQµRUGHUHGVHTXHQFHRIDFWLYLWLHV¶WKDWDOVR
characterises the reporting of the First Gulf War and other recent conflicts. This 
VHTXHQFHZKLFKWKH\ODEHODVµ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶SUHGLFWVPHGLDDQGDFDGHPLF
critique in the post war period as a mostly acceptable and expected element of a wider 
µQDUUDWLYH¶RUµVFULSW¶:DU3URJUDPPLQJVXJJHVWVWKHUHLVDUHSHDWLQJSDWWHUQWRWKH
PHGLD¶VFRYHUDJHRIFRQIOLFWVZKLFKH[KLELWVDµJDPH-OLNHVWUXFWXUH¶LQZKLFKWKH
dominant discourse dominates in the pre-ZDUDQGZDUSHULRGRIWHQµFUDIWHGE\WKLQN
WDQNVDQGKLJKO\RUJDQL]HGFODLPPDNHUV¶,ELGSDQGLQZKLFKWKHFULWLTXHVµWKDW
contain different frames and assumptions IRUDVHULRXVGLDORJXH¶DUHPXWHGRUH[FOXGHG
(p.622), at least until the post-ZDUSHULRG+HQFH:DU3URJUDPPLQJµSURYLGHVDORRSVR
to speak, around the criticism, and thereby provides a syntax of meaning as well as a 
temporal point for criticism and diVVHQWWRRFFXURQVFKHGXOH¶,ELG:KLOH$OWKHLGH
DQG*ULPHV¶FRQFHSWXDOVFKHPHLVRFFDVLRQDOO\H[SUHVVHGLQVRPHZKDWSURJUDPPDWLF
terms their War Programming model offers a useful intervention that can go some way 
to explaining the apparently contradictory evidence that is brought to debates around 
PHGLDµFRPSOLDQFH¶ 
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)LQDOO\7D\ORU¶VµPDSSLQJ¶of four major areas of concern and contestation 
around LVVXHVRIµVHFXULW\LQWHUQDWLRQDOODZPRUDOLW\DQGRSSRUWXQLW\¶ (p.73) usefully 
highlights how many of the arguments employed by a wide range of actors were framed 
in relation to Iraq War. Taylor explains how these frames functioned in different way 
both for those opposed to, and for those in favour of, military action. He then goes on to 
argue thaWVL[PDMRUµVFKRROVRIWKRXJKW¶HPHUJHGLQthe debates about the war that 
developed the arguments commonly heard in distinct ways. The three pro-war schools 
of thought are characterised as µNeo-FRQVHUYDWLVP¶WKHµRIILFLDO¶OLQHDQGµ/LEHUDO
+DZNV¶7KHWhree antiwar schools are labelled µ$QWLZDU5HDOLVWV¶/LEHUDO'RYHV¶DQG
µ$QWLZDU5DGLFDOV¶SWhile sometimes overlapping in the kind of evidence 
SUHVHQWHG7D\ORU¶VPRGHOunderlines how each of the six schools based their arguments 
on a distinct set of premises. Taylor¶VPRGHOoffers a useful template for considering the 
YDULRXVDUJXPHQWVDQGIUDPHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDWSOD\LQWKHPHGLD¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKH
controversy surrounding the war and the how positions advocated by various groups 
were represented. 
 
6.1.3 Censorship DQGµ)ODN¶ 
 
Many studies have indicated that overt censorship of the kind seen in previous wars was 
far less prevalent in reporting the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Partly, this was technologically 
GULYHQDV,71¶V&Kief Executive Stewart Purvis has UHPDUNHGµ7KHZLGHVSUHDG
availability of high-tech kit makes it easier to by-SDVVWKHFRQWUROIUHDNVLQXQLIRUP¶
(cited in Clarke 2003, p.13). While this may be true, we should recall that some doubts 
KDYHEHHQFDVWRQWHFKQRORJ\¶VDELOLW\WRFKallenge traditional gatekeeping and indexing 
functions (see Livingstone and Bennett 2003). Covert censorship was, several critics 
maintain, built into the rules of embedding 3 (see Tumber 2004; Bell 2008); and into 
EURDGFDVWHUV¶RZQWDVWHDQGGHFHQF\JXLGHlines (see Hoskins 2004). 
                                               
3 For instance, restrictions applied to the showing of casualties. 
 207 
 
Overt censorship is also a practice that runs against various principles of military-media 
relations that have been developing since the First World War. Badsey (1996) outlines 
some of the recent thinking in the British military that plays a role in shaping conflict 
coverage. This involves WUHDWLQJWKHPHGLDDVµDOOLHVUDWKHUWKDQDVHQHPLHV¶S
avoiding conscious lies and emphasises the importance of a continuous flow of 
carefully-crafted public relations4. He also argues thDWWKHµGLUW\WULFNV¶ of psychological 
warfare, such as black propaganda, should be kept entirely separate from any agency 
responsible for official contacts with the media (Badsey 1996, p.18). In practice, 
however, this principle came under severe strain in the post-2001 conflict coverage 
environment (see Snow and Taylor 2006; Kumar 2006; Davies 2009).  
 
While overt censorship may have diminished, routine manipulation and intimidation of 
the broadcast media, particularly the BBC, seems to have increased since the First Gulf 
:DUIRXJKWXQGHU-RKQ0DMRU¶VOHDGHUVKLS:KLOHthe attempts at intimidating the BBC 
E\7RQ\%ODLU¶VJRYHUQPHQWLQLWVFRYHUDJHRI<XJRVODYLDwas expressed openly in 
3DUOLDPHQWVHH6LPSVRQSUHFDOOLQJ7KDWFKHU¶VDGPRQLWLRQVRI the BBC over 
WKH)DONODQGV,UHODQGDQGRWKHUFRQIOLFWVPXFKRIWKHLQWLPLGDWLRQRIWKH%%&¶V
coverage of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was direct and behind the scenes. The then 
BBC Head of News and Current Affairs Richard Sambrook recalls one experience over 
a report from Afghanistan: 
 
Rageh Omaar had reported from the smouldering remains of the Red Cross 
food depot which he said had twice been bombed by mistake.  Campbell 
called Sambrook on his mobile with a torrent of foulmouthed abuse, and 
followed up with a letter saying this was "as pure a piece of Taliban 
propaganda as the Taliban and the terrorists they harbour could have hoped 
IRU2PDDU¶VUHSRUWVKRZV&DPSEHOOKDGORVWDOOSHUVSHFWLYH 
(cited Ware 2004, p.14) 
 
                                               
4 6HHDOVR0F/DXJKOLQDZKRGHVFULEHV35LVµWKHQHZFHQVRUVKLS¶(p.101). 
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$ODVWDLU&DPSEHOO¶VFDSDFLW\IRUµIRXOPRXWKHG¶LQWLPLGDWLRQEHFDPHDOPRVWOHJHQGDU\
and its frequency was cited as a factor by BBC management in not spotting a real crisis 
LQWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWRYHUWKH*LOOLJDQ-Kelly affair. 
Certainly Panorama staff had been subject to similar bullying and abusive attacks in the 
past (see Byrne 2007)5, but no examples of such abusive behaviour have yet emerged in 
the research so far conducted into 3DQRUDPD¶V coverage of the 2003 war, although it 
was an almost daily occurrence for BBC News according to evidence submitted at the 
Hutton Inquiry. Gary Horne, for instance, found no evidence of pressure from the 
government on Panorama: 
 
'0,XQGHUVWDQGWKDWWKHµ%%&1HZV¶JRWTXLWHDORWRIFDOOVIURP
Downing Street. 
G.H. Yes, but they were in an entirely different physical building. 
D.M. So that was pressure ZDVRQµ%%&1HZV¶DQGQRWRQFXUUHQWDIIDLUV" 
G.H. Not on current affairs.  Or, if it ZDVLWZDVQ¶WFRPLQJWKURXJKor being 
talked about. 
(personal communication,  October 10, 2007) 
 
In fact most Panorama VWDIIDUHNHHQWRSRLQWKRZµIUHH¶RILQWHUIHUHnce and 
intimidation they were when making programmes about the Iraq invasion 6 by contrast 
WR5RJHU%ROWRQ¶VJUXHOOLQJH[SHULHQFHERWKDWWKH%%&DQG,79IROORZLQJLQWHQVH
JRYHUQPHQWµIODN¶RYHUKLVFRYHUDJHRI5HSXEOLFDQSDUDPLOLWDU\DFWLYLW\LQWKHODWH
1970s and 1980s (cf Bolton 1990, 1997; Thames Television 1989; Wilby 2006). 
 
                                               
5 %\UQH¶VSLHFHRQIRXO-PRXWKHGDEXVHE\D+HDOWK'HSDUWPHQWPLQLVWHU¶V µVSLQ-GRFWRU¶LQDWHOHSKRQH
call to Eamonn Matthews was confirmed in my interview with the former Panorama producer. Other 
interviewees recall intimidation from previous administrations. For instance, David Lomax recalls David 
0HOORU>LQ-RKQ0DMRU¶V&RQVHUYDWLYH*RYHUQPHQW@µmaking noises about the licence fee¶ZKHQXQKDSS\
about a programme (personal communication, November 14, 2007). 
6 Tom Giles, John Ware and Mike Rubin make this point very forcefully in interviews conducted for this 
research. 
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Interestingly, the only interviewee who UHFDOOVDQ\µIODN¶DJDLQVWPanorama around the 
Second Gulf War is former Director General Greg Dyke, who makes the point that the 
Downing Street µKDWHG¶Panorama, especially after a report by John Ware revealed the 
government was effectively re-announcing spending commitments7 [ Spin Doctors tx: 
13-3-2000]. He claims that Alastair Campbell µwould go for them at every available 
opportunity¶However Dyke is unable to recall any specific Panorama programmes 
relating to the war that were subject to government flak: 
'0,W¶VIXQQ\EHFDXVHDOOWKH3DQRUDPDSHRSOH,¶YHWDONHGWRDQG,¶YH
talked to about ten of them, they all deny that there was any pressure on 
them from the Government. 
GD: What from Campbell? 
'0:HOOWKH\VDLGDOOWKHSUHVVXUHZDVRQ1HZVWKH\VDLGWKH\GLGQ¶WJHW
any on Panorama. 
GD: :HOO,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDW¶VWUXH,JRWFRPSODLQWVDERXWWKHP 
DM:  Did you? About the Panorama programmes? 
GD: Yes about certain Panorama programmes. Not a great deal. I mean to 
EHIDLU,GLGQ¶WJHWDZKROHORWRISUHVVXUHWKHWLPH,ZDVWKHUHXQWLOZHJRW
to Iraq. 
(personal communication,  October 16, 2009) 
 
On the available evidence from interviews with current and former Panorama staff the 
conclusion can be drawn that JRYHUQPHQWµIODN¶ZDVunlikely to be an overt influence on 
coverage of the invasion of Iraq in the same way it had been with previous conflicts 
such as Northern Ireland and Suez (see Chapter 4.4). Nevertheless, µflak¶ was certainly 
DSURPLQHQWIHDWXUHRIWKH%%&¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWIRURWKHU
programme makers8 and, given Panorama¶VWHQVHUHOations with governments on 
                                               
7 ,Qµ6SLQ'RFWRUV¶-RKQ:DUHLQYHVWLJDWHVDFFXVDWLRQVWKDW*RYHUQPHQWDQQRXQFHPHQWVRQWKH1+6
DPRXQWWRUHF\FOLQJWKHVDPHLQIRUPDWLRQWRFUHDWHDPRUHSRVLWLYHµVSLQ¶WKDQWKHUHDOILJXUHV 
8 )RUH[DPSOH.HYLQ0DUVK5DGLR¶Today Editor at the time of the war claimed that calls from 
Downing Street were, at one point, on an hourly basis (personal communication). 
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previous occasions, this may have played a more subtle role in shaping or constraining 
coverage of the war. 
 
6.1.4 Conclusion  
 
$VWKH%%&¶V$QQXDO5HSRUWIRUPDNHVFOHDUWKHVWRU\GRPLQDWLQJWKH\HDUZDV
the war in Iraq and its aftermath:   
The conspicuous lack of national consensus here meant that, once again, the 
%%&¶VLPSDUWLDOLW\FDPHXQGHULQWHQVHVFUXWLQ\%%&1HZVSDVVHGWKHWHVW
An ICM poll in April 2003 indicated that it had sustained its position as the 
best and most trusted provider of news. 
(BBC 2004a, p.43) 
These findings are to some extent supported in a survey by Lewis (2003) in which 
UHVSRQGHQWVWKRXJKWWKH%%&µPRUHWUXVWZRUWK\¶RQWKLVVXEMHFWWKDQWKHRWKHU8.
channels (cited Tumber and Palmer 2004, p.99)7KH%%&¶V$QQXDO5HSRUWGRHV
unsurprisingly, admit some limitations. Military sources were sometimes not treated 
with enough scepticism; the BBC lagged behind the technological advances of some of 
LWVULYDOVDQGLPSRUWDQWO\µFXUUHQWDIIDLUVVSHFLDOSUogrammes did not make the 
H[SHFWHGLPSDFW¶,ELG,WLVXQFOHDULIPanorama is amongst the current affairs 
SURJUDPPHVWKDWµGLGQRWPDNHWKHH[SHFWHGLPSDFW¶DQGZK\WKLVVKRXOGEHVRLVOLNHO\
to be beyond the scope of this study (which does not deal with audience reception of the 
programmes), although some answers may lie in its findings. These reservations, 
notwithstanding, the BBC Annual Report is mostly upbeat about the BBC performance 
in the war, despite the bruising Hutton Inquiry, claiming there waVµPXFKWREHSURXG
RI¶ERWKLQWKHEUHDGWKDQGGHSWKRIWKHFRYHUDJHLQWKHUDQJHRI$UDEDQG0XVOLP
opinion, and in some outstanding defence analysis on Newsnight and The World at One¶ 
(Ibid). There is no specific mention made of Panorama in the report. 
 
$VLPLODUJHQHUDOO\FOHDQKHDOWKFKHFNLVIRXQGLQWKH1HLOUHYLHZWHDP¶VUHSRUWHQWLWOHG
7KH%%&¶VMRXUQDOLVPDIWHU+XWWRQZKLFKVWDWHVWKDWµWKH%%&LVLQGHSHQGHQWRIERWK
state and partisan interests, and will strive to be an independent monitor of powerful 
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LQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLQGLYLGXDOV¶%%&ES+RZIDUWKH%%&FDQLQIDFWPDLQWDLQ
real independence from powerful institutions like the government at times of war will 
no doubt continue to exercise critics and academics so long as the BBC and 
international conflicts involving U.K. forces exist. While the latter is a virtual certainty, 
the continued existence of the BBC, especially in its present form, is in more doubt. As 
Greg Dyke remarked in one of many parting shots at the Labour government he once 
supported: 
 
>«@,GLGKDYHWKH'U.HOO\DIIDLUZKHUHE\KLVDFWLRQV*RUGRQ%URZQ
has virtually admitted we were right, and yet the BBC has been bombarded 
by the Government in the three years since the affair in an attempt to 
destabilise the organisation.  My worry is that in this new environment they 
might succeed. 
(Dyke 2007, p.2) 
 
On a broader level I will conclude this survey of the literature and key debates around 
FRQIOLFWFRYHUDJHE\ORRNLQJIRUZDUGWRWKHXQHQYLDEOHSURVSHFWRIWKHPHGLD¶V 
UHSRUWLQJRIIXWXUHZDUV<RXQJDQG-HVVHUH[SORULQJµSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\OLDVRQ¶DQG
perception management in 1997 predicted, with remarkable prescience, how it was 
likely to apply in future conflicts: 
 
The only variables will be the level of domestic political concern or 
international objection and the only saving grace for a generally unprepared 
media, lacking the central control or organisation to counter this form of 
pre-planned manipulation, is if the military should receive a setback or the 
conflict becomes protracted. Such a situation makes it difficult for the 
military to maintain popular enthusiasm. It also affords the media the 
opportunity to break free of its political and military constraints and use 
independent means to present a critical analysis. 
(Young and Jesser 1997, p.295) 
 
6WDQGLQJEDFNIURPWKHGHEDWHVRXWOLQHGDERYHLWVHHPVFOHDUWKDW<RXQJDQG-HVVHU¶V
conclusion is likely to apply to US and British mainstream broadcast media coverage of 
future wars. The reporting of conflict involving British forces is likely to prove as 
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problematic and controversial for the BBC as ever so long as the BBC is serious in its 
FRPPLWPHQWWREHLQJDQµLQGHSHQGHQWPRQLWRURISRZHUIXOLQVWLWXWLRQV¶DQGPDLQWDLQLQJ
LWVGXW\µWRRIIHUDGLYHUVLW\RIRSLQLRQ¶WKDWLVQRWPHUHO\WRNHQ%RUQS
Should another war pass by without controversy for the BBC or expression of deep 
dissatisfaction from major centres of power it seems reasonable to assume it would have 
failed in these fundamental public service commitments. 
 
We now turn to a closer analysis of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH6HFRQG*XOI:DU 
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6.2 Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIµ*ulf II¶ 
6.2.1 Introduction 
 
As we have seen, LVVXHVRIµLQIRUPDWLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶DQGJRYHUQPHQWµSUHVVXUH¶RQWKH
%%&WZLQQHGZLWKFRQFHUQVDERXWD%%&FXOWXUHRIµVKDUHGSROLWLFDODVVXPSWLRQV¶DQG
uncritical over-UHOLDQFHRQµRIILFLDO¶VRXUFHVIUDPHPDQ\RIWKHGHEDWHVDURXQGWKH
&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VKDQGOLQJRIWKH,UDT:DU How far do Panorama broadcasts relating to 
the Iraq conflict reinforce or undermine these concerns? Does Panorama¶Vreporting 
provide further evidence in support of models of media performance within the critical 
tradition which indicate WKHSULYLOHJLQJRIµHOLWH¶RSLQLRQ and the marginalisation of 
dissenting viewpoints? To what extent do consensus (or dissensus) views expressed 
within the House of Commons establish guiding frameworks for Panorama¶V conflict 
coverage (see Groshek 2008)? Is there an over-reliance on official sources or examples 
of so-FDOOHGµLQIRUPDWLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶LQHSLVRGHVGHDOLQJZLth different phases of the 
war? 
 
 
6.2.2 Hypotheses for all phases of conflict 
 
In order to compare 3DQRUDPD¶V coverage of the 1991 and 2003 wars against Iraq the 
same hypotheses (cf. chapter 5.4) are posed to test a body of evidence provided by 
twenty-five Panorama episodes dealing with the lead up to, invasion and occupation of 
Iraq transmitted between October 2001 and October 2005. Twenty-one of the twenty-
five programmes were pre-recorded for which transcripts were available from the 
Panorama website. These twenty-one transcripts were then coded using a variation of 
the coding key developed for the First Gulf War (see Appendix 2.6). All twenty-five 
episodes were watched and further transcription work was carried out on the remaining 
four live episodes which are included in the analysis of interviewees and 
reporter/preVHQWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ 
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Answering the research questions and enabling a comparison between the two conflicts 
requires testing the four hypotheses employed when looking at the First Gulf War, 
namely: 
 
H1. Frames of debate in Panorama¶V coverage of the war are indexed to the 
GHJUHHDQGOHYHORIµSDUOLDPHQWDU\FRQVHQVXV¶ 
 
H2. There is less substantively framed coverage in Panorama¶V coverage of 
the First Gulf War of 1991 when parliamentary consensus was greater [563 
M.P.s in support of military action, 34 against] than the 2003 Gulf War 
where consensus was considered low [396 to 217 without UN mandate] (cf. 
chapters 5.2; 5.3; 6.1). 
 
H3. 2IILFLDO 8.86 VRXUFHV µSULPDU\ GHILQHUV¶ SUHGRPLQDWH LQ DOO
Panorama coverage (cf. chapter 6.1). 
 
H4. Dissenting opinion on the legality, morality and motives (rather than 
timing, strategy or conditions) for the war have a marginal presence in 
Panorama. Arguments against the war are usually advanced only when they 
emerge within powerful institutions, such as Parliament, the US Congress or 
the military establishment and echo divergent views discussed within the 
µ6SKHUHRI/HJLWLPDWH&RQWURYHUV\¶FIFKDSWHU6.1). 
 
As in the discussion of the First Gulf War Panorama¶V coverage will be divided into 
three major periods in order to test these hypotheses in ways that take account of 
Altheide and Grimes (2005) µ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶PRGHO (see Chapter 6.1), whilst 
retaining attention to the interrelated issues of framing, sourcing and indexing. As the 
pre-invasion phase was the period in which Parliamentary consensus was most 
conspicuous by its absence greater attention is paid to this period, including a 
qualitative framing analysis of the contribution of reporters/presenters (see Chapter 3) 
and the visual impact of the programmes. A quantitative framing analysis of the 
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UHSRUWHUSUHVHQWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHUHSRUWVIRUWKHSUH-war period that parallels the 
interviewee coding is also employed (see discussion in Chapter 3 and below). 
 
6.2.3 Panorama and Iraq 
 
The %%&¶Vlegal duty to maintain µLPSDUWLDOLW\¶DQGµEDODQFH¶in its news and current 
affairs coverage SURYHGHVSHFLDOO\GLIILFXOWWRPHHWWRHYHU\RQH¶VVDWLVIDFWLRQin the case 
of the Iraq war because the opposing positions were so far apart and so entrenched. The 
BBC was accusedRQWKHRQHKDQGRIEHLQJµDQWL-ZDU¶E\elements of the US and 
British press and the British Government. For instance, Alastair Campbell, the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V&RPPXQLFDWLRQV'LUHFWRU alleged that µthere was an agenda in large parts 
RIWKH%%&«WKHUHZDVDdisproportionate focus upon, if you like, the dissent, the 
RSSRVLWLRQWRRXUSRVLWLRQ¶&DPSEHOOFLWHGPanorama: µA Fight to the Death¶ tx: 
21.01.04). The BBC was also accused by some who were opposed to the war as being 
slavishly uncritical or of being cowed by a hostile government who were muttering 
threats about the license fee and their charter, a threat, allegedly, made directly by Tessa 
Jowell (Ibid).  For some critics the charge extended to BBC News and Current Affairs 
effectively legitimising the war through the systematic exclusion of dissenting voices 
(Edwards and Cromwell, 2006). These and other allegations of µbias¶ by either side 
were vigorously denied by those working in the wider industry (Tait, 2004.), the BBC 
(Sambrook, 2004) and Panorama (Simpson, 2003), specifically.  
 
What does a closer examination of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHZDU reveal? Twenty-
five of the Panorama episodes that deal with the topic of Iraq since 2000 (see Appendix 
1.1) reveal a sense of how the invasion and occupation unfolded as a series of debates 
about the justification for war, the conduct of the war and the aftermath of the war. A 
IRFXVRQSHUVRQDOLWLHVµ6DGGDP¶µ%ODLU¶RUµ%XVK¶is apparent in the titles of eleven of 
WKHSURJUDPPHVVXFKDVµ6DGGDP- A Warning IURP+LVWRU\¶ [tx: 03.11.02]RUµ%ODLU¶V
:DU¶ [tx: 23.03.03]. There are also an unusual number of programmes with audience 
participation in them ± interactive specials µPanorama ,QWHUDFWLYH,UDT&ULVLV¶>W[
29.09.02], national and international audience debates µ7DFNOLQJ6DGGDP¶[tx: 
02.02.03], µ4XHVWLRQVIURPD'LYLGHG:RUOG¶>W[@ DQGµ$IWHU6DGGDP¶>W[
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13.04.10] which reflect one Panorama strategy for dealing with public and 
establishment divisions around the subject. The qualitative, textual analysis of the 
broadcast material that follows below is supported by a quantitative study which sets 
out to determine an objective measure of Panorama airtime allocated to the range of 
views that existed in relation to the war (see Appendix 2.8). The quantitative study 
makes use of the same coding scheme used in the study of the First Gulf War (with 
small variations in the descriptors relating to the specific details of the wars - see 
chapter 5.4 and Appendix 2.6) to allow comparison of coverage of the conflicts. An 
attempt to code Panorama reporter or presenter input along similar lines is also made in 
the crucial pre-war period when consensus was weakest and public opinion, arguably 
most open to change. Given the traditional role of presenter/reporter aVµGHYLO¶V
DGYRFDWH¶DQGDWWKHµfulcrum¶ of the debate (see Kumar 1975 and discussion chapter 
4.3) this exercise proved problematic but nevertheless provided further important 
evidence RIKRZWKHGHEDWHVZHUHVWUXFWXUHGDQGOHG)RUERWKµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LROogical 
7KUHDW¶DQGµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW6DGGDP¶, for instance, DFRGLQJRIWKHSUHVHQWHU¶V
contribution indicates more than 80% to be framed in ways congruent with pro-war or 
partially pro-war views (see Appendix 2.8.1). Reporter/presenter contributions were 
coded in the same way as other contributors (i.e. FRGHµVXSSRUW¶FRGHµSDUWLDO
VXSSRUW¶FRGHµQHXWUDO¶FRGHµSDUWLDORSSRVLWLRQ¶FRGHµRSSRVLWLRQ¶DQGFRGH
µRIILFLDO,UDTLYLHZ¶). However, this is not to suggest that these statements represented 
WKHUHSRUWHURUSUHVHQWHU¶VYLHZVEXWUDWKHUWKDWSDUWLFXODUWKHPHVSUREOHPGHILQLWLRQV
emerge from the UHSRUWHUSUHVHQWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ which feed into or support particular 
µSDFNDJHV¶DQGµVFKRROVRIWKRXJKW¶VHH7D\ORU Furthermore, in many cases, as 
ZHVKDOOVHHUHSRUWHUVDQGSUHVHQWHUVZHUHVLPSO\µGRLQJWKHLUMRE¶DQGUHSRUWLQJWKH
views of others LQDPDQQHUFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH%%&¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRµEDODQFHDQG
LPSDUWLDOLW\¶VHHFKDSWHU. The coding scheme is included in Appendix 2.6 and further 
discussion of its effectiveness can be found later in this chapter. 
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6.2.4 Findings: Pre-War Phase 
 
Nine Panorama programmes related to the conflict are broadcast between October 2001 
and the invasion of Iraq which commenced on 20th March 2003. Five of these are pre-
recorded µinvestigations¶ composed largely of reportage, analysis, extensive use of 
library footage DQGLQWHUYLHZVµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶µ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW
6DGGDP¶µ6DGGDPD:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶µ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶DQGµ&KDVLQJ
6DGGDP¶V:HDSRQV¶7KHUHPDLQLQJIRXUlive broadcasts are in the form of two 
µinteractive¶ GHEDWHVµ,UDT&ULVLV,QWHUDFWLYH¶DQGµ7DFNOLQJ6DGGDP¶LQZKLFK%%&
reporters and correspondents responded to viewers¶ questions; and two studio debates ± 
one featuring invited guests in New York and Amman and the second amongst 
politicians and journalists/commentators on the eve of war in London. 
 
 
A key aspect of the framing of the Iraq war was the use of fear (see chapter 6.1). This 
was evident from the earliest Panorama UHSRUWZKLFKGHDOWZLWK,UDTµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V
%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶>W[@ which made a link between the Iraq regime and Al 
Qaida operatives, a link later shown to be false and possibly a result of deliberate 
µPLVLQIRUPDWLRQ¶ (see below). Immediately following the ten second Panorama 
VLJQDWXUHWXQHDQGUHYROYLQJJOREHJUDSKLF7RP0DQJROG¶VYRLFH-over sets the scene 
against low synthesiser notes and an eerie high-pitched electronic warble akin to that 
found in the horror film genre: 
 
TOM MANGOLD:  The fear is as old as history.  The plague doctor of the 
middle ages helpless in the continent where disease killed millions.  Today 
the images have returned and with them the fear that disease may walk the 
land once more. 
 
 
This chilling introduction is accompanied by black-and-white library footage of viruses 
attacking a cell under a microscope and half-lit studio shots of a man in a leather 
0HGLHYDOSODJXHGRFWRU¶VPDVN7KLVFXWVTXLFNO\WRDFORVH-up of the eyes of the mask 
lit so that they appear empty, which then cuts to an identically-framed close-up and then 
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medium-shot of a man in contemporary biological warfare suit.  The low, insistent 
synthesiser notes continue as the images dissolves to sheer white. From white there is a 
another dissolve to the image of a screen in a mocked-up laboratory on which television 
footage of Tony Blair giving a speech to Parliament is projected - ZLWKWKHVXEWLWOHµth 
6HSWHPEHU¶ 
 
TONY BLAIR:  [Speaking in the House] We know that they would, if they 
could, go further and use chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons of 
mass destruction.  We know also that there are groups or people 
occasionally states who will trade the technology and capability of such 
weapons. 
 
 
During this speech the camera cuts from the screen framed by studio-lit test tubes to a 
FORVHXSRI7RQ\%ODLU¶VIDFHEHIRUHFXWWLQJWRDQRWKHUHVWDEOLVKLQJVKRWRIWKHVFUHHQ
and lab. The camera tilts down towards an underlit glass laboratory preparation area on 
which more test tubes, beakers of blue and yellow liquids and other chemistry 
paraphernalia is arranged and against which rests a colour photograph of Osama Bin 
Laden. The voice-over during this sequence offers the possibility that such frightening 
images will be exposed DVJRYHUQPHQWµVFDUH-PRQJHULQJ¶ 
 
MANGOLD:  Could there really be a biological attack by Al Qaeda 
terrorists and are we ready for it if there is?  Tonight Panorama sorts facts 
from fears and investigates the reality behind six weeks that have shaken the 
world. 
 
 
,Q&RUQHU¶Vtypography of documentary discourse, the opening shots described 
DERYHFRXOGEHFKDUDFWHULVHGDVLQDQµDVVRFLDWLYHPRGH¶DVWKHµSUR-ILOPLF¶VKRWW\SHV
and editing, rely on a set of horror and science-thriller (cf. The Satan Bug 1965; The 
Andromeda Strain 1971; Outbreak 1995) generic conventions. As Corner notes, such 
LPDJHUHIHUHQFHVµPD\EHSULPDULO\DHVWKHWLF UDWKHUWKDQFRJQLWLYH¶DLPLQJWRSURGXFH
DQHIIHFWRQWKHDXGLHQFHDQGQRWQHFHVVDULO\µLQFUHDVHGLQIRUPDWLRQDO\LHOG¶p.29). 
After this attention-JUDEELQJLQWURGXFWLRQWKHSURJUDPPHVZLWFKHVLQWRDOHVVµSUR-
ILOPLF¶µLOOXVWUDWLYHPRGH¶HPSOR\LQJDVHULHVRIFOLSVIURPUHFHQWQHZVIRRWDJHWR
illustrate the emerging argument. It starts with a medium shot of George Bush 
answHULQJMRXUQDOLVWV¶TXHVWLRQVEHIRUHPRYLQJWRUDSLGO\-cut images of postal workers 
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in face masks, investigators removing sacks of post from US government buildings in 
biological-weapons suits and spraying each other to remove possible anthrax 
contamination: 
 
24 October 2001 
GEORGE BUSH:  First of all I don't have anthrax. 
 
MANGOLD:  The man in the White House may have escaped but three 
people have been murdered by proxy, another ten infected and thirty-two 
more exposed.  Letters laced with anthrax have closed Congress and sent the 
US mail service into chaos.  The perpetrators remain free.  No link has been 
established to Bin Laden but there is growing evidence in the West of his 
involvement in the new horror of biological terrorism. 
 
 
Before looking at the allegations made against Iraq in the programme, what 
subsequently emerged as the background to the events portrayed in these clips is worth 
dwelling on briefly here as it reveals important omissions never addressed in subsequent 
Panorama investigations intR:0'1RWPHQWLRQHGLQ0DQJROG¶VUHSRUWLVWKDWWKH
attacks began only one week after September 11th with anthrax letters mailed to the 
NBC television network and New York Post, but which were not reported until more 
than two weeks after they were opened (see Rosenberg 2002).  It was, according to 
5RVHQEHUJ¶VDFFRXQWDIXUWKHUZHHNDIWHUWKHGHDWKRIWKHILUVWYLFWLPEHIRUHUHSRUWVRQ
NBC and elsewhere acknowledged that letters had been received by media 
organisations containing anthrax spores and threats of more attacks. By this time more 
deadly letters had already been posted to Democrat Senate Majority Leader Tom 
Daschle and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy (New York Times 
2009). From the middle of October to the end of November four or five letters bearing 
WKHVDPHKDQGZULWLQJDQGFRQWDLQLQJOHWKDOµZHDSRQLVHG¶DQWKUD[ZHUHVHQWUHVXOWLQJ
in eighteen cases of infection and five deaths. Thirty-three thousand Americans were 
administered anthrax vaccines or other drugs (Kasuya et al. 2005), many of which had 
severe side effects and the postal service was forced to spend billions of dollars to 
protect their workers from possible attacks (Baltimore Sun 2002). 
 
However, almost as soon as it became clear that the anthrax had originated in an 
American US germ warfare laboratory (see New York Times 2009), media interest in 
WKHFDVHDSSHDUHGWRµIL]]OHRXW¶VHH0RQELRW7HOHYLVLRQQHWZRUNVDQG
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newspapers that had been direct victims of the attacks seemed unperturbed two months 
later that those responsible for the deaths of five people, an assassination attempt on the 
leadership of the Democratic party and the temporary shut down of parts of the US 
government and postal services were still at large (cf. Robin¶V 2004 study of media 
coverage). No suspects were ever apprehended and put on trial, as Mangold notes, and 
yet neither Panorama nor any other British or US teams of investigative reporters 
looked at the failed FBI investigation or the possibility that the same killers might strike 
again. It seems the media were unwilling to follow the trail of the killer into what Tom 
(QJHOKDUGWGHVFULEHVDVµWKHGDUNHVWKHDUWODQGVRI86ELRZHDSRQVUHVHDUFKDQGVRLQWR
the heart of Cold War military R&D from which so much has emerged to endanger our 
worOG¶(QJHOKDUGWS 
 
/DWHULQµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶HYLGHQFHLVEURXJKWIRUZDUGRIPHHWLQJV
between the 9-11 plotter and Iraqi officials that has subsequently been denied by the 
CIA and thoroughly discredited (Tagliabue 2001, Kaufmann 2004) but in 2001 it is 
presented in the report as fact. Sitting at Prague Airport Tom Mangold addresses the 
FDPHUDLQµHYLGHQWLDOPRGH¶VHH&RUQHUVLWWLQJLQWKHORFDWLRQWKH-11 plotter 
and an Iraqi intelligence officer are supposed to have met, Mangold faces the camera 
and presents the following evidence: 
 
0$1*2/'>«@7KHUHDVRQZHNQRZWKHWHUURULVWDQGWKH,UDTLVS\PHW
here at Prague Airport on at least one occasion is because they were 
photographed together by the  Czech Security Services on the day that Atta 
flew to the United States.  But what was Mohamed Atta plotting, and why 
did he have to come so far out of his way just to meet the man who was 
Saddam Hussein's station chief in Prague? 
 
JIM WOOLSEY (Director, CIA, 1993-95) 
It looks extremely suspicious and I doubt very seriously if Mr Atta was in 
that lovely city of Prague as a tourist and just happened to chance upon an 
Iraqi intelligence officer as his tour guide on two occasions, and I also, I 
rather doubt that his interest in crop-dusting was at that point because he 
was interested in a second career.  He knew he had no second career.  Those 
are both extremely suspicious acts on his part. 
 
 
Jim Woolsey is interviewed in a conventional manner wearing a suit and tie and filmed 
in medium close up (MCU) lit, like many of the interviewees, in a muted low-key style 
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with what appears to be a key light and possibly a fill light so that some shadows are 
cast on his face. The location seems to be an office in an urban area although the 
window he sits in front of has the net curtains drawn which mostly obscure the view. As 
with other interviews, µQDPHVXSHUV¶VXEWLWOHV at the bottom left of the screen next to a 
Panorama logo fade in and out briefly at the beginning of the sequence to indicate his 
status, in this case as  µDirector, CIA, 1993-95¶. The interview with Woolsey appears to 
represent confirmation of the meeting between Mohamed Atta and an Iraq spy by US 
intelligence sources, but on closer inspection it is clear the account of the meeting has 
not been officially verified at all, but simply commented on by a former intelligence 
chief. 
 
In a telephone interview with this author Tom Mangold admits that the information 
about the meeting was supplied by a single (named) source from Czech intelligence and 
that reports of the supposedly photographed meeting could not be corroborated further 
at the time. In the interview Mangold describes the information given by his source as 
µWRWDOO\XQWUXH¶4XHULHGLIKHknew LWZDVXQWUXHKHUHSOLHVµ<HV, ZDVWRWDOO\OLHGWR¶
,WZDVWKHQSXWWR0DQJROGWKDWµ,ILWZDVDOLHWKDWVXJJHVWVLWZDVGLVLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WR
ZKLFKKHDQVZHUVµ<HVLWZDV¶:KHQDVNHGZK\&]HFKLQWHOOLJHQFHZDVIHHGLQJIDOVH
LQIRUPDWLRQWRKLPKHUHSOLHVµ,KDYHQRLGHDZKDWWKHbroader plan there was, but it 
ZDVFRPSOHWH«>SDXVH@«LWZDVDOOEROORFNV&RPSOHWHQRQVHQVH¶LQWHUYLHZHGth 
6HSWHPEHU)RUPHU&,$GLUHFWRU-LP:RROVH\¶Vwry, carefully worded 
assessment of this information for the Panorama episode is difficult to explain, but may 
suggest DIRUPRIµRII-the-UHFRUG¶American intelligence endorsement and, at worst, 
possible invoOYHPHQWLQµSODQWLQJ¶WKHVWRU\+RZHYHU7RP Mangold was unwilling to 
VSHFXODWHLQWKLVDUHDµ,WZDVVRPHWLPHDJRDQG,FDQ¶WUHPHPEHU¶DQd so without 
further evidence the precise background to this investigation remains unclear. Jim 
Woolsey appears twice in the programme. Each appearance is less than thirty seconds, 
but each is a highly effective µsoundbite¶. His description of the weapons LQVSHFWRU¶V
success in relation to biological weapons is withering: 
 
Saddam succeeded in keeping all biological agents and all actual material 
away from the inspectors, probably so they couldn't analyse it and type it, 
and he said that he destroyed all of his biological weapons and material for 
it, and if you believe that, as we say over here, I have a bridge in Brooklyn 
I'd like to sell you. 
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The cynical dismissal of Iraqi claims is given extra credence by the calm and measured 
tone it is delivered in. Assessing material offered by intelligence agencies and related 
individuals can be problematic as the current Panorama Editor Tom Giles indicated in 
interview:  
 
D.M: Is there a problem with using security services as your information? 
 
T.G: Of course there is. 
 
D.M: I mean when you talk about authoritative and reliable sources« 
 
T.G: <RX¶YHJRWYLUWXDOO\QRZD\RIYRXFKVDILQJLWDQGWKH\PD\YHU\ZHOO
KDYH\RXNQRZDFOHDUDJHQGDLQZKDWWKH\¶UHWHOOLQJ\RX$QG\RXKDYH
to be very, very careful. Clearly LQWKHUXQWRZDULIVRPHRQH¶VWHOOLQJ\RX
µ:HOOZHKDYHFRPSOHWH\RXNQRZZH¶UHDEVROXWHO\VXUH¶,WFRPHVGRZQ
to your confidence in that source. 
 
D.M: 6R GR \RX WKLQN WKHUH¶s more scepticism now, post 2003, of 
intelligence claims? 
 
T.G: Absolutely. I mean the full consequence of what happened with the 
Gilligan affair, the subsequent Butler Inquiry, the Hutton Inquiry, all these 
inquiries being absolutely to see, to reveal once and for all, though in some 
ZD\V LW¶V DPD]LQJ DQ\RQH EHOLHYHG RWKHUZLVH Whe politicisation of the 
security services. Of course that has made everyone far more suspicious, far 
more suspicious of the sorts of information that was coming out. 
(personal communication,  June 1, 2009) 
 
 
By relying on an unchallenged, and ultimately unreliable, single source a case could be 
made that µ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%RPE¶failed in terms of the legal requirement on current affairs 
SURJUDPPHPDNHUVWRSURYLGHµLPSDUWLDO¶µEDODQFHG¶DQGIDFWXDOO\FRUUect information 
(see chapter 4). This is because while Panorama only dealt witKWKHµWKUHDW¶IURP,UDTin 
parts of the programme, no counter-arguments were set forward to cast doubt on the 
(now discredited) evidence of links EHWZHHQ6DGGDP¶VUHJLPHDQG$O4Deda, although 
British intelligence doubts on this score were voiced by Jane Corbin eleven months later 
LQµ,UDT&ULVLV,QWHUDFWLYH¶(see below). Of the seventeen interviews conducted for µ%LQ
/DGHQ¶V%RPE¶one was with Khidir Hamza, former Head of Iraqi Nuclear Weapons 
Programme, who describes how Saddam had µQRFRPSXQFWLRQ¶DERXWXVLQJ:0'
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DGGLQJWKDWµORRNLQJDWLWQRZLIKHFRXOGXVHLWZLWKFRPSOHWHGHQLDELOLW\KHZRXOG¶ A 
second is with Nabeel Musawi of the Iraqi Opposition National Congress seeking 
6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VRYHUWKURZ0XVDZL, interviewed in what appears to be a hotel suite, 
GHVFULEHVKLVGLVFXVVLRQZLWKDQDQRQ\PRXVGHIHFWRUIURP,UDT¶V,QWHOOLJHQFH6HUYLFHV
recently debriefed by American Intelligence agents. A grainy, black-and-white 
photograph of a young, bald man wearing shaded spectacles taken from behind comes 
into focus, held at an angle against a bright x-ray viewer-type screen. In front of this 
espionage-style photograph of the man (who we assume is the defector) a metal grid 
moves shakily like an aircraft bomb target, perhaps to give the impression of a hunted 
individual who, as Mangold explains, µQHHGVWRVWD\LQKLGLQJ¶ The unnamed 
Lieutenant General was alleged to have witnessed the training of Arab Afghans in 
Salman Pak, which Mangold describes as µKRPHRIWKH>,UDTL@ELRORJLFDOZHDpons 
SURJUDPPH¶   
 
NABEEL MUSAWI: He witnessed on many occasions Arab Afghans going 
in and out of the camp in Salman Pak, but specifically he saw the training of 
Arab Afghans by an Iraqi intelligence officer, another Lieutenant General 
who was training them on hijack [sic] and the protection of planes on a 
Boeing 707 used in the same camp. 
 
 
7KHDOOHJHGWUDLQLQJRIµ$UDE$IJKDQV¶E\,UDTLLQWHOOLJHQFHµclose to Saddam's 
FRQWLQXLQJELRORJLFDOZDUIDUHDFWLYLWLHV¶ is made by an unnamed source and reported by 
an intermediary in the Iraqi Opposition National Congress, but goes unchallenged in the 
programme. Amongst the other interviewees are six British or US emergency 
services/health experts tasked with dealing with WMD attacks; the Chairman of the US 
House Intelligence Committee who recommends that the intelligence community 
µconnect those dots and test it and say is this something that is possible¶; and a former 
Head of the Soviet Biological Warfare Programme. No experts, academics or former 
weapons inspectors are brought forward to throw doubts on the claims of links between 
Iraq and Al Qaeda despite widespread scepticism of any such connection (see Appendix 
2.5). As Hans Blix, Director of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) (2000-KDVZULWWHQLWZDVQRWµVHULRXVO\
claimed that there was any significant link between the Iraqi regime and those 
responsible for the [9-@WHUURUDWWDFN¶S<HWPanorama makes such a link 
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LQµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%RPE¶VXSSRUWHGE\ the testimony of a number of apparently credible 
sources. 
 
 
,Qµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW6DGGDP¶W[Panorama H[DPLQHVµ6DGGDP¶VKLVWRU\RI
developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and examines just what he may 
KDYH¶ (BBC 2010). 
 
JANE CORBIN 
:H¶YHSXW WRJHWKHU WKHKDUGHYLGHQFHRIZKDWKH¶V DFWXDOO\JRW WRGD\ DQG
what he stands a good chance of getting in the not too distant future.  
Tonight we ask what is the real case against Saddam Hussein and is it strong 
enough to justify going to war?   
 
 
&RUELQ¶VLQWURGXFWLRQLVIROORZHGE\OLEUDU\IRRWDJHRI6DGGDP+XVVHLQLQ3DULVLQ
meeting the then Prime Minister of France, Jacques Chirac. Just before we see Saddam 
Hussein there are library shots of the Eiffel Tower and tourists in Paris accompanied by 
music. This begins, under the image of the Eiffel Tower, with the opening bars of The 
Godfather (1972) soundtrack which may have been selected to suggest Saddam 
+XVVHLQ¶Vruthless, criminal character. The image of the Eiffel Tower is followed by a 
brief shot of a tourist painting Notre Dame Cathedral as the voice-over adds: µParis, 
1975, a visitor with a secret ambition arrived on a costly shopping spree¶. There is a 
zoom on a large, white, low-rise building in a more rural setting which cuts to Saddam 
Hussein sitting next to Jacques Chirac and then of him being led, by men in white lab 
coats, on a tour of a nuclear facility. Corbin explains that Saddam had come to buy a 
QXFOHDUUHDFWRUµIRUSHDFHIXOSXUSRVHV, KHVDLG¶7KHQH[WVKRWVKRZV6DGGDPLQ Iraq 
and the music segues into a sinister Arabic-style horn accompaniment, perhaps from a 
ILOPVXFKDV$OH[DQGHU.RUGD¶VThe Thief of Baghdad (1940), DV&RUELQ¶VYRLFH-over 
WHOOVXVµBut back in Baghdad Saddam was soon summoning his top atomic energy 
officials¶.   
 
Now iWLVUHYHDOHGWKDW6DGGDP¶VUHDOSODQZDVWRGHYHORSDERPEDQGKHSHUVXDGHG
some of his top scientists, using threats and brutal torture techniques to work on this 
secret weapons programme. Interviews with Dr Hussein Al Shahristani, former Senior 
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Scientific Advisor, Atomic Energy Organisation of Iraq who spent eleven years in an 
Iraqi prison, give vivid testimony to this method of persuading scientists to work on the 
nuclear programme. Library footage of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor at 
Osirak in 1981 are followed by footage from a Panorama programme made in 1990 
showing how Saddam Hussein was undeterred in his nuclear ambition and was using his 
µYDVWRLOUHVHUYHV¶WREX\QXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\IURPZHVWHUQFRPSDQLHV The use of the 
Panorama DUFKLYHLVPDGHH[SOLFLWLQµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW6DGGDP¶E\UROOLQJWKHHDUOLHU
1990-style Panorama globe graphic before the sequence and, later, by including shots 
of a younger-looking Jane Corbin conducting the interviews. 
 
 
An interview with Richard Perle begins around six minutes into the programme. Perle is 
one of 68 US interviewees compared to 70 British interviewees in the 25 episodes 
studied (excluding members of the public) showing the very strong trans-Atlantic 
IODYRXURI3DQRUDPD¶VFoverage as in Gulf 1 (see Appendix 2.5). Perle is introduced as 
Chairman of the Defence Policy Board at the Department of Defence, but is speaking to 
Panorama µLQKLVSHUVRQDOFDSDFLW\¶. He begins by arguing that allowing Saddam to 
develop his weapons woulGPHDQµwe will be unable to oppose his ambitions whatever 
they may turn out to be¶. The interview filmed in a darkened studio setting is divided 
into seven different segments and is intercut with a variety of other interviews, many 
from the Panorama archive, along thematic lines. Interviewees from the archive include 
senior British and US military figures such as General Sir Peter De La Billiere 
(Commander, UK Forces, Gulf War) and General Colin Powell interviewed in 1996 and 
a contemporary interview with Dr David Kay (Chief Nuclear Weapons Inspector, 1991-
92GLVFXVVLQJ,UDT¶VQXFOHDUDQGFKHPLFDOZHDSRQVFDSDELOLW\LQWKHV 
 
 
µ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW6DGGDP¶>W[@XVHVDQXPEHURISUHYLRXV Panorama 
investigations of the Iraqi regime to build its case alongside information from a 
government dossier which was yet to be released to Parliament. Reporting from a studio 
with banks of  computer screens and large aerial photographs scattered across the desk 
dramatically lit in much the same way as the opening sequence in µ%LQ/DGHQ¶V
  
226 
%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶-DQH&RUELQXVHVHYLGHQFHIURPearlier Panoramas and the new, as 
\HWµXQUHOHDVHG¶HYLGHQFHIURPLQWHOOLJHQFHVHUYLFHVWRPDNHWKHIROORZLQJDVVHVVPHQW  
 
CORBIN:  So where has Saddam got to in rebuilding his chemical weapons 
capability today?  He still has enough material to manufacture 200 tons of 
9;JDVLQMXVWDIHZZHHNV$QGKH¶VJRWVHYHUDOKXQGUHGWRQVRIPXVWDUG
JDVWKHFKRNLQJDJHQWKH¶VXVHGEHIRUHSOXVVHYHUDOWKRXVDQGPXQLWLRQVWR
deliver it on the battlefield.  This summer a chemical plant at Faluja showed 
signs of being rebuilt after an earlier pounding from British and US 
warplanes.  Satellite pictures revealed new chemical storage tanks, buildings 
and piping systems.  The CIA believes Saddam is up to his old tricks, 
producing chlorine here, but far more than Iraq actually needs.  Chlorine is 
an ingredient in some chemical weapons.    
 
 
&RUELQ¶VHYLGHQFH suggests that government and/or US intelligence services cooperated 
extensively with Panorama in the making of the programme, a view supported by 
VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDVµ7KH&,$EHOLHYHV6DGGDPLVXSWRKLVROGWULFNV¶8QOLNHµ%LQ
/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶KRZHYHUFRXQWHUDUJXPHQWVDUHJLYHQVSDFHVXFKDV
comments by Sir Michael Quinlan former Permanent Under-Secretary Minister of 
Defence (1988-92) who says 415 words (coded partial opposition) and the more critical 
former UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Iraq Hans von Sponek (168 words ± coded 
full opposition). In fact, grading degrees of support or opposition becomes problematic 
as the following quote makes clear. Von Sponek is asked by Corbin: 
 
CORBIN:  The reporters only saw one small part of the vast complex and 
QRW EHLQJ H[SHUWV FRXOG RQO\ UHSRUWZKDW WKH\ ,UDTLV WROG WKHP  %XW KH¶V
known to have hidden his chemical weapons production facilities all over 
WKHSODFH 7KHUHDUHPDQ\ VLWHVZLWKGXDOXVH VR LW¶VKDUG WR UHDOO\NQRZ
ZKDW¶VJRLQJRQLQ,UDT 
 
6321(&.,ZRXOGDJUHHWKDW LWLVQRWHDV\WRNQRZZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJLQ
Iraq, but the important point to remember is that we have in different areas, 
in the humanitarian field as well as in the disarmament field, we have 
examples where information is given to the public, information is given to 
political decision makers, which is wrong.  That was what worries me 
EHFDXVH \RXGRQ¶WZDQW WR HQGXS LQYROYLQJ(XURSH DQG WKH86 LQ DZDU
based on conjecture and disinformation. 
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&RGLQJ&RUELQKHUHDVQHXWUDOLVFOHDUO\DQLVVXHDVLV+DQVYRQ6SRQHN¶VUHVSRQVH
Coded 5 as oppositional, it could equally be coded 4 as partly oppositional as von 
Sponek (a prominent anti-war figure) admits some degree of uncertainty DVWRµZKDW¶V
KDSSHQLQJLQ,UDT¶6LPLODUO\6LU0LFKDHO4XLQODQ¶VGRXEWVFRGHGZKLOH
GLSORPDWLFDOO\H[SUHVVHGDQGHPSOR\LQJWKHµQRWHQRXJKHYLGHQFH¶DUJXPHQWDUH
forceful enough to merit full opposition coding (5): 
 
SIR MICHAL QUINLAN:  I find the desire to push this forward in great 
haste disquieting.  No one claims that Saddam has nuclear weapons now.  
,¶YH VHHQ QR FRPSHOOLQJ HYLGHQFH that he is very close to getting nuclear 
weapons and that stands quite aside from the question of even if he has 
them.  Even if one day he gets them, why will not deterrence work as it has 
in so many other contexts and as it did with Saddam? 
 
Coding of thHHQWLUHWUDQVFULSWHYHQDVVXPLQJ&RUELQ¶VFRPPHQWDU\DVµQHXWUDO¶
indicates a more than three-to-RQHµELDV¶WRZDUGVEURDGO\SUR-war arguments (21.3% 
coded partial or full opposition against 73.7%  supportive or partially supportive). Yet, 
&RUELQ¶VFRQFOXsion at the end of the programme underlines the problem of coding 
UHSRUWHUVDVµQHXWUDO¶DQGLVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKHGLUHFWLRQSRLQWHGE\PRVWRIWKHHYLGHQFH
presented: 
 
CORBIN:  The dilemma is that if politicians do not act, Saddam will 
continue down the nuFOHDUSDWK %XWLIKH¶VDWWDFNHGWKHQKHPD\XVHKLV
FKHPLFDO RU ELRORJLFDO DJHQWV  7KH KDZNV DUH FOHDU ZKHUH $PHULFD¶V
interests lie. 
 
Well, if containment has failed with Saddam Hussein, what message does 
that send to other states seeking weapons of mass destruction about the 
attitude America will take towards them? 
 
PERLE:  Well, I hope it sends the message that if you pursue weapons of 
mass destruction and if you are a threat to the United States, we will not 
stand by and allow you to achieve your objectives. 
 
CORBIN:  The Bush administration has put Saddam and the rest of the 
world on notice.  This is a new era.  Time for Saddam Hussein is running 
out. 
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The interview with the hawkish Richard Perle was one of five appearances in separate 
Panorama episodes in which he laid out the neo-conservative strategy (a total of 1,593 
words).  
 
&RUELQ¶VFRQFOXGLQJUHPDUNVPDNHWKUHHDVVXPSWLRQVEDVHGRQWKLVµHYLGHQFH¶ILUVWO\
WKDWWKHµ6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH¶KDGDQDFWLYHDQGSRWHQWLDOO\WKUHDWHQLQJQXFOHDU
programme, secondly, that it was in possession of chemical or biological agents and 
WKLUGO\WKDWµFRQWDLQPHQW¶KDVIDLOHGWRSUHYHQW6DGGDP+XVVHLQGHYHORSLQJWKHVH
weapons. As Scott Ritter and other former weapons inspectors not interviewed by Jane 
Corbin had argued, none of these assumptions were correct (see Ritter 2005). The 
coding of pro- or anti-war statements and views aired by Panorama in this study 
initially excluded any comment by the presenters or journalists (coded simply as (7) 
UHSRUWHU¶VFRPPHQWEXW, as has been shown, DQ\DVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKHµREMHFWLYLW\¶RU
µQHXWUDOLW\¶RIVXFKFRPPHQWVare thrown into doubt on closer examination. 
Consequently a framing analysis of the reporter/presenter input was conducted on the 
nine pre-war Panorama episodes to assess their contribution (see Appendix 2.7). This 
was designed to parallel the coding scheme (1-7)1 developed for interviewees (see 
discussion of methodology in Chapter 3). While this approach proved problematic, 
particularly given the supposed role of rHSRUWHUDVFULWLFDOLQWHUURJDWRURUµGHYLO¶V
DGYRFDWH¶LQLQWHUYLHZVLWGLGSURYLGHVRPHLQGLFDWLRQRIKRZWKHGHEDWHVZHUH
structured and led. )RUERWKµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶DQGµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW
6DGGDP¶DFRGLQJRIWKHSUHVHQWHU¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ indicates more than 80% to be framed 
in ways congruent with pro-war or partially pro-war views (see Appendix 2.8.1).  
 
         
 
,Qµ,UDT&ULVLV,QWHUDFWLYH¶E\FRQWUDVW%%&FRUUHVSRQGHQWDQGUHSRUWHULQSXWWHQGVWR
EHIDUPRUHµQHXWUDO¶DQGRSHQWRDGPitting both pro- and anti-war voices. In fact, while 
voiced contributions from the public make up less than 4% of the total programme, 
more than twice as many of these offer anti-war or partly anti-war views compared to 
pro- or partly pro-war contributions. This may be due to the public mood of the time 
                                               
 
1 3DUDOOHOLQJWKHFRGLQJRIRWKHULQWHUYLHZHHVµVXSSRUW¶IRUWKHZDUµSDUWLDOVXSSRUW¶
µQHXWUDO¶µSDUWLDORSSRVLWLRQ¶µRSSRVLWLRQ¶µRIILFLDO,UDTLYLHZ¶VHH$SSHQGL[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which polls showed was still largely anti-war. As Greg Dyke wrote in 2003 in an open 
letter to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair in defence of the BBC against charges of 
anti-war bias: 
 
>«@ I set up a committee which ...decided to prevent any senior editorial 
figures at the BBC from going on the anti-war march; it was that committee 
which insisted that we had to find a balanced audience for programmes like 
Question Time at a time when it was very hard to find supporters of the war 
willing to come on.  
And it was that same committee when faced with a massive bias against the 
war among phone-in callers, decided to increase the number of phone lines 
so that pro-war listeners had a better chance of getting through and getting 
onto the programmes. All this was done in an attempt to ensure our 
coverage was balanced.  
(21st March 2003) 
 
 
In the live EURDGFDVWµ,UDT&ULVLV,QWHUDFWLYH¶the first of its kind for Panorama, veteran 
World Affairs Editor John Simpson is amongst eight BBC reporters and special 
correspondents answering pre-filmed and emailed viewer questions. The journalists are, 
like Panorama¶VJane Corbin and John Simpson, either gathered around a large, circular 
glass table with their laptops open or, as with Matt Frei, Andrew Marr and Alan Little, 
telecast from locations around the world on a bank of large wall-mounted screens. 
9LHZHUVDUHHQFRXUDJHGWRµYRWH¶E\WH[WRUWHOHSKRQHRQWKHTXHVWLRQµ,VZDU
LQHYLWDEOH"¶H[DFWO\HFKRLQJWKHWLWOHRID*XOI1 Panorama µ,V:DU,QHYLWDEOH¶>tx: 
14.01.91]*DYLQ(VOHUFDOOVIRUYLHZHU¶VYRWHVRQWKLVPRWLRQLQa manner similar to 
polls on shows such as Strictly Come Dancing, X Factor and Big Brother: 
 
GAVIN ESLER: Or you can also vote by phoning the following numbers 
09001800311, to vote Yes, war is inevitable and 09001800322 to vote No.  
Calls cost no more than 10p.   
 
 
It is QRWHZRUWK\WKDWVXFKDQXQFRQWURYHUVLDOµSUHGLFWLYH¶TXHVWLRQZDVSXWWRWKHYRWH
rather than the more controversial and widely debated µPRUDO¶DQGµSROLWLFDO¶TXHVWLRQRI
whether a war was the right thing for the nation to be embarking on, a question that was 
being debated passionately LQWKHZLGHUµSXEOLFVSKHUH¶ 
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Seated in this colourful studio with video conference screens showing other BBC 
journalists in Washington, Paris and Baghdad, Simpson offers his view of Iraqi 
weapons capability, amongst other topics relating to the looming war. Simpson is 
responding to a series of diverse questions posed by members of the public, who are 
filmHGLQµYR[-SRS¶VW\OHRQKLJKVWUHHWVDURXQGWKHFRXQWU\7KHVHPHPEHUVRIWKH
public face the camera with their brief questions and are framed to the left of the screen 
occupying around a third of the image - inset within an orange and brown computer-
geneUDWHGPDSZKLFKIODVKHVWRLQGLFDWHWKHFLWLHVWKH\DUHILOPHGLQ*DYLQ(VOHU¶Vjoke 
about the burkah at the end of the viewerV¶ TXHVWLRQVLQFLGHQWDOO\UHIHUVWR6LPSVRQ¶V
lampooned but, probably tongue-in-cheek quip in 2002 that, arriving ahead of the army, 
WKH%%&KDGµOLEHUDWHG¶.DEXOFI6LPSVRQ 
 
1$7$/,( >0DQFKHVWHU@ +L P\ QDPH¶V 1DWDOLH ,¶P IURP 2OG 7UDIIRUG
and I would like to know is this going to escalate into a full world war? 
 
GERALD MCMILLAN [Glasgow]: I believe we need to stop Saddam 
Hussain now and go to war and get it sorted out. 
 
67(9( -$59,6 >&DUGLII@ :K\ GLGQ¶W WKH\ ILQLVK KLP RII ODVW WLPH"
:KDW¶VJRLQJWRFKDQJHWKLVWLPH" 
 
NATASHA RITCHIE [Birmingham]: If we do go to war, will the UK be a 
target for terrorism? 
 
BOB [StockSRUW@+HOORP\ QDPH¶V%RE DQG ,¶P IURP6WRFNSRUW DQG ,¶G
like to know is it safe to travel abroad? 
 
ALICE PARSONS [Cardiff]: Is Blair putting Britain at risk by just agreeing 
with Bush? 
 
*$9,1(6/(5-RKQZHOOWKHUH¶VDIODYRXURILWDQG-RKQ6LPSVRQ¶Vseen 
a lot of war zones.  And I have to say John some of the emails suggested 
\RXFRXOGJRLQDQGOLEHUDWH%DJKGDGLQDEXUNDKEXW OHW¶VJHWRQWRPRUH
serious matters. 
 
-2+16,03621+H¶GEHLQWURXEOHLI,GLG 
 
ESLER: Perhaps he would.  Neil in Manchester, How safe is the rest of the 
ZRUOGZLWK D UHJLPH OLNH 6DGGDP¶V"  3LFNLQJ XS RQ D ORW RI WKRVH SRLQWV
there. 
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JOHN SIMPSON: It always seems to me that the real problem behind all 
WKLV LV WKDW LI \RX VWLU XS6DGGDP+XVVHLQ KH¶OO XVH WKHZHDSRQV WKDW KH 
XQGRXEWHGO\ KDV VHFUHWO\DQG KH¶V EHHQGHYHORSLQJZLWKRXWDQ\TXHVWLRQ
DWDOOXVHWKHPDJDLQVW,VUDHO7KHQZHKDYHWKHTXHVWLRQµ'RHV,VUDHOVWULNH
EDFNDW,UDT"¶ 
 
  
Simpson XVHVWKHYDJXHH[SUHVVLRQµZHDSRQV¶EXWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQWKDWWKHVHDUH
µXQGRXEWHGO\¶EHLQJµVHFUHWO\¶GHYHORSHGsuggests he is referring to WMD and this is 
SLFNHGXSE\WKH%%&¶VFRUUHVSRQGHQW'DYLG6KXNPDQLQ9LHQQDZKRVLWWLQJZLWKD
file open on his lap, makes the same point more explicitly: 
 
*$9,1(6/(5 >«@/HWPHPRYHRYer to Vienna and David Shukmann 
now because a lot of our questions also have asked, David, whether we are 
at risk.  Whether there is a terrorist threat to us as Natasha Ritchie was 
saying in Birmingham there.  Will the UK be a target for terrorism?  What 
do you think? 
 
'$9,'6+8&.0$1:HOO , WKLQN LW¶V SHUIHFWO\ SUREDEOH :KHWKHU LW¶V
JRLQJWRKDSSHQD ORWZHVLPSO\FDQ¶WWHOO %XW,WKLQNWKHUHDUHSUREDEO\
two direct threats to British interests.  One is, imagine British forces 
gathering in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia before an attack on Iraq and Saddam 
feels that his back is against the wall, he may well use the chemical and 
biological weapons that we know he has, as John was saying.  The other 
route, that terrorist threat, if he feels that he really, his days in Baghdad 
really are numbered and he can only leave feet first, there is a possibility 
obviously that he may pass on whatever weapons he has to other groups that 
may be favourable to him. 
 
 
:KLOHWKH%%&ZDVWRIDFHLWVµJUHDWHVWHGLWRULDOFULVLV¶IRU *LOOLJDQ¶VFODLPWKDWWKH
JRYHUQPHQWµVH[HGXS¶LWVFDVHIRUZDUDQGLQVHUWHGLQWHOOLJHQFHNQRZLQJLWZDV
µSUREDEO\ZURQJ¶ILUPDQGXQTXDOLILHGDVVHUWLRQVE\%%&FRUUHVSRQGHQWVWKDWµZH
NQRZ¶6DGGDPKDVFKHPLFDODQGELRORJLFDOZHDSRQVKDYHlargely passed unremarked in 
WKHPHGLDRULQWKHEXONRIVFKRODUO\ZRUNRQWKH&RUSRUDWLRQ¶VFRQIOLFWFRYHUDJH 
Nevertheless, not all BBC reporter/presenter contributions were framed in ways 
supportive of the official view. To take just one example Gavin Esler reads out some of 
the more sceptical anti-war views sent in and Caroline Hawley a BBC correspondent 
based in Iraq relays both official Iraqi denial and Arab anti-war sentiment in her 
response: 
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GAVIN ESLER: /HW¶V MXVW EULQJ LQ VRPH YRLFHV IURP HOVHZKHUH LQ WKH
world.  Some of our viewers are pretty sceptical too about the real reason 
why America is gunning for Iraq.  Wendy from Bath is pretty typical here, 
VKH VDLG µ7KLVZDU KDV QRWKLQJ WR GRZLWK RU DQ\ WKUHDW WR WKH:HVW
,W¶VDOODERXWRLORLORLO¶7KDW must play down pretty well in Baghdad eh 
Caroline? 
 
CAROLINE HAWLEY: $EVROXWHO\ WKDW¶VZKDW WKH\VDLGDOO DORQJ 7KH\
say this is not about weapons inspections, it is about oil.  I was speaking to a 
senior Iraqi official not too long ago who said, that really there is no reason 
now for any attack.  That in Kuwait, after Iraq went into Kuwait in 1990, 
WKDWZDVWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQKHVDLGIRUWKH*XOI:DU%XWKHVDLGµ:KDW
KDYHZHGRQHQRZ":KDWKDYHZHGRQHRYHUWKHODVWGHFDGH"¶6RFHUWDLQO\
the feeling in Iraq and the feeling among ordinary people as well is that it is 
about oil. 
 
 
The difficulty of coding presenter/reporter contributions is obvious here. Gavin Esler 
LQWURGXFHVDQGUHDGVRXWYLHZVZKLFKFDQEHFRGHGµUDGLFDODQWL-ZDU¶DQGVRKLV 
FRQWULEXWLRQLVFRGHG\HWWKHILQDOOLQHµThat must play down pretty well in Baghdad 
eh Caroline?¶FRXOGEHUHDGDVFULWLFDOO\IUDPHGDVLWDOOLHVDQWL-war sentiment with 
%D¶DWK3DUW\SHUVSHFWLYHV-XGJLQJKRZWRFRGHWKLVXOWLPDWHO\EHFRPHVDVXEMHFW ive 
matter and while this paragraph has all been coded 5 µIXOORSSRVLWLRQ¶it is a judgement 
that could be GLVSXWHG6LPLODUO\&DUROLQH+DZOH\¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLVDSHUIHFWO\SURSHU
HODERUDWLRQRIWKH,UDTL*RYHUQPHQW¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDQGLVobviously not meant to 
LQGLFDWH&DUROLQH¶VYLHZ :KDWµWKH\VDLG¶± LQGLFDWHVµ,UDTLRIILFLDOSHUVSHFWLYHV¶DQG
WKLVFRQWULEXWLRQLVFRGHGµ,UDTL*RYHUQPHQW¶DSDUWIURPWKHODVWOLQHZKLFKVWUDGGOHV
both official Iraqi perspectives and Arab anti-war perspectives (see Appendix 2.7). This 
final line KDVEHHQFRGHGµIXOORSSRVLWLRQ¶EXW could also, equally, have been coded 6.  
 
 
Coding of all the BBC presenter/correspondent contributions for this programme threw 
up many examples of framing that encompassed a number of views simultaneously, of 
ambivalence, shifts in perspectives and of qualifications or further questions. We see in 
PDQ\RIWKHDQVZHUVWRYLHZHU¶VTXHVWLRQVWKHFRUUHVSRQGHQWVDQGUHSRUWHUVWU\LQJWR
µKROGWKHPLGGOHJURXQG¶.XPDUDQGQRWYROXQWHHUDSHrsonal view, but guide 
the viewer through competing explanatory narratives. Hence 51% of the contribution in 
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this programme LVFRGHGDVµQHXWUDO¶RUWRRILQHO\EDODQFHGWRFRGHDQ\RWKHUZD\ (see 
Appendix 2.8.1).  The problem definitions are often, but not always, drawn from elite 
debates, particularly amongst the European, British and American political class and we 
see less time given to hawkish, neo-conservative pro-war or radical anti-war positions, 
EXWPRUHWRSDUWO\VXSSRUWLYHµRIILFLDOSHUVSHFWLYHV¶FRGHG8%) or partly 
oppositional views (coded 4: 27%). In strong contrast to the previous two Panorama 
episodes, reporter/presenter framing appears to offer more support, on the whole, to a 
range of anti-war perspectives than to pro-war views.       
 
 
The same cannot be said, however, for the next Panorama LQYHVWLJDWLRQµ6addam: A 
:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶>W[@ presented by John Simpson which opens with 
moving images from a computer game µ&RQIOLFW'HVHUW6WRUP¶ showing Saddam 
Hussein in his bunker and then on the run, intercut with Iraqi celebratory videos 
IHDWXULQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VOHDGHU. The commentary begins over edited shots from the game 
LQZKLFKDQ$PHULFDQVROGLHUUXQVWKURXJKZKDWORRNVOLNH%DJKGDGµA brand new 
JDPHKDVKLW$PHULFD¶VFRmputer screens as Saddam Hussein lurks in his bunker the 
forces of freedom and democracy close in for the kill¶.  This is followed by clips from 
,UDT¶VVWDWH-controlled television of the leader being handed flowers by children, 
walking amongst the public and firing a rifle from a balcony. Simpson links these µWZR-
GLPHQVLRQDO¶LPDJHs of the Iraqi dictator:  µ%XWZKLFKRI6DGGDP¶VPDQ\IDFHVLVWKH
real one?  And as the final showdown comes, what lessons can we draw from the past 
about what he will do now?¶AVWKHVHOLQHVDUHGHOLYHUHGWKHWLWOHµ6$''$0$
:DUQLQJIURP+LVWRU\¶IUHH]Hs over a computerised image of a limping Saddam 
Hussein running towards the camera with a gun target superimposed on his face which 
then fades to black. 
 
When the image fades in again it is on a black-and-white portrait of Saddam Hussein 
projected on a screen some distance away.  $VLQWKHVWXGLRVKRWVRI-DQH&RUELQLQµ7KH
&DVH$JDLQVW6DGGDP¶WKHFDPHUDnow tracks slowly towards the presenter sitting at a 
computer desk. The camera passes various objects in the foreground on a warehouse-
style, metal open shelf, including two black-and-white still images of Saddam Hussein, 
a few Sony computer disks, a white hard drive, a jug and some glasses of water. As the 
camera tracks along the shelf passing the various objects and images of the Iraqi leader 
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a synthesizer descends dramatically down the scale. This menacing design sound effect 
is not unlike that used in the introduction of a villain in Dr Who. In the background, 
partly obscured by the shelf is a large screen on which computer images are projected, 
DVLQµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶. The screen shows two grainy photographs of 
Saddam Hussein side by side with measuring points being manipulated on each face. 
Beneath the screen two men sit at a desk looking at a large computer screen which is the 
only other apparent source of light in the darkened studio. This casts a bluish light on 
the men whose faces are half obscured by shadow as they study the monitor.  The 
tracking shot ends on this medium-long shot of Simpson and a German scientist Dieter 
Buhmann as they examine the computer screen with serious expressions. The following 
exchange takes place over close ups of Simpson and Buhmann and screen shots of 
Saddam Hussein and his various doubles: 
 
SIMPSON:  For years Saddam Hussein has been fooling everyone.  A 
German forensic scientist Dieter Buhmann, armed with the latest computer 
technology, has analysed thousands of hours of video footage and made an 
extraordinary discovery. 
 
BUHMANN:  On the left side is the real Mr Saddam Hussein, on the right 
side is Mr Hussein in the year 94. 
 
SIMPSON:  He takes careful measurements of the images of the genuine 
Saddam.  He knows there is one double but he is surprised at what he finds. 
 
BUHMANN:  I found the left one is the real Saddam Hussein in the year 
1990, the second is a double and those are the other doubles. 
 
SIMPSON:  Are you absolutely certain that those are four different men that 
we are looking at there? 
 
BUHMANN:  I am absolutely sure. 
  
 
7KLVLQWURGXFWLRQVHWVWKHVFHQHIRUWKHLQYHVWLJDWLRQZKLFKORRNVDW6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶V
history of duplicity and cruelty from his earliest days as a violent youth in Tikrit, to his 
position as ruthless and feared dictator in Iraq. The programme is largely composed of 
library footage and includes several sequences seen previously in µ7KH0LQGRI
6DGGDP¶>W[@GXULQJWKH)LUVW*XOI:DUIndeed there are interviews with two 
of the same specialists: the CIA psychologist Dr Jerrold Post and Hassan Al Alawi 
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IRUPHUµVSLQGRFWRU¶WRWKHOHDGHU as well as similar comparisons with Joseph Stalin 
who Saddam Hussein allegedly admired. There is also the same archive clip of Saddam 
being interviewed by Richard Lindley for Panorama VKRZQLQµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW
SDGGDP¶LQZKLFKKHZLOOLQJO\DGPLWVWKDWKLVRSSRQHQWVKRXOGEHµsubject to execution 
and to torture in accordance with the law¶ 
 
 
While much of the narrative is framed in ways implicitly supportive of the British 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ6LPSVRQ¶VYRLFHRYHr also contains a few reminders of 
6DGGDP¶VSUHYLRXVVWDWXVDVZHVWHUQDOO\In one extract, for instance, describing the 
,UDTLOHDGHU¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRXVH:0'LQWKH,UDQ-Iraq War there is a short reminder of 
WKHZHVW¶VUROHLQDUPLQJKLP 
 
SIMPSON: The war had reached stalemate.  Iraq was haemorrhaging men 
and money.  Now he was backed into a corner Saddam showed how far he 
would go to save his regime.  Again using western technology, Saddam 
deployed a weapon scarcely seen since the first world war - poison gas.  It 
was horribly effective against the closely packed Iranian forces. 
 
 
Hence, while the paragraph is mostly coded 2 (partly supportive), the third sentence is 
coded 5 (oppositional) because it reiterates a point made by many anti-war campaigners 
that Saddam Hussein had previously been a friend of Britain and the US. Nevertheless, 
DIUDPHDQDO\VLVRI6LPSVRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVKRZVWKDWLWPLUURUVTXLWHDFFXUDWHO\WKH
various contributions from interviewees, in that around 60% is coded partly supportive 
ZLWKDURXQGµQHXWUDO¶RUWRRILQHO\EDODQFHGWRFRGHDFFXUDWHO\6LPSVRQ¶V
attention to previous Western support for Saddam Hussein and failure to support the 
Shiite uprising that had been encouraged by George Bush senior following the First 
Gulf War OHGWRRIKLVYRLFHRYHUEHLQJFRGHGµRSSRVLWLRQDO¶LQLWVIUDPLQJ:KLOH
WKHSUREOHPVRIDSSO\LQJDIUDPLQJDQDO\VLVLQDQµREMHFWLYH¶VWULFWO\UHSOLFDEOHPDQQHU
are again apparent it is clear that the great majority of the programme, including John 
SLPSVRQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQZDVIUDPHGLQZD\VWKDWJDYHRYHUZKHOPLQJPRUHWKDQ-1) 
VXSSRUWIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFDVHIRUDµWRXJKOLQH¶DJDLQVW,UDT 
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Looking back at the first four programmes related to the looming war it seems clear 
than until December 2002 Panorama had mainly relied on official US and British 
JRYHUQPHQWVSRNHVSHUVRQV,UDTLGLVVLGHQWVDQGLQWHOOLJHQFHVRXUFHVIRUWKHµHYLGHQFH¶
of its investigations. As Miller (1994) notes: 
 
Journalists continue to mistake authority and status for credibility and are 
orientated towards the state in their work practices and their reportage. 
However, the extent to which the state or the government comes in for 
criticism from the media is variable.  It depends among other things on the 
balance of political forces at any time.  If the government is weak or divided 
then it will be easier for journalists to criticise and for the broadcasters to 
resist pressure and intimidation 
(p.277) 
 
It is against this context at the end of 2002, with mounting alarm amongst sections of 
the established parliamentary parties, military and intelligence services that Panorama 
produced a programme that contained a range of explicitly anti-war arguments and 
voices.   
 
 
If Panorama¶V investigations had until this point been, in effect, µSUR-ZDU¶WKHQH[W
investigation was clearly framed to address the perceived imbalaQFH,Qµ7KH&DVH
$JDLQVW:DU¶>W[@ several opponents of the war were interviewed. This was, in 
a sense, less a Panorama investigation than a chance for figures opposed to the war to 
express their doubts. Steve Bradshaw does the voice over but does not appear before the 
FDPHUDDVKHGRHVODWHULQµ7KH:DU3DUW\¶>@RUDV0DQJROG&RUELQRU
Simpson had done in their investigations. It is through the content of the interviews that 
the case against war is made, although %UDGVKDZ¶VYRLFHRYHUGRHVRIWHQDGGYHU\WHOOLQJ
detail to the arguments made. The interviewees include Major General Patrick 
Cordingley (Commander 7th Armoured Brigade 1988-91); Haifa Zangana, an Iraqi 
exile tortured by the regime, but still opposed to war; Robert Baer a former CIA agent 
who worried about destabilizing the region; Sir Andrew Green ± former Ambassador to 
Syria and Saudi Arabia; Jessica Stern (former presidential advisor on the National 
Security Council); Chuck Hagel (Republican Foreign Relations Committee) a right 
wing senator and Vietnam veteran who called for more debate; and the Bishop of 
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2[IRUG5W5HY5LFKDUG+DUULHVZKRVDLGµ,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHWUDGLWLRQDOµMXVWZDU¶
criterLDKDYHEHHQPHW¶ 
 
The interview with Jessica Stern to some extent typifies the tenor of the argument 
amongst those opposed to war for practical or tactical reasons, rather than on moral and 
legal grounds. Shots of Jessica Stern driving a Volkswagen car in a rainy US city 
(possibly Boston) accompany %UDGVKDZ¶Vvoice-over introduction. As with the other 
anti-war interviewees there is a brief freeze frame of Stern which fades to monochrome 
with her title (in uppercase) superimposed on the image of her at the wheel. The 
introduction emphasises her credentials to speak on matters of security: 
 
The PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER 
 
In the 90s Jessica Stern was an advisor to President Clinton.  She once 
warned that terrorists could nuke the Empire State building and to alert 
people for the dangers of so-called hyper-terrorism she helped make the 
+ROO\ZRRG PRYLH ³7KH 3HDFHPDNHU´ VKH ZDV WKH PRGHO IRU WKH 1LFROH
Kidman character who saves New York from a nuclear suitcase bomb.  The 
former presidential adviser now lectures on public policy and religious 
terrorism at Harvard University. 
 
JESSICA STERN (National Security Council, 1994-95) 
There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq.  Saddam poses a 
threat to the entire world.  However, we need to consider whether the risks 
of going to war exceed the benefit and I believe they do. 
 
-HVVLFD6WHUQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLVFRGHGSDUWO\RSSRVLWLRQDO although she gives 
compelling security-based reasons for not going to war, many of which have proved 
prescient: 
 
We are in the middle of a war on terrorism, this is the most important war 
we have to fight.  Right now terrorists pose a far more significant threat to 
international security than states do.  I think that attacking Saddam will 
increase the appeal, will help the terrorists mobilise disgruntled youth.  We, 
in fact, will be doing Al-4DHGD¶VZRUNLIZHDWWDFN6DGGDP 
 
 
More radical anti-war voices are given some space in the programme, although they 
tend to be used in the spaces between the more soberµLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\HQGRZHG¶ 
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assessments, such as those by Chuck Hegel or the Bishop of Oxford.  Tony Benn, 
President of the Stop the War Coalition which organized huge demonstrations, is 
µLQWHUYLHZHG¶IRUten seconds, for instance, compared to several minutes of airtime for 
each of the other contributors. Analysis reveals that the programme dealt mainly with 
nuances of opposition within the establishment ± and reflected only incidentally the 
more radical perspectives of the anti-war movement. Arguments were largely based 
around the notion that the threat had not reached a level where a war was fully justified, 
rather than arguments that the war was completely unjustified, illegal and immoral. 
 
The interview with the Iraqi exile Haifa Zangana, however, is mostly coded 5 
µRSSRVLWLRQDO¶GXHWRLWVIRFXVRQOLNHO\,UDTLFDVXDOWLHV%ULWDLQ¶VFRORQLDOKLVWRU\LQ
Iraq and the issue of oil: 
 
HAIFA:  Iraq could be the largest reserve oil country in the world after 
Saudi Arabia and Britain is fighting to gain access to that, to have a share in 
the spoil of the war.  The British involvement at the moment in Iraq, or 
trying to involve in this war, definitely will be looked upon by the Iraqis as 
another colonisation of Iraq, something which they fought very hard during 
the whole last century to get rid of. 
 
 
,QWRWDOPRUHWKDQRI6WHYH%UDGVKDZ¶VYRLFHRYHUDQGRILQWHUYLHZHHVLVFRGHG
SDUWO\RSSRVLWLRQDORURSSRVLWLRQDODQGµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶FDQEHVHHQDV
the beginning of a rebalancing of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKHFRQIOLFWZKLch until this 
point had been largely pro-war or partly pro-war in its framing of the debates. 
 
 
In the first three months of 2003 as the story moved to the preparation for invasion, and 
with conflict more likely with each passing week, the focus increasingly shifted to 
justification for the coming war. Panorama programmes made in this period, 
particularly phone-LQVDQGOLYHDXGLHQFHGHEDWHVµ%XVKYHUVXV6DGGDP¶>W[@
DQGµ4XHVWLRQVIURPD'LYLGHG:RUOG¶>W[@EURDGFDVWLQWKHLQYDVLRQSHUiod) 
reflect the deep split in public opinion on such a justification. Consisting of various 
levels of audience participation, these programmes may have been seen by the BBC as 
an opportunity to allow more dissenting voices. As already noted, however, in some 
FDVHVWKHVHµLQWHUDFWLYH¶Panoramas ZHUHIUDPHGE\WKHµH[SHUW¶UHVSRQVHVRI%%&
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correspondents (which dominated the programmes) in ways that tended to sidestep or 
downplay many of the central claims made by those opposed to war. 
 
µ7DFNOLQJ6DGGDP¶(tx : 02/02/03) is the second live, studio-based µLQWHUDFWLYHdebate¶
on the war in which very brief, pre-recorded questions from members of the public (273 
words in total) or emails sent in during the programme are put to BBC correspondents 
and Panorama reporters. The somewhat futuristic studio includes an orange background 
and enlarged photographs of Saddam Hussein as well as screens showing moving 
images of Saddam Hussein and library footage of burning oil wells from the First Gulf 
War.  This is one of three Panorama episodes on the conflict in which BBC journalists 
KDYHDQXQFKDOOHQJHGSODWIRUPWRDGGUHVVWKHLUµH[SHUWRSLQLRQ¶RQWKHFRQIOLFWWRWKH
general public (see chapter 4.4), a trend in television coverage noted by Hoskins (2004) 
and others. 
 
The questions from the public are overwhelmingly anti-war in terms of themes and 
issues explored although at 273 words, in total, the filmed public input remains 
marginal compared to 7,627 words given over to presenter/reporter input. 
Reporter/presenter contribution has been mainly coded neutral (52%) or partly 
oppositional (38%), compared to just 6% partly supportive of the drive towards war. 
91% of the small number of filmed questions posed by the public were partly 
oppositional and  around 9% fully oppositional. One example of the oppositional-style 
questions comes from Rhianna Khan, who has a Welsh accent and first name but whose 
surname and appearance suggest Pakistani roots: 
 
ESLER: Well our cameras have also been out and about, all across Britain, 
getting your views.  Here is one comment which sums up a lot of the 
FRQFHUQVZH¶YHEHHQKHDULQJIURP\RXWKLVZHHN 
 
,¶P 5KLDQQD .KDQ IURP&DUGLII DQG ,¶G OLNH WR NQRZZKHQ 7RQ\ %ODLU¶V
going to stop following George Bush and think for himself? 
 
Gavin Esler puts RhLDQQD¶VTXHVWLRQWR$QGUHZ0DUUWKH%%&VHQLRUSROLWLFDO
FRUUHVSRQGHQWDWWKHWLPH+LVDQVZHUH[HPSOLILHVWKH%%&SUHVHQWHUUHSRUWHU¶VDELOLW\
to straddle the debate, including awkward details about the Blair-Bush relationship 
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whilst defending Bush from charges of idiocy and of Blair from the accusation that he 
ZDVDµSRRGOH¶WR86SRZHU 
 
At a personal level it seems they get on remarkably well, given that alleged 
political difference.  This weekend George Bush stood there and lavished 
praise on Tony Blair in a most toe curling manner, I mean it was really quite 
H[WUHPH$QG7RQ\%ODLUVD\VLQSULYDWHWKDW%XVKLVQRLGLRWKH¶VQRWOLNH
KH¶V PDGH RXW WR EH KH GRHV OLVWHQ DQG FOHDUO\ %ODLU WKLQNV WKDW KH KDV
LQIOXHQFHWKDWKH¶VNHSW*HRUJH%XVKLQVLGH the United Nations process for 
much longer than he would otherwise have done and that he is listened to.  
It has to be said, in Washington, people on the hawkish end of the spectrum, 
sometimes talk about the relationship being reversed and somehow George 
Bush has been conned by Tony Blair.   
 
7KLVDQVZHUKDVEHHQFRGHGµQHXWUDO¶GHVSLWHDVFULELQJµWRHFXUOLQJ¶V\FRSKDQF\WR
*HRUJH%XVKDQGDVVHUWLQJ%ODLU¶VSRVLWLYHSULYDWHYLHZVRQWKH863UHVLGHQW,WLVD
typically finely balanced response that effectively neutralises the question whilst 
UHPDLQLQJXQFRQWURYHUVLDODQGµEDODQFHG¶ 
 
Later, Andrew Marr is quite revealing about splits on the war amongst the ruling elite: 
 
So there is a more Arabist and perhaps a more moderate open attitude inside 
most of WKLWHKDOO  7KH VWUDQJH WKLQJ DW WKH PRPHQW LV WKDW LW GRHVQ¶W
appeared to be shared, especially as far as your rhetoric goes, by the guy at 
the top, the Prime Minister. 
 
This so-FDOOHG$UDELVWWHQGHQF\KDVEHHQVHHQLQ6LU$QGUHZ*UHHQ¶VIRUPHU
Ambassador WR6\ULDDQG6DXGL$UDELDFRQWULEXWLRQWRµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶LQ
ZKLFKKHDUJXHGµ7KHUH¶VFHUWDLQO\DJURXSRISHRSOHDWWKHWRSRIWKH$PHULFDQ
administration who have a great deal of sympathy with Israeli aims in the region¶. All of 
*UHHQ¶VFRQWULEXtions LQµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶were coded 5 (oppositional) as they 
were broadly in line with popular Arab anti-war sentiment and perspectives. However, 
detailed discussion of splits amongst the parties, diplomatic breakthroughs and setbacks 
and other commentary on political manoeuvres LQµ7DFNOLQJ6DGGDP¶relying on a 
µVWUDWHJ\IUDPH¶(see Jamieson 1992; Jackson 2009) ZHUHFRGHGDVµQHXWUDO¶7KHVH
were popular themes for discussion in the Panorama studio as the war approached, as 
was discussion of the µLQHYLWDELOLW\¶RIZDU ± an uncontroversial question explored at 
length before the First Gulf War. Discussion of tactical military options played a 
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smaller role in Panorama¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKe Second Gulf War compared to the First 
Gulf War, perhaps because the overwhelming military success of the First Gulf War had 
considerably lowered expectations of the threat posed by the Iraqi army (which had 
been further degraded in the intervening years), a point made several times by John 
Simpson: 
 
,W¶V WUXH WKDW,Uaq is weaker now than it was before.  This time I hope we 
ZRQ¶WJHWWKDWNLQGRI WXUJLGSURSDJDQGDWKDWNHSWWDONLQJDERXWWKH IRXUWK
largest army in the world, which we had in 1991, and all those tens of 
thousands, hundreds of thousands, of soldiers dedicated to giving their lives 
IRU6DGGDP+XVVHLQEHFDXVHZHNQRZWKDW¶VQRWWUXHQRZDQGWKDWZLOOEH
even less true this time.  I mean, a leading Arab political figure said to me 
WKHRWKHUGD\µ7KHSUREOHPWKDWWKH$PHULFDQVDUHJRLQJWRKDYHZKHQWKH\
invade Iraq is going to be the major problem is going to be fending off all 
WKRVHJHQHUDOVFRPLQJWRZDUGVWKHPZLWKZKLWHIODJVLQMHHSV¶7KDWZDVDQ
$UDE OHDGHU WKDWZDVQ¶WDQ$PHULFDQ 6RZH¶UHQRWWDONLQJDERXWDWRXJK
and heavily defended Government, wH¶UH WDONLQJ DERXW D *RYHUQPHQW
ZKLFK KDV JRW VRPH YHU\ QDVW\ ZHDSRQV DQG PD\ XVH WKHP EXW GRHVQ¶W
have the kind of back up support we managed to delude ourselves back in 
1991 that Saddam Hussein had. 
 
 
6LPSVRQ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRµQDVW\ZHDSRQV¶DJDLQVWURQJly suggests that Iraq possesses 
some form of WMD such as chemical weapons, although this contribution is coded 
µQHXWUDO¶as it partly supports the view that attacking Iraq might provoke the use of such 
weapons, an argument often made by those opposed to the war on tactical, security 
grounds. 
 
:KHQGLVFXVVLRQPRYHVRQWRKRZDWWDFNLQJ,UDTZRXOGDIIHFWWKHµ:DURQ7HUURU¶
µTackling Saddam¶LVrevealing of possible splits between elements of the British and 
American political and intelligence community over the issue of links between Iraq and 
the 9-11 hijackers. When Gavin Esler asks Jane Corbin to comment on the alleged links 
she replies: 
 
&25%,17KHUH¶VDUHDOSUREOHPKHUH*DYLQEHFDXVHWKH$PHULFDQVKDYH
been consistently trying to draw the link between Al-Qaeda and Iraq and 
UHDOO\ WKH\ KDYHQ¶W PDGH LW DW DOO  $QG LQ WKH PHDQWLPH WKH %ULWLVK
*RYHUQPHQW KDV EHHQ VRUW RI VLWWLQJ RQ WKH VLGHOLQHV KRSLQJ WKH\¶UH QRW
going to make too much of it, because British intelligence basically just 
GRHVQ¶W DJUHH ZLWK WKDW DVVHVVPHQW ,¶YH EHHQ FRYHULQJ $O-Qaeda for a 
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number of years on Panorama,¶YHEHHQWR$IJKDQLVWDQ,¶YHWUDYHOOHGYHU\
widely, I have never managed to put my finger on any direct link.    
 
 
,Q&RUELQ¶VFDVHVKHVXPPDULVHVWKH%ULWLVKLQWHOOLJHQFHYLew that cast doubt on US 
JRYHUQPHQWFODLPV7KH%ULWLVKLQWHOOLJHQFHSRVLWLRQWKDWQRµILUPHYLGHQFH¶RI
organizational links between the Iraq regime and Al Qaeda exists is a view which 
Corbin tentatively supports - based on her reporting experience.  
  
 
 
In the seventh programme to deal with the Iraq crisis µChasing Saddam's Weapons¶>W[ 
09/02/03] Jane Corbin follows the UNMOVIC team of weapons inspectors for three 
months from November 2002 as they inspect various sites around Iraq. The 
investigation is composed of several interviews with members of the team and with 
Iraqi officials. The interviews with Iraqi officials are sometimes very critically framed, 
as in this example: 
 
CORBIN:  The problem for Iraq is that in the past you've said you didn't 
have weapons of mass destruction and then they were discovered.  You lack 
credibility.  You yourself even said you didn't have them in the past.  So the 
world says well why should we believe you this time? 
 
TARIQ AZIZ (Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq) 
No, when the inspectors came, madam, when the inspectors came in 1991 
ZHGLGQ
WVD\WKDWZHGRQ¶WKDYHZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQ&KHPLFDOZH
did have, long range missiles we did have.  We did have a nuclear 
programme.  We didn't have nuclear weapons, but we did have a nuclear 
programme, we confessed that to UNSCOM and to the IAEA.  As regards 
the biological area, we revealed all the facts to UNSCOM after 1995. 
 
CORBIN:  But it took years. 
 
AZIZ:  It took years because why, why?   
 
CORBIN:  Because you didn't put it all on the table to begin with. 
 
AZIZ:  Who is to blame for that?  Who is to blame for that? 
 
CORBIN:  Mr Aziz had conveniently forgotten that after the Gulf War Iraq 
never revealed any significant weapons until the Inspectors found them.   
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&RUELQ¶VTXHVtions and comment are coded 2 here (partial support) due to the highly 
sceptical tone. Yet, not all RI&RUELQ¶Vinterviews are so critically framed, as in the 
following example coded 6 (official Iraqi view): 
 
CORBIN: Does the President Saddam Hussein feel the pressure on the 
country, on himself? 
 
AZIZ:  Of course.  He is the leader of Iraq.  When there is a pressure on his 
country he is the first person to feel the pressure. But President Saddam 
Hussein is a very strong and courageous person.  He will not bow to 
pressure. 
 
 
&RUELQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVDUHFRGHGDOPRVWµpartially supportive¶ against µIraqi official 
YLHZ¶. Many of the interviews are with British or US officials who are sceptical of 
,UDT¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKH81LQVSHFWLRQSURFHVV7KLVLQWHUYLHw with the UK 
Ambassador to the UN is fairly typical: 
 
Sir JEREMY GREENSTOCK (UK Ambassador to the United Nations) 
The silences are eloquent.  They have not wanted to explain what we have 
fairly strong evidence they are still holding and the onus is on Iraq to 
explain those silences under the resolutions and it's a huge disappointment 
to the UK which wants to resolve this whole thing without the use of force 
that the declaration has not been used as an opportunity to do that. 
 
µChasing Saddam's Weapons¶SURvided the Iraqis with the best opportunity to state their 
FDVHDQG,UDTLRIILFLDOSHUVSHFWLYHVWDNHXSRIWKHSURJUDPPH¶VLQWHUYLHZHHV
although some of these are very critically framed as we have seen. There were also a 
ODUJHQXPEHURIµQHXWUDO¶SHUVSectives (40%) offered by UN inspectors who were 
clearly being careful not to provide contentious evidence either for or against the Iraqis 
in the programme.  
 
 
,QWKHHLJKWKSURJUDPPHµBush v Saddam¶>tx: 02/03/03] we KHDUPRUHµPDUJLQDO¶RU
µGLVVLGHQW¶YLews on the war than in any other programme. This is due, in part, to the 
locations of the debate which is a café in New York and a restaurant in Amman, Jordan. 
Gavin Esler introduces the programme from a family-run restaurant and is filmed in the 
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opening sequence, rather strangely, through the roasting coals of an open oven where 
meat is being cooked: 
 
You join us in a Jordanian family restaurant for a unique experiment 
bringing together people from here in the heart of the Arab world and 
Americans in New York to discuss the crisis in Iraq.  Well, as the politicians 
stoke up their war of words and the military build up continues.  How wide 
is the gap of misunderstanding between the west and Arab people?  How, if 
at all, can we bridge that gap?  Here in a village on the edge of the Jordanian 
capital Amman the mood is fairly grim I'd have to say with everyone I've 
been speaking to saying that America's war on Iraq is inevitable and most 
people adding that it is completely unjustified.   
 
 
 
In fact, the programme reveals that the gap of misunderstanding is a huge one, at least 
between the mostly hawkish New York interviewees and the overwhelmingly anti-war 
Arab speakers. The guests, both in New York and Amman, are articulate and passionate 
and drawn mostly from the professional classes. In Amman this includes a journalist, a 
novelist, a former Jordanian Minister of Information, a Catholic priest, a sociologist, a 
housewife, a dentist, the Head of an Islamic Shurah Council, a TV presenter and a 
businessman. In New York they include the former Mayor (Ed Koch), a cab driver, a 
Vietnam War veteran, a publisher, a housewife, a teacher, a columnist and a lawyer. 
Lisa Pinto, a lawyer and conservative activist gives voice to the kind of ultra-hawkish 
viewpoint rarely heard on Panorama, making an explicit connection between Al Qaeda 
and Saddam Hussein: 
 
PINTO: He's provided money for them.  He's given them a safe haven, he 
has a jumbo jet that they can practice hijacking planes on.  He's on his 
ZD\«KH
VZHOORQKLVZD\WRD nuclear weapon.  In fact he's been actively 
trying to acquire fissionable material, and we know that nuclear weapon 
would be heading our way the next day.  He's sponsored these terrorists.  He 
pays $25,000 to the family of the suicide bombers, and besides the fact that 
a thousand times he's fired on coalition aircraft in violation of the 1991 
ceasefire agreement.  We know he doesn't plan to keep his promises.  So 
he's destroyed two lousy missiles, there are a hundred more to go.  And 
meanwhile, even as we sit here today, he's manufacturing sarin nerve agent, 
mustard gas, and we know, as Americans, that it will all come our way. 
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Lisa Pinto, like the other interviewees is filmed in the New York café at a simple 
formica table with her back to the window which overlooks a rainy street. Her 
contribution is coded 1 and is in line with many, but not all, of the American speakers. 
 
By contrast, in Amman, almost all of the speakers articulate highly critical anti-war 
perspectives that focus on issues such as oil, the destabilising effects of a war on the 
region, US hypocrisy and double standards in its dealings with the Middle East. This, 
combined with the few anti-war voices from New York account for the almost 60% 
fully oppositional (code 5) perspectives aired compared to 35% fully supportive (code 
1). TV presenter Danna Abu Sham, for instance, articulates a radical antiwar 
perspective: 
 
Well that's not the point.  They [the US] QHYHUZDQWHGWROLEHUDWH«,PHDQ
it's not democracy what they are seeking.  Democracy would be exactly the 
opposite of what they are seeking in Iraq.  It's against their interest to have 
democracy in Iraq.  The whole point is the oil.  It has always been the oil. 
 
 
Interestingly, there is some common ground here between Arab anti-war opinion and 
the most hawkish US perspectives where there is recognition of the importance of oil in 
the conflict. Nisha Pillai asks if it is a µwar for oil¶ as some of the Jordanians had 
FODLPHG.HLWK=DNDL¶VDQVZHUFRGHGGRHVQRWGLVPLVVWKLVQRWLRQ 
 
NISHA:  Nobody has mentioned oil which we heard a lot about in Jordan.  
Keith Zakheim, underneath it all, isn't this really about oil, a war for oil? 
 
KEITH ZAKAI (NEW YORK) Public Relations executive 
A part of it is about oil, but that's not a crass ideal.  Oil is the engine to the 
world economy.  Oil allows all the women in apartment buildings in 
America to turn on the heat.  Oil allows computers to go.  Oil allows middle 
class workers to get in their cars and drive to their jobs.  It's not about some 
cabal of people getting rich off oil.  It's about making sure the economy, 
which everybody in this world enjoys, keeps on humming. 
 
 
     
The last programme before the onset of the conflict is a live studio debate in London 
hosted by David Dimbleby. This Panorama Special µBlair's Road To War¶>tx: 
18/03/03] focuses on the effect of the ,UDTGHEDWHRQWKH/DERXU3DUW\DQGRQ%ODLU¶V
  
246 
OHDGHUVKLS%\FRQWUDVWWRµBush v 6DGGDP¶PDQ\RIWKHDUJXPHQWVDSSHDUWangential to 
the central debates about the rights and wrongs of the war ± focussing mostly on the 
effects on Tony Blair¶VOHDGHUVKLS and damage to the Labour Party.  
 
Three of the contributors are British journalists, as in previous live debates, but this time 
two are newspaper columnists ± Alice Thompson from The Telegraph and Andrew 
Rawnsley for The Observer, both of whom wrote articles in support of the war, but who 
mainly limit their discussion to the issue of political fallout on the Labour Party in this 
debate and are therefore mainly coded 3 (neutral). The discussion even amongst the 
politicians attending (Peter Mandleson for Labour, Michael Portillo for the 
Conservatives and Simon Hughes for the Liberal Democrats) is polite and non-
confrontational. Dimbleby appears keen to keep the debate away from the controversy 
about the case for war, drawing it back repeatedly WRWKHTXHVWLRQRI%ODLU¶VOHDGHUVKLS
as in the following exchange with Glenda Jackson, an opponent of the war filmed in a 
live link from Westminster before a vote on the war: 
 
DAVID DIMBLEBY: But if yRX FDQ¶W WUXVW DPDQ WR JHW D ELJ GHFLVLRQ
right, how can you trust him on the other decisions? 
 
GLENDA JACKSON: :HOO,GRQ¶WWKLQNLW¶VULJKWWRVD\WKDWRQHFDQ¶WWUXVW
KLP7KHUHLVDJHQXLQHGLIIHUHQFHRIRSLQLRQKHUH$QG,¶YHDOZD\VEHHQ
opposed to a pre-emptive strike against Iraq because I cannot see how it 
presents any real and present danger either to my country or to our allies.  
And I see absolutely no reason why we are dispensing with a policy, which 
KDV NHSW KLP ZLWKLQ KLV ER[  $QG ,¶P SDUWicularly exercised at having 
announced that we were in this to maintain the will of, and respect for the 
8QLWHG1DWLRQVZKHQ81RIILFLDOVDVNHGIRUPRUHWLPH« 
 
DAVID DIMBLEBY: Yes.. 
 
 GLENDA JACKSON: that was turned down. 
 
DAVID DIMBLEBY: Yes well your reasons are well known but I want to 
come... 
 
GLENDA JACKSON: 7KDWGRHVQ¶WPDNHWKHPDQ\OHVVUHDO 
 
DAVID DIMBLEBY: :HOOQR,¶PQRWGLVSXWLQJWKDWEXW,ZDQWWRVWLFN
with this issue of the standing of the Prime Minister if we can, just to 
concentrate on that for a moment.  Bob Marshall-Andrews, you would 
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surely agree that these attacks that are being mounted in this huge way, 
GLPLQLVKHVWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶VDXWKRULW\ 
 
 
We see a massive swing in this programme away from the controversial arguments of 
µ%XVKY6DGGDP¶WRZDUGVDUHODWLYHO\XQ-contentious µstrategy¶ frame by Dimbleby and 
SUHVHQWHUFRQWULEXWLRQLVFRGHGµQHXWUDO¶LQWKLVSURJUDPPH6LPLODUO\around 38% 
RILQWHUYLHZHHFRPPHQWLVFRGHGµQHXWUDO¶RUWRRILQHO\EDODQFHGWRFRGHZLWKDURXQG
33% pro- or partly pro-war views expressed compared to 28% anti- or partly anti-war. 
 
Over all nine pre-war programmes the balance of voices is quite even with a slightly 
greater percentage (41% to 39%) expressing anti- or partly-antiwar perspectives 
compared to those in favour; and of a slightly higher percentage of reporter/presenter 
contributions framed in ways supportive of the conflict (31% to 27%). While a fairly 
wide range of views are expressed by contributors to the programmes, especially in 
public dHEDWHVUHSRUWHUSUHVHQWHUFRQWULEXWLRQVWHQGHLWKHUWRZDUGVµQHXWUDO¶RUILQHO\
EDODQFHGMXGJHPHQWVDQGµSDUWLDORSSRVLWLRQ¶RUµSDUWLDOVXSSRUW¶UDWKHUWKDQVWURQJSUR- 
or anti-war positions. 
 
 
 
6.2.5 Findings: Invasion Phase 
 
µ%ODLU¶V:DU¶appears to give the anti-war movement its best opportunity for making the 
case against invasion. However, the programme was broadcast on the 23rd March when 
British and American troops were already deep into Iraqi territory and, to some extent, 
the arguments had been superseded by events. The film was, in fact, made in the run up 
WRWKHELJJHVWPDUFKLQ%ULWDLQ¶VKLVWRU\DQGLQLWPanorama JRHVµWRWKHKHDUW¶RIWKH
6WRSWKH:DU&RDOLWLRQDQGFRQWUDVWVLWZLWK%ODLU¶VUDOO\LQJFDOOIRUVXSSRUW6FUHHQLQJ
the programme DWDOODWWKLVWLPHPLJKWKDYHEHHQUHJDUGHGDVDµULVN¶IRUWKH%%&JLYHQ
the furious government reaction to Panorama¶Vµ&DQ:H$YRLG:DU"¶ZKHQWKH
Falkland¶VµWDVNIRUFH¶ZDVDWVHDHowever, Panorama¶V focus is not on, some might 
argue, the most informed and articulate leading anti-war figures such as Tariq Ali, 
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George Galloway or Tony Benn, but rather WKHXQOLNHO\VXSSRUWHUVIURPµPLGGOH
(QJODQG¶DWWUDFWHGWRWKHPDUFK9LYLHQ:KLWHLQWHUYLHZVDQRYHOLVWa former army 
Major and a professional female Labour supporter who works for a Birmingham think 
tank. There are brief appearances by anti-war organizers who are introduced with 
VRPHWKLQJRIDµKHDOWKZDUQLQJ¶Lindsey *HUPDQµa long-serving member of the 
6RFLDOLVW:RUNHUV3DUW\¶DQG$QGUHZ MurUD\µDFRPPXQLVW¶Murray was filmed for a 
week and interviewed many times (personal communication Andrew Murray March 27, 
2006) but only says 129 words in the programme compared to 462 words by Tony Blair 
or 721 words by Jack Straw. We do not hear any of Lindsey *HUPDQ¶VDUJXPHQWVDQG
only 24 words by The Stop the War President, Tony Benn, widely regarded as one of 
%ULWDLQ¶VPRVWHORTXHQWVSHDNHUVVHH0DUU 
 
By April 27th, more than two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, a Panorama report 
entitled µ7KH%DWWOHIRU%DVUD¶ZDVWUDQVPLWWHGZLWK-DQH&RUELQIRFXVLQJRQWKH%ULWLVK
RFFXSDWLRQRIWKHVRXWKHUQFLW\&RUELQLVµHPEHGGHG¶ZLWK%ULWLVKWURRSVDOWKRXJKKHU
report does include some critical assessment of the progress of the war amongst material 
favourable to the occupying forces. There is some insight into the plight of civilians 
caught up in the war, for instance, when Corbin interviews the victims of a British 
DLUVWULNHWKDWZDVWDUJHWLQJ6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶VFRXVLQ$OL+DVVDQDO-Majid, nicknamed 
µ&KHPLFDO$OL¶7KHVWULNHNLOOHGVHYHUDOPHPEHUVRIDUHVSHFWHG(QJOLVK-educated 
GRFWRU¶VIDPLO\7KHVXUYLYRUVDUHDEOHWRWHOOWKHLUWDOHLQIOXHQW(QJOLVKDQGVKRZ
photographs of the children and adults who were killed. Corbin explores the power 
vacuum LQ%DVUDDQGORRNVDWKRZWKHWURRSVDUHDVNHGWRGRDµGLIILFXOWMRE¶ZLQQLQJD
µKHDUWVDQGPLQGVFDPSDLJQ¶ZLWKIHZUHVRXUFHV7KHUHLVQRZDWHUHOHFWULFLW\IXHORU
backup administration, for instance. 
 
 
Jane Corbin is embedded with British troops in Basra for the report. The process and 
effect of embedding journalists has raised many questions about the possibility of 
balance and impartiality (see Bell 2003, Miller 2004, Hoskins 2004, Tumber 2004, 
Lewis et al. 2006).  Corbin offers no criticism of the occupying forces and the language 
employed, including the comparison with Nazi Germany, suggest her loyalties are 
firmly with the British forces she accompanies: 
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CORBIN:  The imam of a local mosque however can't run a city the size of 
Basra.  The Ba'ath Party dominated almost every aspect of life here as the 
Nazis once did in Germany.  It will prove almost impossible to root the 
Ba'ath out completely. The problem is, how do you know who the good 
guys are and the bad guys?  That's a real problem for you surely? 
 
McSPORRAN:  It is but what we're doing is we're deferring to the people 
that we can identify and particularly as with this gentleman's own case, the 
sort of religious leaders who the locals obviously respect, we found very 
quickly in the small villages on the outskirts of town that the key Ba'athist 
members, the people who've been responsible for enforcing the regime were 
indicated to us straightaway.   
 
CORBIN:  So people here know who the bad guys are. 
 
McSPORRAN:  Yes, they do very much so. 
 
CORBIN:  The bad guys were still very much in evidence on the streets of 
Basra as the Irish Guard were finding on their nightly patrols.  These young 
soldiers with experience of Northern Ireland reckoned that some criminal 
elements were seizing their opportunity as the regime released its grip on 
Basra.  But Sergeant Perry suspected that some of the gunmen were one-
time members of Saddam's militias seeking to prolong the anarchy.   
 
%D¶DWKSDUW\PHPEHUVPD\genuinely have had a reputation amongst local Shiites as the 
µEDGJX\V¶HVSHFLDOO\JLYHQWKHSDUW\¶VUHFRUGLQ%DVUDEXWWKHVLPSOLVWLFODEHOµJRRG
JX\VDQGEDGJX\V¶LVTXHVWLRQDEOHODQJXDJHWRVD\WKHOHDVWIRUDMRXUQDOLVWWRXVH
whilst reporting with an occupying army.  
 
In April another Panorama examined possible problems with the invasion strategy, 
including the doubts of former military figures that the coalition had enough troops to 
take Baghdad. John Ware puts some of the doubts raised to the Minister of Defence 
Geoff Hoon including this question: 
 
WARE:  The Americans have bombed the information ministry.  Yet, 
although its signal has sometimes been shaky, Iraqi TV is still on the air. Do 
you think it was a mistake not to have taken Iraqi TV off the air straight 
away? 
 
GEOFF HOON MP 
Secretary of State for Defence 
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What we were trying to achieve in this campaign was both military success 
but also to leave as much of the infrastructure of the country in place as 
possible.  
 
WARE:  But the TV is a central part of the Saddam regime, isn't it? 
 
HOON:  Certainly it has been used for propaganda reasons.  It's been used 
to support the military resistance.  It is part of the regime, and certainly I 
have consistently complained about the way in which Saddam's propaganda 
has been rebroadcast not least in the Arab world but even in the western 
world. 
 
This appears to be a remarkably hawkish line of questioning for a journalist to ask a 
Defence Minister and raises important ethical questions about the role of journalists at 
times of war and *RYHUQPHQW¶V responsibilities to abide by International Conventions 
protecting civilians from deliberate attack.  
 
 
As in the pre-invasion phase there is some evidence that Panorama¶VLQYHVWLJDWLYH
reporting favoured pro-war voices against anti-war voices during the invasion period. 
Coding of statements made in pre-edited Panorama programmes (not live debates and 
phone-ins) shows that 48.5% of statements were pro- or partially pro-war; against 
40.4% anti- or partially anti-ZDU0DQ\RIWKHµSDUWLDOO\DQWL-ZDU¶VWDWHPHQWVFDVWGRXEt 
on the effectiveness of particular tactics rather than arguing against the legitimacy of the 
war itself ± DSRVLWLRQUDUHO\IRXQGDIWHUµ%ODLU¶V:DU¶UHFRUGHGDWWKHKHLJKWRIWKHDQWL-
war movement, but transmitted after the invasion phase had begun. Interestingly, 
VWDWHPHQWVFRGHGDVµQHXWUDO¶IHOOIURPEHIRUHWKHLQYDVLRQWRMXVWDQG
anti-coalition Iraqi forces statements fell from 9.3% to just 0.3% between the pre-
invasion and invasion phase. 
 
 
6.2.6 Findings: Post-War Phase 
 
It is after the end of official hostilities (declared on the 1st May 2003) that we see far 
PRUHFULWLFDOLQYHVWLJDWLYHMRXUQDOLVPEHJLQWRHPHUJHµ7KH:DU3DUW\¶LVWKHILUVWRI
these transmitted on the 18th of May, but mainly recorded during the invasion. The 
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programPHH[SRVHVWKHDLPVDQGDPELWLRQVRIWKHVRFDOOHGµQHR-FRQVHUYDWLYHV¶LQ
Washington, especially those behind the Project for a New American Century. It does 
WKLVWKURXJKH[WHQVLYHLQWHUYLHZVZLWKµQHR-FRQV¶DQGWKHLURSSRQHQWV,QIDFWDFRGLQJ
of the programme reveals that 68% of the views aired were pro- or partially pro-war, 
with only 23% given to opponents of the war and the neo-con agenda. However, the 
µneo-conservative¶ position (cf. Taylor 2008) is framed critically in the report with their 
views shown to be deeply influential, extreme and potentially dangerous. This strongly 
suggests that coding can only be of limited value in assessing overall degrees of 
partiality to given views. Closer contextual reading is more useful at teasing out framing 
strDWHJLHVDQGWKHµSRVLWLRQLQJ¶RIWKHPanorama audience. In the following excerpt we 
see how interviews with leading neo-cons are used to clarify their position and present a 
sense of the possible threat they present to peace in the Middle East and the wider 
world: 
 
BRADSHAW:  How did you feel when the statue came down? 
 
WILLIAM KRISTOL (Project for the New American Century) 
Moved. It was a moving moment really. Great to see. 
 
BRADSHAW:  Looks like you won.  What next? 
 
KRISTOL:  Well, I think we need to help get Iraq on its feet and help 
establish a decent government there, and then really work to remove other 
dictators with weapons of mass destruction and deal with the threat of 
terrorism around the world, but hopefully not with military action, hopefully 
through diplomatic pressure, but this is the end to the beginning of this 
broader war, it's not the end of the end. 
 
KRISTOL:  [addressing public]:  This was a very important moment I think 
in all honesty in American history this last 3-4 weeks.  After Vietnam many 
Americans came to think that we couldn't be a force for good in the world, 
WKDWRXUPLOLWDU\« 
 
BRADSHAW:  Much of the world peers into the New American Century 
with anxiety.  Neo-conservatives hope we'll rally round their faith in 
American power.  They may not win every battle, George Bush may yet 
find them a liability.  But his ideological shock troops are on a roll.  Bad 
news if you're in the way. 
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.ULVWRO¶VFRQWULEXWLRQVLVFRGHGDVSUR-ZDUEXWWKHUHSRUWHU¶V%UDGVKDZ¶VOLQHRI
questioning and narration frame the neo-con position problematically µ>«@KLV
LGHRORJLFDOVKRFNWURRSVDUHRQDUROO%DGQHZVLI\RX
UHLQWKHZD\¶  
 
Another four months pass in the post-invasion phase before the next Panorama during 
which time the initial euphoria RIµOLEHUDWLRQ¶VKRZQLQVRPHLQYDVLRQ-phase 
SURJUDPPHVVHHPVWRKDYHZRUQRII,Qµ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶Panorama reporter 
Andy Davies spends six months with the American 427 field artillery nicknamed 
µ7KXQGHU%DWWDOLRQ¶IURP0DUFK± August 2003. µ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶WUDFHVWKH
progress of the occupation over the period. It shows how early, cautious support  for the 
troops from many of those Iraqis grateful to see the back of Saddam, quickly soured as 
the army was forced into a peacekeeping and law enforcing role for which it was not 
HTXLSSHG$QG\'DYLHV¶UHSRUWVKRZVWKHIUXVWUDWLRQRI,UDTLVDVPRQWKVLQWRWKH
occupation there is still no water, electricity or law and order ± the provision of which is 
a legal duty for any occupying power.  
 
We are also shown how violence flares up as a result of poor decision making by the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). For example, as large denomination notes lose 
their value because of falling confidence in the old bank notes, the CPA decides to 
allow Iraqis to exchange these for smaller denomination notes. But instead of using a 
network of banks they distribute them through a handful of offices. Consequently there 
are huge queues outside these offices in the heat of the summer. The US troops have to 
police these and we see the patience of the waiting crowd and troops snap and the 
Panorama crew films a group of soldiers beating and abusing the angry crowd. Later a 
protestor is shot dead in a demonstration by former Iraqi soldiers who have not been 
paid for months. Andy Davies interviews the family of the dead man who we see in 
dignified grief. They say they want justice, either the man who killed their brother must 
be punished and blood money paid. If not, his brother swears to kill four soldiers for 
every one they have killed. 
 
Some aspects of the report are possibly affected by the embedding process (see chapter 
6.1) such as the generally positive representation of most US soldiers who are shown to 
be doing their best against difficult circumstances. Examples of ignorance, racism or 
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µWULJJHU-KDSSLQHVV¶WKDWKDYHEHHQFRPPRQDOOHJDWLRQVDJDLQVWRFFXS\LQJWURRSVDUH
RQO\KLQWHGDWDVLQDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\EUXWDOVHTXHQFHZKLFKDSSHDUVWRVKRZDµGULYH
E\¶VKRRWLQJRIDQLQQRFHQWFLYLOLDQDFFRPSDQLHGE\WKHIollowing understated 
narration: 
 
A group of American soldiers had just taken a hit on one of their vehicles 
and they decided to hit back with another overwhelming show of force.  But 
this was a busy shopping district and in the confusion the soldiers opened 
fire on a group of onlookers. 
 
7KHUHDUHDOVRDVZLWKµ7KH%DWWOHIRU%DVUD¶LQWHUYLHZVZLWK,UDTLVVXSSRUWLYHRIWKH
invasion. However, Andy Davies is also able to leave the battalion to report on the 
appalling conditions in local hospitals and (over the six months) show the rapidly 
deteriorating security condition. Consequently, there is a sense here in which an 
LQYHVWLJDWLYHUHSRUWHUKDVJLYHQDPRUHµEDODQFHG¶DQGVRSKLVWLFDWHGYLHZRIHYHQWVRQ
the ground than in previous Panorama reports that relied more heavily on official and 
XQFULWLFDOVRXUFHVRUJDYHDPRUHµHPEHGGHG¶YLHZ 
 
µ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶LVW\SLFDORIPDQ\RIWKHPanorama investigations in the post-
invasion phase that look at difficulties with the occupation and cast doubts on the 
necessity of the war (as predicted by the War Programming model). These include 
&RUELQ¶VIROORZ-up report µ6WLOO&KDVLQJ6DGGDP¶V:HDSRQV¶ [tx: 23/11/03]µ$)LJKWWR
WKH'HDWK¶[tx: 21/01/04] ± -RKQ:DUH¶VFULWLFDODFFRXQWRIERWKWKHJRYHUQPHQWDQGWKH
%%&¶VFRQGXFWRYHUWKH*LOOLJDQDIIDLUµ6KDPHG¶-DQH&RUELQ¶VGDPQLQJLQYHVWLJDWLRQ
LQWRWKH$EX*UDLEVFDQGDOµ$)DLOXUHRI,QWHOOLJHQFH¶>W[@ RUµ,UDT7RQ\DQG
WKH7UXWK¶[tx: 20/03/05] - :DUH¶VRZQUHSRUWVRQWKHµWKLQ¶DQGµH[DJJHUDWHG¶
intellLJHQFHWKDWWRRN%ULWDLQWRZDUµ7URRSV2XW"¶[tx: 30/10/05] a debate on the anti-
ZDUDUJXPHQWVIRUZLWKGUDZLQJWURRSVDQGµ$*RRG.LFNLQJ¶[tx: 13/03/07] on the 
beating and torture of Iraqi prisoners by British soldiers.  
 
 
7KHWKHPHRIWKHSULFHRIµYLFWRU\¶IRUDOOVLGHVLVDOVRH[SORUHGLQµIQWKH/LQHRI)LUH¶
[tx: 09/11/03] a Panorama µVSHFLDO¶UXQQLQJDWDQXQXVXDOOHQJWKof one hour and 
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fifteen minutes and which contains some of the most graphic images of the effects of 
the war in Panorama¶V coverage. 2 µ,QWKH/LQHRI)LUH¶ recounts through, what Corner 
(1996) LGHQWLILHVDVµWHVWLPRQ\¶DQGµH[SRVLWLRQDOPRGH¶WKHHYHQWVOHDGLQJWRDVR-
FDOOHGµIULHQGO\ILUH¶LQFLGHQWLQZKLFK-RKQ6LPSVRQKLVSURGXFHUTom Giles and 
camera operator Fred Scott were injured and sixteen others were killed including the 
WHDP¶VWUDQVODWRU, Kamaran Abdurazaq. The film makes use of 6LPSVRQ¶VYRLFHRYHU and 
three (overlapping) types of interview content that include information, viewpoint and 
experience (cf. Corner 1999, p.42-43) as the participants recount and reflect on the 
events. Interviews with the crew as well as people affected by the incident are filmed in 
studios and in what DSSHDUWREHWKHGRPHVWLFVHWWLQJRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶KRPHV, as well 
as on location. There is also the use of dramatic reconstruction intercut with footage 
filmed by the team on location in Turkey, Northern Iraq and Baghdad both before and 
after they weUHERPEHGE\D86PLOLWDU\DLUFUDIW7KHµIULHQGO\ILUH¶LQFLGHQWIRUPVWKH
dramatic centre of the film with events leading up to it and the consequences of the 
attack explored in different ways.  
 
µ,n the LLQHRI)LUH¶gives viewers a glimpse of the effects of Allied bombing in Iraq, 
particularly as it affected the µVHPL-HPEHGGHG¶crew employed by Panorama. In a rerun 
of a sequence that had been shown in truncated form on BBC news bulletins in April 
when the attack occurred, we see blood trickle down the camera lens immediately after 
the airstrike (although the F-14 jet is not seen actually dropping the bomb) and an 
impression of chaos, death and destruction that is largely achieved through the use of 
sound (the roaring aircraft, a wailing car alarm and men shouting incoherently) and 
handheld filming. A subjective point-of-view shot is maintained as the camera operator 
struggles to wipe the blood from his lens and rushes to check on the health and 
whereabouts of his colleagues. The sequence is powerful - illustrating the destructive 
capacity of a single bomb as well as the human impact of the war, although the most 
graphic material shot was not screened as the producer felt that it would be µLQWUXVLYH¶
and µZURQJ¶personal correspondence with Tom Giles). Interestingly, in terms of the 
framing of the incident, the film also includes fairly lengthy interviews with US Navy 
                                               
 
2 7KHSURJUDPPHZDVYLHZHGE\DµGLVDSSRLQWLQJ¶PLOOLRQSHRSOHRQ%%&DJDLQVWIRU%%&¶V
µ/RXLVDQGWKH%URWKHO¶%URDGFDVW (cf. discussion on current affairs ratings in Chapter 4.3). 
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pilots Lt. Commander Larry Sidbury, Lt. Robert Roy and Lt. Commander Ron Stinson 
F-14 pilots and navigators explaining how the error occurred. 
 
An arguably more disturbing sequence briefly showing the effect of the Allied bombing 
campaign on civilians in Baghdad occurs later in the programme in which we see a very 
young girl in hospital who is shown to the camera crew by an Iraqi doctor armed with a 
Kalashnikov for protection. The girl is crying and suffering from appalling injuries only 
partly covered by the bandages. The doctor says a single line and the camera, almost 
uniquely in Panorama¶V coverage of the entire war, holds on an almost unbearable 
image of suffering: 
 
DOCTOR:  This patient has burns from the bombs and all her family are 
dead. 
 
While the entire sequence is only twenty-two seconds in length there is time for 
6LPSVRQ¶VYRLFHRYHUIROORZLQJWKHGRFWRU¶VXQGHUVWDWHGEXWFRPSDVVLRQDWHFRPPHQW
to anchor the image in ways, that I would argue, go to the heart of the debate presented 
LQWKLVWKHVLV,QWZRVHQWHQFHV6LPSVRQILUVWGHVFULEHVDQGWKHQFRQWH[WXDOLVHVWKHJLUO¶V
injuries in terms of a wider narrative: 
 
SIMPSON:  In the intensive care unit lies a little girl; the extent of her 
suffering is impossible to imagine.  In a way, she too is a victim of friendly 
ILUHVKHWRRKDVSDLGIRUKHUFRXQWU\¶VOLEHUDWLRQ 
 
Here we see an acknowledgement of suffering and an emotive discourse of compassion 
which then switches to a quite different order of discourse in the second sentence. Here 
WKHJLUO¶VSOLJKWLVFRPSDUHGWRWKDWRIWKHPanorama crew ± she too is a victim of 
µIULHQGO\ILUH¶SHUKDSVDOVRWKHYLFWLPRIDPLVWDNHE\ZHOO-meaning pilots.  Her 
VXIIHULQJLVDOVRWKHSULFHRIµYLFWRU\¶± a very heavy price, no doubt - that has to be 
ZHLJKHGDJDLQVWWKHJDLQRIµKHUFRXQWU\¶VOLEHUDWLRQ¶7KLVdiscourse of political 
freedom cannot completely take the sting from the sequence, but its effect - if read at 
face value ± may be to soften it, or to make the unbearable more µbearable¶. It is also, 
significantly, a discourse based on the presupposition that the invasion was indeed a 
µOLEHUDWLRQ¶, although it could be argued that Simpson is being heavily ironic in his 
selection of words. An examination of other statements by the reporter in this film and 
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others would suggest, however, that Simpson is not being ironic at all. Of course, as 
Hall et al. KDYHSRLQWHGRXWµWKHEURDGFDVWHUV¶REMHFWLYHLVWRKDYHWKHDXGLHQFH
reconstruct [or decode] the programme as it has been ideologically inflected and 
VWUXFWXUHGE\WKHP¶ (p.99) yet such a reading they note cannot be guaranteed. When 
different groups of BA, MA and PhD media students have been asked to code these two 
sentences according to the coding scheme developed (see Appendix 2.6) there have 
been widely differing readings, ranging from fully supportive through neutral, to fully 
oppositional. This would suggest that a great deal of ideological work has gone into this 
voiced-RYHUVHTXHQFHZKLFKWULHVWRFUHDWHDVSDFHLQZKLFKDµKDUPRQ\¶(cf. Hall et al. 
1981) of contradictory positions can be held.  
 
 
Continuing this theme, programmes in the post-invasion period still contained 
statements partly supportive of the invasion although they are almost always tempered 
by criticism of the cRQGXFWRIWKHRFFXSDWLRQ6LPSVRQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQVDWWKHHQGRI
µ6LPSVRQLQ,UDT¶ [tx: 30/01/05] following the elections suggest that while deeply 
flawed, the occupation can bring about some benefit to the Iraqi nation with his own 
prediction of the long-term outcome: 
 
SIMPSON:  A lot of Iraqis must have reflected today that these  
elections would have been far more peaceful if only the Coalition  
had agreed to hold them before the Sunnis were so alienated and  
WKHLQVXUJHQF\JUHZVRVWURQJ,GRQ¶WWKLQNLt ever occurred to me  
in all the years I've been coming to Baghdad, that the first time  
Iraqis were able to cast their votes in a free and fair election that it  
would be in an atmosphere like this, half empty streets and the  
noise of explosions every now and then, and a general sense of  
anxiety and fear.  But I do think it's important not to assume from  
what's happening today that the entire process is bound to fail, in  
fact on the contrary I think it's bound to succeed. It's just that it's  
been so badly botched along the way by so many people.  
 
 
6LPSVRQ¶VFRQFOXVLRQH[HPSOLILHVKRZVHQLRU%%&FRUUHVSRQGHQWVSDUWLFXODUO\µVWDU
UHSRUWHUV¶ are permitted to suggest an opinion within current affairs. Within the 
exposition there is clear acknowledgement RIKLVH[SHUWLVHZKHQLWLVVWDWHGµin all the 
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years I've been coming to Baghdad >«@¶7KLVIODJV6LPSVRQ¶V\ears of reporting in the 
Middle East DQGVSHFLILFDOO\,UDTLQFDVHWKHYLHZHUGLGQ¶WNQRZThe passage, 
delivered as a voiceover against shots of Iraqi soldiers in tanks and armoured vehicles 
on the streets of Baghdad, is offered as DSHUVRQDOYLHZQRWWKHYLHZRIWKH%%&µI 
GRQ¶WWKLQNLWHYHURFFXUUHGWRPH >«@¶DQGLQWKHSHQXOWLPDWHOLQHµBut I do think it's 
important not to assume from what's happening today that the entire process is bound to 
fail, in fact on the contrary I think it's bound to succeed¶. 6LPSVRQ¶VYLHZSRLQWDOVR
suggests .XPDU¶V (1975) insights into the role of the current affairs presenter in 
µKROGLQJWKHPLGGOHJURXQG¶ are relevant more than thirty years after they were made 
(see chapter 4.4).  There is an admission that the occupation of Iraq has not gone 
DFFRUGLQJWRSODQLWZDVµbadly botched along the way by so many people¶WKH6XQQLV
DUHµalienated¶WKHLQVXUJHQF\LVµstrong¶HOHFWLRQVKDYHWDNHQSODFHLQµKDOIHPSW\
VWUHHWV¶amidst H[SORVLRQVDQGDQDWPRVSKHUHRIµanxiety and fear¶<HW6LPSVRQ¶V
YLHZGHVSLWHWKLVLVWKDWµit's bound to succeed¶SHUKDSVLPSO\LQJWKDWµGHPRFUDF\¶
even when enforced by foreign powers, is a µnatural order¶. It is a conclusion that 
appears to tacitly suggest, as with his commentary on the badly injured girl, that the 
sacrifices made on all sides have been, or will be, somehow worthwhile, or at least not 
LQYDLQ,UDT¶VGHPRFUDF\LVµERXQGWRVXFFHHG¶QRZWKDW6DGGDP+XVVHLQKDVEHHQ
overthrown. In order to keep the process of coding as unproblematic as possible 
6LPSVRQ¶VUHPDUNVDVZLWKDOOUHSRUWHUcommentary (excluding the pre-war phase), are 
not coded, but once again this example clearly demonstrates the difficulty of attempting 
WRµFRGH¶ µFRPSOH[FRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWV¶ ,WVKRXOGDOVREHQRWHGWKDWUHSRUWHU¶V
commentary make up around 60% of all the words spoken in Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRI
The Second Gulf War. 
 
 
Putting such coding issues to one side, however, content analysis reveals that pro- or 
partially pro-war statements and arguments are found in far fewer proportions amongst 
Panorama programmes transmitted after George Bush declared an end of major 
hostilities (see coding results Appendix 2.8.4, 2.8.5). This finding is in line with the 
PRGHORIµ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶DGYDQFHGE\$WKHLGHDQG*ULPHV 
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6.2.7 Conclusion 
 
Panorama is not a monolithic entity. In fact, speaking to former Panorama journalists ± 
one of the criticisms of the programme is that reporters work in separate teams. Michael 
Crick who now works for Newsnight said: 
 
I mean on Newsnight everyone sort of gets on with each other as far as I can 
WHOO<RXNQRZHYHU\RQH¶VVRUWRIFRRSHUDWLYHZKHUHDVRQPanorama there 
was almost a sort of quiet glee if somebody else did a programme that 
ZDVQ¶WYHU\JRRG  
(personal communication,  February 16, 2007) 
 
 
Consequently, the type of investigations that get made can be quite different from each 
other with journalists and producers following up their particular interests. 
Nevertheless, some quite consistent patterns emerge from a study of Panorama¶V
coverage of the war that tie in with some models and frameworks of understanding 
developed within critical media theory. 
 
Panorama¶VSUH-war coverage was neither overwhelmingly pro-war nor anti-war. The 
%%&¶VOHJDOREOLJDWLRQWRSURYLGHµEDODQFH¶FDQDWRQHOHYHOEHIRXQGLQWKHUDQJHRI
opinions found in the programmes transmitted, particularly if live debates and phone-ins 
are LQFOXGHG7KLVSDUWO\VXSSRUWV7XPEHUDQG3DOPHU¶VVWXG\RIWKH,UDT:DU
which shows a high degree of scepticism in the run up to the war in sections of the 
media. As Hallin (1989) argues, the way the media reports events is closely tied to the 
degrHHRIFRQVHQVXVDPRQJWKHSROLWLFDOHOLWHRUWKHµVSKHUHRIFRQVHQVXV¶DVKHODEHOVLW
and such a consensus was not apparent in the same way that it was in previous conflict, 
such as over Afghanistan or Yugoslavia. Panorama was able to respond to the strains in 
the foreign policy elite by producing far higher amounts of critical coverage without 
DEDQGRQLQJµREMHFWLYHMRXUQDOLVP¶IRUVRPHDFWLYLVWRUDQWL-establishment conception of 
their role. 
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+RZHYHUWKHTXHVWLRQRIµEDODQFH¶LQWKHSUH-war phase is not so easily answered. 
6LPSOHTXDQWLWDWLYHDQDO\VLVIRUH[DPSOHFDQQRWFOHDUO\DFFRXQWIRUWKHµTXDOLW\¶RU
types of arguments excluded, or the context for arguments put forward. Examination of 
(post-ZDUµ7KH:DU3DUW\¶µ,QWKH/LQHRI)LUH¶ DQGµSimpson LQ,UDT¶ shows there is 
no easy correlation between the number of pro- or anti-war statements and the overall 
framing of the programme, a process which evades simple categorisation of this kind. 
Chronology also needs factoring in to any assessment of balance in the pre-war phase. 
Programmes in the early pre-war phase were generally supportive of a pro-war 
viewpoint, while anti-war voices were heard more clearly as war approached. The 
crucial period for influencing public opinion in order to prevent war may well have 
passed by the time British troops were being sent to the region. 
 
This study of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH,UDTFRQIOLFWoffers some evidence for 
theories of source behaviour which are used in critical studies to explain how the media 
FDQµVXSSRUW¶DZDUZLWKRXWDEDQGRQLQJWKHLUµREMHFWLYLW\¶LQDWHFKQLFDOVHQVH0HGLD-
JRYHUQPHQWUHODWLRQVDUHH[SODLQHGE\%HQQHWW¶VµLQGH[LQJK\SRWKHVLV¶ 
 
Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to 
index the range of voices and both news and editorials according to the 
range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given 
topic.  
(p.13) 
 
According to the hypothesis, non-official sources only appear in news stories when their 
opinions are already emerging in official circles. When institutional opposition 
collapses, even if public opinion is opposed to a particular policy, the volume of 
opposition in news and editorials is indexed accordingly. Hence, as the war began and 
the major Parliamentary parties all lent their support to the efforts of the British troops 
the media reduced access to anti-war voices, or they were reported at a distance. Only 
µRUJDQLVDWLRQDOO\HQGRZHGFODLPVPDNHUV¶JRWFRQVLVWHQWDFFHVVRQFHKRVWLOLWLHVEHJDQ
This view was partly confirmed by WKLVVWXG\DOWKRXJKµ%ODLU¶V:DU¶DQGDOLYHGHEDWH
µ4XHVWLRQVIURPD'LYLGHG:RUOG¶WUDQVPLWWHGLQWKHHDUO\VWDJHVRIWKHZDURIIHUHGDQ
opportunity for a range of dissenting voices as well as pro-war voices to be heard. The 
FRQWHQWVRIµ4XHVWLRQVIURP a Divided WoUOG¶DQGµ$IWHU6DGGDP¶VXSSRUW WKHµ:DU
3URJUDPPLQJ¶PRGHO¶VSUHGLFWLRQRIFRYHUDJHLQZDUWLPHDVGHDOLQJZLWKµLQWHUQDWLRQDO
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UHDFWLRQDQGDQWLFLSDWLRQRIWKHZDU¶VDIWHUPDWK¶µ7KH%DWWOHIRU%DVUD¶DQGµ7KH5DFH
WR%DJKGDG¶FRQILUPWKHPRGHO¶VSUHGLFWLRQRIµFRYHUDJHRIWKHFXUUHQWZDU>«@WR
FDSWXUHWKHYDULRXVDVSHFWVRIWKHEDWWOHIURQWWKHKRPHIURQW>DQG@WKHPHGLDFRYHUDJH¶ 
-RQDWKDQ0HUPLQ¶VHODERUDWLRQRI%HQQHWW¶VLQGH[LQJWKHRU\VXJJHVWVWKHPHGLD
are able to claim they are fulfilling journalistic ideals of balance and objectivity when a 
conflict is underway by switching to presenting and analysing the ability of the 
government to achieve the goals it has set. Reporters offer critical analysis inside the 
terms of the apparently settled policy debate. In the case of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHWKLV
was articulated along strategic questions such as: Can the coalition forces capture 
%DJKGDGZLWKWKHUHODWLYHO\VPDOOQXPEHURIIRUFHVWKH\KDYH"6KRXOGQ¶WWKHFRDOLWLRQ
forces have µtaken out¶ WKH%D¶DWKLVWGRPLQDWHGWHOHYLVLRQVWDWLRQ"'RWKH\KDYHHQRXJK
PHQWRPDLQWDLQFRQWURODIWHUWKHIDOORI6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH" 
 
7KLVVWXG\OHQGVVXSSRUWWRWKHYLHZWKDWLWLVLQWKHµSRVW-ZDU¶SKDVHWKDWµFULWLFDO¶
investigative journalism is most likely to take place and confirms the pattern of 
FRYHUDJHDQWLFLSDWHGE\WKHµ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶PRGHO:K\VKRXOGWKLVEH"'LGWKH
PHGLDRSHUDWHDVµFR-FRQVSLUDWRUV¶LQWKHSUHSDUDWLRQIRUZDU" Was the BBC intimidated 
by the government into excluding anti-war perspectives?  The evidence of this study 
suggests a more complicated process at work.  
 
While government pressure on the BBC was a daily reality in the lead up to and 
execution of the invasion, there is no evidence that such pressure directly influenced 
Panorama journalists. It certainly made individual reporters more careful in checking 
facts that might embarrass the government, but testimony from current and former 
Panorama staff suggests that investigating government claims on WMD or the case for 
war was never discouraged at senior levels (see discussion in previous chapters). The 
chilling effect of the Hutton Inquiry on the BBC may have tempered investigations for a 
time in the post-war period, but as we have seen it is in this period that the most critical 
material on the war is produced.  
 
:DVµMRXUQDOLVWLFFXOWXUHDQGSUDFWLFH¶DWIDXOWIRUDOORZLQJJRYHUQPHQWFODLPVDERXWWKH
Iraqi regime to go relatively uncontested until just four months before war? As 
previously discussed the social composition of Panorama¶VPDQDJHULDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH
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and its programme makers lends some support to WKHYLHZWKDWµWKRVHLQFKDUJHRIPDVV
communication tend to share similar backgrounds to those in control of economic and 
VRFLDOV\VWHPV¶-RKQVWRQHHWDOLQ0F4XDLO7KHFKDUJHVRIµHOLWLVP¶RURIDQ
µ2[EULGJH¶ELDVPD\SDUWO\DFFRXQWIRUWKHUHVWULFWHGOHYHORIGHEDWHWKDWLindsey 
German complains of (in interview with this author) - and awareness of this problem at 
the BBC, documented above, may account for the opportunities (albeit belated and 
limited ones) given to proponents of an anti-war view to make their case. It seems likely 
that divided popular opinion, audience pressure and the widely publicised mass protest, 
had its part to play in encouraging attention to the wider debate at the BBC in this 
respect, although 0LNH5XGLQZKRSURGXFHGµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶argued that his 
own interest in exploring this area was a greater factor. 
 
6HULRXVIODZVLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPVDERXW:0'ZHUHZHOONQRZQLQDGYDQFHRf 
March 2003, and while some of these views were reported, they received relatively late 
attention from Panorama LQYHVWLJDWRUVµ([SHUWV¶UHSUHVHQWLQJYLHZVZKROO\RSSRVHGWR
war and contrary to dominant discourse, such as former UN inspector Scott Ritter, 
former UN Humanitarian Coordinators for Iraq Hans von Sponeck and Dennis Halliday, 
US intellectual Noam Chomsky or other leading anti-war activists went largely 
unrepresented. Panorama programme makers argued this was because they were felt to 
be less perVXDVLYHIRUDJHQHUDODXGLHQFHWKDQPRUHµHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶ILJXUHVRUµXQOLNHO\¶
middle-class protestors.  In other cases, as with Scott Ritter, they were regarded as 
µXQUHOLDEOH¶VRXUFHVE\WKRVHPanorama programme makers making the case against 
war (off-the-record correspondence). While Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHZDVQRWXQLIRUPWKH
majority of criticism and reflection followed major military action, rather than 
preceding it as expected with the War Programming conception of war coverage. 
 
Research by Chouliaraki (2005) on news coverage of the Iraq war is in line with 
findings from this study, that journalists and media organizations do not consciously 
DEDQGRQµLPSDUWLDOLW\¶DVDJXLGLQJSULQFLSOHDWWLPHVRIZDURUFR-ordinate behind-the-
scenes with the government to persuade the public of a point of view. Rather, that it is 
the more routine aspects of journalistic practice and editorial policy (see Allan, 1999), 
particularly reliance on official sources, the use of news frames and dominant thematic 
emphases to structure the selection, presentation and emphasis of reports, which help 
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explain the relative under-representation of dissenting and radical anti-war voices, 
particularly in the lead up to war. 
 
In conclusion, this study of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH,UDTZar reveals a degree of 
professional autonomy at play, producing differing accounts of the justification, conduct 
and consequences of the war. These accounts served, on the one hand, as a conduit for 
XQUHOLDEOHµLQWHOOLJHQFHLQIRUPDWLRQ¶WRWKHSXEOLFDQGfor a particular period, excluded 
expert and activist opinion opposed to the war. However, as war drew closer, 
RSSRVLWLRQDOYLHZVJUHZORXGHU7KH%%&¶VUHOLDQFHRQSROLWLFDOHOLWHGLVFRXUVH
permitted the considerable disquiet with, and (partial) opposition to, US and UK foreign 
policy to be expressed by a variety of establishment and (to a much lesser extent) non-
establishment actors. This disquiet continued, albeit muted, throughout the war and then 
grew as coalition control of Iraq broke down in the post-invasion phase. The study 
partly confirms a number of theories of war reporting and media-state relations, 
LQFOXGLQJ$OWKHLGHDQG*ULPHV¶µ:DU3URJUDPPLQJ¶PRGHO%HQQHWW¶V
µLQGH[LQJK\SRWKHVLV¶DQGHPSLULFDOVWXGLHVWKDWVKRZSUHGRPLQDQWO\µVXSSRUWLYH¶
coverage by the broadcast media at times of war particularly in relation to how: 
µGHSHQGHQFHRQJRYHUQPHQWVRXUFHVLVXQGHUVWRRGWRSOD\DFHQWUDOUROHLQshaping 
MRXUQDOLVW¶V SHUFHSWLRQVRIHYHQWV¶*RGGDUGet al. 2007b) 
 
These findings, however, suggest that while the well-documented government 
LQWLPLGDWLRQRIWKH%%&GXULQJWKLVSHULRGPD\KDYHLPSUHVVHGDQHHGIRUµFDXWLRQ¶
during investigations liable to embarrass WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQother factors are 
more likely to have shaped the Panorama WHDP¶VFRYHUDJHSDUWLFXODUO\WKHMRXUQDOLVWLF
FXOWXUHDQGSUDFWLFHVRSHUDWLQJPRUHZLGHO\ZLWKLQWKH%%&¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW
Affairs Department. These other factors also include Panorama¶Vevolving, but deep-
rooted journalistic traditions and sometimes fraught, but often close relationship to µWKH
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶VHHFKDSWHU4.4). In contrast to the First Gulf War strong and widely 
articulated opposition to the invasion emerged within British elite opinion, both at a 
party political and Parliamentary level (cf. Hansard 2002, 2003). There were divisions 
and arguments within the Cabinet, a number of Government departments and other 
powerful institutions such as the Church, the military and the intelligence community, 
as the recent Cudlip Inquiry has shown (The Iraq Inquiry 2010; Financial Times 2010). 
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Panorama provided a platform for airing some of these disagreements as well as many 
of the recriminations that ultimately followed the 2003 invasion.  
 
It seems clear that such open divisions amongst the political elite also allowed 
Panorama to provide a space for a wide ranging, if carefully managed, public debate on 
the case for military action. As war approached in 2003, this included articulate and 
occasionally passionate pro-war and anti-war views, particularly amongst Arab and US 
contributors as LQµ%XVKY6DGGDP¶>W[ 02/03/03]. However, opportunities for the 
radical anti-war movement and its leaders, experts and intellectual allies to make its 
case were limited and largely marginalised within the programmes, as they were for the 
Iraqi Government.  
 
 
Expert opinion that was radically opposed to the war was only rarely expressed within 
Panorama¶VLQYHVWLJDWLYHUHSRUWV in the pre-war period which contributed to an 
inadequate critique of British and US government claims RQ,UDT¶V weapons capability. 
Unlike Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH)LUVW*XOI:DUWKHUHZHUHQRPDMRUUHYHODWLRQVWKDW
proved embarrassing to the government FIµ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UPV5LQJ¶µ6DGGDP¶V
6XSHUJXQ¶until major hostilities had ceased. On the contrary, official US and British 
government perspectives and US neo-conservative positions were buttressed to a great 
extent by investigative reports leading up to the 2003 war, albeit tempered by the more 
cautionary anti-war voices particularly amongst accredited former military, intelligence 
and foreign office figures. This situation changed somewhat in the post war period 
HVSHFLDOO\RQFHUHSRUWHUVZHUHDEOHWRUHSRUWµRQWKHJURXQG¶DVLQGHSHQGHQWH\H-
ZLWQHVVHVUDWKHUWKDQHPEHGVFIµ7KH 3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶, or when government claims 
RQ,UDT¶V:0'FDSDELOLW\ZHUHPRUHFORVHO\VFUXWLQLVHGFIµ,UDT7RQ\DQGWKH
7UXWK¶ 
 
As has been shown, Panorama¶V coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 suggests the 
programme makers made efforts towards proviGLQJµEDODQFHG¶FRYHUDJHRIDKLJKO\
contentious conflict in line with the splits in the Parliamentary consensus over the need 
for armed intervention (lending support to hypotheses H1 and H2). Nevertheless, a 
heavy reliance on British and US officialµLQVtitutionally-HQGRZHG¶RU µHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶
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voices and perspectives and an apparent suspicion of more radical expert and academic 
opinion constrained Panorama¶Vability to critique Government claims, at least until the 
post-war period (lending support to hypotheses H3 and H4). Panorama¶VSUH-war 
investigations largely supported Government claims that were later proven to be false or 
exaggerated, although several of Panorama¶VSXEOLFGHEDWHVLQWKHSUH-war and war 
periods, especially those with international audience participation, made space for a 
range of critical viewpoints. 
 
 
As this study suggests, making sense of Panorama¶VFRQIOLFWFRYHUDJHis a multi-
layered task that requires understanding the complex interconnections between state 
pressures and institutional constraints, of managerial and editorial decision making 
processes and of the influence of journalistic traditions, generic conventions and 
reporting practices at a departmental and programme level. These interlocking elements 
help shape Panorama¶Vcoverage of war and tracing their operation in relations to the 
%%&¶Vcurrent affairs output will, it is hoped, be the focus of further research. 
 
 
The concluding chapter that follows brings together some of the evidence presented in 
this chapter alongside findings on Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH)LUVW*XOI:DU(see 
Chapter 5.4) to draw some broader conclusions regarding the BBC¶V relationship to the 
µ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ 
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7.1 Conclusion 
 
In September 2009 former Director General of the BBC Greg Dyke addressed a fringe 
meeting of the Liberal Democrat Party Conference in which he claimed that the BBC is 
SDUWRIDµFRQVSLUDF\¶ SUHYHQWLQJWKHµUDGLFDOFKDQJHV¶ needed to UK democracy (BBC 
2009). Dyke argued that British democracy is in crisis and that the media iVµLQGHQLDO¶
of the scale of the problem because it iVSDUWRIDµ:HVWPLQVWHUYLOODJH¶YLHZ:  
 
The evidence that our democracy is failing is overwhelming and yet those 
with the biggest interest in sustaining the current system ± the Westminster 
village, the media and particularly the political parties, including this one ± 
are the groups most in denial about what is really happening to our 
democracy. The separation of the political classes ± and that includes you 
lot and me ± from the people out there has never been greater. >«@ 
(Dyke 2009, p.1) 
 
Dyke continued, describing the problems he faced as Director General, in trying to 
address this problem as he saw it: 
1RZ,¶YHEeen banging on about this for something like a decade. I tried 
and failed to get the problem properly addressed by the BBC when I was 
Director General ± I was stopped by a combination of the politicos on the 
Board of Governors ± one of whom was married to the man claiming for 
cleaning his moat - and the political journalists at the BBC. Why? Because 
collectively they are part of the problem. They are part of the Westminster 
conspiracy. 7KH\GRQ¶WZDQWDQ\WKLQJWRFKDQJH 
(Ibid) 
 
'\NH¶VVSHHFKdirectly confronts the central question explored in this thesis of whether 
WKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ largely shapes the views and perspectives offered within 
WKH%%&¶V1HZVDQG&XUUHQW$IIDLUVFRYHUDJH:LWKWKHDVVLVWDQFHRIIRUPHUPanorama 
producer Gary Horne I was able to contact the former Director General to ask further 
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questions around this theme. The telephone interview conducted on the 16th of October 
with Dyke is frank and revealing: 
 
DM: ,¶PYHU\LQWHUHVWHGLQWKLVLGHDRID:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXVWKHLGHDRI 
Dµ:HVWPLQVWHUYLOODJHYLHZ¶EHFDXVHWKDW¶VFHQWUDOWRZKDW,¶PORRNLQJDW
So, it suggests to me that you do think that BBC news and current affairs 
has been too narrow and bound by the Westminster consensus. Is that a fair 
reading? 
GD: Yes. News in particular. >«@ 
 
On the question of whether current affairs is also bound by such a consensus Dyke is 
more equivocal, suggesting that news had triumphed over current affairs in a long-
running battle for primacy, partly due to technological developments, and that, as a 
result, current affairs was now more poorly UHVRXUFHGDQGOHVVµLPSRUWDQW¶Pressed on 
his views of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH,UDT:DU Dyke defends Panorama¶VUHFRUG
ZKLOVWUHPDLQLQJFULWLFDORI-RKQ:DUH¶VUHSRUWµ$)LJKWWRWKH'HDWK¶IRUQRWgiving 
him an opportunity to be interviewed. He argues that Panorama¶VSUH-war 
investigations were not able to H[SRVHWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VFODLPVRQ:0'WREHfalse 
EHFDXVHµ:HGLGQ¶WKDYHWKHHYLGHQFHDQGWKHSUHVVXUHZDVHQRUPRXV¶+HSRLQWV
repeatedly to pressure from the Government, and from Alastair Campbell in particular, 
QRWRQO\RQWKH%%&¶VQHZVFRYHUDJHEXWRQPanorama¶VUHSRUWLQJJHQHUDOO\ZKLFKKH
VXJJHVWVµWKH\KDWHG¶. In spite of testimony from Panorama reporters and producers that 
the programme was not under any pressure from the Government in their reporting of 
the war, the view from the Director General who was being passed the worst complaints 
from Richard Sambrook, was that the pressure was real:  µNever underestimate that 
Campbell hated them [Panorama] and would go for them at every available 
opportunity¶. Dyke offers little criticism of the Panorama team, standing by their pre-
war investigations: µ,GRQ¶Wthink you can complain about what Panorama did in the run 
up to the war. I think a lot RIWKHHYLGHQFHFDPHRXWDIWHUZDUGV¶ Perhaps surprisingly, 
'\NHLVDOVRGHIHQVLYHRI%LUW¶VFRQWURYHUVLDOUHIRUPVRI BBC Current Affairs and 
PanoramaVD\LQJµ,WKLQNKHZDVULJKW¶DQGSRLQWLQJWRH[SHQVHVLUUHJXODULWLHVDQGpoor 
journalism by some of thHµROGJXDUG¶.  
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Finally, towards the end of the interview we returned to a core theme of his speech at 
the Liberal Democrat Conference when I asked him why he thought Westminster views 
WHQGHGWRGRPLQDWHWKHPHGLDDQGWKH%%&¶VUHSRUWLQJ+LVDQVZHULVSertinent to 
GLVFXVVLRQVDWWKHEHJLQQLQJRIWKLVWKHVLVDERXWUXOLQJµHOLWHV¶ DQGµHOLWHSHUVSHFWLYHV¶
(see chapter 1.1) 
DM:  Returning briefly to this Westminster view, do you think that 
Westminster culture is because of the background of journalists or is it to do 
ZLWKWKHSUHVVXUHIURPWKH*RYHUQPHQWLVWRGRZLWKWKHWUDLQLQJ«" 
GD: 1R,WKLQNLW¶VWRGRZLWKFXOWXUH,W¶VDYLOODJHDQGWKDWYLOODJHLQFOXGHV
the politicians, it includes the civil servants, it includes the journalists, it 
includes the lobbyists and they have increasingly become one group and 
everyone else has become another. 
DM:  So they echo each other. 
GD: And you are not allowed to question. Journalism is not allowed to 
question. I actually think we over-report politics. 
DM:  And do you think the training of BBC journalists is not making them 
FULWLFDOHQRXJKRUQRWPDNLQJWKHPTXHVWLRQHQRXJK«WRJREH\RQGWKRVH
sources? 
GD: I think the victory of news over current affairs has not been to the 
benefit of our society. I think current affairs gave you time to analyse, 
XQGHUVWDQGUHVHDUFKWKLQN$QG,GRQ¶WWKLQNQHZVGRHV 
 
7KLVYLHZRIDµYLFWRU\RIQHZVRYHUFXUUHQWDIIDLUV¶LVDSHUVXDVLYHRQH DQG'\NH¶V
answer - H[SUHVVHGLQWKHSDVWWHQVHµcurrent affairs gave you time to analyse, 
understand, research, think¶VXJJHVWVKHIHHOVWKHFXUUHQWDIIDLUVWUDGLWLRQLVLQGHFOLQH
He somewhat sidesteps the question of how far BBC current affairs (as distinct from 
news) and Panorama, specifically, echo the Westminster consensus, pointing instead to 
a failure of journalism in general. 
 
The evidence of this study lends some VXSSRUWWR'\NH¶VYLHZRI%%&MRXUQDOLVP
although it also provides evidence that current affairs as well as news has been 
substantially shaped E\WKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUYLOODJHYLHZ¶7KLVµvillage¶, as Dyke has 
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indicated, is composed of a political elite that includes politicians, civil servants, 
journalists and lobbyists. To this list we should add former and serving diplomats, 
military officers, intelligence agencies and representatives from think tanks. However, 
this study has also found that American elite opinion is very influential in Panorama¶V
coverage of the two wars against Iraq (see Appendix 2:10). Indeed a striking similarity 
between Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWZRZDUV was tKHµWUDQVDWODQWLFYLHZ¶RIWKHFRQIOLFWV
While political elites from other regions, such as Europe and the Middle East, were 
represented this was not on anything like the same scale as the number from Britain and 
the United States. Remarkably, in terms of the number of interviewees, US views 
actually dominated Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIthe 1991 war and was almost equal 
(excluding public contributions) for the 2003 war. Given the high levels of concern 
about the first conflict in the Senate and Congress, compared to the British Parliament, 
this gives support to a number of explanatory frameworks regarding media coverage of 
war put forward by US scholars such as Herman and Chomsky (2008), Hallin (1989), 
Bennett (2005) and Mermin (1999). However, the number of US interviewees for the 
Second Gulf War suggests that US elite opinion carries considerable weight in terms of 
access to television media far EH\RQG$PHULFD¶VERUGHUV and does not depend upon 
significant dissent amongst the Washington elite. Certainly, Panorama gave US 
political, military and intelligence figures a great deal of airtime either to support (see 
Chapter 6.1) or, at times, offer an alternative (see Chapter 5.4) to the dominant 
Westminster consensus on these major international conflicts. That is not so surprising 
given the leading role the US played in both the First and Second Gulf Wars, but it also 
poses something of a challenge to the central thesis, as currently expressed, that 
µPanorama reflects the Westminster consensus in its coverage of coQIOLFW¶. 
 
Evidence in support of the central thesis emerges in the range of views found as shown 
in the coding exercises, identification of interviewees and, more revealingly, through 
close textual analysis. In the First Gulf War which received strong Parliamentary 
support, dissenting perspectives expressed outside Parliament amongst the British 
public or in anti-war groups received no coverage, other than that expressed by the 
relatives of soldiers in µ,V:DU,QHYLWDEOH"¶ This despite what that programme describes 
as some of the largest anti-war protests seen in Britain since the anti-Vietnam marches 
of 1968. However, with Parliament split over going to war in 2003, the huge levels of 
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public protest and anti-war dissent were given much more airtime, albeit primarily in 
WKHIRUPRIµYR[SRS¶FRQWULEXWLRQV, rather than lengthy interviews with anti-war 
activists and experts. Nevertheless, while pro- or partly pro-war voices outnumber anti- 
or partly anti- war voices overall in both Gulf Wars, the margin narrows dramatically 
from almost 2:1 in Gulf 1 to around 8:7 in Gulf 2 (see Appendix 2.9). In the First Gulf 
War pro-war perspectives dominate in all three periods studied and increase with the 
onset of war and increase again in the post war period where they peak at around 3:1. 
Military success and low casualty figures on the Allied side may go some way to 
explaining why partly anti-war perspectives fall to around 19% following the ceasefire, 
DOWKRXJKDEURDGHUFULWLTXHRIWKHZDU¶VORQJWHUPVXFFHVVHPHUJHVDVDn important 
frame of understanding. Through all three periods studied strong dissenting, anti-war 
voices never account for more than 2.3% of all views expressed, lending substantial 
weight to critical studies that have noted the marginalisation of challenging anti-war 
perspectives in conflict coverage (and to hypothesis H4). 
 
Coding of Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH6HFRQG*XOI:DUVKRZVDVRPHZKDWGLIIHUHQW
pattern. Pre-recorded Panorama programmes in the pre-war period include more pro-
war perspectives than anti-war perspectives but by a lower margin of 43% to 35%, 
although the framing of the debate and reporter contributions (59% to 21% - almost 3:1) 
in Panorama investigations lends considerable support to WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VYLHZRIWKH
existence of a substantial WMD programme in Iraq. If live debates are included, 
however, pro- and anti-war perspectives are almost evenly balanced with the balance 
tipped slightly in favour of pro-war arguments by BBC reporter/presenter contributions 
(31.5% to 27.4%) and very sliJKWO\DJDLQVWE\LQWHUYLHZHHVDQGµYR[SRSV¶ µSUR-
ZDU¶WRµDQWL-ZDU¶. Furthermore, there is a seven-fold increase in the number of 
dissenting oppositional voices (around 14% compared to 2% coded 5) overall in 
coverage of the 2003 conflict compared to the 1991 conflict lending very strong support 
to the central hypothesis of this thesis (H1) that frames of debate in Panorama¶V
coverage of the war are indexed to the degree and levHORIµSDUOLDPHQWDU\FRQVHQVXV¶
(see Appendix 2.9). Much of this dissent was expressed by members of the public ± 
often, for example, from Arab countries. However, close textual analysis of the 
programmes and an examination of the background of interviewees (cf. Appendix 2.1, 
2.5) does UHYHDODFRQWLQXLQJUHOLDQFHRQµLQVWLWXWLRQDOO\HQGRZHG¶H[SHUWVDQG
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establishment voices. µBalance¶ in this respect continues to be somewhat lacking in 
Panorama¶VFRYHUDJH 
 
Furthermore, as textual analysis has UHYHDOHGWKHVXSSRVHGµQHXWUDOLW\¶RIstatements by 
BBC correspondents and reporters cannot be assumed at all, although they remain 
problematic to code in reliable, replicable ways. Indeed, if presenter/reporter 
contributions were always easily coded according to a limited number of problem 
definitions and frames of understanding it would suggest they were not presenting a 
µEDODQFHGYLHZ¶WKDWWRRNDFFRXQWRIDYDULHW\RISHUVSHFWLYHV7KHPHWKRGRORJLFDO
problems raised by assigning reporter speech to particular categories have been made 
clear in an analysis of their contribution to the pre-war period of the Second Gulf War 
(2003), yet that contribution is substantial and can only be fully understood through 
close textual analysis that takes into account the visual and aural dimension of the 
programme. Such an analysis confirms the notion, previously discussed, that no reporter 
can present a wholly µQHXWUDO¶RUµREMHFWLYH¶SRLQWRIYLHZ As reporter and presenter 
talk makes up more than fifty percent of all talk across Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIERWK
wars this should give further reason to treat the coding results RILQWHUYLHZHH¶V
contribution as a provisional indication of certain trends within the series rather than as 
an empirically secure and complete picture of bias and point-of-view across all 
programmes. 
 
In the invasion period of the Second Gulf War pro- and partly pro-war voices were 
more frequently heard (48.5%) although anti- and partly anti-war voices still had a 
relatively strong presence (41.5%). While µ%ODLU¶V:DU¶DQGµ4XHVWLRQVIUom a Divided 
:RUOG¶VKRZHGWKDWSRZHUIXOO\-expressed anti-war perspectives could be heard even as 
troops were engaged in battle, anti-war activists and experts remained a relatively 
marginal presence in all three periods. In the post war period (until 2005 - the period 
studied) coding indicates that pro- or partly pro-war perspectives continued to be heard 
a little more frequently than anti-war perspectives by 45% to 41%, but this result does 
not fairly reflect the increasingly sceptical and critical framing of the war which 
emerged in many of the reSRUWVFIµ7KH:DU3DUW\¶µ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶µ6KDPHG¶ 
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The breakdown of interviewees in the coverage of both wars (see Appendix 2.1) is in 
some respects a more useful and less subjective guide to understanding how war 
narratives are constructed in the Panorama series. This shows that political, military, 
diplomatic and intelligence elements within the British (and US) State predominate both 
in supportive and critical discussion of the conflicts. Public voices, which are virtually 
excluded in the 1991 war, have a considerable presence in the 2003 conflict which may 
well be a response by the Panorama team to the high levels of public and Parliamentary 
dissent and disagreement. Significantly, *UHJ'\NH¶VOHWWHUWR7RQ\%ODLUVHHchapter 
6.2) reveals that extra effort was made to include pro-war voices from the public as well 
as anti-war voices (in the setting up of extra telephone lines). With the possible 
H[FHSWLRQRIµ4XHVWLRQVIURPD'LYLGHG:RUOG¶LWLVGRXEWIXOLIDQ\RIWKHSXEOLFYRLFHV
made a real difference to the debate as contributions were extremely brief, usually 
consisting of a montage of critical questions and concerns which were, in many cases, 
blandly assuaged by in-KRXVHµH[SHUWV¶ It would be instructive to compare Panorama¶V
coverage of the 2003 invasion with that of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan or the 
NATO action in the Balkans in 1995 to see exactly how unusual such levels of public 
participation in current affairs debates are. The use of BB&FRUUHVSRQGHQWVDVµH[SHUWV¶
from 2002 to 2003 answering questions put by the public and by Panorama presenters 
was a significant break from Panorama¶VRXWSXWLQDQGLWUDLVHVFRQWURYHUVLDO
questions around the role of reporters in debates about war. Unlike the First Gulf War, 
interviews with anti-war activists, peace campaigners, NGOs and experts opposed to the 
military intervention could be found in Panorama¶VFRYHUDJHRIWKH6HFRQG*XOI:DU
but they tended to be brief and largely marginal. 
 
Close textual analysis provides more interesting insights into differences in the coverage 
of the wars. Coding and counting of content cannot reveal Panorama¶Vcomplex and 
shifting framing strategies or how closely these correlate to various explanatory frames 
that informed discussion in the Houses of Parliament. While it is difficult to measure the 
H[DFWGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKHVHIUDPHVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDUHµLQGH[HG¶WRWKHQXPHURXV
debates within Westminster, it seems clear from this study of the First Gulf War that the 
range of views explored and frames of understanding employed tended to remain within 
ZKDW+DOOLQFDOOVWKHµ6SKHUHRI&RQVHQVXV¶DQGµ6SKHUHRI/HJLWLPDWH&RQWURYHUV\¶
and only UDUHO\VWUD\HGLQWRWKHµ6SKHUHRI'LVVHQW¶ However, within these limits 
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Panorama¶VLQYHVWLJDWLYHZRUNLQWKH First Gulf War is impressive and important. 
&RUELQ¶VZRUNRQDUPVVDOHV DQG:HVWHUQVXSSRUWIRU,UDTLQµ6DGGDP¶V6HFUHW$UPV
5LQJ¶DQGµ6DGGDP¶VSupergun¶ is detailed and potentially damaging to the Government 
of the day. 5RELQ'HQVHORZ¶VUHSRUWVLQµ6DGGDP¶V)LIWK&ROXPQ¶DQGµ7KH'UHDPVRI
.XUGLVWDQ¶'DYLG/RPD[¶VUHSRUWIURP6DXGL$UDELDLQµ%HKLQGWKH'HVHUW6KLHOG¶
-DQH&RUELQ¶VWZRUHSRUWVµ.XZDLW2XWRIWKH$VKHV¶DQGµ7KH9LFWLPVRI9LFWRU\¶DQG
-RKQ6LPSVRQ¶VUHSRUWRQµ6DGGDPWKH6XUYLYRU¶throw real light on a complex set of 
forces and events. 
 
Panorama¶VLQYHVWLJDWLYHVXFFHVVHVLQLWVFRYHUDJHRIWKH6HFRQG*XOI:DUcan be 
described as more modest, at best. While some post-war investigations were revealing 
QRWDEO\µ7KH:DU3DUW\¶µ7KH3ULFHRI9LFWRU\¶µ6KDPHG¶DQGµ$)DLOXUHRI
,QWHOOLJHQFH¶WKHSURJUDPPHIDLOHGWRWKURZDQ\VXEVWDQWLDOGRXEWRQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
inflated claims about WMD in the run up to the war. Instead, Panorama served as 
something of a conduit for unreliable intelligence and amplified Government claims 
DERXW,UDTLQ0DQJROG¶Vµ%LQ/DGHQ¶V%LRORJLFDO7KUHDW¶&RUELQ¶Vµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW
6DGGDP¶DQGµ&KDVLQJ6DGGDP¶V:HDSRQV¶DQG6LPSVRQ¶Vµ6DGGDPD:DUQLQJIURP
+LVWRU\¶Rather than investigating the doubts of leading weapons experts such as Scott 
Ritter, Panorama turned to DVHULHVRIµXQOLNHO\¶RSSRQHQWVRIWKHZDUZKRWHQGWR
articulate a softer anti-ZDUOLQHLQµ7KH&DVH$JDLQVW:DU¶DQGµ%ODLU¶V:DU¶RUIHOO
back on interactive studio debates and discussion as if the factual case were closed. My 
interviews with producers and reporters involved in the war reinforce the impression 
that leading anti-ZDUILJXUHVDQGVSRNHVSHUVRQVZHUHHLWKHUUHJDUGHGDVµXQUHOLDEOH¶RU
DVDµWXUQRII¶WRWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLFE\WKHPanorama team. But if such figures are never 
given the space to articulate their views, how can the public ever hear the full range of 
arguments to form an opinion? Here, the example set by Robin Denselow in the First 
Gulf War in giving space to a full spectrum of views including that of leaders and 
radicals associated with violent RUµH[WUHPLVW¶ groups, is instructive. Had Panorama 
devoted as much time to the detailed arguments of those most closely associated with 
the anti-war movement as it did to the GoverQPHQW¶VFODLPV in its coverage of the 
Second Gulf War it might have protected itself from the kind of charges levelled by 
Edwards and Cromwell (2002, 2006, 2009) and others who accused the BBC of pro-war 
bias.  
 273 
 
As to the question of why such dissenting views were often marginalised in Panorama¶V
coverage in favour of a relatively uncontroversial µ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶WKLVWKHVLV
can point tentatively to a number of contributory factors. A long history of Government 
SUHVVXUHDQGµIODN¶PD\QRWKDYHFRQWULbuted directly, as it did in the reporting of the 
Falklands Conflict or Northern Ireland, to influencing the Panorama team, but it 
FHUWDLQO\PDGHSURJUDPPHPDNHUVDZDUHRIZKDWZDVDWVWDNHµLIWKH\JRWLWZURQJ¶
'\NH¶VYLHZWKDWWKLVSUHVVXUHZDVLPSRUWDnt may apply more to News than Current 
Affairs, but it remains a significant background factor in Gulf II (where tensions 
between the BBC and the Government were high), if less so in Gulf 1 (under John 
0DMRU¶VOHDGHUVKLS. The influence on Panorama of particular Director Generals, 
especially John Birt, has been emphasised in some accounts of Panorama¶VZRUNFI
Lindley 2003a)\HW'\NH¶VFODLPWKDWKHJDYHSHUPLVVLRQIRUFXUUHQWDIIDLUVWR µPDNH
WURXEOH¶ZDVDFKDOOHQJHDUJXDEO\never really taken up by the Panorama team in its 
coverage of the Iraq war. There was no sharp adversarial or investigative challenge to 
the official government view before the war and arguably too much passive acceptance 
of dubious and off-the-record intelligence claims. In this sense Williams (1968) 
criticism of Panorama DVµODFNLQJDVFHSWLFDODWWLWXGHWRZDUGVLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGWKRVHLQ
DXWKRULW\¶SPLJKWHTXDOO\DSSO\LQBy contrast, in 1991 under the watchful 
eye of John Birt, Panorama did, to some extent, µstir up trouble¶LQLWVLQYHVWLJDWLRQV 
(notably reports by Jane Corbin and David Lomax), leading to the lengthy 
postponement of at least one programme - µ6DGGDP¶V6XSHUJXQ¶ 
 
7KHLGHDRIDµMRXUQDOLVWLFFXOWXUH¶(see interview with Greg Dyke above) shaping output 
is somewhat easier to defend than explanations ZKLFKIRFXVRQJRYHUQPHQWµIODN¶. Yet 
this journalistic culture can be different, as we have seen, from one organisation to 
another (compare London Weekend Television and Granada), from one series to 
another (FRPSDUHWKH%%&¶VPanorama to Tonight) and from one time to another (early 
This Week to its post TV Eye phase). Panorama¶VFXUUHQWµjournalistic culture¶DV
expressed in the post 2007 half-hour programmes, for instance, is clearly very different 
from that of Panorama fifty, twenty, or even five years ago (see Chapter 4.4). Change 
can occur quickly and is sometimes driven by powerful outside forces, institutional 
changes, managerial influence and even through the efforts of individual current affairs 
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programme makers WRµEUHDNWKHPRXOG¶(cf. Dimbleby 1975; Day 1990; Bolton 1990; 
Lindley 2003a). Until now, if there is a core to Panorama¶VMRXUQDOLVWLFFXOWXUH± it is 
identified by a reoccurring observation in critical coverage of the current affairs series 
over its long history. The observation is that Panorama has remained too µVDIH¶, too 
close to establishment perspectives and official views (Williams 1968, 1971; Edwards 
and Cromwell 2006) or that it has provided a sounding board for a narrow range of 
opinion sometimes characterised as the µ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶+DOO This 
accusation has now been made against the &RUSRUDWLRQ¶V wider journalistic culture by a 
former Director General providing further evidence that the charge has some merit and 
needs answering. $QDUURZµ:HVWPLQVWHUvillage YLHZ¶RIFXUUHQWDIIDLUVGRHVQRWIXOILO
WKH%%&¶VVWDWXWRU\REOLJDWLRQWRprovide a diversity of perspectives and reflect and 
respond to different views held in wider society. The obligation WRHQVXUHµWKDWQR
signiILFDQWVWUDQGRIWKRXJKWLVNQRZLQJO\XQUHIOHFWHGRUXQGHUUHSUHVHQWHG¶%%&
2005a, p.26) is particularly crucial at times of armed conflict involving British troops, 
when pressures on British broadcasters to conform to official perspectives are at their 
sharpest. :LWKWKHWKUHDWRIIXWXUHFRQIOLFWVHYHUSUHVHQWWKH%%&¶VGXW\WRVHUYHWKH
whole nation has never been greater and this duty bears most heavily on its current 
affairs coverage where there is more space and time to explore a range of views and 
options on present threats. Panorama has undergone many changes since its earliest 
broadcasts in 1953. The most urgent it now faces is to respond to this critical challenge 
DQGHQVXUHWKDWLWVFRYHUDJHLVQRORQJHUFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶ 
particularly at times of war. While this change would present GDQJHUVIRUWKH%%&¶V
relationship to the Government of the day, as Roger Bolton discovered in 1979, the 
alternative presents a challenge to the long term relevance of current affairs and a grave 
threat to WKHSXEOLF¶VDELOLW\WRUDWLRQDOO\FRQVLGHUDOWHUQDWLYHVWRZDU 
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Appendix 1.1: List of Panorama programmes for Gulf 1 and 2. 
 
 
GULF 1 - EPISODES OF PANORAMA 03/09/90-02/09/91 
 
1. PANORAMA:SADDAM'S SECRET ARMS RING.............    03/09/90    
2. PANORAMA:SADDAM'S FIFTH COLUMN.................    10/09/90    
3. PANORAMA:GULF IN OUR DEFENCES..................    17/09/90       
4. PANORAMA:BEHIND THE DESERT SHIELD..............    07/01/91        
5. PANORAMA:IS WAR INEVITABLE?....................    14/01/91        
6. PANORAMA:DESERT STORM:AFTER FIVE DAYS..........    21/01/91         
7. PANORAMA:THE GATHERING STORM...................    28/01/91       
8. PANORAMA:AFTER THE DESERT STORM................    04/02/91          
9. PANORAMA:THE MIND OF SADDAM....................    11/02/91        
10. PANORAMA:SADDAM'S SUPERGUN:PROJECT BABYLON.....    18/02/91        
11. PANORAMA:PEACE DIARY...........................    25/02/91           
12. PANORAMA:KUWAIT:OUT OF THE ASHES...............    11/03/91       
13. PANORAMA:AMERICA'S SECRET WAR..................    25/03/91        
14. PANORAMA:THE DREAM OF KURDISTAN................    17/06/91    
15. PANORAMA:KUWAIT:THE VICTIMS OF VICTORY.........    05/08/91    
16. PANORAMA:IRAQ:SADDAM THE SURVIVOR..............    12/08/91    
17. PANORAMA:THE ALLIES:IN THE EYE OF THE STORM....    02/09/91    
 
GULF 2 - EPISODES OF PANORAMA 28/10/01-30/10/05 
 
1. PANORAMA:BIN LADEN'S BIOLOGICAL THREAT.........    28/10/01    
2. PANORAMA:THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM...............    23/09/02          
3. PANORAMA:PANORAMA INTERACTIVE:IRAQ CRISIS......    29/09/02        
4. PANORAMA:SADDAM:A WARNING FROM HISTORY.........    03/11/02    
5. PANORAMA:THE CASE AGAINST WAR..................    08/12/02    
6. PANORAMA:TACKLING SADDAM.......................    02/02/03    
7. PANORAMA:CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS..............    09/02/03    
8. PANORAMA:BUSH V SADDAM.........................    02/03/03       
9. PANORAMA:PANORAMA SPECIAL:BLAIR'S ROAD TO WAR..    18/03/03    
10. PANORAMA:BLAIR'S WAR...........................    23/03/03      
11. PANORAMA:QUESTIONS FROM A DIVIDED WORLD........    30/03/03          
12. PANORAMA:THE RACE TO BAGHDAD...................    06/04/03    
13. PANORAMA:AFTER SADDAM..........................    13/04/03       
14. PANORAMA:THE BATTLE FOR BASRA..................    27/04/03      
15. PANORAMA:THE WAR PARTY.........................    18/05/03      
16. PANORAMA:THE PRICE OF VICTORY..................    28/09/03    
17. PANORAMA:IN THE LINE OF FIRE...................    09/11/03         
18. PANORAMA:STILL CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS........    23/11/03          
19. PANORAMA:A FIGHT TO THE DEATH..................    21/01/04    
20. PANORAMA:SADDAM ON THE RUN.....................    28/03/04       
21. PANORAMA:SHAMED................................    19/05/04       
22. PANORAMA:A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE.............  11/07/04    
23. PANORAMA:SIMPSON IN IRAQ.......................    30/01/05         
24. PANORAMA:IRAQ,TONY AND THE TRUTH...............    20/03/05    
25. PANORAMA:TROOPS OUT?...........................    30/10/05    
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2.2: Coding key for Panorama transcripts 
of First Gulf War coverage 
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Position 
re: war 
Pre-Desert Storm 
(-15/01/91) 
Desert Storm 
(16/01/91-27/02/91) 
Post±Desert Storm 
(28/02/91-) 
Examples 
Coded 1 
 
(red) 
 
Support 
µsphere of 
consensus¶ 
 
Statements or 
arguments explicitly 
supporting military 
action to push Iraqi 
forces out of 
Kuwait. 
 
Statements or 
arguments by 
official Allied 
military & 
government 
spokespersons and 
known supporters of 
war. 
 
Israeli officials and 
army spokespersons 
threatening military 
engagement against 
Iraq and its 
supporters eg PLO. 
Statements or 
arguments explicitly 
supporting Desert 
Storm and its 
objectives. Uncritical 
perspectives on 
invasion. Emphasising 
low levels of civilian 
casualties. 
 
Official US military 
spokespersons. 
Kuwaiti celebrations 
DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶
support for Desert 
Storm. 
 
(see chapter 5.3) 
Statements or 
arguments explicitly 
supporting Desert 
Storm and its 
objectives. Uncritical 
perspectives on 
invasion. Emphasising 
low levels of civilian 
casualties. 
 
Official US military 
spokespersons. 
Kuwaiti celebrations 
DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶
support for Desert 
Storm 
(see chapter 5.3). 
George 
Bush, John 
Major, 
Tom King, 
Dick 
Cheney, 
Benjamin 
Netanyahu  
Coded 2 
 
(pink) 
 
partial 
support 
µsphere of 
legitimate 
controversy
¶ 
Qualified support 
for military action. 
(YLGHQFHRI,UDT¶V
militaristic 
intentions in the 
region including the 
development of 
WMD. Focus on the 
threat posed by 
6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH 
 
Evidence for Iraqi 
IRUFHV¶EUXWDOLW\LQ
Kuwait, or against 
captured westerners. 
6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH¶V
duplicity, cruelty, 
etc. (Lending 
implicit support for 
war.) 
 
Pragmatic and 
µSURFHGXUDO¶
concerns about 
military and political 
strategy. 
 
Interviewees 
(qualified) supportive 
of military action but 
critical of aspects of 
the µKDQGOLQJ¶RIWKH
invasion and/or 
RFFXSDWLRQµ&RDOLWLRQ¶
VROGLHUV¶DFFRXQWV
when focus is on 
difficulties or 
problems with 
operations. Evidence 
IRU,UDTLIRUFHV¶
brutality in Kuwait, 
against captured 
westerners or Allied 
pilots. Pragmatic and 
µSURFHGXUDO¶ concerns 
about military and 
political strategy. 
Opportunities for new 
regional peace that the 
war has brought. 
Statements or 
arguments explicitly 
supporting continued 
military action against 
6DGGDP+XVVHLQ¶V
regime. Argument that 
war was ended too 
soon. 
 
Kuwaiti accounts of 
Iraqi brutality. 
 
µ&RDOLWLRQ¶VROGLHUV¶
RIILFHUV¶H\HZLWQHVV
accounts focusing on 
problems with 
operations. Pragmatic 
and procedural 
concerns about 
military and political 
strategy 
John 
McCain, 
Gordon 
Brown. 
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Coded 3 
 
(yellow) 
 
µQHXWUDO¶
neither 
supporting 
nor 
opposing 
 
Statements neither 
for nor against 
military action. Off 
topic discussion. 
 
Statements neither for 
nor against military 
action. Off topic 
discussion. 
 
Statements neither for 
nor against military 
action. Off topic 
discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 
Coded 4 
(blue) 
 
partial 
opposition 
µsphere of 
legitimate 
contro-
YHUV\¶ 
Interviewees urging 
caution and calling 
for time for 
sanctions to work, 
resisting immediate 
military response. 
7KHµQRW\HW¶
argument.  
 
Attention to Western 
JRYHUQPHQWV¶WDFit 
support for export of 
material that could 
be used to develop 
WMD. A focus on 
passive indifference 
of western 
governments to 
,UDT¶V:0'
programme. The 
µ:hy are we 
µILJKWLQJDJDLQVW
own deadly 
weapons?¶DUJXPHQW 
 
Fear of backlash to 
western intervention 
in the area. 
Iraqi eyewitness 
accounts of negative 
impact of war. 
 
Major long term 
problems with the war, 
such as environmental 
destruction, potential 
instability in the 
region. 
 
Accusations of 
prisoner mistreatment. 
 
Links between Iraqi 
military capability and 
western arms sales. 
Links between Iraqi 
WMD and Israeli 
WMD, including 
nuclear capability. 
Linking Palestinian 
grievances  to future 
stability in the region. 
 
 
Problems with Desert 
6WRUPVXFKDVµ*XOI
:DUV\QGURPH¶
environmental hazard 
of oil spills and 
burning oil rigs, high 
Iraqi level casualties. 
 
Interviewees critical 
of aspects of the 
µKDQGOLQJ¶RIWKHwar 
and restoration of law 
and order in Kuwait.  
 
µ&RDOLWLRQ¶VROGLHUV¶
accounts when focus 
is on problems with 
operations.  
 
Kuwaiti disaffection 
DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶
disagreement with 
aspects of 
reimposition of 
previous government. 
 
 
(see chapter 5.3) 
Denis 
Healey,  
Gordon 
Brown. 
Coded 5 
(green) 
 
Opposition 
µVSKHUHRI
GHYLDQFH¶ 
Unequivocal anti-
war arguments. 
Highly sceptical 
views of motives for 
the war. Emphasis 
on oil resources, 
previous active 
western support for 
Saddam Hussein ± 
including his use of 
WMD, the probable 
effect of the war on 
innocent civilians 
etc.  
Unequivocal anti-war 
arguments. Highly 
critical of effects on 
civilians or on the 
region. Highly critical 
eyewitness accounts. 
Serious accusations of 
prisoner abuse, torture 
or use of 
disproportionate force. 
Focus on double 
standards of turning a 
blind eye to Israeli 
WMD. 
Unequivocal anti-war 
arguments. Calls for 
immediate troop 
withdrawal. Highly 
critical eyewitness 
accounts, 
condemnation of 
Mutla Ridge 
µPDVVDFUHV¶HWF (see 
chapter 5.3) 
Tony Benn  
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Coded 6 
(brown) 
Anti-
coalition 
Iraqi 
Forces 
Official 
Iraqi View 
Iraqi Government 
and Military 
sources. Iraqi 
officials. Supporters 
RI6DGGDP¶V
invasion. 
Iraqi Government and 
Military sources. Iraqi 
officials. Supporters of 
6DGGDP¶VLQYDVLRQ 
Iraqi Government and 
Military sources. Iraqi 
officials. Supporters 
RI6DGGDP¶VLQYDVLRQ 
Saddam 
Hussein, 
Tariq Aziz,  
Yasser 
Arafat 
Coded 7 
(grey) 
Reporter 
comment 
Panorama reporter 
or presenter. 
Panorama reporter or 
presenter. 
Panorama reporter or 
presenter. 
Jane 
Corbin 
 
 
(For notes on coding see Appendix 2.6, p.306 and 309-311. The coding parameters are 
discussed further in Chapters 3.1, 5.4 and 6.2) 
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2.3.1: Panorama¶V3UH-War Coding results (Gulf War 1991) 
 
code no. of words %  Title   
Pre-Invasion  tape 1 Saddam's secret arms ring 
1 0 0.0  03.09.90   
2 842 32.2     
3 103 3.9     
4 1596 61.0     
5 73 2.8     
6 0 0.0     
7   2768 51.42 % journalist/ 
total 2615    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
code no. of words %  Title   
Pre-Invasion  tape 2 Saddam's fifth column 
1 446 18.2  10.09.90   
2 72 2.9     
3 1,155 47.1     
4 0 0.0     
5 191 7.8     
6 590 24.0     
7   3163 56.31 % journalist/ 
total 2454    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
code no. of words %  Title   
Pre-Invasion  tape 3 Gulf: in our defences 
1 1622 43.6  17.09.90   
2 1,848 49.7     
3 0 0.0     
4 252 6.8     
5 0 0.0     
6 0 0.0     
7   2922 43.98 % journalist/ 
total 3722    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
code no. of words %  Title   
Pre-Invasion  tape 4 Behind the desert shield 
1 42 2.1  07.01.91   
2 241 12.0     
3 1,554 77.1     
4 178 8.8     
5 0 0.0     
6 0 0.0     
7   3128 60.82 % journalist/ 
total 2015    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
 290 
       
       
code no. of words %  Title   
Pre-Invasion  tape 5 Is war inevitable?  
1 3018 50.7  14.01.91   
2 213 3.6     
3 7 0.1     
4 2,654 44.6     
5 57 1.0     
6 0 0.0     
7   3828 39.15 % journalist/ 
total 5949    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
              
       
       
code no. of words %  TOTAL PRE-WAR  
Pre-Invasion  tape 6  rank  
1 5129 30.6   1  
2 3216 19.2   3  
3 2819 16.8   4  
4 4680 27.9   2  
5 321 1.9   6  
6 590 3.5   5  
7       
total 16755  15809 48.55 % journalist/ 
     reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
       
1 30.6      
2 19.2 49.8 % pro- or partly pro-war  
3 16.8      
4 27.9      
5 1.9 29.8 % anti- or partly anti-war  
6 3.5      
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2.3.2: Panorama¶Vµ'HVHUW6WRUP¶&RGLQJUHVXOWV*XOI:DU 
 
code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 1 
Desert storm: after five 
days 
1 2506 41.4  21.01.91   
2 2521 41.6     
3 0 0.0     
4 1032 17.0     
5 0 0.0     
6 0 0.0     
7   3937 39.39 %  journalist/ 
total 6059    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
       
code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 6 The gathering storm 
1 304 10.2  28.01.91   
2 2464 83.0     
3 0 0.0     
4 0 0.0     
5 0 0.0     
6 199 6.7     
7   3654 55.18 %  journalist/ 
total 2968    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
       
       
code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 7 After the desert storm 
1 1554 43.7  04.02.91   
2 953 26.8     
3 79 2.2     
4 673 18.9     
5 299 8.4     
6 0 0.0     
7   2830 44.30 %  journalist/ 
total 3558    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
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code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 4 The mind of Saddam 
1 21 0.7  11.02.91   
2 3132 99.3     
3 0 0.0     
4 0 0.0     
5 0 0.0     
6 0 0.0     
7   2719 46.30 %  journalist/ 
total 3154    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
       
       
code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 5 Saddam's supergun 
1 0 0.0  18.02.91   
2 0 0.0     
3 290 9.4     
4 2795 90.5     
5 0 0.0     
6 3 0.1     
7   4386 58.68 %  journalist/ 
total 3088    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 5 Peace diary  
1 1102 34.8  25.02.91   
2 961 30.3     
3 285 9.0     
4 748 23.6     
5 70 2.2     
6 3 0.1     
7   3051 49.05 %  journalist/ 
total 3169    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
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code 
no. of 
words %  Title   
Desert storm  tape 1 Desert storm total Rank 
1 5162 32.5    1 
2 4435 27.9    3 
3 654 4.1    4 
4 5248 33.1    2 
5 369 2.3    5 
6 6 0.0    6 
7   16640 51.18 %  journalist/ 
total 15874    reporter speech 
     (of total)  
       
       
       
Desert storm      
1 32.5      
2 27.9 60.5 % pro- or partly pro-war  
3 4.1      
4 33.1      
5 2.3 35.4 % anti- or partly anti-war  
6 0.0      
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2.3.3: Panorama¶V3RVW-War Coding results (Gulf War 1991) 
 
 
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 1 Out of the ashes   
1 0 0.0  11.03.91    
2 1252 62.7      
3 47 2.4      
4 697 34.9      
5 0 0.0      
6 0 0.0      
7   3612 64.41 %  journalist/  
total 1996    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
        
        
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 2 America's secret war  
1 749 25.4  25.03.91    
2 1735 58.8      
3 126 4.3      
4 340 11.5      
5 0 0.0      
6 0 0.0      
7   3118 0.51 %  journalist/  
total 2950    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
        
        
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 3 The dream of Kurdistan  
1 0 0.0  17.06.91    
2 161 10.3      
3 766 48.8      
4 640 40.8      
5 0 0.0      
6 2 0.1      
7   3925 71.44 %  journalist/  
total 1569    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
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code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 4 The victims of victory  
1 0 0.0  05.08.91    
2 0 0.0      
3 680 43.0      
4 903 57.0      
5 0 0.0      
6 0 0.0      
7   2987 65.36 %  journalist/  
total 1583    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
        
        
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 5 Saddam the survivor  
1 254 9.7  12.08.91    
2 1674 64.1      
3 124 4.8      
4 282 10.8      
5 245 9.4      
6 31 1.2      
7   2836 52.07 %  journalist/  
total 2610    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
        
        
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 6 The allies: in the eye of the storm 
1 1829 44.4  02.09.91    
2 1700 41.2      
3 595 14.4      
4 0 0.0      
5 0 0.0      
6 0 0.0      
7   2164 34.41 %  journalist/  
total 4124    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
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POSTWAR TOTAL       
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 7 TOTAL  Rank  
1 2832 19.1  Jul-04  3  
2 6522 44.0    1  
3 2338 15.8    4  
4 2862 19.3    2  
5 245 1.7    5  
6 33 0.2    6  
7   15655 51.35 %  journalist/  
total 14832    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
        
        
        
POSTWAR TOTAL       
1 19.1       
2 44.0 63.1 % pro- or partly pro-war   
3 15.8       
4 19.3       
5 1.7 20.9 % anti- or partly anti-war   
6 0.2       
        
        
 
 
 
 
 
        
        
ALL PERIODS COMBINED (PRE-WAR, WAR, POST-WAR)   
code 
no. of 
words %  Title    
Post-desert storm  tape 7 TOTAL  Rank  
1 13087 27.6  Jul-04  2  
2 14173 29.9    1  
3 5811 12.3    4  
4 12790 27.0    3  
5 935 2.0    5  
6 629 1.3    6  
7   48104 50.36 %  journalist/  
total 47425    reporter speech  
     (of total)   
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2.4: Results for all Periods Gulf 1 
 
       
 ALL      
 GULF 1 all periods participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 13087 27.60       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 14173 29.89 57.48 % 'pro-war' 
 3 5811 12.25    
 4 12790 26.97    
 5 935 1.97       (coded 4, 5 or 6)  
 6 629 1.33 28.94  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 47425 100.00    
       
       
 
 
GULF 1 TOTAL (interviewees/participants only)
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 Appendix 2.6 
 
Coding for Panorama Transcripts on Iraq Wars 
Categories are generally indicative of positions below. (Note that there are obvious examples of 
overlap.)  
1RWHWKHµ7KH:HVWPLQVWHUFRQVHQVXV¶XVLQJ+DOO HWDO¶V(1981) formulation of  the agenda of    
SUREOHPVDQGµSUHVFULSWLRQV¶OLPLWHGWRWKRVHZKLFKKDYHUHJLVWHUHGZLWKRUDUHRIIHUHGXSE\
the established Parliamentary parties would include codes (positions) 1-4, but not 5 or 6. 
0DSSLQJWKHVHSRVLWLRQVZLWKLQ+DOOLQ¶VVSKHUHVRIFRQVHQVXs, legitimate controversy and dissent 
is slightly more problematic, but could be represented diagrammatically as follows: 
 
problematic, but could be represented diagrammatically as follows: 
 
 
 
µ6SKHUHRI
FRQVHQVXV¶ 
(full 
support, 
partial 
support) 
Sphere of 
legitimate 
FRQWURYHUV\¶ 
(full 
support, 
partial 
opposition) 
µ6SKHUHRI
GHYLDQFH¶ 
Full opposition, 
anti-coalition 
raqi supporters 
5DQJHRIYLHZVZLWKLQWKHµ:HVWPLQVWHUµHOLWH¶
FRQVHQVXV¶ 
Dissident views 
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code Position 
re: war 
Pre-invasion  
(-19/03/03) 
Invasion  
(20/03/03-1/05/03) 
Post invasion 
(02/05/03-) 
Examples 
1 
 
(red) 
Support 
µVSKHUHRI
consensus/ 
legitimate 
FRQWURYHUV\¶ 
Statements or 
arguments 
explicitly 
VXSSRUWLQJµUHJLPH
FKDQJH¶PLOLWDU\
action, invasion etc.  
Statements or arguments 
by official US military 
spokespersons and 
known supporters of 
war. 
Statements or 
arguments explicitly 
supporting continued 
occupation. Official 
US military 
spokespersons. 
George Bush, 
Tony Blair, 
Jack Straw, 
Richard Perle 
2 (pink) 
partial 
support 
µVSKHUHRI
consensus/ 
legitimate 
FRQWURYHUV\¶ 
(YLGHQFHIRU,UDT¶V
WMD capability, 
6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH¶V
duplicity, cruelty, 
etc. (Lending 
implicit support for 
invasion/war.) 
8QFULWLFDOµFRDOLWLRQ¶
perspective of invasion. 
µ&RDOLWLRQ¶VROGLHUV¶
RIILFHUV¶H\HZLWQHVV
accounts (unless 
focusing on problems 
with operations). 
Celebrating Iraqis 
(implicit supporters of 
invasion) 
Qualified arguments 
IRUµFRDOLWLRQ¶WURRSV
to maintain (some 
temporary) presence, 
stabilise country etc. 
Dr. Hussain 
Sharistani 
3 (yellow) 
neither 
supporting 
nor 
opposing 
Statements neither 
for nor against 
invasion (or) off-
topic statements. 
Statements neither for 
nor against invasion (or) 
off-topic statements. 
Statements neither 
for nor against 
occupation (or) off-
topic statements. 
Mayor  
Rudolph 
Giuliani, Dr. 
Hans Blix 
 
4 (blue) 
partial 
opposition 
µVSKHUHRI
legitimate 
FRQWURYHUV\¶ 
Interviewees urging 
caution whilst 
mindful of possible 
future threat from 
6DGGDP7KHµQRW
HQRXJKHYLGHQFH¶
argument. Strategic 
and tactical 
arguments. 
Interviewees critical of 
DVSHFWVRIWKHµKDQGOLQJ¶
of the invasion and/or 
RFFXSDWLRQµ&RDOLWLRQ¶
VROGLHUV¶DFFRXQWVZKHQ
focus is on problems 
with operations. Iraqi 
eyewitness accounts of 
negative impact of war. 
Interviewees critical 
of aspects of the 
µKDQGOLQJ¶RIWKH
invasion and/or 
occupation. Iraqi 
eyewitness accounts 
of negative impact of 
the occupation. 
MOD civil 
servant Sir 
Michael 
Quinlan. Iraqi 
civilian 
eyewitness 
accounts 
5 (green) 
Opposition 
µVSKHUHRI
deviance¶ 
Unequivocal anti-
war arguments. 
Highly sceptical of 
existence of WMD 
or the need for war. 
:DUDµFULPLQDO¶
µLOOHJDO¶DFWLRQ  
Unequivocal anti-war 
arguments. Highly 
sceptical of existence of 
WMD or need for war. 
Highly critical 
eyewitness accounts. 
Unequivocal anti-
war arguments. Calls 
for immediate troop 
withdrawal. Highly 
critical eyewitness 
accounts. 
Edith Cresson 
(ex-French 
PM), ex-UN 
Humanitarian 
Co-ordinator 
for Iraq Hans 
von Sponeck,  
6 (brown) 
Anti-
coalition 
Iraqi 
forces 
Iraqi Government 
and Military 
sources. Iraqi 
officials. 
Iraqi Government and 
Military sources. Iraqi 
officials. 
,UDTLµUHVLVWDQFH¶- 
various factions 
calling for troop 
withdrawal by 
violent means. 
Saddam 
Hussein, 
Tariq Aziz, 
Dr Rihab 
Taha 
7 (grey) 
Reporter 
comment 
Panorama reporter. Panorama reporter Panorama reporter. Jane Corbin, 
John 
Simpson. 
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Notes on Coding 
Despite efforts to refine the descriptors the coding remains a fairly blunt instrument. 
Attempts to divide up spectrum of opinion from interviewees on the wars against Iraq lump 
together views that are sometimes quite distinct. The context is often missing i.e how the 
quote is being used, what precedes it, etc. unless when quoted ironically (e.g. Rumsfeld* in 
Iraqi anti-war video-clip shown). The following examples illustrate some of the coding 
issues encountered: 
 
1) Statements supportive of military action or by known supporters of war eg George Bush, 
Dick Cheney, Geoffrey Hoon etc. (on the topic), e.g: 
US Vice-President DICK CHENEY: The read we get on the people of Iraq is there's no 
question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they will welcome as 
liberators the United States when we come to do that. 
but not off topic eg: 
 
GEORGE BUSH:  Laura and I are very honoured to have our friends, Tony and Cherie Blair 
and their family, visit us here in Crawford.  We appreciate the rain that the Prime Minister 
brought with him, and so do the other farmers and ranchers in the area.  Mr Prime Minister 
thanks for bringing it. FRGHGµQHLWKHUIRUQRUDJDLQVWZDU¶ 
 
2) )RUH[DPSOHµFRDOLWLRQ¶VROGLHUV¶H\HZLWQHVVDFFRXQWVRIRSHUDWLRQVXQOHVVIRFXVLQJRQ
problems with operations). Celebrating Iraqis. Not 1 because may only be celebrating 
fall of Saddam and but not pro-invasion e.g: 
 
KHALOOD BANDA 
President Saddam Hussein killed my husband.  I have five children, five young girls.  When 
he was killed I was pregnant with the fifth girl. 
CORBIN:  Why was your husband killed? 
BANDA:  I think he was killed for political reasons. 
CORBIN:  And what is the situation now, are you still afraid of the Saddam Hussein 
regime? 
BANDA:  Yes, I'm scared of course of the people and of everybody.   Thank you Mr Blair. 
CORBIN:  You want to thank Mr Blair for bringing the army here? 
BANDA:  Yes, yes.   Very good. 
CORBIN:  And many people feel that in Basrah? 
ALL:   Yes, yes, yes, yes.   [applause]    
MAN:  Thank God Mr Blair. 
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Celebrating Iraqis coded partial support because they may have been opposed to invasion 
but now celebrating fall of regime. 
 
3) Supposedly neutral, but obviously no statement can be completely µneutral¶. Here neutral 
means the statement cannot easily be coded as supportive or opposing the war. Hence Dick 
Cheney might be coded red (1), pink (2) or yellow (3) according to the subject of his 
statement. Neutrality also problematic as it may include statements of no obvious relevance 
to the invasion of Iraq such as interviews about the 9-11 plotters which were used in 
SURJUDPPHVDORQJVLGHDOOHJDWLRQVRI,UDTLFROOXVLRQZLWKµWHUURULVWV¶ 
 
4)  Opposition to the war may be based on practical, strategic considerations, on 
the timing, rather than morality, legality of the war, for instance: 
 
JESSICA STERN (National Security Council, 1994-95) 
There are compelling reasons to go to war against Iraq.  Saddam poses a threat to 
the entire world.  However, we need to consider whether the risks of going to war 
exceed the benefit and I believe they do. 
Also, fRUH[DPSOHµFRDOLWLRQ¶VROGLHUV¶DFFRXQWVLIWKH\IRFXVRQSUREOHPVZLWKRSHUDWLRQV 
 
5) Statements wholly against the war or by anti-war activists unless off-topic. Such 
VWDWHPHQWVFRXOGEHH[SUHVVHGE\µXQOLNHO\¶ILJXUHVVXFKDV&RQVHUYDWLYH03.HQ&ODUNH 
 
 KEN CLARKE MP 
Conservative Minister, 1979-97 
I think Mr Blair's mission was to try to cloak all this with legality, with the old world order.  
So because of Blair in part, the Americans allowed the politics and the diplomacy to go 
round a loop line trying to get some support for this in United Nations whilst the build up of 
the American and British armies and air force and navy continued, ready for the war to start 
in the spring.   
 
&RQWH[WGHSHQGHQWHJZKHQ5XPVIHOG¶VZRUGVDUHXVHGLQDDQWL-US video clip with images 
of injured children his words are coded as 5 (opposition) 
 
* RUMSFELD:  [message subtitled] The weapons that are being used today have a degree 
of precision that no one ever dreamt of. 
 
6) ,UDTLµHQHP\¶6WDWHPHQWVFRXOGEHXVHGWRVXSSRUWpro-or anti-invasion arguments. These 
statements were often used within pro-invasion argument. Eg Saddam is asked if it is it right 
to torture opponents by Panorama reporter Richard Lindley. Saddam Hussein answers: 
µNam¶ (yes) 
,5$4,2)),&(5>DGGUHVVLQJWURRSV@µ6OLWWKHLUWKURDWVDQGGLYLGHWKHLUKHDUWVLQWZR¶FRGHG,UDTL
µHQHP\¶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7) Reporter and presenter speech is, for the most part, problematic to code and is therefore 
coded separately as (7) except for pre-war period (see discussion Chapter 3 and Appendix 
2.7). Reporters and presenters and supposed to remain µimpartial¶ so the assumption for the 
sake of the quantitative study (excluding pre-war period) is that they are. However, this 
assumption is clearly flawed. For example, during the invasion period John Ware asked 
Defence Secretary Geoffrey +RRQZK\WKH\KDYHQ¶WµWDNHQRXW¶WKH,UDTL7HOHYLVLRQVWDWLRQ: 
 
WARE:  The Americans have bombed the information ministry.  Yet, although its signal has 
sometimes been shaky, Iraqi TV is still on the air. 
 
Do you think it was a mistake not to have taken Iraqi TV off the air straight away? 
(Or) 
CORBIN: The problem is, how do you know who the good guys are and the Bad guys?  
That's a real problem for you surely? 
 
McSPORRAN:  It is but what we're doing is we're deferring to the people that we can 
identify and particularly as with this gentleman's own case, the sort of religious leaders who 
the locals obviously respect, we found very quickly in the small villages on the outskirts of 
town that the key Ba'athist members, the people who've been responsible for enforcing the 
regime were indicated to us straightaway.   
 
CORBIN:  So people here know who the bad guys are. 
 
Journalist can take up anything between 40 and 70% of airtime in any programme (see 
coding of Gulf 1 in Appendix 2.3). Not including Panorama reporters quoting or 
summarising the points of views of others is, as discussed (see Chapter 3, 5, 6), problematic 
yet coding these contributions is, as the pre-war coding exercise shows, equally problematic. 
 
Note: coding says nothing of the quality of interviewees. Quantitative analysis does not 
account for how articulate, passionate, well-informed or qualified the interviewees are. It 
also does not account for full visual context ± for example - is the interviewee recorded in a 
studio ± SURSHUO\OLWµVPDUWO\¶GUHVVHGZLWKPLFURSKRQHDQGFOHDUO\DXGLEOHRUDUHWKH\
shouting to be heard in a demonstration, in casual clothes etc?  
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2.7: Coding for Panorama transcripts (BBC reporter/presenter contributions) 
 
   Categories are generally indicative of positions below. (Note that there are obvious examples of overlap.) 
 
Pre-invasion only 
(-19/03/03) Evidence or questions eliciting these themes, 
unless very critically framed. 
 
Code Examples 
Themes/Problem Definition:  
- 3RVLWLYHEHQHILWVRIµUHJLPHFKDQJH¶ 
- Opportunities for spreading democracy in Middle East.  
- Links between Iraq and Al Qaeda/terrorist groups.  
- Imminent risk of IraT¶V:0'FDSDELOLW\ 
 
Package:  
- Pro-war security oriented arguments; pro-war moral 
argument; pro-war legal arguments 
 
Schools of thought  
- µ1HR-FRQVHUYDWLVP¶ 
- +DZNLVKµRIILFLDO¶YLHZ 
 
Code: 1  
µVXSSRUW¶ 
MANGOLD: There's no doubt that 
qualified technicians could have 
converted the tanks and spray 
nozzles of these crop dusters into an 
horrific biological weapon, the 
technology had already been 
mastered in Baghdad.  Mohamed 
Atta paid a second visit to the 
airfield. 
 
Themes/Problem Definition:  
- ,UDT¶VSDst and present WMD capability.  
- Risk of WMD falling into terrorist hands.  
- Security threat to region and/or west.  
- 6DGGDP¶VUHJLPH¶Vduplicity, cruelty, human rights 
record (lending implicit support for invasion/war).  
- Obligation to disarm Iraq under International law 
 
Packages:  
- Pro-war security oriented arguments; pro-war moral 
argument; pro-war legal arguments 
 
Schools of thought  
- 7KHµRIILFLDO¶YLHZ 
- µ/LEHUDO+DZN¶YLHZ 
 
Code 2: 
µSDUWLDO
VXSSRUW¶ 
CORBIN: So where has Saddam got 
to in rebuilding his chemical 
weapons capability today?  He still 
has enough material to manufacture 
200 tons of VX gas in just a few 
ZHHNV$QGKH¶VJRWVHYHUDOKXQGUHG
tons of mustard gas, the choking 
DJHQWKH¶VXVHGEHIRUHSOXVVHYHUDO
thousand munitions to deliver it on 
the battlefield.   
Themes/Problem Definition:  
- Unrelated to conflict or too finely balanced between 
competing themes to code. 
- Commentary on diplomatic and political manoeuvres, 
breakthroughs, setback, splits. (strategy frame).  
- Military preparations, inevitability of war. 
 
 
Code 3 
µQHXWUDO¶ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MANGOLD: September 11th has 
renewed the struggle in the West 
between those who see Iraq's hand 
behind all Islamic fundamentalist 
terrorism, and now want a second 
front against Iraq to finish Saddam 
off, and those who say there may be 
circumstantial evidence but no 
proof, and until then he should be 
left alone.   
 
 
 
   Note: For discussion of this coding scheme see Chapter 3 (Methodology) and Chapter 6.2. 
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Themes/Problem Definition:  
- Uncertainty RYHU,UDT¶V:0'FDSDELOLW\RU Iraqi 
weapons programmes judged minimal/containable.  
- Why Iraq? (e.g. threat from North Korea greater) 
- Need to allow UN inspections to continue. 
- Arguments urging caution whilst mindful of possible 
future threat from Saddam.  
- Fears for stability in the region, US intentions towards 
other states (e.g. Syria) 
- Security threat of war, danger of Iraqi use of WMD, 
terrorist attacks and/or military quagmire/post-war 
chaos. Risk of British troop/Iraqi civilian casualties. 
- Financial cost of war. 
 
Packages:  
- Anti-war security oriented arguments; anti-war moral 
arguments; anti-war legal arguments 
 
Schools of thought  
- Anti-war realists  
- µ/LEHUDO'RYHV¶ 
Code 4 
µ3DUWLDO
RSSRVLWLRQ¶ 
 
 
CORBIN: The Chief Civil 
Servant at the MoD during the 
Gulf War was Sir Michael 
Quinlan, the man who developed 
%ULWDLQ¶VQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFH
SROLF\%XWKH¶VVFHSWLFDODERXW
the urgency of dealing with 
Saddam. 
 
 
BRADSHAW: Major General 
Patrick Cordingley is on his way 
to Westminster Abbey for 
Remembrance Sunday.  For the 
General who retired two years ago 
LW¶VWLPHWRFRQWHPSODWHWKHFRVW
of war, including another war 
against Iraq. 
 
 
Themes/Problem Definition:  
- Energy resources (oil) 
- :HVW¶VSUHYLRXVVXSSRUWIRU,UDTLUHJLPH 
- Deep scepticism of existence of WMD (judged an 
excuse for war).   
- Immorality and illegality of the war. 
- Fear of massive Iraqi casualties.  
- +\SRFULV\RI:HVW¶VDWWLWXGHWR,VUDHOL:0'FDSDFLW\
and UN resolutions on Palestinian occupied territories. 
- µ86LPSHULDOLVP¶Zarmongers/war profiteers, 
US/Israeli regional ambition DQG%ULWLVKµODSGRJ¶UROH 
- Fears of instability/civil war in the region.  
 
Packages:  
- Anti-war security oriented arguments; anti-war moral 
arguments; anti-war legal arguments 
 
Schools of thought  
- µ$QWLZDU5DGLFDOV¶ 
- Arab anti-war opinion 
Code 5 
µ2SSRVLWLRQ¶ 
 
CORBIN: Yet despite all this the 
west went on selling Saddam 
technology.  There were fat 
contracts to be had for ailing 
defence industries at home. 
 
 
BRADSHAW:  Now Iraqis fear 
their natural resources are being 
coveted by a new imperial power.  
As the US builds up its forces in 
WKH*XOI+DLIDIHDUVWKHZRUOG¶V
solo superpower is starting to 
behave like Britain before it with 
the arrogance of empire.   
 
 
Themes/Problem Definition:  
-Iraqi Government and Military perspectives e.g. Iraq 
in full compliance with UN inspections/resolutions.  
 
Package:  
- Anti-war security oriented arguments; anti-war legal 
arguments 
 
School of thought 
Official Iraqi view 
Code 6 
µOfficial Iraqi 
YLHZ¶ 
CORBIN: The West still doesn't 
seem to believe Iraq, there's still 
this feeling you're hiding 
something, that you're not really 
laying out your cards on the table. 
 
General AMER AL-SAADI 
Presidential Advisor 
Well how else can they justify 
their military build up?  They 
must portray things as not being 
satisfactory, that Iraq is holding 
back, Iraq is hiding things.  
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Pre-invasion 
period (Gulf 2)      
2.8.1: PRESENTERS and REPORTERS    
        
BIN LADEN'S BIOLOGICAL THREAT tx: 28:10:01 1   
        
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
     
           
1 786 21.62      
2 2627 72.25      
3 181 4.98      
4 42 1.16      
5 0 0.00      
6 0 0.00      
           
total 3636 100      
        
THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM tx: 23:09:02  2   
        
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
     
           
1 106 3.21      
2 2602 78.82      
3 331 10.03      
4 200 6.06      
5 62 1.88      
6 0 0      
           
total 3301 100      
        
IRAQ CRISIS INTERACTIVE  tx: 29/09/02  3   
        
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
     
           
1 15 0.19      
2 1418 17.84      
3 4036 50.77      
4 2125 26.73      
5 275 3.46      
6 80 1.01      
           
total 7949 100  (mostly composed of reporter comment) 
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SADDAM: A WARNING FROM HISTORY  tx: 03/11/02  4    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 0 0.00       
2 1,562 62.83       
3 741 29.81       
4 0 0.00       
5 183 7.36       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 2,486 100       
         
         
THE CASE AGAINST WAR  tx: 08/12/02   5    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 0 0.00       
2 75 3.06       
3 267 10.90       
4 1,952 79.71       
5 155 6.33       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 2,449 100.00       
         
         
         
TACKLING SADDAM  tx: 02/02/03    6    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 0 0.00       
2 471 6.18       
3 3,966 52.00       
4 2,921 38.30       
5 269 3.53       
6   0.00       
            
total 7,627 100.00  (mostly composed of reporter/presenter contribution) 
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CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS  tx: 09/02/03   7     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 22 0.56        
2 1,493 37.68        
3 1,759 44.40        
4 151 3.81        
5 0 0.00        
6 537 13.55        
             
total 3,962 100.00        
          
          
BUSH V SADDAM  tx: 02/03/03    8     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 150 4.74        
2 228 7.21        
3 1,743 55.12        
4 618 19.54        
5 423 13.38        
6 0 0.00        
             
total 3,162 100.00        
          
          
BLAIR'S ROAD TO WAR DEBATE  tx: 18/03/03   9     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 0 0.00        
2 60 2.61        
3 2,127 92.60        
4 98 4.27        
5 12 0.52        
6 0 0.00        
             
total 2,297 100.00        
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ALL         
total pre-invasion PRESENTERS/REPORTERS     
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 1079 2.93       (coded 1 or 2)     
2 10536 28.58 31.50 % 'pro-war'     
3 15151 41.09       
4 8107 21.99       
5 1379 3.74       (coded 4, 5 or 6)     
6 617 1.67 27.40  %'anti-war'     
            
total 36869 100.00       
         
NO DEBATES        
total pre-invasion PRESENTERS/REPORTERS     
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 914 5.77       (coded 1 or 2)     
2 8359 52.79 58.56 % 'pro-war'     
3 3279 20.71       
4 2345 14.81       
5 400 2.53       (coded 4, 5 or 6)     
6 537 3.39 20.73  %'anti-war'     
            
total 15834 100.00       
         
DEBATES ONLY        
total pre-invasion PRESENTERS/REPORTERS     
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 165 0.78       (coded 1 or 2)     
2 2177 10.35 11.13 % 'pro-war'     
3 11872 56.44       
4 5762 27.39       
5 979 4.65       (coded 4, 5 or 6)     
6 80 0.38 32.43  %'anti-war'     
            
total 21035 100.00       
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Pre-invasion Panorama presenters/reporters (all)
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
coding 1-6
%
 o
f 
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ta
l
full support
partial support
'neutral'
partial opposition
full opposition
Iraqi government
 
Pre-invasion Panorama presenters/reporters (excluding 
debates)
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1
coding 1-6
%
 o
f 
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partial support
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partial opposition
full opposition
Iraqi government
 
Pre-invasion Panorama presenters/reporters (debates 
only)
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
1
coding 1-6
%
 o
f 
to
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l
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'neutral'
partial opposition
full opposition
Iraqi government
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Pre-invasion period (Gulf 2)      
2.8.2: PARTICIPANTS/INTERVIEWEES     
         
         
BIN LADEN'S BIOLOGICAL THREAT tx: 28:10:01 1    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 170 7.00       
2 1432 58.98       
3 826 34.02       
4 0 0.00       
5 0 0.00       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 2428 100       
         
THE CASE AGAINST SADDAM tx: 23:09:02  2    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 394 12.99       
2 1845 60.85       
3 57 1.88       
4 481 15.86       
5 168 5.54       
6 87 2.87       
            
total 3032 100       
         
IRAQ CRISIS INTERACTIVE  tx: 29/09/02  3    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 47 14.73       
2 23 7.21       
3 102 31.97       
4 83 26.02       
5 64 20.06       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 319 100  (Vox pop and clips from Blair and Bush speeches) 
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SADDAM: A WARNING FROM HISTORY  tx: 03/11/02  4     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 53 2.34        
2 1,422 62.75        
3 712 31.42        
4 0 0.00        
5 0 0.00        
6 79 3.49        
             
total 2,266 100        
          
          
THE CASE AGAINST WAR  tx: 08/12/02   5     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 62 2.21        
2 0 0.00        
3 197 7.02        
4 1,357 48.33        
5 1192 42.45        
6 0 0.00        
             
total 2,808 100.00        
          
          
          
TACKLING SADDAM  tx: 02/02/03    6     
          
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
       
             
1 0 0.00        
2   0.00        
3   0.00        
4 250 91.58        
5 23 8.42        
6   0.00        
             
total 273 100.00  (only 7 brief vox pops, other contributors are reported speech) 
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CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS  tx: 09/02/03   7    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 215 7.37       
2 184 6.31       
3 1,181 40.47       
4 220 7.54       
5 39 1.34       
6 1079 36.98       
            
total 2,918 100.00       
         
         
BUSH V SADDAM  tx: 02/03/03    8    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 2021 35.15       
2 72 1.25       
3 169 2.94       
4 190 3.30       
5 3298 57.36       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 5,750 100.00       
         
         
BLAIR'S ROAD TO WAR DEBATE  tx: 18/03/03   9    
         
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
      
            
1 425 14.28       
2 575 19.31       
3 1,142 38.36       
4 728 24.45       
5 107 3.59       
6 0 0.00       
            
total 2,977 100.00       
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ALL       
total pre-invasion participants/interviewees   
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 3387 14.87       (coded 1 or 2)   
2 5553 24.39 39.26 % 'pro-war'   
3 4386 19.26     
4 3309 14.53     
5 4891 21.48       (coded 4, 5 or 6)   
6 1245 5.47 41.48  %'anti-war'   
          
Total 22771 100.00     
       
NO DEBATES      
total pre-invasion participants/interviewees   
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 894 6.65       (coded 1 or 2)   
2 4883 36.30 42.95 % 'pro-war'   
3 2973 22.10     
4 2058 15.30     
5 1399 10.40       (coded 4, 5 or 6)   
6 1245 9.26 34.95  %'anti-war'   
          
Total 13452 100.00     
       
DEBATES ONLY      
total pre-invasion participants/interviewees   
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 2493 26.75       (coded 1 or 2)   
2 670 7.19 33.94 % 'pro-war'   
3 1413 15.16     
4 1251 13.42     
5 3492 37.47       (coded 4, 5 or 6)   
6 0 0.00 50.90  %'anti-war'   
          
total 9319 100.00     
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Invasion Period (Gulf 2)     
2.8.3: PARTICIPANTS/INTERVIEWEES  
       
       
BLAIR'S WAR tx: 23:03:03   1  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 1487 34.19     
2 113 2.60     
3 633 14.56     
4 639 14.69     
5 1477 33.96     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 4349 100     
       
QUESTIONS FROM A  DIVIDED WORLD tx: 30:03:03 2  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 2394 51.42     
2 175 3.76     
3 365 7.84     
4 747 16.04     
5 975 20.94     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 4656 100     
       
THE RACE TO BAGHDAD  tx: 06/04/03  3  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 670 24.27     
2 429 15.54     
3 218 7.90     
4 941 34.08     
5 477 17.28     
6 26 0.94     
          
total 2761 100     
       
  
 
325 
 
AFTER SADDAM  tx: 13/04/03    4  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 127 11.96     
2 100 9.42     
3 71 6.69     
4 532 50.09     
5 232 21.85     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 1,062 100     
       
       
THE BATTLE FOR BASRA  tx: 27/04/03   5  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 0 0.00     
2 1,855 79.21     
3 201 8.58     
4 286 12.21     
5 0 0.00     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 2,342 100.00     
       
participants/interviewees     
total INVASION PERIOD     
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 4678 30.84       (coded 1 or 2)   
2 2672 17.61 48.45 % 'pro-war'  
3 1488 9.81     
4 3145 20.73     
5 3161 20.84       (coded 4, 5 or 6)   
6 26 0.17 41.74  %'anti-war'  
          
total 15170 100.00     
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Post-invasion period (Gulf 2)    
2.8.4: PARTICIPANTS/INTERVIEWEES  
       
       
THE WAR PARTY tx: 18:05:03   1  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 1539 37.89     
2 1225 30.16     
3 360 8.86     
4 654 16.10     
5 284 6.99     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 4062 100     
       
THE PRICE OF VICTORY tx: 28:09:03  2  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 923 25.41     
2 1573 43.30     
3 39 1.07     
4 934 25.71     
5 119 3.28     
6 45 1.24     
          
total 3633 100     
       
STILL CHASING SADDAM'S WEAPONS  tx: 23/11/03 3  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 478 13.41     
2 1520 42.65     
3 672 18.86     
4 793 22.25     
5 0 0.00     
6 101 2.83     
          
total 3564 100     
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A FIGHT TO THE DEATH  tx: 21/01/04   4  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 270 5.22     
2 1,064 20.57     
3 2,532 48.95     
4 1307 25.27     
5 0 0.00     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 5,173 100     
       
       
SADDAM ON THE RUN  tx: 28/03/04   5  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 88 2.97     
2 2,027 68.48     
3 534 18.04     
4 56 1.89     
5 0 0.00     
6 255 8.61     
          
total 2,960 100.00     
       
       
       
SHAMED  tx: 
19/05/04     6  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 0 0.00     
2 322 8.33     
3 215 5.56     
4 2,309 59.73     
5 1020 26.38     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 3,866 100.00     
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A FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE  tx: 11/07/04   7  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 662 22.61     
2 150 5.12     
3 371 12.67     
4 1,745 59.60     
5 0 0.00     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 2,928 100.00     
       
       
       
       
EXIT STRATEGY  (SIMPSON IN IRAQ) tx: 30/01/05  8  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 682 28.91     
2 710 30.10     
3 301 12.76     
4 447 18.95     
5 28 1.19     
6 191 8.10     
          
total 2,359 100.00     
       
       
IRAQ, TONY AND THE TRUTH  tx: 20/03/05   9  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 984 28.18     
2 311 8.91     
3 369 10.57     
4 1,815 51.98     
5 13 0.37     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 3,492 100.00     
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TROOPS OUT?  tx: 30/10/05    10  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 2175 32.72     
2 1,526 22.95     
3 38 0.57     
4 2,718 40.88     
5 191 2.87     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 6,648 100.00     
       
       
A GOOD KICKING  tx: /03/03    11  
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 0 0.00     
2 62 3.44     
3 112 6.21     
4 257 14.25     
5 1372 76.10     
6 0 0.00     
          
total 1,803 100.00     
       
          
          
       
ALL       
total post-
invasion participants/interviewees   
       
Code No. of 
words 
percentage 
    
          
1 7801 19.27       (coded 1 or 2)   
2 10490 25.91 45.18 % 'pro-war'  
3 5543 13.69     
4 13035 32.19     
5 3027 7.48       (coded 4, 5 or 6)   
6 592 1.46 41.13  %'anti-war'  
          
total 40488 100.00     
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2.8.5: Results for all Periods Gulf 2 
 
       
 ALL      
 total pre-invasion participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 3387 14.87       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 5553 24.39 39.26 % 'pro-war' 
 3 4386 19.26    
 4 3309 14.53    
 5 4891 21.48       (coded 4, 5 or 6)  
 6 1245 5.47 41.48  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 22771 100.00    
       
       
 ALL      
 total invasion period participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 4678 30.84       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 2672 17.61 48.45089 % 'pro-war' 
 3 1488 9.81    
 4 3145 20.73    
 5 3161 20.84       (coded 4, 5 or 6)  
 6 26 0.17 41.74028  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 15170 100.00    
       
       
 ALL      
 total post-invasion participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 7801 19.27       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 10490 25.91 45.17 % 'pro-war' 
 3 5543 13.69    
 4 13035 32.19    
 5 3027 7.48       (coded 4, 5 or 6)  
 6 592 1.46 41.13  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 40488 100.00    
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 ALL      
 GULF 2 all periods participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 15866 20.23       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 18715 23.86 44.09 % 'pro-war' 
 3 11417 14.56    
 4 19489 24.85    
 5 11079 14.13 
      (coded 4, 5 or 
6)  
 6 1863 2.38 41.35  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 78429 100.00    
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2.9 Comparison of Data and Graphs for 
Gulf 1 and 2 
 
2.9.1: Comparison of Totals (Gulf 1 and 2) 
       
 ALL      
 GULF 1 all periods participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 13087 27.60       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 14173 29.89 57.48 % 'pro-war' 
 3 5811 12.25    
 4 12790 26.97    
 5 935 1.97 
      (coded 4, 5 or 
6)  
 6 629 1.33 28.94  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 47425 100.00    
       
       
       
       
 ALL      
 GULF 2 all periods participants/interviewees  
       
 Code 
No. of 
words percentage    
       
 1 15866 20.23       (coded 1 or 2)  
 2 18715 23.86 44.09 % 'pro-war' 
 3 11417 14.56    
 4 19489 24.85    
 5 11079 14.13 
      (coded 4, 5 or 
6)  
 6 1863 2.38 41.35  %'anti-war' 
       
 total 78429 100.00    
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2.9.2: Comparison of Graphs for all Periods (Gulf 1 and 2) 
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Appendix 3 
3.1 List of Panorama Editors and key 
developments 
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Panorama Editors 
 
 
Key events Director 
General 
 
Dennis Bardens 1953-1954 
WW2 ± at the Press Office 
at The Ministry of 
Information where he was 
responsible for putting out 
propaganda material to 
confuse the enemy. 
BBC Television management's desire to have a 
regular, informative "window on the world" first 
brought Panorama to the screen in November 
1953. After a disastrous first night Panorama is re-
launched as a fortnightly topical, general-interest 
magazine programme fronted by Max Robertson. 
 
Sir Ian Jacob 
1952-59  
 
Michael Barsley 1954-1955 
Educated: Oxford 
University 
 
Hydrogen bomb debate on Panorama includes 
Bertrand Russell for CND and the Archbishop of 
York. Malcolm Muggeridge interviews Billy 
Graham. ITV is launched.   
Korean War, US Senate condemns McCarthy, 
Winston Churchill resigns and Anthony Eden 
becomes (Conservative) Prime Minister. 
 
Michael Peacock 1955-1958 
Educated: London School of 
Economics 
 
Leonard Miall gives Grace Wyndham Goldie the 
task of transforming Panorama LQWRDPRUHµKHDY\-
weight¶ current affairs programme presented by 
Richard Dimbleby. Programmes on a wide range of 
events and issues, including the Suez crisis, the 
Hungarian uprising and race and immigration in the 
8.%%&¶VTonight launched in 1956. On April 
Fool's Day, 1957, Panorama broadcast an 
apparently serious account of spaghetti harvesting 
from trees in Switzerland. Panorama is the most 
SRSXODURIWKH%%&¶VWRSSURJUDPPHVEden 
resigns following Suez controversy, Harold 
Macmillan becomes  (Conservative) PM. 
 
Rex Moorfoot 1958±1960 
5RVHWKURXJK%%&¶V<RXWK
in Training (YIT) scheme. 
Competition from Tonight and This Week eroding 
3DQRUDPD¶V previously unrivalled reputation. 
Cuban revolution.  John F Kennedy elected 
president. 
Hugh 
Carleton 
Greene 
1960-69  
 
Michael Peacock 1960±
1961 
 
$UHYLYDORIIRUWXQHVZLWK3HDFRFN¶VUHWXUQ,QWKH
early 1960s Panorama documents the passage of 
African decolonisation and the escalation of the 
Cold War. The Berlin Wall is built in 1961 and is 
visited several times by the team.  
 
Paul Fox 1961±1963 
 
Soviets win space race. Alec Douglas-Home 
becomes (Conservative) PM. 
 
David Wheeler 1964-1965 BBC 2 launched.  Robin Day reports from outside 
the court on the day Nelson Mandela and his co-
defendants are sentenced. Harold Wilson becomes 
(Labour) PM. 
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Jeremy Isaacs 1965-1967 
Educated: Oxford 
University. 
Chief executive of Channel 
4 1981-1987 
Reports on unrest in the Middle East, Vietnam, the 
civil rights movement and the space race.  
 
 
David Webster 1967-1969 
 
Israeli 6 day war. Tet offensive in Vietnam. Paris 
riots, anti-war protest in Grosvenor Square. 
 
Brian Wenham 1969-1971 
 
Ian Smith declares Rhodesia a republic.  Edward 
Heath wins in surprise election victory for 
Conservatives. 
Charles 
Curran 
1969-77  
 
Frank Smith 1971-1975 Conflict in Northern Ireland, the fall-out from the 
oil crisis and continuing industrial conflict between 
the government and unions were recurring domestic 
themes. In 1974 Harold Wilson becomes (Labour) 
PM and David Dimbleby joins Panorama. 
 
Peter Pagnamenta 1975-
1977 
 
Reports on the drawn-out ending of the Vietnam 
War, Britain's involvement in the European 
Economic Community, Cold War espionage and 
the growth of international terrorist groups like the 
Red Army Faction. James Callaghan becomes 
(Labour) PM in 1976. 
 
 
Christopher Capron 1977-79 
 
President  Jimmy Carter elected. Israeli troops 
leave southern Lebanon.  Margaret Thatcher 
elected (Conservative) PM in 1979. 
Ian 
Trethowan 
1977-82 
Roger Bolton 1979-1981 
Educated: Liverpool 
University 
 
)ODNRYHUµ&DUULFNPRUHLQFLGHQW¶6DFNLQJDQGWKHQ
reinstatement of Bolton as Editor. 
 
George Carey 1981-1983 Domestic films on Mrs Thatcher's reforming 
economic and social policies, the Falklands War 
and the Miners' Strike. Flak over Panorama¶V 
)DONODQG¶VFRYHUDJH 
 
Alasdair 
Milne 
1982-87 
Peter Ibbotson 1983-1985 
 
Panorama charts the ongoing problems in the 
Middle East. 1982 saw the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war spanned almost the 
whole decade. Panorama addresses US covert 
operations in Central America. 
 
David Dickinson 1985-1987  
Educated: Cambridge 
University. Born Dublin 
now an author 
Mikhail Gorbachev Calls for Glasnost and 
Perestroika. Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, U.S. 
Bombs Libya.   
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Key events: sources BBC Panorama website; Lindley 2003a%%&µ2QWKLVGD\¶timeline; 
BUFVC Panorama Project Database. 
 
Tim Gardam 1987-1990  
Educated Cambridge 
University.  Head of Current 
Affairs 1993-96. 
Appointed to Ofcom Board 
2008. 
U.S shoots down Iranian jetliner. Lockerbie 
bombing. Fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning 
of the collapse of Communism in Europe. 
Tiananmen Square massacre. 
 
Michael 
Checkland 
1987-92 
Mark Thompson 1990-1992 
Educated: Oxford 
University.  
BBC Director General 
(2004-) 
 
Mrs Thatcher resigns. John Major becomes 
(Conservative) PM. First Gulf War (Desert Storm), 
reunification of Germany, the break-up of the 
Soviet Union and the Balkan wars, the release of 
1HOVRQ0DQGHODWKHHQGRI6RXWK$IULFD¶V 
apartheid regime. 
 
Glenwyn Benson 1992-1994 
Educated: Cambridge 
University, Harvard and the 
Charles University, Prague. 
Came from LWT with Birt. 
Controller, Factual 
Television 2003-2006 
Black Wednesday. The Rwandan genocide. Anti-
European Union wrangles and recession. 
Conservative Party voted out after 18 years, New 
Labour win landslide victory.  
John Birt 
1992-2000 
Steve Hewlett 1994-1997 
Educated: The University of 
Manchester 
 
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Princess of 
Wales interview with Martin Bashir is watched by 
22.8 million viewers in which she discusses her 
adultery, depression and bulimia, her children, the 
media and the future of the monarchy in candid 
detail. 
 
Peter Horrocks 1997-2000  
Head of Television News 
2005 
The IRA ceasefire leading to the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement. U.S. President Clinton 
Impeached. NATO Attacks Serbia. John Ware 
UHSRUWVIURP1RUWKHUQ,UHODQGLQµ:KR%RPEHG
2PDJK"¶'HYROXWLRQWR6FRWODQGDQG:DOHV 
 
Greg Dyke 
2000-2004 
Mike Robinson 2000±2006 
 
9-11; Invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq; London 
bombings. 
Mark 
Thompson 
2004- 
Sandy Smith March 2006 ± 
2009 formerly Watchdog 
 
Move to Monday 8.30 primetime slot from 2007. 
Programme reduced to 30 minutes.  Tony Blair 
steps down and Gordon Brown becomes (Labour) 
PM. Banking and financial crisis. 
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